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INTRODUCTION 
A. The Object of the Study 
The study focuses on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea1 
(hereinafter LOSC) regime of straits, since this represents the only universal 
treaty on the legal regime of straits.2 The extension of the width of the territorial 
sea up to 12 nautical miles (hereinafter miles) under Article 3 of the LOSC 
entailed a progressive development of the international legal framework on 
straits. Part III of the LOSC serves as the cornerstone for the current law on the 
sophisticated legal categories of these natural narrow sea passages. 
The most innovative legal concept in Part III of the LOSC is the regime of 
transit passage. It applies to straits that connect two parts of an exclusive economic 
zone (hereinafter EEZ) or the high seas (Article 37 of the LOSC). Part III of the 
LOSC also codified the rules of innocent passage in straits. The right of innocent 
passage is applied to two types of straits. First, it includes straits that connect the 
high seas or an EEZ with the territorial sea of a foreign State (Article 45(1)(b) of the 
LOSC). Second, it encompasses straits where the transit passage does not apply, 
since they are formed by an island of a State bordering the strait (hereinafter strait 
State) and its mainland and there exists a route seaward of the island through the 
high seas or through an EEZ of similar convenience with respect to navigational 
and hydrographical characteristics (Article 45(1)(a) of the LOSC). 
Since the legal framework of transit and innocent passage encroaches on the 
sovereignty of the strait State it otherwise enjoys in its internal waters and ter-
ritorial sea, Part III of the LOSC also stipulates certain narrowly construed 
exceptions to the applicability of these straits regimes. Those exceptions apply 
to another three types of straits. Straits through which passage has already been 
regulated by a long-standing international convention are excluded from the 
LOSC regime on transit and innocent passage (Article 35(c) of the LOSC). 
Likewise, straits comprising long-standing internal waters (Article 35(a) of the 
LOSC) and straits through which there is a high seas route or which are crossed 
by an EEZ (Articles 35(b) and 36 of the LOSC) are not affected by the strait 
regime of transit or innocent passage. 
The six above-mentioned main legal classifications of straits in addition to a 
potentially distinct category of sui generis straits (Article 311(2) of the LOSC) 
and non-international straits3 form the object of this study. Due to its geograph-
ical scope, the study is not concerned with archipelagic sea lanes passage (Arti-
cle 53 of the LOSC; applies to archipelagic States, e.g. Indonesia or the Philip-
pines) which is functionally, however, grosso modo equivalent to the transit 
passage in straits and forms another exception to the applicability of the transit 
                                                                          
1  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay 10.12.1982, e.i.f. 
16.11.1994. 
2  See e.g. R. Palmer Cundick. International Straits: The Right of Access. – 5 Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 1975, pp. 117, 121–124. 
3  See infra section 1.1 of Part I. 
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or non-suspendable innocent passage regimes in straits. Likewise, the poten-
tially distinct category of ice-covered straits (Article 234 of the LOSC) is not 
directly relevant for the purposes of this study, although due to conceptual rea-
sons its potential theoretical foundations are also discussed.4 
In order to reflect on the legal classification of straits as comprehensively as 
possible, the present study is limited in geographical scope. It concerns the 
Estonian Straits5 in the north-eastern part of the Baltic Sea that are situated in 
the Gulf of Finland and in the Gulf of Riga, since the author is most aware of 
their legal, historical and geographical context. The Estonian Straits include the 
Viro Strait in the Gulf of Finland,6 the Irbe Strait in the Gulf of Riga and the Sea 
of Straits in the western Estonian archipelago. Albeit the Viro Strait is also bor-
dered by the Finnish coast and the Irbe Strait by the Latvian coast, the common 
denominator of the above-referred straits is that their strait State is or includes 
Estonia.7 Thus, the term Estonian Straits is above all a geographical notion. 
In the course of the study, parallels with other straits of the world, in partic-
ular in the Baltic Sea, are drawn where appropriate. The Estonian Straits have 
also been chosen as the primary object of this study for the exceptional reason 
that they enable to examine within a clearly defined geographical and legal 
dimension the interrelations of all the main legal categories of straits (as identi-
fied above) due to their potential application to the Estonian Straits on the basis 
of their legal and geographical characteristics. 
 
 
B. Research Task and Central Postulates 
Albeit the six main legal categories of straits fall under distinct legal regimes, 
they nevertheless are far from isolated from each other. As this study aims to 
demonstrate, they are inextricably linked in that in most cases, the category of a 
strait is potentially subject to alteration. Due to a change in circumstances, a 
strait that first is covered by one passage regime may become subject to a dif-
ferent passage regime. In most cases, this depends primarily on whether the 
strait States intend to apply the regime of transit or innocent passage to the ships 
and aircraft transiting the strait. Once the decision has been made, it is also 
reversible. Prima facie the strait States may shift the legal regime applicable to 
a strait by having, in most cases, the possibility to give effect to the above-
                                                                          
4  See infra section 2.2 of Part I. 
5  The author is not aware of any prior use of the term Estonian Straits in legal literature. 
6  The term Viro Strait has not been used before. Instead, this maritime area has been 
referred to as the Passage through the Gulf of Finland, Entrance to the Gulf of Finland 
or simply Gulf of Finland since it is not commonly acknowledged that this natural 
narrow sea passage forms a strait legally. In this study the term Viro Strait has been 
adopted primarily for reasons of precision and clarity – so as to draw a clear distinction 
between the Viro Strait and the Gulf of Finland proper. 
7  Similarly, the Danish Straits include the Øresund which is bordered by the Danish as 
well as Swedish coasts. 
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referred exceptions to the applicability of the transit or innocent passage regime. 
This implies a certain volatility in the classification of straits. 
In addition, since the exact legal categorisation of straits depends above all 
on legal nuances, the discovery of new legal circumstances may warrant an 
unanticipated exception to the applicability of the transit or innocent passage 
regime in a strait. The relevant circumstances may be difficult to discover and 
might spring up in unexpected ways, as this study also exemplifies. Thus, as 
will be subsequently demonstrated, general monographs on the legal classifica-
tion of international straits of the world may not always be exact since they fail 
to discuss all the necessary details for specific straits. The exact legal classifica-
tion of straits is necessary since inaccuracies in this field may lead to further 
confusion or conflict over the applicable passage rights. 
The objective of the present study is to establish the interrelations between 
the afore-referred six main categories of straits as well as the potentially distinct 
category of sui generis straits and, in the course of that, provide legal classifica-
tions for the straits in the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga. The problem lies 
in ascertaining the main legal circumstances that serve as the basis for such 
interrelations. The hypothesis of this study is that such legal circumstances 
comprise the outer limits of maritime zones and maritime boundary delimita-
tion, long-standing international conventions on straits, the maritime zones of 
the strait State (prima facie its domestic law on internal waters) as well as the 
concept of State continuity. 
The importance of nearly all of these factors for the legal regime of straits is 
underlined in Part III of the LOSC on the legal framework on straits. Only such 
legal factors as maritime boundary delimitation and State continuity are not 
expressly referred to in the text of Part III of the LOSC. However, both the legal 
literature and the case law suggest the relevance of navigational factors in 
delimiting the territorial sea.8 The legal regime of straits is of great importance for 
navigation and thus may serve as one of such legal circumstances which may 
influence the final course of the maritime boundary. Likewise, references to long-
standing treaties and domestic law of the strait State on its internal waters in Part III 
of the LOSC imply the potential relevance of the concept of State continuity for 
giving effect to the exceptions to the strait regime of transit or innocent passage. 
The author aims to determine whether these factors singled out above (not 
forming a closed list) have significance for the legal classification of straits by 
providing grounds for effectuating the exceptions to the applicability of the 
transit or non-suspendable innocent passage regime,  mostly at the discretion of 
the strait State(s). The author is not aware of any previous general studies on 
such interrelations of the legal categories of straits. It follows from the fore-
going that the study also purports to demonstrate how the legal regime of straits 
may be intertwined with the domestic law, maritime delimitation law and the 
law of treaties. 
                                                                          
8  See e.g. Y. Tanaka. Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation. 
Oxford/Portland/Oregon: Hart 2006, pp. 314–319. 
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C. Methodology and Sources of the Research 
The study is not limited to the interpretation of the LOSC and other inter-
national treaties on the basis of the relevant case law. Its primary sources in-
clude equally important archival materials, domestic law and maps of the rele-
vant strait States – Estonia, Finland and Latvia as well as non-strait States like 
the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. With the exception of Part I of the study, 
legal literature is supplementary for interpreting the above-mentioned primary 
sources. Notably, previous studies with a focus on the legal regime of the Esto-
nian Straits are lacking. 
It follows from the foregoing that the study uses mostly analytical and com-
parative legal methods for interpreting the relevant international law as well as 
Estonian, Finnish and Latvian domestic law on the legal regime of straits. The 
analysis occasionally departs from the lex lata and includes suggestions from 
the perspective of de lege ferenda where appropriate. 
Since the legal classification of the Estonian Straits together with the study 
of the maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Riga requires the estab-
lishment of the facts of the past and focusing on the historical treaties, historical 
maps, long-annulled domestic laws of the strait States and other archival mate-
rials, the research also follows the historical method. In particular, in the field of 
the legal regime of straits and maritime boundary delimitation, the LOSC makes 
explicit references to history by employing the concepts of historic bays (Article 
10(6) of the LOSC), historic titles (Article 15 of the LOSC), long-standing 
international conventions (Article 35(c) of the LOSC) and long-standing inter-
nal waters (Articles 8(2) and 35(a) of the LOSC). The historical method is used 
mainly for determining whether these concepts are applicable in the case of 
Estonian Straits. 
 
 
D. Structure of the Research 
The study comprises five parts. In the first part, the conclusions of various 
authors on the legal categories of straits are discussed with the aim of estab-
lishing whether there exists a uniform understanding on the legal classification 
of straits in legal literature. A differentiation is made between scholars on the 
basis of whether they adopt a traditional or liberal approach towards Part III of 
the LOSC. 
The traditional approach follows legal positivism in that the authors stick to 
the text of Part III of the LOSC in categorising straits. The liberal approach, on 
the other hand, adopts such determinants for the legal classification of straits 
which do not directly follow from Part III of the LOSC. Notably, in discussing 
the types of straits as systematised by the various authors, a harmonised use of 
terms is used regarding the legal catalogue of straits. This use of terms may not 
always coincide with the terminology used by other authors.  
15 
In some instances a term is used for a particular legal category of straits 
which might never have been used before in the legal literature in this context 
(e.g. straits comprising long-standing internal waters, sui generis straits, ice-
covered straits). This is due to the need of maintaining a certain degree of con-
sistency throughout the text and for guiding the reader in the sophisticated con-
tent of the catalogue of straits. Specific references are made after the titles of 
different types of straits to the relevant provisions of the LOSC which provide 
their legal basis. 
The first part then proceeds with examining the most disputable categories of 
straits, over which there is most disagreement in the legal literature. At that 
stage, the study does not focus on the legal categories of straits that have not 
raised any substantial controversy in the legal literature. Such types of straits are 
scrutinised in detail in other parts of the study. Finally, the principal legal 
instruments which serve as the means for altering the legal categories of straits 
are established in the first part of the study. 
In the next four parts of the study, nearly all of such determinants of the 
legal categories of straits are studied in detail. It is established how the coastal 
States of the Gulf of Finland and Gulf of Riga have altered and may further alter 
the legal categories of straits regimes which are potentially applicable to the 
Estonian Straits. In the course of this, the focus lies on establishing the signifi-
cance of the outer limits of maritime zones, long-standing international conven-
tions, sui generis legal regimes, as well as the concept of State continuity, 
domestic law on the internal waters and the maritime boundary delimitation for 
the Estonian Straits. 
The study on the Viro Strait in Part IV and chapter 2 of Part III aims at 
determining the interrelations between five types of straits: straits linking two 
parts of an EEZ, straits that connect an EEZ with the territorial sea of a foreign 
State, straits through which passage has already been regulated by a long-
standing international convention, sui generis straits as well as straits through 
which runs an EEZ. In this context, particular emphasis lies on scrutinising the 
passage rights of foreign ships and aircraft in the Viro Strait under the various 
potentially applicable legal regimes. 
The study on the legal regime of the passages of the Gulf of Riga in Part V 
and chapter 1 of Part III concerns the legal classification of the Irbe Strait and 
the Sea of Straits. The passages to the Gulf of Riga are used to establish the 
potential interrelations between five legal categories of straits, all of which are 
potentially applicable to the Irbe Strait and the Sea of Straits: straits linking two 
parts of an EEZ, straits that connect an EEZ with the territorial sea of a foreign 
State, straits comprising long-standing internal waters, straits which include an 
EEZ corridor as well as straits where transit passage does not apply since they 
are formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland and there 
exists seaward of the island a route through the high seas or through an EEZ of 
similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical character-
istics. In this context, the maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Riga is 
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examined in Part II of the study for ascertaining whether it has had an impact on 
the legal classification of the Irbe Strait and the Sea of Straits.  
Finally, the study ends with a conclusion on the significance of the main 
determinants of the legal categories of straits for the classification of the Esto-
nian Straits. This concerns the outer limits of maritime zones, maritime bound-
ary delimitation, long-standing international conventions, domestic law on 
internal waters, sui generis strait regimes and the concept of State continuity. It 
departs at times from the narrow geographical confines of the Estonian Straits 
as it purports to reflect also the universal interconnections between the legal 
regimes of straits.  
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PART I. THE LEGAL CATEGORIES OF STRAITS 
1. Interpretation of the Legal Categories  
of Straits under the LOSC 
1.1. The Definition of Strait 
Part III of the LOSC provides a legal framework for straits used for inter-
national navigation from which the legal categories of straits can also be 
inferred. Generally, the term strait is understood to mean a natural narrow sea 
passage which connects two larger areas of water. In essence, this is a geo-
graphical definition. A clear legal definition of a strait is missing. 
For the purposes of the present study, strait means any international or non-
international strait. These terms are not used in the LOSC. The LOSC refers to 
straits used for international navigation which is not synonymous with either 
international straits or non-international straits. It is important to distinguish 
between them mainly because, in contrast to international straits, international 
vessel traffic is not safeguarded under Part III (and Part IV) of the LOSC in 
non-international straits. 
Under the systematic interpretation of the LOSC, one may consider inter-
national straits as such natural sea passages that connect two larger maritime 
areas and which are not more than 24 miles wide9 as measured from coast to 
coast or from baseline to baseline and which are due to the applicable legal 
regime different from non-international straits. As an additional criterion, an 
international strait needs to be used for international navigation, the magnitude 
of which is essentially irrelevant.10 
Therefore, straits which could in all other aspects be categorised as inter-
national straits but fail to meet this functional criterion of actual vessel traffic 
are non-international straits. Non-international straits also include straits that are 
located either in long-standing internal waters where the passage rights of for-
eign ships and aircraft are not internationally safeguarded under Part III of the 
LOSC (Article 35(a) of the LOSC) or in such territorial sea in respect of which 
none of the legal regimes of international straits applies (consequently, the ordi-
nary regime of suspendable innocent passage applies (Article 17 of the LOSC)). 
                                                                          
9  This follows from Article 35(b) of the LOSC according to which nothing in Part III of 
the LOSC affects the legal status of the waters beyond the territorial seas of strait States 
as EEZs or high seas. It should be noted, however, that if the EEZ or high seas belt cross-
ing such maritime area is very narrow (prima facie less than couple of miles wide) and, 
due to its characteristics, is not convenient for shipping, then this narrow passage would 
still meet the legal characteristics of a strait and fall under Part III of the LOSC (Article 
36 of the LOSC). Nonetheless, it is a purely hypothetical possibility and, in practice, 
highly unlikely. Other than that, the narrow passages which exceed the 24-mile limit 
should not be considered as straits legally (unlike geographically, by custom etc). 
10  Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 28. 
See further e.g. S. N. Nandan, D. H. Anderson. Straits Used for International Navigation: 
A Commentary on Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982. – 60 The British Yearbook of International Law 1989(1), pp. 167–169. 
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Due to its functional scope, the definition straits used for international navi-
gation as used in Part III of the LOSC thus embraces most legal categories of 
non-international straits and all international straits. Analogously to the above-
mentioned legal types of non-international straits, international straits also fall 
under distinct legal categories. Most of them provide for either transit or non-
suspendable innocent passage regimes. These passage regimes are only applica-
ble in international straits. 
 
 
1.2. The Regimes of Transit and Non-Suspendable Innocent Passage 
The aim of establishing the right of transit passage in the LOSC was to guaran-
tee a regime of passage in the strategically important international straits similar 
to that of the freedom of navigation and overflight. These freedoms had gener-
ally been applicable in such straits but that state of affairs was jeopardised by 
the prospective extension of the maximum width of the territorial sea under the 
LOSC from the generally recognised 3 miles to 12 miles. In the context of the 
adoption of the LOSC, its Part III on the legal regime of straits has thus been 
considered by one of its drafters even as “by far the single most important issue 
at the Conference”.11 
As a consequence of a package deal in connection with the extension of the 
outer limits of territorial sea, the right of transit passage guarantees under Arti-
cle 38(2) of the LOSC the freedom of navigation and overflight in international 
straits that are located in the territorial sea and are used for navigating from one 
part of the high seas or an EEZ to another. The extension of the breadth of the 
territorial sea to 12 miles and the establishment of the right of transit passage 
under the LOSC are hence inseparably connected.12 
Ships, including submarines, may transit a strait in their normal mode under 
the right of transit passage. This means that submarines, for example, enjoy the 
right of submerged continuous and expeditious passage in a strait. By contrast, 
in innocent passage submarines and other underwater vehicles are required, 
pursuant to Article 20 of the LOSC, to navigate on the surface and to show their 
flag.13 In addition, foreign aircraft enjoy the freedom of overflight in transit 
                                                                          
11  S. N. Nandan. The Provisions on Straits Used for International Navigation in the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. – 2 Singapore Journal of International 
& Comparative Law 1998, p. 393. 
12  See R. B. McNees. Freedom of Transit through International Straits. – 6 Journal of Mari-
time Law and Commerce 1975, pp. 183-188, 210. See also, e.g. S. Mahmoudi. Custom-
ary International Law and Transit Passage. – 20 Ocean Development and International 
Law 1989(2), p. 163. See also Nandan, Anderson, op. cit., p. 179. 
13  During the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, many strait States 
anticipated to establish in the draft LOSC that submarines have to navigate on the 
surface also while in transit passage, but as a result of the negotiations, such proposals 
were withdrawn by 1977. See D. D. Caron. The Great Straits Debate: The Conflict, 
Debate, and Compromise that Shaped the Straits Articles of the 1982 United Nations 
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passage, which, by comparison, is not applicable for aircraft under the frame-
work of innocent passage. Maritime States also safeguard their right to launch 
and land aircraft or use formation steaming in transit passage.14 
Distinct from the extensive requirements applicable to innocent passage 
under Article 21 of the LOSC, ships and aircraft in transit passage need to fol-
low only a few conditions. Of those, the primary requirement stems from Arti-
cle 39 of the LOSC which provides that transit passage needs to be continuous 
and expeditious while ships and aircraft need to refrain from any activities other 
than those incidental to their normal mode of continuous and expeditious 
transit, unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress. It is also pro-
hibited to carry out any research or survey activities without the prior authori-
sation of strait States in transit passage (Article 40 of the LOSC).15  
Unlike the general innocent passage, the strait State cannot temporarily sus-
pend transit passage or non-suspendable innocent passage in straits for the pro-
tection of its security or due to inter alia military exercises. However, on the 
basis of customary international law, this does not exclude the possibility of 
adopting immediate, proportionate and necessary measures against foreign ships 
or aircraft to counter a foreign State’s attack.16 
Safeguards with respect to international straits are stipulated in Article 233 
of the LOSC. It provides that the strait State(s) may take appropriate enforce-
ment measures by giving effect to applicable international regulations regarding 
the discharge of noxious substances (e.g. oil, oily wastes) if violation of the 
laws and regulations on the safety of navigation, the regulation of maritime 
traffic or the prevention, reduction and control of pollution in the strait is caus-
ing or threatening major damage to the marine environment of the straits. Yet in 
practice, States have the right to adopt such measures only in exceptional 
cases.17 
The strait regimes of transit passage and non-suspendable innocent passage 
have thus been clearly distinguished in the LOSC.18 However, Part III of the 
LOSC does not present a clear list of the legal categories of straits, on the basis 
of which straits may be made subject to a particular type of passage regime. In 
practice, this complicates the exact legal categorisation of straits. It is important 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Convention on the Law of the Sea. – D. D. Caron, N. Oral (eds). Navigating Straits: 
Challenges for International Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2014, p. 26. 
14  B. H. Oxman. Transit of Straits and Archipelagic Waters by Military Aircraft. – Singa-
pore Journal of International & Comparative Law 2000(4), pp. 403–404. 
15  At the same time, it is argued that the use of radar and sonar during transit passage is 
permitted. N. Klein. Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2011, p. 34. 
16  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, para 194–195. Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 226, para 41. 
17  J. M. Van Dyke. Rights and Responsibilities of Straits States. – Caron, Oral (eds), op. 
cit., pp. 40–41.  
18  The differences between the two passage regimes are examined in greater detail below in 
the course of this study. 
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to establish the applicable legal category to a particular strait accurately because 
this determines the passage rights of foreign ships and aircraft as well as the 
rights and duties of strait State(s) in the relevant maritime area. As examined 
next, the conclusions made in the legal literature on the catalogue of the legal 
categories of straits have not been uniform. 
 
 
1.3. The Classification of Straits: Traditional Approach 
The traditional approach towards the classification of straits is characterised by 
staying within the confines of the legal categories of straits as provided in Part 
III of the LOSC. In this view the legal categories of straits as stipulated in Part 
III of the LOSC are exhaustive. Hence, this approach omits any other legal cat-
egories of straits not explicitly mentioned in Part III of the LOSC. Thus, its 
potential inter-linkages with the other parts of the LOSC are ignored. 
There appears to be a few authors who approach the legal classification of 
straits traditionally. For example, in their catalogue of straits, Satya N. Nandan 
and David H. Anderson distinguish between six legal categories of straits:19 
1. Straits which link two parts of an EEZ or the high seas (Article 37); 
2. Straits which are regulated by long-standing international conventions 
(Article 35(c)); 
3. Straits which are formed by an island of a strait State and its mainland 
coast (Article 38(1)); 
4. Straits which connect an EEZ or the high seas with the territorial sea of 
a foreign State (Article 45(1)(b)); 
5. Straits which include an EEZ or the high seas corridor (Article 36); 
6. Straits not used for international navigation. 
 
In addition, Nandan and Anderson note that straits which are located in the 
archipelagic waters are subject to Part IV of the LOSC (on the archipelagic 
States).20 Notably, their list explicitly includes straits not used for international 
navigation which are not referred to as a distinct legal category of straits by 
many (if not most) other authors. Yet it is inherent in the legal regime of straits 
that such straits do not fall under the scope of Part III of the LOSC which 
begins in its Article 34(1) by stating that this part establishes the regime of pas-
sage (only) through straits used for international navigation. Since many other 
authors refer in their catalogues of the legal categories of straits only to straits 
used for international navigation, it is hereinafter tacitly understood that they 
deem straits not used for international navigation as falling under a separate 
legal regime. For example, Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe also argue for 
the existence of the afore-referred (first) five distinct Part III-categories of 
                                                                          
19  Nandan, Anderson, op. cit., p. 165. 
20  Ibid, pp. 165–166. 
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straits,21 without explicitly claiming the apparently obvious fact that straits not 
used for international navigation form a separate category of straits.22 
This list of five legal categories of straits is also shared by Donald Rothwell 
and Tim Stephens.23 In addition, Rothwell and Stephens refer to straits in the 
archipelagic waters where the archipelagic sea lanes passage applies (Article 
53). They do not expressly include this in their list as a distinct legal category of 
straits.24 Neither do Churchill and Lowe as well as Nandan and Anderson.25 
Nevertheless, systematically, the five authors seem to associate the Article 53-
regime with straits. Rothwell and Stephens, as well as Churchill and Lowe, also 
omit in their catalogue such straits which comprise long-standing internal 
waters (Article 35(a) of the LOSC). They do not make any other reference to 
this provision in the context of the legal categories of straits. In comparison, 
although Nandan and Anderson neither refer to Article 35(a)-type of straits, 
they still interpret the said provision, albeit in a different context. They claim 
that Article 35(a) might affect some maritime areas in a particular strait but 
apparently do not find that this provision could affect the legal regime of a par-
ticular strait in toto.26 
Rothwell and Stephens take a relatively liberal stance towards Article 35(c) 
of the LOSC as they do not restrict its applicability only to such straits that have 
been generally recognised as falling under its scope. Instead, Rothwell and 
Stephens also refer to the Torres Strait and the Strait of Tiran as potentially fall-
ing under the Article 35(c)-exception “if the treaties which regulate those straits 
remain operative and are respected not only by the parties themselves but by 
other user states.”27 
Jon Van Dyke, on the other hand, refers only to the first four types of above-
listed straits.28 Van Dyke maintains the safety clause “at least” (four types of 
straits) prior to outlining the categories of straits.29 He does not explicitly men-
tion straits in the archipelagic waters where archipelagic sea lanes passage 
applies (Article 53 of the LOSC) as a distinct legal category of straits. Addi-
tionally, he abstains from making a reference to straits comprising long-stand-
ing internal waters (Article 35(a) of the LOSC). These omissions also charac-
                                                                          
21  R. R. Churchill, A. V. Lowe. The Law of the Sea. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press 1992, pp. 90–94. 
22  On the straits not used for international navigation, see supra section 1.1 of Part I. 
23  D. R. Rothwell, T. Stephens. The International Law of the Sea. Oxford/Portland/Oregon: 
Hart 2010, pp. 237–238. D. R. Rothwell, T. Stephens. The International Law of the Sea. 
Oxford/Portland/Oregon: Hart 2016, p. 253. In an earlier article Rothwell also refers to 
these five types of straits. See D. R. Rothwell. International Straits and UNCLOS: An 
Australian Case Study. – 23 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 1992(3), pp. 467–469. 
24  Rothwell, Stephens 2010, op. cit., pp. 250–251. Rothwell, Stephens 2016, op. cit., p. 270. 
25  See Churchill, Lowe, op. cit., p. 90. Nandan, Anderson, op. cit., p. 165. 
26  See Nandan, Anderson, op. cit., pp. 173–174. 
27  Rothwell, Stephens 2010, op. cit., p. 238. Rothwell, Stephens 2016, op. cit., p. 254. On 
this matter, see also infra section 3 of Part I. 
28  Van Dyke 2014, op. cit., pp. 33–34. 
29  Ibid, p. 33. 
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terise the catalogue of straits as listed by Churchill and Lowe, Rothwell and 
Stephens, Nandan and Anderson. 
Likewise, Janusz Symonides omits straits in the archipelagic waters from his 
list. In addition, he does not refer to straits that connect an EEZ or the high seas 
with the territorial sea of a foreign State (Article 45(1)(b)). Unlike other above-
mentioned authors, he lists straits in internal waters where the strait State main-
tains freedom of transit regulation as a distinct category of “local straits” (pre-
sumably in reference to Article 35(a) of the LOSC). The other four categories of 
straits included in Symonides’ list are Article 37, 35(c), 38(1), and 36-types of 
straits (mentioned above).30 
However, as examined next, the LOSC potentially allows distinguishing 
between additional legal categories of straits that are not mentioned above. The 
existence of such additional legal categories of straits is based on a systematic 
interpretation of the LOSC. Therefore, this approach towards the classification 
of straits is not traditional, as it embraces the interlinkages between the various 
parts of the LOSC. This approach, in combination with State practice, may also 
indicate the existence of such legal categories of straits that do not originate 
from Part III of the LOSC. 
 
 
1.4. The Classification of Straits: Liberal Approach 
It is characteristic for the liberal approach to add some categories of straits to 
the ones explicitly provided in Part III of the LOSC. There are many reasons 
why authors may depart from the text of Part III of the LOSC when categorising 
straits. This may be done intentionally or mistakenly. In the latter instance, the 
writer’s intention may not necessarily be that of adopting a liberal approach and 
it thus should not be considered as such. Such practices include the incomplete 
classification of the legal categories of straits, e.g. open-ended lists. Neverthe-
less, by enlisting only some selected legal categories of straits, the author inev-
itably downplays the importance of the ones left unnoticed. 
In The Regime of Straits in International Law, Bing Bing Jia appears to have 
deliberately not delved into the positivist classification of straits. His mono-
graph lacks a clear list of categories for straits. Instead, he examines other 
determinants of an international strait, such as their geographical criteria (e.g. 
straits between internal waters and the high seas, straits between the territorial 
sea and the high seas, straits between parts of the high seas) and the criterion of 
use for international navigation.  
However, Jia’s study also includes elements of positivist classification, e.g. 
in examining special regimes of passage under long-standing treaties (Article 
35(c) of the LOSC) and the regime of transit passage (Article 37 of the LOSC). 
Perhaps one of his most liberal assertions is that of the existence of a separate 
category of straits comprising historic waters, which he appears to distinguish 
                                                                          
30  J. Symonides. Freedom of Navigation in International Straits. – 17 Polish Yearbook of 
International Law 1988, p. 215. 
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from straits comprising long-standing internal waters under Article 35(a) of the 
LOSC.31 In a recent article, however, Jia essentially merges his assertion of the 
existence of historic straits with the Article 35(a)-exception on straits compris-
ing long-standing internal waters.32 
Another author who asserts the existence of historic straits is Ana López 
Martín. In her monograph titled International Straits: Concept, Classification 
and Rules of Passage, the author interprets Article 35(a) of the LOSC liberally 
by coming to the conclusion that the applicability of this category of straits rests 
on the condition of historic entitlements which, if existent, leads to the strait 
being categorised as a historic strait.33 In total, López Martín presents in her 
catalogue eight types of straits: 
1. Straits which link two parts of an EEZ or the high seas (Article 37); 
2. Straits which are regulated by long-standing international conventions 
(Article 35(c)); 
3. Straits which are formed by an island of a strait State and its mainland 
coast (Article 38(1)); 
4. Straits which connect an EEZ or the high seas with the territorial sea of 
a foreign State (Article 45(1)(b)); 
5. Straits in archipelagic waters (Article 53); 
6. Straits which include an EEZ or high seas corridor (Article 36); 
7. Historic straits (Article 35(a)); 
8. Straits regulated by a treaty compatible with the LOSC (Article 311(2)). 
 
As examined below, the interpretation of Article 35(a) of the LOSC in a way 
which centres on the concept of historic straits is not wholly in line with 
the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context and in the light of the pro-
vision’s object and purpose.34 In addition, among López Martín’s other liberal 
assertions is the existence of the Article 311(2)-category of straits as it is not 
explicitly provided for in the text of Part III of the LOSC. According to Article 
311(2), the LOSC does not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties 
which arise from other agreements compatible with the LOSC and which do not 
affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of 
their obligations under the LOSC. López Martín thus notes that 
 
“[A] treaty which specifically regulates the passage through a determined strait 
will be applicable on condition that its provisions are compatible with those of 
the [LOSC] and the rights and obligations in Part III are not affected. That is to 
say, if the treaty contains a regime of passage for this strait which is more liberal 
                                                                          
31  B. B. Jia. The Regime of Straits in International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998,  
pp. 8–9, 75–76. See also infra section 2.1 of Part I. 
32  B. B. Jia. The Northwest Passage: An Artificial Waterway Subject to a Bilateral Treaty 
Regime. – 44 Ocean Development & International Law 2013(2), pp. 125, 127. 
33  A. G. López Martín. International Straits: Concept, Classification and Rules of Passage. 
Heidelberg/Dordrecht/London/New York: Springer 2010, p. 70.  
34  See infra section 2.1 of Part I. 
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than the one which would correspond by applying the relevant provisions in Part 
III, then this treaty is applicable.”35 
 
The existence of the category of straits regulated by a treaty compatible with the 
LOSC (hereinafter sui generis straits) is scrutinised below.36 Yet, unlike the 
other authors, López Martín also interprets Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC liber-
ally as she comes to the conclusion that this provision, which applies the regime 
of non-suspendable innocent passage to straits that connect an EEZ or the high 
seas with the territorial sea of a foreign State, may be applied to all so-called 
dead-end straits37 leading to a territorial sea of a State, including to the territo-
rial sea of one of the strait States.38 
In their monograph The Legal Regime of Straits, Hugo Caminos and Vincent 
Cogliati-Bantz do not provide a clear, concise and exhaustive list of the legal 
categories of straits. However, one may infer such a list from the book’s second 
and third parts, which address the transit passage and archipelagic sealanes pas-
sage regimes as well as exceptions to the transit passage regime. In essence, 
Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz refer to the same eight categories of straits men-
tioned by López Martín and listed above: straits which link two parts of an EEZ 
or the high seas (Article 37);39 straits which are regulated by long-standing 
international conventions (Article 35(c));40 straits which are formed by an island 
of a strait State and its mainland coast (Article 38(1));41 straits which connect an 
EEZ or the high seas with the territorial sea of a foreign State (Article 
45(1)(b));42 straits which include an EEZ or the high seas corridor (Article 36);43 
straits in the archipelagic waters (Article 53);44 straits comprising long-standing 
internal waters (Article 35(a));45 sui generis straits (Article 311(2)).46 
Thus, Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz interpret the interrelationship between 
some provisions of the LOSC and its Part III on the legal regime of straits liber-
ally. This concerns prima facie Article 53 on straits in archipelagic waters as 
well as Article 311(2) of the LOSC which pertains to sui generis straits. Fur-
thermore, Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz are rather supportive of a liberal inter-
                                                                          
35  López Martín, op. cit., p. 80. 
36  See infra section 2.3 of Part I. 
37  The term dead-end straits is widely used for referring to Article 45(1)(b)-type of straits. 
See also e.g. W. L. Schachte Jr, J. P. A. Bernhardt. International Straits and Navigational 
Freedoms. – 33 Virginia Journal of International Law 1992–1993, p. 534. 
38  López Martín, op. cit., p. 100. For critique on this interpretation, see infra section 4.1 of 
chapter 1 in Part III. 
39  H. Caminos, V. P. Cogliati-Bantz. The Legal Regime of Straits: Contemporary Challen-
ges and Solutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014, p. 208. 
40  Ibid, pp. 71–72. 
41  Ibid, p. 46. 
42  Ibid, p. 54. 
43  Ibid, p. 42. 
44  Ibid, pp. 184–188. 
45  Ibid, pp. 65–66. 
46  Ibid, pp. 107–108. 
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pretation of Article 234 of the LOSC pertaining potentially to international 
straits that are wholly or partly located in ice-covered areas and covered with 
ice for most of the year (hereinafter ice-covered straits). This is subject to fur-
ther discussion below.47 
Lewis Alexander’s list comprises the first seven of the above-mentioned cat-
egories of straits (thus excluding sui generis straits).48 While Caminos and 
Cogliati-Bantz approach Article 35(c) of the LOSC traditionally and argue for a 
closed list of straits (the Danish Straits, the Åland Strait, the Strait of Magellan 
and the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and the Dardanelles)),49 Alexander does not 
wholly share this approach. Alexander notes that in addition to the Turkish and 
Danish straits, the “[t]wo other straits that might conceivably be affected by the 
article are Gibraltar and Tiran.”50 Alexander substantiates this claim by examin-
ing the relevant treaties that regulate passage in these straits. This is noteworthy 
because very few authors who have interpreted Article 35(c) of the LOSC have 
departed from the generally accepted list of the above-mentioned straits falling 
under its scope.51 Thus, it seems that in Alexander’s view, the list of Article 
35(c)-straits has not been written in stone. 
Other two authors related to the United States Government, William 
Schachte Jr and Peter Bernhardt, provide a closed list of legal categories of 
straits which includes the above-referred first six types of straits.52 Unlike 
Alexander’s categories of straits, Schachte Jr and Bernhardt omit (in addition to 
the sui generis straits) straits comprising long-standing internal waters (Article 
35(a)) from their list. Yet Alexander, Schachte Jr and Bernhardt all consider 
straits in archipelagic waters as a distinct category of straits, despite the fact that 
this type of straits is not included in Part III of the LOSC. 
Analogously to Schachte Jr and Bernhardt, Erik Franckx makes reference to 
all of the above-listed first six categories of straits (incl. straits in the archipe-
lagic waters) and not to straits comprising long-standing internal waters (Article 
35(a)) and sui generis straits (Article 311(2)).53 Franckx refers to straits with a 
route through the high seas or an EEZ that is not of similar convenience (Article 
36 to the contrary) as a distinct category of straits. Such a classification is not 
clearly provided for in the text of the LOSC. Franckx infers from Article 36 of 
the LOSC on straits that include an EEZ or the high seas corridor that if the 
EEZ or the high seas corridor is not of similar convenience to an ordinary route 
through the high seas or an EEZ, then the regime of transit passage should be 
                                                                          
47  See infra section 2 of Part I. 
48  L. M. Alexander. International Straits. – H. B. Robertson, Jr. (ed). The Law of Naval 
Operations. Newport: Naval War College Press 1991, pp. 91, 95–96, 99–103. 
49  Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit, p. 77. On this matter, see also infra section 3 of Part I. 
50  Alexander 1991, op. cit., p. 101. 
51  Notably, Rothwell and Stephens also adopted a liberal approach towards Article 35(c) of 
the LOSC. See supra section 1.3 of Part I. 
52  Schachte Jr, Bernhardt, op. cit., p. 538. 
53  E. Franckx. The U.S.S.R. Position on the Innocent Passage of Warships Through Foreign 
Territorial Waters. – 18 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 1987(1), pp. 34–35. 
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applicable.54 However, it might not necessarily be the case that the right of 
transit passage applies in such a strait. It is equally possible that the regime of 
non-suspendable innocent passage applies in case the strait leads to the territo-
rial sea of a foreign State or it is formed by an island of a strait State and its 
mainland coast. In any case, however, it would not necessarily form a distinct 
category of straits under the LOSC, since, as provided in Article 36, in such 
instance Part III of the LOSC would be applicable along with its conventional 
categories of straits. 
Yoshifumi Tanaka also refers to straits in the archipelagic waters as a dis-
tinct category of straits.55 Similarly to Franckx, and Schachte Jr and Bernhardt, 
Tanaka omits from his well-structured catalogue of the above-mentioned six 
categories of straits the Article 35(a)-type of straits comprising long-standing 
internal waters.56 In a slightly different context, he nevertheless refers to Article 
35(a), but not as providing for a distinct category of straits (similarly to Nandan 
and Anderson).57 
 
 
1.5. Synopsis of the Traditional and Liberal  
Approach on the Classification of Straits 
In light of the foregoing, legal scholars do not share a common view on the 
legal categories of straits. A uniform list of types of straits is thus lacking. In 
some respects, this is prima facie a theoretical problem (e.g. whether straits in 
archipelagic waters constitute a distinct legal category of straits). Generally, 
however, this has significant practical implications for navigation. For example, 
the question about the existence of distinct types of so-called historic straits and 
straits comprising long-standing internal waters (Article 35(a)), as well as ice-
covered straits (Article 234) lies at the heart of the dispute about passage rights 
in the Northeast Passage and Northwest Passage in the Arctic. 
The above-referred authors expressly accept in unison only the following 
four types of straits: 
1. Straits which link two parts of an EEZ or the high seas (Article 37); 
2. Straits which are regulated by long-standing international conventions 
(Article 35(c)); 
3. Straits that are formed by an island of a strait State and its mainland 
coast (Article 38(1)); 
4. Straits that connect an EEZ or the high seas with the territorial sea of a 
foreign State (Article 45(1)(b)). 
 
                                                                          
54  Ibid, p. 35. 
55  Y. Tanaka. The International Law of the Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2012, p. 97. Y. Tanaka. The International Law of the Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2015, p. 98. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Tanaka 2012, op. cit., pp. 97–98. Tanaka 2015, op. cit., p. 99. 
27 
These four types of straits (in combination with the obvious legal category of 
straits that are not used for international navigation) represent nearly half of the 
(potential) legal categories of straits discussed above. Therefore, it is difficult to 
agree with Donald Rothwell that the regime of international straits is settled.58 
As long as a consensus is lacking in the legal literature and presumably between 
States on the classification of straits under the LOSC, the legal regime of straits 
cannot be settled. 
It would be reasonable, however, to add to the above-mentioned four types 
of straits another two legal categories that do not invoke much controversy in 
the legal literature. First, straits that include an EEZ or a high seas corridor 
(Article 36) are recognised almost unanimously as a distinct category of straits. 
Only Jon Van Dyke does not expressly mention this type of straits as a distinct 
legal category, but this may be explained by the fact that he left his list open-
ended. Erik Franckx, on the other hand, appeared to interpret Article 36 of the 
LOSC somewhat differently from the rest of the authors; but in any case, he 
does not deny the existence of a distinct legal category of straits under the said 
provision. 
Likewise, it appears that there is no substantial disagreement over the exist-
ence of a particular type of straits located in the archipelagic waters. Although 
the representatives of the traditional approach avoid referring to the Article 53-
type of straits explicitly in their catalogues as a distinct legal category of straits, 
they have either left the list open (Van Dyke) or closely associated straits in the 
archipelagic waters with Part III of the LOSC on international straits (Nandan 
and Anderson, Rothwell and Stephens, Churchill and Lowe). The inclusion of 
straits in the archipelagic waters into the catalogue of legal categories of straits 
follows a liberal approach, since Article 53 is placed in Part IV of the LOSC. 
Part III of the LOSC on the legal framework of straits does not include any ref-
erence to straits in the archipelagic waters. 
In this regard, Jia has recently commented on the appropriateness of recog-
nising straits in the archipelagic waters as a distinct legal category of straits. In 
his review of Caminos’ and Cogliati-Bantz’s above-referred monograph on the 
legal regime of straits, Jia finds that 
 
“The sections on the regime of archipelagic waters (168–205) are interesting 
additions to a standard account of the regime of international straits, even though 
it may be wondered to what extent the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage, 
provided under Part IV of [the LOSC], is similar to that of Part III (185). The 
similarity of these two regimes would readily be acknowledged, were it referred 
to the, more or less, similar language used in expressing the respective rights of 
passage and overflight. However there is perhaps one distinction that should be 
drawn between them. The archipelagic sea lanes run along normal routes of pas-
sage or overflight (Article 53 (4), [LOSC]), which are defined by reference to 
                                                                          
58  D. R. Rothwell. International Straits. – D. R. Rothwell, A. G. Oude Elferink, K. N. Scott, 
T. Stephens (eds). The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2015, p. 133. 
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continuous axis lines (Article 53 (5)). In contrast, international straits, in the 
sense of Part III, are natural waterways, each being a geographical unit. They are 
not readily assimilated to such ‘artificial’ waterways as navigational routes 
which are, at most, ‘composite’ straits. Examples similar to archipelagic sea 
lanes can perhaps be found in singular cases of composite straits, such as the 
Northwest Passage off the Canadian coast in the Arctic. There is reason to view 
that Passage as a combination of straits that mirrors a route formed by archipe-
lagic sea lanes.”59 
 
Thus, Jia appears to relate the rationale behind recognising straits in the archi-
pelagic waters as a distinct category of straits with the existence of such ‘com-
posite’ straits which bear resemblance to the archipelagic sea lanes due to their 
character as prolonged and continuous waterways. Yet it is questionable 
whether this relevant. Rather, the fundamental problem here appears to be the 
legal definition of an international strait. This term has not been defined in legal 
instruments, including the LOSC. 
However, the criteria of an international strait (as put forward above)60 are 
met with regard to a strait in the archipelagic waters if its width is less than 24 
miles as measured from coast to coast and it is used for international navigation. 
Straits in the archipelagic waters maintain their characteristics and function as 
straits. Article 53 of the LOSC merely provides a distinct legal regime that 
exempts them from the scope of transit and non-suspendable innocent passage 
under Part III of the LOSC.61 Thus, in the context of straits, Article 53 of the 
LOSC belongs to the group of provisions comprised of Articles 35(a–c) and 36 
which provide exceptions to the transit and non-suspendable innocent passage 
regimes. Arguably, it would have been appropriate for the drafters of the LOSC 
to also express this in section 1 of Part III of the LOSC in view of ensuring 
coherence and clarity in respect to the legal framework on straits. 
It also follows from the systematic interpretation of the LOSC that another 
legally relevant category of straits should be recognised. This category com-
prises non-international straits located in territorial sea in respect of which none 
of the legal regimes of international straits applies. Therefore, the ordinary 
regime of suspendable innocent passage applies (Article 17) in such straits. In 
practice, such non-international straits can include e.g. straits which connect an 
EEZ or the high seas with the territorial sea of one of its strait States (straits 
which do not meet the condition of a foreign State as stipulated in Article 
45(1)(b)).62 Such Article 17-type of straits appear to form a distinct legal cate-
                                                                          
59  B. B. Jia. The Legal Regime of Straits: Contemporary Challenges and Solutions. By 
Hugo Caminos & Vincent P. Cogliati-Bantz. – 85 The British Yearbook of International 
Law 2015(1), p. 184. 
60  Supra section 1.1 of Part I. 
61  For the differences between the archipelagic sea lanes passage and transit passage, see 
e.g. Klein, op. cit., pp. 34, 36. See also Oxman, op. cit., p. 405. The characteristics of the 
transit and non-suspendable innocent passage are discussed in supra section 1.1 of Part I.  
62  For a discussion on the implications of the wording of Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC in the 
context of the Article 17-category of straits, see infra section 4.1 of chapter 1 in Part III. 
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gory of non-international straits, albeit none of the above-referred authors has 
apparently expressly acknowledged this. The lack of legal debate on this matter 
may be explained by the fact that, in practice, this is a relatively insignificant 
legal category of straits similarly to such straits which are not used for inter-
national navigation. 
However, there are significant disagreements over the existence of the so-
called historic straits and straits comprising long-standing internal waters (Arti-
cle 35(a)), ice-covered straits (Article 234) and sui generis straits (Article 
311(2)). In the legal literature, there are clear discrepancies between the views 
of the representatives of the traditional and liberal approach to these types of 
straits. Thus, the principal difference between the traditional and liberal 
approaches ultimately rests on the (non-)recognition of only a few distinct legal 
categories of straits. Yet in practice, this has significant implications for the 
passage rights of foreign ships and aircraft in and over straits. Moreover, even 
the liberal authors, who do not limit themselves only to Part III of the LOSC 
when classifying straits, are far from sharing a mutual view on the existence of 
these types of straits.  
While most of the authors confirm the existence of a distinct legal category 
of straits in the archipelagic waters under Part IV of the LOSC, it is not so 
common for them to agree with the existence of potentially another two legal 
categories of straits, i.e. Article 234 and 311(2)-types of straits, which are like-
wise founded on such LOSC provisions that fall outside of Part III of the LOSC. 
Therefore, these two potentially distinct categories of straits in addition to Arti-
cle 35(a)-type of straits will be subjected to further scrutiny. 
 
 
2. The Legal Regimes of Historic Straits,  
Ice-Covered Straits and Sui Generis Straits 
2.1. Historic Straits: Interpretation of Article 35(a) of the LOSC 
Much less than half of the above-mentioned authors refer to Article 35(a) of the 
LOSC as the legal basis for a distinct category of straits. Yet Article 35(a) in 
Part III of the LOSC and its importance for the legal regime of straits stands out 
even under a traditional reading of the LOSC. The poor record of reference to 
Article 35(a) may be due to its sophisticated wording which veils its scope and 
makes its significance for the legal regime of straits difficult to understand. 
The use of terms in Article 35(a) of the LOSC has also warranted different 
interpretations. It has been interpreted broadly as well as restrictively. Under its 
broad interpretation one departs from the ordinary meaning of its terms, 
whereas this is not the case under the literal interpretation. 
Article 35(a) of the LOSC may potentially embrace two categories of straits 
that do not fall under the LOSC legal framework on international straits. Pursu-
ant to the broad interpretation, the first category of straits included in this pro-
vision may be straits comprising internal waters which have historically been 
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considered as such not under a long-standing convention (Article 35(c) of the 
LOSC), but instead, for example, on the basis of the concept of historic bay or, 
more generally, historic waters. Authors who support the existence of such a 
distinct category of straits include Jia and López Martín. 
Jia, for example, refers to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Hudson Strait and the 
Northeast Passage as examples of potential historic straits.63 He argues that his-
toric straits occur as integral parts of historic bays.64 
Similarly, López Martín has limited the application of Article 35(a) of the 
LOSC only to such straits that have always been part of internal waters on the 
basis of historic entitlements. Thus, she argues that 
 
“There are straits which are formed by internal waters which have always been 
internal waters. This category of straits remains outside the scope of application 
of Part III according to article 35 a). /.../   
When do such circumstances arise? When can we speak of internal waters which 
have not arisen as a consequence of the establishment of a straight baseline in 
accordance with the method of article 7? This possibility that a strait might 
include internal waters which have always been of this type, that is to say, they 
have not been transformed into internal waters as a consequence of the estab-
lishment of a straight baseline, may occur, as pointed out by D. Pharand, as a 
consequence of the existence of historic entitlements. This would involve the 
hypothesis of historic waters which would create a type of ‘historic straits’ simi-
lar to the ‘historic bays’ referred to in article 10.6 of the Convention.  
Practice provides some examples of historic bays which are fully recognized, 
such as Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay and the Gulf of Fonseca. However, the 
situation differs as regards the existence of historic internal waters in straits. 
Except for Indreleia in Norway, there is no generalised recognition of any other 
strait which includes historic waters.”65 
 
Such interpretations by Jia and López Martín of Article 35(a) of the LOSC do 
not well coincide with the provision’s literal or teleological meaning.66 First, it 
is misleading to adopt the ambiguous temporal dimension “always (been part of 
internal waters)” instead of the one provided in Article 35(a) of the LOSC itself, 
according to which Part III of the LOSC does not affect any areas of internal 
waters within a strait that had been considered as such prior to the establishment 
of straight baselines. It is also unnecessary to relate Article 35(a) of the LOSC 
only to another ambiguous term “historic entitlements” as Article 35(a) of the 
LOSC encompasses a somewhat more clear-cut scope of application. 
                                                                          
63  Jia 1998, op. cit., p. 75. 
64  Ibid, pp. 75–77. 
65  López Martín, op. cit., pp. 69–70. 
66  The literal and teleological interpretation methods are referred to in Article 31 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention in the following terms: „A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. Vienna 23.05.1969, e.i.f. 27.01.1980. 
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In addition, the LOSC does not refer to the term “historic straits” in Article 
35(a) as a distinct category of straits. However, Article 35(a) of the LOSC may 
embrace in some cases also the concept of historic waters or historic bay which 
may include, as Jia notes, so-called historic straits. Yet, as the LOSC Annex VII 
Tribunal has observed, historic waters may refer to an exceptional title over 
either the internal waters or territorial sea.67 Hence, so-called historic straits may 
not necessarily fall under Article 35(a) of the LOSC since it refers only to inter-
nal waters, whereas historic straits may also comprise the territorial sea. 
If recognised, the concept of historic straits would be a controversial distinct 
category of straits, since it would not necessarily follow the categories of straits 
as provided in Part III of the LOSC. This is primarily due to the fact that, as 
examined above, historic straits may not fall under the terms of Article 35(a) of 
the LOSC. In this case, such a distinct category of straits could find its legal 
basis only from general international law. However, in this context Caminos 
and Cogliati-Bantz have come to the conclusion that “Because the [LOSC] reg-
ulates the regime of straits used for international navigation, the last preambular 
paragraph referring to rules of general international law is inapplicable.”68 Simi-
larly, the LOSC Annex VII Tribunal has emphasised that the LOSC is a pack-
age deal and in this regard stated that 
 
“In the Tribunal’s view, the prohibition on reservations is informative of the 
Convention’s approach to historic rights. It is simply inconceivable that the 
drafters of the Convention could have gone to such lengths to forge a consensus 
text and to prohibit any but a few express reservations while, at the same time, 
anticipating that the resulting Convention would be subordinate to broad claims 
of historic rights.”69 
 
Therefore, it should be understood that the so-called historic straits do not form 
a distinct and, legally speaking, ambiguous category of straits, but instead are 
part of the category of straits comprising long-standing internal waters on the 
condition that they meet the criteria of Article 35(a) of the LOSC. 
In case a particular so-called historic strait does not satisfy the criteria of Article 
35(a) of the LOSC, then it may form an exception to the applicability of the transit 
or non-suspendable innocent passage regime, but only when its legal regime is in 
conformity with Article 311(2) of the LOSC. The LOSC Annex VII Tribunal has 
stated that “this provision applies equally to the interaction of the Convention with 
other norms of international law, such as historic rights, that do not take the form of 
an agreement”.70 This means that the so-called historic strait’s particular legal 
regime needs to be more liberal or at least as liberal in comparison to the one that 
would otherwise be applicable to it under Part III of the LOSC. 
                                                                          
67  South China Sea Arbitration (the Philippines v. China). Award of the LOSC Annex VII 
Tribunal, 12.07.2016, para 225. 
68  Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., p. 75. 
69  South China Sea Arbitration, op. cit., para 254. 
70  Ibid, para 235. 
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In practice, the occurrence of such Article 311(2)-type of so-called historic 
straits is unlikely. In general, States invoke the applicability of the concept of 
historic straits for restricting the passage rights to foreign ships and aircraft that 
would otherwise enjoy it under Part III of the LOSC. Nevertheless, in case any 
so-called historic strait not falling under the Article 35(a)-exception should 
meet the conditions of Article 311(2) of the LOSC, it would consequently fall 
under the potentially distinct category of sui generis straits.71 
If the so-called historic strait’s legal regime does not meet either the criteria 
of Articles 35(a) nor 311(2) of the LOSC, then, depending on the particular 
characteristics of the strait, one of the other legal categories of straits applies to 
it. This follows directly from the ordinary meaning of the terms of the said pro-
visions. According to Article 35(a) of the LOSC the right of transit passage or 
non-suspendable innocent passage exists in these kinds of internal waters, 
including straits where the establishment of a straight baseline has the effect of 
enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as 
such and which also do not meet the criteria of sui generis straits (Article 
311(2)). 
Pursuant to its ordinary meaning, Article 35(a) of the LOSC unequivocally 
encompasses straits that have been enclosed by a straight baseline, as a result of 
which the strait includes internal waters which, however, were also internal 
waters prior to the drawing of the straight baseline(s). Article 35(a)-type of 
straits may be referred to as straits comprising long-standing internal waters. In 
this context, the notion “long-standing internal waters” is a euphemism. Since 
this criterion, similarly to Article 35(c) of the LOSC (on straits which are regu-
lated by long-standing international conventions), creates a direct link with pre-
vious legal instruments applicable to a particular maritime area, the term long-
standing as used in this euphemism serves to underline the similarities between 
the two categories of straits and assist in grasping its sophisticated wording and 
meaning. 
The criterion “not previously been considered as such” has also caused some 
confusion in the legal literature about its actual meaning. In some coastal States, 
e.g. in Norway and Finland, the method of drawing straight baselines was used 
prior to its first formulation in an international treaty, the 1958 Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.72 Subsequent to the International 
Court of Justice’s (hereinafter ICJ) legitimisation of Norway’s use of straight 
baselines in its 1951 judgment,73 Finland established straight baselines under its 
1956 Act on the Delimitation of Territorial Waters of Finland.74 
                                                                          
71  On sui generis straits see infra section 2.3 of Part I. 
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132. 
74  Laki Suomen aluevesien rajoista (Act on the Delimitation of Territorial Waters of 
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Pirjo Kleemola-Juntunen has found that as the exception provided in Article 
35(a) of the LOSC was incorporated into the LOSC from Article 5(2) of the 
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the time 
frame “not previously been considered as such” should therefore be understood 
as referring to the 1958 Convention.75 Thus, following this reasoning, the pas-
sages through e.g. the Finnish Archipelago Sea are not international straits in 
terms of Article 35(a) of the LOSC. Instead, under the LOSC as well as the 
domestic law of Finland, the waters of the Archipelago Sea are internal waters 
since the Finnish system of straight baselines was established prior to the 1958 
Convention. Consequently, the passages through the Archipelago Sea may be 
regarded as so-called internal straits through which foreign vessels cannot exer-
cise innocent or transit passage. Jia has made an analogous claim in respect to 
the Canadian straight baselines around its Arctic archipelago, as a consequence 
of which he deems the Article 35(a)-exception applicable also to the Northwest 
Passage.76 
As will be demonstrated subsequently in the example of the Estonian Sea of 
Straits,77 the question of whether excluding the right of innocent or transit pas-
sage inter alia in the Finnish Archipelago Sea is slightly more complex than 
merely assessing whether the system of straight baselines was first established 
prior to the 1958 Convention. In the view of the present author, Kleemola-
Juntunen’s and Jia’s interpretations of Article 35(a) of the LOSC depart from 
the wording of the said provision. They essentially create criteria for its appli-
cation that are different from the one provided in the Convention itself. Under 
their interpretation Article 35(a) of the LOSC would also embrace such straits 
the waters of which were not internal prior to the first drawing of the straight 
baseline(s) by the strait State. 
The Virginia Commentary refers to the exception provided in Article 35(a) 
of the LOSC in following terms, “The exception is internal waters “which had 
not previously been considered as such” before the establishment of a straight 
baseline “in accordance with the method set forth in Article 7.””78 Thus, as 
Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz point out, Article 35(a) of the LOSC means that 
any existing and future area of internal waters within a strait will be affected by 
the legal framework applicable to international straits under Part III of the 
LOSC if that particular area was not part of the internal waters of the coastal 
State prior to the establishment of straight baselines.79 Similarly, Nandan and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
No 332/1966 and Act No 981/1995). Accessible: http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/ 
kaannokset/1956/en19560463.pdf (14.09.2016). 
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76  Jia 2013, op. cit., p. 125. 
77  See infra section 4 of Part V. 
78  S. N. Nandan, S. Rosenne (eds). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: 
A Commentary, vol. II. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff 2003, p. 307. 
79  See Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., pp. 66–67. 
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Anderson note that “sub-paragraph (a) means that the rules about passage in 
Part III do not affect any areas of internal waters within a strait, unless those 
areas become internal waters as a result of the drawing of straight baselines in 
accordance with the method set forth in Article 7.”80  
This follows the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 35(a) of the LOSC 
but also its teleological meaning. It is also in accordance with the aim of the 
drafters of an analogous clause stipulated in Article 5(2) of the 1958 Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.81 Likewise, it follows the 
drafting history of Article 35(a) of the LOSC as its drafters’ intention was to 
include “any areas of internal waters which had been considered as part of the 
high seas or territorial sea prior to the drawing of straight baselines” under the 
legal framework of Part III of the LOSC on international straits.82 In particular, 
if a strait State should include a strait in which the right of innocent (or transit) 
passage has been applicable within its system of straight baselines, it would not 
deprive the foreign ships (and aircraft) from the right of innocent (or transit) 
passage in that particular strait. 
This literal and teleological interpretation of Article 35(a) of the LOSC 
embraces many straits, not least in the Baltic Sea, which fall under the category 
of straits comprising long-standing internal waters. By contrast, under the his-
toric straits-centred approach, López Martín argued that only the Norwegian 
Indreleia falls within the ambit of Article 35(a) of the LOSC.83 As will be exam-
ined later in the study, at least two seas of straits in the Baltic Sea meet the cri-
teria of Article 35(a) of the LOSC under its literal and teleological interpretation 
(or, likewise, under the above-referred interpretation of Jia and Kleemola-
Juntunen) and in light of the 1938 Nordic Rules of Neutrality. These are the 
Estonian Sea of Straits and the Finnish Archipelago Sea (next to the Åland 
Strait) as well as potentially the Swedish Kalmarsund.84 
Notably, Canada refers to the Northwest Passage and the Russian Federation 
refers to the Northern Sea Route as historic straits, their Arctic waters thus 
forming a part of so-called historic internal waters.85 The legitimacy of these 
claims depend a priori on the applicability of the Article 35(a)-exception as 
interpreted above. However, the legal regime of the Northwest Passage and the 
Northern Sea Route exemplifies also how closely Article 35(a) of the LOSC 
may be intertwined with Article 234 of the LOSC. The Article 234-category of 
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straits potentially provides the means for the strait States to prohibit or exten-
sively restrict passage also in those Arctic straits which do not meet the criteria 
of Article 35(a) of the LOSC and consequently do not comprise long-standing 
internal waters. This necessitates next a scrutiny on the scope of Article 234 of 
the LOSC. 
 
 
2.2. Ice-Covered Straits: Interpretation of Article 234 of the LOSC 
Article 234 of the LOSC stipulates that coastal States have the right to adopt 
and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduc-
tion and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the 
limits of the EEZ where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence 
of ice covering the area for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional 
hazards to navigation; and pollution of the marine environment could cause 
major harm to or irreversible disturbance to the ecological balance. Such laws 
and regulations need to have due regard to navigation and the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific 
evidence. 
Article 234 of the LOSC does not refer to straits. Neither does Part III of the 
LOSC on the legal regime of straits refer to Article 234. Therefore, under literal 
interpretation it is not clear whether strait States may adopt measures aimed 
against marine pollution in ice-covered straits. In this regard, Erik Jaap 
Molenaar maintains that 
 
“This raises the question whether within such straits Part III applies or, rather, 
the extensive coastal State powers pursuant to Article 234. The fact that Article 
234 is placed in the separate section 8 of Part XII and does not refer to straits, 
seem to support the view of ‘dominance’ of Article 234 over Part III. Supporting 
the opposite view would in many geographical constellations lead to the illogical 
result of a corridor of less extensive coastal (strait) State jurisdiction connecting 
areas with more extensive coastal State jurisdiction. The exceptional circum-
stances in ice-covered areas would also justify a regime which interferes more 
with navigation than under Part III of the LOSC, provided this is necessary for 
the safety of navigation or the protection of the marine environment.”86 
 
In essence, Molenaar thus argues for a distinct legal regime under Article 234 of 
the LOSC for ice-covered straits. Molenaar adds that the situation would be 
different if the regulatory content of Article 234 of the LOSC would have been 
inserted during the drafting of the LOSC into its Article 233, then Part III of the 
LOSC would have prevailed.87 Analogously, Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz argue 
that “Because Article 233 does not except section 8, it should be concluded that 
                                                                          
86  E. J. Molenaar. Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution. The Hague/ 
Boston/London: Kluwer 1998, pp. 289–290. 
87  Ibid, p. 289. 
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section 8 indeed may affect the legal regime of straits in ice-covered areas.”88 
This view is also shared by Donat Pharand.89 Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz claim 
that under Article 234 strait States may adopt unilateral measures also in inter-
national straits in derogation from both Part II and Part III.90 Jia agrees, “Article 
234 can certainly be applied to straits subject to Part III of the LOS Conven-
tion.”91 
Indeed, Article 233 of the LOSC excludes expressly the possibility that 
LOSC sections 5, 6 and 7 (on international rules and national legislation to pre-
vent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment as well as on 
enforcement and safeguards) would in any way affect the legal regime of inter-
national straits. Thus, it does not at least directly rule out the possibility that 
section 8 (Article 234) of the LOSC on ice-covered areas could affect the legal 
regime of straits as stipulated in Part III of the LOSC. 
Similarly to most authors Shabtai Rosenne and Alexander Yankov find that 
Article 234 of the LOSC concerns all waters landward of the outer limits of an 
EEZ,92 but they do not take a clear position on its impact on the legal regime of 
straits.93 By contrast, McRae and Goundrey as well as Boyle interpret the scope 
of Article 234 narrowly and argue that it is only applicable in an EEZ, not in the 
internal waters or territorial sea, the legal regime of which thus also sets the 
limits to the extent of the unilateral measures that may be taken by the coastal 
State under Article 234 in its EEZ.94 
McRae and Goundrey argue that the coastal State would not be entitled 
under Article 234 to inter alia impose requirements on foreign ships having the 
effect of impairing or denying the right of innocent passage (and thus presum-
ably also the right of transit passage).95 Similarly, Douglas Brubaker maintains: 
 
„Although controversial, theoretically it seems probable that the international 
straits regime would prevail over the ice-covered waters regime. This is chiefly 
because it seems unlikely that the United States, the principal opponent to the 
                                                                          
88  Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., pp. 414–415. 
89  D. Pharand. The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit. – 38 Ocean 
Development & International Law 2007(3), pp. 46–47. 
90  Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., p. 415. 
91  Jia 2013, op. cit., p. 134. 
92  S. Rosenne, A. Yankov. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Com-
mentary, vol. IV. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff 2002, p. 397. See also R. 
Douglas Brubaker. Regulation of navigation and vessel-source pollution in the Northern 
Sea Route: Article 234 and state practice. – D. Vidas (ed). Protecting the polar marine 
environment: Law and policy for pollution prevention. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2004, p. 227. See also Pharand, op. cit., p. 47. 
93  See Rosenne, Yankov, op. cit., pp. 392–398. 
94  D. M. McRae, D. J. Goundrey. Environmental Jurisdiction in Arctic Waters: The Extent 
of Article 234. – 16 University of British Columbia Law Review 1982(2), pp. 221, 227. 
A. E. Boyle. Marine Pollution under the Law of the Sea Convention. – 79 The American 
Journal of International Law 1985, p. 361. 
95  McRae, Goundrey, op. cit., pp. 221, 227. 
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Soviet Union and Canada in the negotiations leading to Article 234, would allow 
any interference with the international straits regime.“96 
 
Notably, for aircraft and submarines, the ice-cover does not constitute a circum-
stance that would have a significant practical effect on the straits regime. In 
particular, Schachte Jr and Bernhardt claim that “In the United States’ view, it is 
immaterial whether ice covers such a [Article 37] strait during most or all of the 
year, because the right of transit passage covers overflight as well as submerged 
transit.”97 
In light of the diverging views and State practice it is not clear whether Arti-
cle 234 prevails over the legal regime of straits stipulated in Part III of the 
LOSC. Hence, it is uncertain whether there exists a new category of straits 
which are located in ice-covered areas. Article 234 of the LOSC in its scope as 
well as in wording is a vaguely drafted provision which regulates ice-covered 
areas within the limits of an EEZ. Nevertheless, while Canada and the Russian 
Federation have already applied it in respect of navigation transiting straits that 
inter alia fall under the territorial sea,98 there have been recently calls for such 
application of Article 234 of the LOSC also in the United States which has 
rather asserted the prevalence of Part III of the LOSC over Article 234.99 
Even if a particular strait State should adopt the liberal interpretation of Arti-
cle 234 of the LOSC, it must strictly distinguish between those vessels or air-
craft that are owned or operated by a State and those that are not. Pursuant to 
Article 236 the LOSC provisions on the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment (incl. Art 234) do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, 
other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time 
being, only on government non-commercial service. Such vessels and aircraft 
have to follow the strait State’s domestic legal requirements for exercising pas-
sage rights adopted under Article 234 of the LOSC only so far as is reasonable 
and practicable. While Part III of the LOSC provides generally uniform straits 
regimes for all ships and, where applicable, aircraft, the ice-covered straits 
would consequently embrace under Article 234 of the LOSC a very different 
approach, distinguishing between the applicable regimes of passage depending 
on whether a particular vessel or aircraft is owned or operated by a State. 
The broad wording of Article 234 would provide a strait State in ice-covered 
areas with extensive means for restricting passage in international straits under 
its domestic law as long as in doing so the strait State generally gives ‘due 
regard to navigation’. Article 234 of the LOSC aims at ‘preventing, reducing 
and controlling marine pollution from vessels’ which may be interpreted by the 
                                                                          
96  R. Douglas Brubaker. Straits in the Russian Arctic. – 32 Ocean Development & Inter-
national Law 2001, p. 269. 
97  Schachte Jr, Bernhardt, op. cit., p. 538. 
98  Douglas Brubaker, op. cit., pp. 272–273, 276–277. 
99  S. P. Fields. Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: The 
Overlooked Linchpin for Achieving Safety and Security in the U.S. Arctic? – 7 Harvard 
National Security Journal 2016(1), pp. 75–76. 
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strait State concerned in a manner which results essentially in the denial of pas-
sage rights in international straits. Such measures, irrespective of the question of 
their legitimacy under inter alia Article 35(a) of the LOSC, may in State prac-
tice include blanket fees for transiting the straits and mandatory ice-breaker 
pilotage or leading.100 
Since it is practically impossible to objectively determine the threshold that a 
strait State needs to reach under Article 234 of the LOSC for meeting the crite-
rion of giving ‘due regard to navigation’, this provision, if accepted as appli-
cable to straits, would effectively provide the strait State with nearly unlimited 
discretion for regulating passage rights in a strait. Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz, 
for example, come to the conclusion that “If it is established that the measure, 
when adopted in a strait, complies with the due regard requirement, the best 
interpretation is that it does not hamper or impede transit passage under Part 
III.”101 However, this statement about the need to preserve the right of transit 
passage in international straits that fall potentially under Article 234 is some-
what self-defeating if one accepts the strait States’ near-unfettered discretion as 
expressed in the mere ’due regard’ criterion for adopting unilateral measures 
under Article 234 of the LOSC which severely hinder or prohibit passage in 
international straits. Similarly, McRae and Goundrey argue that 
 
“Beyond stating that as a minimum Article 234 contemplates that there will be 
some navigation in ice-covered areas it is difficult to ascribe much precision to 
the term "due regard to navigation". It would be going too far to suggest that the 
coastal state must have due regard to the usual rules relating to navigation within 
the economic zone, for this would reintroduce the standards from which Article 
234 purports to derogate.”102 
 
The existence of a distinct category of ice-covered straits under Article 234 is 
thus doubtful. Although the opposite interpretation of the said vaguely worded 
provision is not ruled out, it is a very liberal one in the context of the straits 
regime. The extensive powers that would be attributed to a strait State in case 
the general norm of Article 234 would overshadow Part III of the LOSC would 
have necessitated, given the sensitivity of the straits debate in the drafting of the 
LOSC, at least a somewhat more clear recognition of that in the text of the 
LOSC. 
The rejection of the prevalence of Article 234 over Part III of the LOSC does 
not mean that the coastal States bordering ice-covered straits would not have the 
right to adopt measures aimed at countering the hazards stemming from naviga-
tion in these particularly sensitive maritime areas. According to Article 42(1) of 
Part III of the LOSC the concerned strait States may adopt measures inter alia 
                                                                          
100  See e.g. Douglas Brubaker 2004, op. cit., pp. 228–229. See also E. Franckx. The Legal 
Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic. – 18 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 
2009(2), pp. 334–335, 340. 
101  Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., p. 420.  
102  McRae, Goundrey, op. cit., p. 221. 
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for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution, by giving effect to appli-
cable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and 
other noxious substances in the strait. The main difference is that such laws 
could not be adopted unilaterally subject only to the discretion of the strait 
State, but instead „by giving effect to applicable international regulations“, 
which prima facie are adopted by the International Maritime Organization. Pur-
suant to Article 42(2) of the LOSC such laws and regulations cannot discrimi-
nate in form or in fact among foreign ships or in their application have the prac-
tical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage. Even 
greater means are available for the strait State in regards to the non-suspendable 
innocent passage in international straits pursuant to Article 21(1)-(2) of the 
LOSC. 
In addition to Article 234 on ice-covered straits as well as Article 53 on 
straits in the archipelagic waters, there is another LOSC provision which pro-
vides potentially for a distinct legal regime for a strait irrespective of that 
otherwise applicable to it under Part III of the LOSC. This third potential legal 
category of straits belonging to the group of such strait regimes which are not 
integrated into Part III of the LOSC is the Article 311(2)-type of straits. How-
ever, in sharp contrast to Article 234 the straits falling under the legal regime of 
Article 311(2) of the LOSC can only provide for a more liberal navigational 
regime in and over straits as compared to the one which would otherwise regu-
late its passage regime under Part III of the LOSC. 
 
 
2.3. Sui Generis Straits: Interpretation of Article 311(2) of the LOSC 
Part III of the LOSC does not make any references to Article 311(2). It is a gen-
eral provision that enables to determine the legality of treaties concluded 
between States on matters that are regulated under the LOSC. No doubt, the 
legal regime of straits is one of such fields among numerous others. Article 
311(2) of the LOSC may thus be considered relevant for interpreting the legal 
regimes of straits under Part III of the LOSC.  
Article 311(2) of the LOSC facilitates inter-linkages between the different 
categories of straits as regulated under Part III of the LOSC. Thus, it clarifies 
the possibilities for States to change the legal regime applicable to a particular 
strait within the existing legal framework of the categories of straits under Part 
III of the LOSC. For example, strait States may conclude an agreement for lim-
iting the width of the outer limits of their territorial sea in a particular strait to 
establish an EEZ or a high seas corridor in order to switch the legal regime 
otherwise applicable to that strait (either transit or non-suspendable innocent 
passage) with the one provided in Article 36 of the LOSC.103 
However, it is not settled whether Article 311(2) of the LOSC also provides 
the legal basis for a distinct category of straits. If Article 311(2) of the LOSC 
                                                                          
103  For a case study on this in the example of the Viro Strait, see infra section 2 of chapter 2 
in Part III. 
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has such potential, then it would essentially imply the existence of a sui generis 
category of straits, which is not expressly provided for in Part III of the LOSC. 
This creates a certain amount of instability for the Part III legal framework on 
straits. 
Nevertheless, this concern is mitigated by the requirement of Article 311(2) 
of the LOSC according to which such sui generis strait regimes must be com-
patible with the LOSC. This means that for their legality, such legal regimes can 
only provide for more extensive passage rights to foreign States as compared to 
the conventional categories of straits that would otherwise be applicable to a 
particular strait. Hence, the contracting States could adopt in and above their 
waters only a more liberal regime of passage in line with the underlying prin-
ciple of the freedom of the seas. 
Molenaar has referred to the following straits that are regulated by a specific 
treaty other than the LOSC that do not fall under the Article 35(c)-exception: 
the Beagle Channel, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore 
and the Strait of Tiran.104 In addition, the Torres Strait, similarly to the Strait of 
Tiran, is also subject to a treaty concluded in the end of the 1970s and hence 
they are generally not considered as straits in which passage is regulated by a 
long-standing convention in terms of Article 35(c) of the LOSC, since, these 
treaties were, above all, concluded shortly before the adoption of the LOSC in 
1982 and are thus not long-standing.105 The same applies to the 1984 treaty106 
regulating passage in the Beagle Channel between Argentina and Chile107 as 
well as to the depth separation scheme that was adopted with regards to the 
straits of Malacca and Singapore in 1976,108 albeit there have also been no 
pretensions to the effect that these straits fall under the Article 35(c)-exception. 
Molenaar’s list is not presented in the context of Article 311(2) of the LOSC. 
It is doubtful whether all, if any, of the strait regimes mentioned by Molenaar 
fall under the scope of sui generis category of straits under Article 311(2) of the 
LOSC. Nonetheless, they are indicative for assessing the potential scope of the 
Article 311(2)-category of straits. For the purpose of examining the theoretical 
foundations of Article 311(2)-type of straits it suffices to establish that at least 
one of these strait regimes cannot be classified into any other categories of 
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straits as established above.109 In particular, in the legal literature it is suggested 
that the Strait of Tiran falls into the category of sui generis straits.110 
The Strait of Tiran meets the requirements of Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC 
as it connects EEZs in the Red Sea with the territorial sea of a non-riparian for-
eign State (Israel and Jordan). In particular, this provision (as incorporated from 
the 1958 Convention to the LOSC) was initially drafted to specifically address 
Israel’s navigational concerns with the Strait of Tiran.111 
However, the passage regime in the Strait of Tiran is partly regulated under 
Article 5(2) of the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel.112 It stipulates 
that “The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be inter-
national waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable 
freedom of navigation and overflight. The parties will respect each other’s right 
to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of 
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.” This provision is also included in Article 14(3) of 
the 1994 Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.113 
This implies that Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC is (currently) inapplicable in 
respect of the ships and aircraft of all States transiting this maritime area in the 
Egyptian, Israeli and Jordanian waters of the Gulf of Aqaba and Strait of Tiran 
due to the more liberal passage regime (which is thus in conformity with Article 
311(2) of the LOSC) provided in the 1979 and 1994 peace treaties.114 Only 
Saudi Arabia, the fourth coastal State of the Gulf of Aqaba, has not concluded a 
treaty with Israel that would provide for a similar passage regime in the Gulf of 
Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran. 
The regime of passage as stipulated in the 1979 and 1994 peace treaties 
bears most resemblance to the transit passage regime. It guarantees in the Strait 
of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba freedom of navigation and overflight, which 
would otherwise be applicable under the transit passage regime (Article 38(2) of 
the LOSC). Yet the Strait of Tiran does not link two parts of an EEZ or the high 
seas (the precondition for the applicability of the regime of transit passage 
under Article 37 of the LOSC). In addition, it appears that the passage regime 
applicable to the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba under the said treaties 
does not coincide with the transit passage regime. The transit passage regime is 
not the same in all its aspects as that of the freedom of navigation and overflight 
applicable in the EEZ and in the high seas.115 
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The freedom of navigation and overflight could potentially apply to the 
Strait of Tiran only under Article 36 of the LOSC when its straits States would 
establish a convenient EEZ corridor through the strait by limiting the maximum 
breadth of their territorial sea in this maritime area. The strait States have not 
done so, which is why the Article 36-category of straits is also not applicable to 
the Strait of Tiran. 
In addition, the freedom of navigation and overflight as guaranteed in the 
Egyptian, Israeli and Jordanian waters is clearly not reconcilable with the 
regime of non-suspendable innocent passage under Article 38(1) of the LOSC 
(applicable to straits that are formed by an island of a strait State and its main-
land coast) or the passage regime of non-international straits that fall into long-
standing internal waters in terms of Article 35(a) of the LOSC. Evidently, the 
Strait of Tiran cannot be considered an ice-covered strait (Article 234 of the 
LOSC) or a strait located in the archipelagic waters (Article 53 of the LOSC). 
Therefore, if one would exclude the category of sui generis straits (Article 
311(2) of the LOSC), then the passage regime applicable to the Strait of Tiran 
under the 1979 and 1994 peace treaties could conceivably only fall to the 
Article 35(c)-category of straits that are regulated by long-standing international 
conventions. This is not ruled out since although the Strait of Tiran was not 
considered as such at the time of drafting the LOSC, it may by now potentially 
satisfy the criteria of Article 35(c) of the LOSC pursuant to the ordinary mean-
ing of its terms due to the 1979 Peace Treaty. This is also suggested by Roth-
well, Stephens and Alexander.116 Indeed, it is not ruled out on the basis of the 
wording of Article 35(c) of the LOSC or its object and purpose that in case the 
regulation of passage in certain straits under a separate convention concluded 
prior to the LOSC stays in force for a long period of time, it may qualify under 
the Article 35(c)-exception in the future. 
However, there is no indication to the effect that States (prima facie Egypt 
and Israel) consider the Strait of Tiran as an Article 35(c)-type of strait. Fur-
thermore, even if the Strait of Tiran would be declared an Article 35(c)-type of 
strait in the future, it would still not settle the question about the legal category 
that was applicable to it from 1979 onwards. Clearly, at the time of signing the 
LOSC, the Strait of Tiran was not considered as a strait regulated by a long-
standing treaty. Hence, the legal regime applicable to the Strait of Tiran demon-
strates the existence of a sui generis category of straits under Article 311(2) of 
the LOSC.117 Next, it is necessary to examine what are the primary legal instru-
ments by which States may potentially change the legal category of a particular 
strait. 
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3. The Determinants of the Legal Categories of Straits 
In most cases, the legal category of a strait is not predetermined and there is 
considerable room of manoeuvre for the concerned States to change the appli-
cable legal regime subject to their discretion. The principal legal instruments 
that determine the legal categories of straits are embodied in the afore-men-
tioned LOSC provisions on the various types of straits. In broad terms, such 
determinants include the following: 
1. EEZ or the high seas at both ends of the strait (Article 37); 
2. Non-strait-State’s territorial sea to which the strait leads (Article 
45(1)(b)); 
3. EEZ or high seas corridor through the strait (Article 36); 
4. An island around which an alternative and convenient sea-route exists 
through the high seas or an EEZ by-passing the strait situated between 
that island and mainland coast (Article 38(1)); 
5. Archipelagic baselines (Article 47); 
6. Straight baselines and long-standing internal waters comprising the 
strait (Article 35(a)); 
7. Long-standing treaties on straits (Article 35(c)); 
8. Non-long-standing treaties on straits compatible with the LOSC (Article 
311(2)); 
9. Ice which covers the strait for most of the year (Article 234);118 
10. Major geopolitical implications concerning the relevant coastal and 
maritime area. 
 
Only two of these determinants are such that the concerned States have close to 
no influence over their presence. Such determinants are islands and ice (respec-
tively, Articles 38(1) and 234 of the LOSC). The existence of naturally formed 
islands and ice in the relevant maritime area depends on nature and particularly 
on climate change. Thus, they are not constant. Rather, the two may be referred 
to as natural determinants, whereas the other eight are in essence man-made 
determinants. 
States exercise considerable control over the man-made determinants. The 
man-made determinants may be categorised into four groups. First, geopolitical 
implications concerning the relevant coastal and maritime area form a distinct 
determinant. From the outset, it is the advent or loss of independence of a State 
or the change in title over sections of the relevant coastal and maritime area that 
may change the legal category of a strait under the LOSC or cause the termina-
tion of the legal status of a strait completely.119 In this context, the concept of 
State continuity may also have a significant effect on the legal regime of straits 
as examined below.120 In respect of the other man-made determinants, their 
effects on the categorisation of straits may be more nuanced. 
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Straits in the internal waters and archipelagic waters that meet the criteria of 
Articles 35(a) and 47 of the LOSC are similar, since their common characteris-
tics and also main determinants are baselines. A State exercises discretion over 
the establishment of straight or archipelagic baselines. If a State chooses to do 
so, the archipelagic or internal waters falling to the land-ward side of the base-
lines may include straits in which the passage rights may thus be regulated by 
the regimes of archipelagic sea lanes passage (Article 53 of the LOSC) or the 
domestic law of the strait State on its internal waters, in case the relevant mari-
time area was also considered internal waters prior to the establishment of 
straight baselines (Article 35(a) of the LOSC). On the other hand, in case the 
strait State chooses to maintain normal baselines, its strait(s) would fall under 
the other potentially applicable legal categories of straits. In both instances, it is 
mostly a matter of the strait State’s domestic law whether the archipelagic or 
straight baselines are established and whether the internal waters falling to the 
land-ward side of the straight baselines either maintain their status as internal 
waters or are newly created as a result of drawing straight baselines. 
A third group of man-made determinants for the legal categories of straits 
consists of treaties (Articles 35(c) and 311(2) of the LOSC). It is generally 
agreed that the criteria of Article 35(c) of the LOSC are met in the instances of 
the Danish Straits,121 the Åland Strait,122 the Strait of Magellan,123 and the 
Turkish Straits (Bosporus and the Dardanelles).124 Yet there also seems to be 
such international straits that may satisfy the criteria of Article 35(c) of the 
LOSC, but are not considered as straits falling under the exception provided in 
Article 35(c) of the LOSC in practice. Such treaties may be in force and they 
may at least partly regulate passage in a particular strait, but they are neverthe-
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124  N. Ünlü. The Legal Regime of the Turkish Straits. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 2002, p. 
54. See also Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., p. 77. López Martín, op. cit., p. 78. 
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less not considered by States, including its strait States, as falling under the 
Article 35(c)-exception. 
In this regard, Article 35(c) of the LOSC appears not to require the strait 
State’s and other States’ subjective element on the applicability of such a con-
vention to an international strait. The wording of Article 35(c) of the LOSC 
implies that in the presence of a long-standing convention it should regulate 
passage in an international strait ipso facto, i.e. on the condition that such an 
agreement: 1) is in force and; 2) regulates in whole or in part ...; 3)... passage 
specifically in such strait (specifically relates to such a strait). 
However, it is noted in the legal literature that a well-established recognition 
by States is a necessary precondition for the applicability of Article 35(c) of the 
LOSC.125 State practice seems to confirm that even if there is a long-standing 
treaty that satisfies the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 35(c) of the 
LOSC, its applicability still depends on the intent of (strait) States. Thus, it is a 
matter of discretion for the strait States to invoke Article 35(c) of the LOSC as 
the exception to the applicability of the transit or non-suspendable innocent 
passage regimes. 
In the instance of the Strait of Gibraltar, the States, including the strait States 
Spain, Morocco and the United Kingdom, have not recognised it as a strait 
falling under the exception stipulated in Article 35(c) of the LOSC due to the 
reason that the 1904 declaration between Great Britain and France126 is not 
deemed as regulating passage in the strait.127 Its Article 7 prohibited the erection 
of any fortifications or strategic works on a specific portion of the coast of 
Morocco in order to secure free passage in the Strait of Gibraltar.128 Many 
scholars have maintained on this basis that a long-standing convention regulates 
passage in the Strait of Gibraltar.129 It is also referred to in the 1958 United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Preparatory Document No. 11 as  
one of the five straits where the legal regime has already been regulated  
under a specific treaty.130 
                                                                          
125  Caminos 2007, op. cit., p. 583.  
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Palmer Cundick refers to the Strait of Gibraltar as the best known example 
of a strait that is regulated by an international agreement and ensures the free-
dom of passage through straits whose width prior to the LOSC far exceeded the 
sum of the belts of territorial sea running through them.131 He argues in respect 
of Article 7 of the 1904 declaration that “This was designed to guarantee that 
nations might continue their usage, even where the channel used for navigation 
might require shipping to pass through the territorial waters of the coastal 
state.“132 Indeed, the aim of Article 7 is explicitly “to secure the free passage of 
the Straits of Gibraltar”. This treaty, which clearly safeguards freedom of navi-
gation, may potentially fall under the scope of Article 35(c) of the LOSC but, 
crucially, is not considered as such by States. It is widely held that the Strait of 
Gibraltar cannot be regarded as an international strait falling under the category 
of Article 35(c) of the LOSC.133 
The scope of Article 35(c) of the LOSC is narrow and there are only few 
treaties which meet its criteria. In this context, a significant example aside the 
Strait of Gibraltar is the Viro Strait in the Gulf of Finland, which may have 
potentially been subject to long-standing treaties that regulated passage specifi-
cally in that strait from 1991 until their termination most likely in 1994 or, 
alternatively, in 2010, but which were not recognised as such by States, includ-
ing the strait States.134 The Viro Strait also illustrates the magnitude of control 
that States possess in regard to long-standing treaties giving effect to the Article 
35(c)-exception, as they may be terminated or modified in conformity with the 
general international law of treaties as examined below.135 Consequently, a 
strait which has been subject to Article 35(c) of the LOSC may lose its status 
and fall under a different legal category of straits. 
The same applies to non-long-standing treaties that regulate passage in 
straits and are compatible with the LOSC (Article 311(2) of the LOSC). Strait 
States exercise even more control over this strait regime’s determinant since 
States may conclude such a treaty (unlike the long-standing treaties on straits) 
whenever they wish, thereby altering the legal category of a strait, provided that 
such a treaty is compatible with the LOSC. The latter criterion, on the other 
hand, limits considerably the discretion that strait States have in regard to this 
determinant since, as analysed above,136 it means in practice that the passage 
regime provided in such a treaty needs to be more liberal in comparison with 
the one which would otherwise be applicable to such a strait under Part III of 
the LOSC. 
The common denominator for the fourth group of man-made determinants of 
the legal categories of straits is their focus on the interplay between various 
maritime zones and their outer limits. Article 37 of the LOSC determines the 
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135  See infra section 5 of Part IV. 
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legal category of a strait in case there is an EEZ or high seas at both ends of the 
strait, whereas Article 36 of the LOSC is applicable in case there is an EEZ 
corridor or a high seas corridor through the strait. The third determinant 
belonging to this group includes the presence of non-strait-State’s territorial sea 
to which the strait leads (Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC). 
The three categories of straits falling under Articles 36, 37 and 45(1)(b) of 
the LOSC are closely connected. In general, any Article 45(1)(b)-type of strait 
between a part of the high seas or an EEZ and the territorial sea of a foreign 
State may be alternatively subject to the legal categories of Articles 36 or 37 of 
the LOSC. 
If the strait States limit the extent of their territorial sea that would otherwise 
entirely cover the strait, so as to create a convenient EEZ corridor or a high seas 
corridor through the strait, then the applicable passage regime is that provided 
in Article 36 of the LOSC. This alteration of the legal regime may be given 
effect irrespective of whether the strait leads to the territorial sea of a foreign 
State. Such a restriction on the outer limits of the territorial sea of a strait State 
is also relatively common in the Baltic Sea, as it has been used by Denmark and 
its neighbouring States Sweden and Germany in respect of straits which connect 
two parts of an EEZ, as well as by Estonia and Finland with regard to the Viro 
Strait, which leads to the territorial sea of a foreign State (the Russian Federa-
tion).137 
However, it may likewise occur that the strait leads to the territorial sea of a 
foreign State and the strait States are not willing to limit the breadth of their 
territorial sea in order to establish a corridor where the freedom of navigation 
could be enjoyed for the purpose of transiting the strait. This would grant for-
eign ships the right of non-suspendable innocent passage in the strait under 
Article 41(1)(b) of the LOSC, but would not provide the right of overflight for 
foreign aircraft. Technically, it is then possible for the third State to by-pass 
Article 41(1)(b) of the LOSC by limiting under its domestic law the maximum 
breadth of its own territorial sea in the maritime area to which the strait leads 
with the aim of establishing an EEZ. Since the strait would then link two parts 
of an EEZ (or the high seas), Article 37 of the LOSC would be applicable, 
granting foreign ships and aircraft the right of transit passage in the strait.138 In 
practice, the legal regime of an Article 41(1)(b)-type of strait has apparently not 
been switched to that of Article 37 thus far. 
The impact that the above-mentioned four groups of man-made determinants 
and the natural determinant of islands (Article 38(1)) have on the legal categori-
sation of straits will be studied more closely in the example of the Estonian 
Straits. In particular, the significance of outer limits of maritime zones, treaties 
(particularly long-standing international conventions), domestic law of the strait 
State on its internal waters and baselines as well as geopolitical implications 
concerning the relevant coastal and maritime areas (particularly the concept of 
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State continuity) for the classification of straits are examined. In the course of 
this, it is established which legal categories of straits (as identified above) have 
been applicable, currently apply and may potentially apply to the Estonian 
Straits. This classification points to the volatility that is embedded in the straits 
regime. It also exemplifies how the applicable passage regimes of foreign ships 
and aircraft in the Gulf of Finland, the Sea of Straits and the Gulf of Riga have 
changed in the last century and may be further altered in the future by (mostly) 
the concerned strait States. The following parts of the study thus aim to demon-
strate the practical implications of the legal categorisation of straits. 
In the first part of the study, it was first necessary to establish the list of legal 
categories of straits since it would be purposeless and potentially misleading to 
classify straits in practice without having first ascertained which legal catego-
ries of straits exist under the LOSC and what are their general legal criteria. The 
legal classification of particular straits in practice makes it possible to provide a 
much more detailed understanding on such legal criteria as well as the inter-
relationship between the legal categories of straits. Therefore, in the next parts 
of the study, the substance and criteria of most of the above-referred legal cate-
gories of straits are further examined on the basis of the Estonian Straits with 
the aim of establishing the practical significance of the legal classification of 
straits for international navigation in and over straits. 
However, first it is scrutinised whether maritime boundary delimitation may 
also have had a determinative effect on the legal regime of the Estonian Straits. 
In case it had such an effect, it should be included in the above catalogue of 
determinants of the legal categories of straits. Notably, nothing in Part III of the 
LOSC indicates that maritime boundary delimitation could have a substantial 
impact on the legal classification of straits. However, since navigational factors 
have been generally singled out as a special circumstance, potentially warrant-
ing the modification of the preliminary equidistance line, it might be likewise 
possible that the passage rights of foreign ships and aircraft may be somehow 
influenced by the delimitation of boundaries in a strait or in an adjacent mari-
time area. 
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PART II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MARITIME  
BOUNDARY DELIMITATION FOR THE LEGAL  
REGIME OF THE ESTONIAN STRAITS 
The right of transit passage applies in straits which are used for international 
navigation between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the 
high seas or an EEZ (Article 37 of the LOSC). It follows from this that the 
delimitation of a maritime boundary can potentially influence the passage 
regime of an adjacent strait if the concerned States either agree on the estab-
lishment of an EEZ in the relevant maritime area which would otherwise be 
non-existent or on the abolishment of an already existing EEZ in the relevant 
maritime area by means of maritime delimitation law. Correspondingly, this 
may result in the applicability or inapplicability of the right of transit passage in 
an adjacent strait. The applicable passage regime of the Estonian Straits was 
potentially alterable in the course of maritime boundary delimitations between 
the coastal States of the Gulf of Finland proper and the Gulf of Riga. 
It is clear that the Estonian-Russian maritime boundary delimitation in the 
south-eastern part of the Gulf of Finland did not have any significance for the 
Viro Strait’s transit regime. Due to the relative proximity of the Estonian and 
Russian coasts in Narva Bay and in the Gulf of Finland proper as well as the 
fact that by virtue of Article 3 of the LOSC both States have the right to estab-
lish the breadth of their territorial sea up to a limit of 12 miles for islands under 
their sovereignty, the relevant maritime area, as viewed from both sides of the 
agreed median line, falls exclusively to the zones of 12-miles-wide territorial 
sea of both States.139 Therefore, the relevant maritime area did not include an 
already existing EEZ prior to the delimitation process. Estonia and the Russian 
Federation did also not agree on the establishment of an EEZ in the relevant 
maritime area. The question of the possibility of the establishment of an EEZ 
under the Maritime Boundary Treaty140 was not relevant for the maritime 
delimitation between Estonia and the Russian Federation. The potential signifi-
cance of the maritime boundary delimitation between Finland and the Soviet 
Union in the north-eastern part of the Gulf of Finland for the current legal 
regime of the Viro Strait is studied below.141 
In this part, it is examined whether the maritime boundary delimitation 
between Estonia and Latvia in the Gulf of Riga had any significance for the 
legal regime of the Irbe Strait and the Sea of Straits. In particular, the Estonian 
and Latvian coasts in the Gulf of Riga are relatively distant. This raises the 
                                                                          
139  See A. Lott. The Estonian-Russian Territorial Sea Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of 
Finland. – The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 2017 (forthcoming). 
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question of whether the internal waters and territorial sea of Estonia and Latvia 
cover the entire maritime area of the Gulf of Riga. Hence, the problem lies in 
determining whether the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Riga delimits the 
territorial sea of Estonia and Latvia or whether it serves as a single maritime 
boundary which is also the boundary line between the EEZ, continental shelf 
and potential contiguous zone of the Gulf’s coastal States. 
 
 
1. The Estonian-Latvian Negotiations on the  
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Riga 
The land boundary between Estonia and Latvia was delimited under the October 
19th, 1920 bilateral Convention142 and additional treaties.143 On March 20th, 
1992, Estonia and Latvia agreed to re-establish the pre-June 16th, 1940 land 
boundary between the two States on the basis of the treaties and other legal acts 
concluded in the 1920s and 1930s.144 
The maritime boundary in the Gulf of Riga had not been delimited between 
the two States.145 Hence, Article XIII of the 1992 Treaty on the re-establishment 
of the boundary provided that the maritime boundary between Estonia and 
Latvia was to be delimited under a separate agreement. The negotiations 
between the Estonian and Latvian delegations on the maritime boundary in the 
Gulf of Riga commenced in November 1994.146 Swedish experts entered the 
negotiations in autumn 1995 and provided good offices and chaired the meet-
ings between the two negotiating States.147 
In connection with the conclusion of the maritime boundary treaty, Estonia 
first sought Latvia’s recognition of a 12-miles-wide Estonia’s territorial sea 
around Ruhnu Island (hist. Runö), the coordinates of which had already been 
stipulated in the 1993 Estonian Maritime Boundaries Act.148 However, Latvia 
favoured a perpendicular line as drawn west-wards from the end-point of the 
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Estonian-Latvian land boundary and accompanied with a 3-miles-wide territo-
rial sea around Ruhnu Island.149 
At that stage, the parties did not deliberate on the delimitation of their EEZ 
in the Baltic Sea west of the Gulf of Riga. Yet the need for trilateral negotia-
tions between Estonia, Latvia and Sweden on certain technical aspects pertain-
ing to their tripoint was acknowledged during the negotiations.150 According to 
the Estonian foreign minister, the States had no problems with agreeing on the 
prospective tripoint since by that stage, Estonia and Latvia had already essen-
tially accepted the boundary line that had been agreed upon earlier between the 
Soviet Union and Sweden.151 
By contrast, the maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Riga was 
complex and caused tensions between the two States. The Estonian foreign 
minister commented that by April 1996, Estonia and Latvia had reached “a situ-
ation in which the divergence of views was obvious.”152 By that time, Latvia 
had adopted a fishing line in the Gulf of Riga which, due to its expansive 
nature, ignited tensions between Estonian and Latvian fishermen in the begin-
ning of the fishing season which, as noted by the Estonian foreign minister, 
caused a potential for the escalation of the conflict: 
 
“Let’s be frank, the threshold of power politics was reached. Our friends from 
the other coast of the Baltic Sea as well as from the rest of the world were deeply 
concerned. /.../ On such difficult questions, compromises are hard to reach and 
they do not seem very pleasant, and yet the only alternative is the continuation 
with the “herring war”, long-poisoned relations with the southern neighbour, 
diminishing trust in many capitals of the world.”153 
 
In April 1996, the foreign ministers of Estonia and Latvia met in Vilnius to find 
a peaceful solution to the maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Riga. 
On May 3rd and 4th, 1996, the prime ministers of both countries met in Visby 
during the first meeting of the Baltic Sea coastal States, where the heads of gov-
ernments together with the President of the European Commission and the 
European Council underlined the importance of stability and security in the 
region, including in the relations between neighbouring States.154 A week later, 
on May 12th, 1996, the prime ministers of Estonia and Latvia met again and 
reached an understanding on the maritime boundary, as well as fishing rights in 
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the Gulf of Riga.155 The Maritime Boundary Treaty was signed by the prime 
ministers in Tallinn a month later, on July 12th, 1996.156 
The Estonian foreign minister cautioned the members of the Estonian Par-
liament during the first reading of the Maritime Boundary Treaty and noted that 
the ratification of the treaty is “the last option before turning to the court” as the 
two States were willing to refer the maritime boundary delimitation to the ICJ in 
case the treaties would not have been ratified by the parliaments.157 The treaty 
caused much parliamentary debate, but was nevertheless ratified.158 It was the 
first maritime boundary treaty concluded between the States that had regained 
their independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.159 
According to the Estonian media, approximately 800 km2 of maritime area 
was ceded to Latvia primarily in the eastern part of the Gulf of Riga.160 The 
vice-chancellor of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that Estonia’s 
territorial sea will decrease to some extent in size and Estonia relinquished a 
claim for an EEZ in the Gulf of Riga.161 The question about the alleged cession 
of territory was also raised during the deliberations in the Estonian Parlia-
ment.162 
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In terms of law, however, the parties could not have ceded any territory as a 
result of the boundary negotiations since the boundary had not been agreed 
before. Under section 3 of the Latvian Constitution163 and section 122 of the 
Estonian Constitution164, the maritime boundary had yet to be delimited by an 
international agreement. For this reason also the 1993 Estonian Maritime 
Boundaries Act could not have raised any legitimate expectations for a fixed 
maritime boundary prior to the delimitation with Latvia. 
In this regard, Latvia had also abandoned its claim pursuant to which the 
maritime maps from the 1920s, which depicted a boundary line in the Gulf of 
Riga, should be chosen as the basis for the maritime boundary delimitation.165 
Estonia did not recognise this claim. The Estonian foreign minister noted that 
such maps depicted a discontinuous line that was roughly indicative of the divi-
sion of the maritime areas in the Gulf of Riga but had no significance from the 
perspective of international law.166 Likewise, Alex Oude Elferink has noted that 
both States did not ascribe any significance to such illustrative maps in terms of 
law and, generally, according to the case law of the ICJ, maps may only be of 
assisting or confirmative value in the maritime boundary delimitation pro-
cess.167 
Also, there were essentially no pre-existing agreements between Estonia and 
Latvia on the delimitation of the maritime area of Gulf of Riga that could have 
provided grounds for such legitimate expectations, as subsequent analysis will 
show. 
 
 
2. Pre-Existing Agreements Pertaining to  
the Delimitation of the Maritime Area 
The Estonian and Latvian coasts in the eastern part of the Gulf of Riga are adja-
cent. Hence, the starting point of the maritime boundary between the two States 
is the end point of the land boundary at low-tide. After gaining independence in 
1918, the two States reached an agreement on their land boundary in the 1920s. 
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Estonia and Latvia requested from the United Kingdom the appointment of 
an arbitrator for the demarcation of their land boundary. The Convention on the 
Establishment of a Joint Commission Headed by Colonel Stephen George 
Tallents for the Delimitation of a Land Boundary168 was concluded on March 
22nd, 1920 and Colonel Tallents delivered his decisions on the basis of the Con-
vention on July 1st and 3rd the same year. On October 19th, 1920 at Riga, Estonia 
and Latvia concluded the Convention Regarding the Delimitation on the Spot of 
the Frontier between the Two States, and also regarding the rights of the citi-
zens in the frontier zone and the status of immovable property intersected by the 
frontier line which was registered in the League of Nations on June 16th, 
1923.169 
The Supplementary Boundary Convention between Estonia and Latvia was 
concluded in Tallinn on November 1st, 1923.170 It was ratified by Estonia on 
December 20th, 1923,171 whereas Latvia ratified it in March 1927.172 Thus, it 
entered into force (pursuant to its Article XIV) upon the exchange of the 
instruments of ratification on March 30th, 1927.173 Estonia and Latvia concluded 
another protocol in Tallinn on February 23rd, 1927 whereby the initial boundary 
Convention of October 19th, 1920 and the supplementary boundary Convention 
of November 1st, 1923 was modified.174 Pursuant to a declaration on March 31st, 
1927, the boundary between Estonia and Latvia was declared definitively con-
cluded as of April 1st, 1927.175 
The end point of the Estonian-Latvian land boundary was fixed in the Con-
vention regarding the State Frontier and the Rights of Citizens of the Frontier 
                                                                          
168  Convention on the Establishment of a Joint Commission Headed by Colonel Stephen 
George Tallents for the Delimitation of a Land Boundary. Valga 22.03.1920, e.i.f. April 
1920. 
169  Certificate of the Registration of the Estonian-Latvian Boundary Treaty in the League of 
Nations, 16.06.1923. ERA.957.18.8, p. 1. 
170  Supplementary Convention between Estonia and Latvia on Frontier Questions. Tallinn 
01.11.1923, e.i.f. 30.03.1927. See ERA.957.18.14. 
171  See the Instrument of Ratification Regarding the Supplementary Boundary Convention. 
Tallinn, February 1924. Accessible at the National Archives of Estonia. 
172  Instrument of Ratification Regarding the Supplementary Boundary Convention. Riga 
30.03.1927. See ERA.957.18.15. 
173  Protocol on the Exchange of Instruments of Ratification Regarding the Supplementary 
Boundary Convention between Estonia and Latvia. Riga 30.03.1927. See 
ERA.957.18.16. 
174  Protocol Amending the Convention regarding the State Frontier and the Rights of 
Citizens of the Frontier Zone, Concluded between Estonia and Latvia at Riga, October 
19th, 1920 and the Additional Convention regarding Frontier Questions, Concluded at 
Tallinn November 1st, 1923. Tallinn 23.02.1927, e.i.f. 31.03.1927. See League of 
Nations. Treaty Series 1927(61), p. 315. Accessible: http://www.worldlii.org/ 
int/other/LNTSer/1927/50.pdf (14.09.2016).  
175  Protocol Constituting a Declaration with regard to the Final Delimitation of the Frontier 
between the Two Countries. Riga 31.03.1927. See League of Nations. Treaty Series 
1927(61), p. 323. Accessible: http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1927/50.pdf 
(14.09.2016). 
55 
Zone of October 19th, 1920. This was also the starting point of the maritime 
boundary between the two States and also the only spot where, at the time, the 
territorial sea of Estonia and Latvia abutted.176 In this Ikla-Ainaži section, the 
two States considered their maritime boundary fixed under the afore-mentioned 
Convention of October 19th, 1920.177 The 1920 Convention may thus be consid-
ered as a partial agreement on the maritime boundary. The 1920 Convention is 
valid on the basis of State continuity of both States. 
The 1920 Convention was not the only partial agreement on the maritime 
boundary between Estonia and Latvia. While the 1920 Convention settled the 
starting point of the maritime boundary between the two States, they also 
delimited the maritime boundary in its adjacent waters in 1923. It follows from 
a stenographic record of a meeting in the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
on October 15th, 1923 that a general agreement between Estonia and Latvia on 
inter alia the shallow entrance to the Ainaži port was reached in the Estonian-
Latvian mixed commission on February 8th to 9th, 1923.178 This agreement was 
appended as a protocol to the 1923 Supplementary Convention on the Estonian-
Latvian Frontier Questions. The maritime boundary line provided therein 
favoured Latvia. In this regard, Artur Taska has deemed it incomprehensible 
why, despite of the smooth coastline running nearly directly from north to 
south, Estonia nevertheless accepted in this section a straight boundary line 
heading north-east, thus leaving Estonia twice as small maritime area as com-
pared to Latvia, instead of adopting a parallel line that would have been more in 
accordance with the geographical circumstances.179 
However, according to archival documents, the agreement on the entrance to 
the port of Ainaži was reached by means of exchange of territories between the 
two States. In order to avoid the passage of Latvian ships through Estonian 
waters in the course of entering the port, Estonia agreed to exchange the adja-
cent waters in the entrance to the Ainaži port with Latvian land territory in 
Kiusumetsa region (which included many Estonian farmsteads) as compensa-
tion. Anton Jürgenstein, a member of the Parliament and representative of the 
Estonian Coast Guard, commented in a meeting of Estonian officials at the For-
eign Ministry that “The port is not of great value, we can gladly give it as com-
pensation.”180 Thus, Article 1(a) of the 1923 Protocol to the 1923 Supplemen-
tary Convention on the Estonian-Latvian Frontier Questions provided that 
Ainaži port belongs completely to Latvia and the boundary line is drawn in 
parallel with its jetty in such a distance as is necessary for the passage of ships 
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and will be demarcated by a technical committee on a map. The provision also 
stipulates that in this manner Latvia will be granted entrance to the port and exit 
to the sea. The joint Estonian-Latvian commission specified in their description 
of the boundary line that this section of the boundary heads four versts181 to 
north-east, “the boundary heads to the Gulf of Riga and reaches 4 versts in the 
direction of NW 50o00´00´´. For locating the boundary in the nature, a post has 
been placed in the opposite direction SO 50o00´00´´ 217 m from the coast.”182 
Other sections of the maritime area in the Gulf of Riga were not delimited by 
the two States in the 1923 Supplementary Convention.183  
The Estonian Government noted during the ratification of the 1923 Supple-
mentary Convention in the Parliament that there is no need for delimiting other 
maritime areas of the Gulf of Riga.184 The Government explained that the Gulf 
of Riga comprises the high seas, which is why solving the question of the mari-
time boundary is not complicated as the coastal State needs to delimit the outer 
limit of its coastal sea on the basis of its domestic law and in accordance with 
the principles of international law.185 
However, in practice Estonia and Latvia were in strong disagreement on the 
question of Ruhnu Island. At the time, both States claimed sovereignty over the 
island and due to its location in the middle of the Gulf of Riga, it was of utmost 
value for navigation. The troubled history of the territorial dispute over Ruhnu 
Island will be scrutinised in more depth in the next section. 
 
 
3. Pre-Existing Agreements on the Status of Ruhnu Island 
Ruhnu Island is situated in the middle of the Gulf of Riga, 19 miles from the 
Kolka Cape on the Latvian Courland Peninsula, 29 miles from the Estonian 
Kihnu Island (hist. Kynö) and 35 miles from the Estonian town Kuressaare on 
Saaremaa Island (hist. Ösel).186 The distance between Ruhnu and the Estonian 
city Pärnu as well as the Latvian capital of Riga is approximately 52 miles. The 
island is located on the same latitude as the Irbe Strait. 
Geographically, Ruhnu Island is thus closest to the Latvian coast. The his-
torical connections of Ruhnu Island with Latvia are illustrated by its inclusion 
into the Duchy of Courland from 1562 to 1621.187 Notably, maps which were 
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compiled relatively shortly after this period did not present Ruhnu Island as 
being part of western Estonia.188 Upon gaining independence in 1918, both Lat-
via and Estonia claimed sovereignty over the island. 
In the declaration of independence from February 24th, 1918, Estonia 
claimed that “the Estonian Republic includes within its borders /.../ Pärnu 
County along with the Baltic Sea islands – Saare-, Hiiu- and Muhumaa and 
others which are traditionally inhabited by the Estonian nation in the great 
majority.”189 According to the 1922 Estonian population census, the population 
of Ruhnu Island composed of 252 Swedes, 10 Estonians (3.7 %) and 2 Ger-
mans.190 Thus, Ruhnu Island was not “traditionally inhabited by Estonians in the 
great majority” in terms of the 1918 Estonian declaration of independence. 
In its meeting of January 17th, 1919, the Estonian Provisional Government 
adopted the decision, “To declare Ruhnu Island part of Estonia.”191 On June 4th, 
1919, the Estonian Constituent Assembly adopted as the second pre-constitu-
tional act192 the temporary Estonian constitution “The Provisional Order of 
Government for the Republic of Estonia,” which came into effect on July 9th, 
1919.193 In its section 2, it provided the provisional boundaries of Estonia and 
listed land areas that fall within those boundaries, inter alia the Estonian islands 
“Saaremaa, Hiiumaa, Muhumaa, Ruhnu, Kihnu, Vormsi, Osmussaar, Pakri 
Islands, Naissaar, Aegna, Prangli Islands, Suur [Tütarsaar] and Väike Tütar-
saar.”194 However, section 2 of the Estonian Constitution that was adopted by 
the Constituent Assembly on June 15th, 1920 did not explicitly mention Ruhnu 
Island, whereas it referred to “Saaremaa, Muhumaa, Hiiumaa and other islands 
and reefs situated in the Estonian waters”.195 Distinctly, from the 1918 declara-
tion of independence, section 2 of the Constitution did not stipulate the criterion 
by which an Estonian island should be “traditionally inhabited by Estonians in 
the great majority”. Nor did it refer by name to any small islands of Estonia. 
Presumably, it would have otherwise been also more difficult for Estonia to 
recognise Finnish sovereignty over Tytärsaari Islands as provided in Articles 3 
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and 13 of the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty between Finland and the Soviet Rus-
sia.196 
At the same time, Latvia also claimed sovereignty over Ruhnu Island. In 
spite of their aim and previous negotiations, Estonia and Latvia were not able to 
avoid controversies in their border descriptions as presented in their memoranda 
to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The “Memorandum on Latvia” declared 
Ruhnu Island part of Latvia on the basis of the historical inclusion of Ruhnu 
into the Latvian territorial waters and into the Courland Duchy, as well as by the 
fact that the lighthouse and radio station located on the island are important for 
navigation to/from Riga.197 
According to the letter sent by the Estonian Navy captain Rudolf Schiller to 
the Estonian Prime Minister on May 10th, 1919, the Latvian Prime Minister 
Kārlis Ulmanis had claimed sovereignty over Ruhnu Island and had also 
declared this in notices that were presented in Courland.198 On May 27th, 1919, 
the Estonian Ministry of the Interior sent a sea-expedition from Tallinn to 
Ruhnu that landed on the island on June 3rd, carrying cash and trade for bar-
gaining with the islanders.199 On the next day, after hearing a speech given in 
Swedish by the Estonian secretary for the Swedish minority Nikolai Blees, the 
islanders’ general assembly decided to support unification with Estonia.200 At 
the presence of the local community, N. Blees then declared Ruhnu Island part 
of Estonia on behalf of the Estonian Government.201  
Latvia raised the question about the status of Ruhnu Island in the joint Esto-
nian-Latvian boundary commission headed by Colonel Tallents, but Colonel 
Tallents found that this question did not fall within the direct ambit of the com-
mission and, after Estonia refused to address this matter, he decided not to dis-
cuss it any further.202 Nevertheless, two out of the three alternative draft bound-
ary lines (from May 31st and June 1st, 1920) concerning the Estonian-Latvian 
border town Valga, as prepared by the boundary sub-commission on Valga 
(headed by Colonel Robinson), proposed to cede Ruhnu Island to Latvia in 
exchange for a more favourable solution for Estonia in Valga.203 Estonia did not 
approve any of the three draft proposals.204 
The Latvian delegation also raised questions about the status of Ruhnu on 
August 31st, 1920 during the Buldur (Riga) Conference between Estonia, Fin-
land, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The Latvian delegation found that Latvia 
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has an economic, strategic and ethnic right over the island.205 The Latvian repre-
sentative proposed to decide on the sovereignty over Ruhnu Island separately 
from the other sections of the Estonian-Latvian boundary, but Estonia again 
refused.206  
On July 15th, 1921 the Latvian minister of foreign affairs sent a letter to his 
Estonian counterpart in which he enumerated geographic, navigational, security, 
historical and economic arguments in favour of Latvia’s title over Ruhnu 
Island.207 He concluded: 
 
“Taking into consideration these geographical, economic and historical observa-
tions, my Government cannot renounce Runo Island and in the final delimitation 
of the maritime boundary between our States, the island of Runo must be 
attributed to Latvia.”208 
 
Pursuant to the Estonian Government’s decision of August 5th, 1921, the Esto-
nian Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified Latvia that the territorial status of 
Ruhnu Island is not a subject matter of the joint boundary commission and that 
this question may only be discussed between the two States by diplomatic 
channels.209 
At the same time, the Swedish local community on Ruhnu was discontent 
with the Estonian rule over the island and sent a letter to the Swedish Govern-
ment in the beginning of 1921 asking Sweden to annex the island.210 In the sum-
mer of 1921, the Estonian Prime Minister Konstantin Päts visited the island. He 
was assured by the head of the local community about the islanders’ desire to 
live either under the Swedish rule or independently.211 
Estonia’s sovereignty over Ruhnu took root as a result of the Estonian Prime 
Minister’s negotiations with the local community during his visit to the island. 
It is possible that due to the presence of a large ethnic Swedish minority in 
north-western Estonia, Sweden also favoured Estonia’s rule over Ruhnu Island 
– the representatives of Sweden had assured this to the Estonian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in 1922 as well as to the Estonian Ambassador in Latvia in 
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1923.212 Nevertheless, it was not possible to reach an agreement between Esto-
nia and Latvia on the sovereignty over Ruhnu Island.213 
On May 2nd, 1923, an Estonian Government commission – comprised of rep-
resentatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War and Interior as well as the 
Maritime Administration – upon the request of the Parliament established the 
coordinates of the boundary of the territorial waters and six base-points (out of 
142 in total) of Ruhnu Island.214 In July 1923, the Latvian foreign minister 
expressed readiness to his Estonian colleague to solve the dispute over Ruhnu 
Island by referring the question to arbitral proceedings if an agreement between 
the two States should not be reached or, alternatively, sought Estonia’s 
acceptance for establishing a Latvian radio station on the island in case a defin-
itive solution to the dispute over the island should not be reached.215 
Notwithstanding the official position of the leading Estonian politicians, 
Estonia’s sovereignty over Ruhnu Island was not taken for granted in Estonia 
even by the end of 1923. At a meeting of the Estonian officials in the Estonian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 1923, Anton Jürgenstein (the Estonian 
member of the Parliament and the representative of the Coast Guard) proposed 
to consider the cession of Ruhnu Island in exchange for 30–40 farmsteads situ-
ated in the frontier area of Võru County.216 The foreign minister Friedrich Akel 
rejected the idea and pointed out that the islanders rather preferred staying under 
the Estonian rule.217 
By the time of a bilateral conference with Estonia which commenced in Tal-
linn on October 25th, 1923, Latvia was willing to recognise Estonia’s sover-
eignty over Ruhnu Island in exchange for a monetary compensation.218 Estonia 
declined. Thus, the supplementary Convention that was concluded between 
Estonia and Latvia in Tallinn on November 1st, 1923 does not pay any reference 
to the status of Ruhnu. Nevertheless, Latvia subsequently refrained from mak-
ing any claims to its title over the island.219 Latvia recognised Ruhnu Island as 
part of Estonia under the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty.220 
As noted by Erik Franckx, islands were the determining factor in the mari-
time boundary delimitation between Estonia and Latvia.221 In particular, Ruhnu 
had a decisive role due to its location in the centre of the Gulf of Riga.222 This 
necessitates further scrutiny in view of Ruhnu’s status under Article 7(1) of the 
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LOSC in light of the legitimacy of the contemporary Estonian straight baselines 
that connect Ruhnu Island with Kihnu Island and Allirahu Islets (hist. Hullu-
rahu), as well as their significance for the maritime boundary delimitation in the 
Gulf of Riga. 
 
 
4. The Status of Ruhnu Island under Article 7(1) of the LOSC 
According to Article 7(1) of the LOSC, Ruhnu Island should be part of a fringe 
of islands in the immediate vicinity of the Estonian coast in order to draw a 
straight baseline to and from the islands. Alex Oude Elferink and Erik Franckx 
have questioned whether Ruhnu Island and its surrounding islets may be 
regarded as a fringe of islands in the immediate vicinity of the Estonian coast.223 
In case the islands of Ruhnu do not meet the criteria of Article 7(1) of the 
LOSC, States could dispute the legality of the Estonian straight baselines in the 
northern part of the Gulf of Riga. 
Lewis Alexander has noted that the LOSC lacks universal criteria for deter-
mining whether or not a baseline system follows the general direction of the 
coast.224 Likewise, it is also not settled how many islands at minimum may 
comprise “a fringe of islands”.225 The islands of Ruhnu include the main island 
and some smaller islets in its immediate vicinity. They form part of a lengthy 
chain of islands off Estonia’s western coast. The islands of West Estonian 
Archipelago are of varying size as they include some of the largest islands in 
the Baltic Sea (Saaremaa, Hiiumaa, Muhu and Vormsi) as well as over a thou-
sand smaller islands and islets.226 
The straight baseline between Ruhnu and Kihnu is approximately 29 miles 
long and the one between Ruhnu and Allirahu Islets is 24 miles long. According 
to the explanations of the Estonian foreign minister, the draft Maritime Bounda-
ries Act of Estonia was modified prior to its second reading in the Parliament in 
order to establish straight baselines with Ruhnu Island.227 He added that “It is a 
very important modification to the Government’s draft Act and introduced 
indeed by the defence committee [of the Parliament], but the Government does 
not oppose it.”228 Also, during the deliberations on the 1996 Maritime Boundary 
Treaty in the Estonian Parliament, the foreign minister, referring to the question 
of Ruhnu Island, explained that “this island may serve as a base-point only if 
the distance between it and the coast or another island is less than 24 nautical 
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miles,” and that “this would be a point on which we would have had a relatively 
weak position if the question would have been referred to the court.”229 Yet the 
views of the Estonian foreign minister do not necessarily correspond to the 
LOSC or the case law of the ICJ. 
The length of straight baselines is explicitly limited only with regard to natu-
ral entrances to bays and in connection with archipelagic States (Article 47(2) 
of the LOSC). Thus, Article 10(5) of the LOSC stipulates that where the dis-
tance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay 
exceeds 24 miles, a straight baseline of 24 miles shall be drawn within the bay 
in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of water that is possible with 
a line of that length. The straight baselines connecting Ruhnu Island with Alli-
rahu and Kihnu islands do not pertain to any natural entrance points of a bay. 
During the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea, a proposal was made to 
set the limit of 15 miles for the length of any straight baseline, but it was 
rejected.230 By that time, the ICJ had already (in 1951) noted that the attempts to 
limit the length of a straight baseline drawn at sea, analogously to the ones 
located in bays so that its length would not exceed twice the width of the territo-
rial sea of a coastal State, have been only random proposals and Norway’s 44-
miles-long straight baselines are not contrary to international law.231 
Thus, Lewis Alexander has observed that 
 
“Neither the 1958 nor the 1982 Conventions suggest a maximum limit, and the 
only potential yardstick is the 1935 Norwegian delimitation method approved by 
the ICJ. The longest line utilized by the Norwegians was the 44-mile line across 
Lopphavet.”232 
 
In State practice there are numerous examples of straight baselines exceeding 
24 miles in length, including those of European States, e.g. Iceland, Italy, Malta 
and Norway.233 Also, e.g. the straight baselines drawn by Japan in 1977 are in 
46 instances longer than 24 miles and in 21 instances longer than 40 miles 
(maximum length 62 miles), whereas the Chinese straight baselines reach even 
70 miles.234 
In spite of the omission of a limit to the length of a straight baseline in the 
LOSC, States may nevertheless provide for one in their domestic law. Up until 
the amendment of its Act on the Delimitation of Territorial Waters in 1995, 
Finland had stipulated that the length of its straight baselines does not exceed 
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twice the breadth of its territorial sea, i.e. at the time 8 miles.235 However, such 
limitations to the length of straight baselines in the domestic law of a coastal 
State are rare. Subsequent to the update of the Finnish system of straight base-
lines in 1995 (the updates are carried out after every 30 years due to the land 
uplift236), the longest Finnish straight baseline exceeds the previous limit of 24 
miles and is approximately 27 miles long.237 Similarly, the longest segment of 
the Swedish straight baseline is 30 miles,238 thus also exceeding the Estonian 
ones connecting Ruhnu Island. 
Clearly, the method of straight baselines needs to be applied restrictively and 
in conformity with the conditions stipulated in Article 7(1) of the LOSC.239 Yet, 
since Article 7(1) of the LOSC does not stipulate detailed criteria for assessing 
the legality of straight baselines,240 the position of other States on the legality of 
particular straight baselines is decisive in most cases.241 In 2016, the Inter-
national Law Association’s Committee on Baselines concluded that as much as 
half of the straight baseline claims of various States have been contested by 
other States.242 Significantly, no State, prima facie Latvia, has objected to the 
Estonian straight baselines (incl. in the Gulf of Riga).243 
However, Erik Franckx is of the view that in the 1996 Maritime Boundary 
Treaty, Estonia and Latvia did not take into account the Estonian straight base-
lines that connect Ruhnu Island. Instead, as argued by Erik Franckx, the bound-
ary line was predicated not on straight baselines, but on historical circumstances 
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Martinus Nijhoff 1998, p. 2545. 
238  Ibid, p. 2544. 
239  Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 94, paras 212–215. 
240  See also United States Department of State. Developing Standard Guidelines for 
Evaluating Straight Baselines. – Limits in the Seas, No. 106. Washington D.C: US 
Department of State 1987, pp. 17–29. 
241  See generally Churchill, Lowe, op. cit., p. 47. 
242  D. Rothwell (Rapporteur). Baselines under the International Law of the Sea (Draft 
Report). Johannesburg: International Law Association 2016, p. 17. Accessible: http:// 
www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1028 (01.12.2016). 
243  For the list of protests made against the straight baseline claims of States, see ibid, pp. 
17–21. See also US Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps. – Estonia. Summary of 
Claims. April 2014. 
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in the east of Ruhnu Island244 and on the coordinates of the islands in the section 
between Ruhnu and Allirahu.245 The 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty between 
Estonia and Latvia does not provide any indication in support of this claim. To 
the opposite, as explained below,246 Latvia tacitly recognised Estonia’s straight 
baselines in the Gulf of Riga (likewise Estonia recognised Latvia’s straight 
baselines) by concluding the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty. The boundary 
line, as agreed in the treaty, concords with the Estonian and Latvian straight 
baselines in the Gulf of Riga.247 
 
 
5. Delimitation in the Gulf of Riga 
5.1. Relevant Coasts and Baselines in the Gulf of Riga 
The geographical borders of the Gulf of Riga are the entrance of the Irbe Strait 
(to the west), the Latvian coast (to the south), the coast of Saaremaa Island (to 
the north-west), the southern ends of the Small Strait and Big Strait next to 
Muhu Island (to the north) and the mouth of the Pärnu River (to the east). In the 
centre of the Gulf of Riga lies Ruhnu Island. 
Erik Franckx has considered the geographical positioning of the coasts of the 
Gulf of Riga as complicated from the perspective of maritime boundary delim-
itation.248 The coasts in the eastern part of the Gulf of Riga are adjacent, then 
become opposite in the central and western part of the gulf, only to turn adja-
cent again in the Baltic Sea proper. 
Notwithstanding the vicinity of Latvia and Estonia, their coastlines have 
little in common in terms of Article 7(1) of the LOSC. Article 7(1) of the LOSC 
provides that in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or 
if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the 
method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in 
drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
In this regard, Estonia has many islands in the Gulf of Riga, whereas Latvia has 
none. Thus, section 1(10) of the Latvian Law on the State Border does not refer 
to any straight baselines connecting islands or enclosing bays. It defines a base-
line in the Baltic Sea as “the maximum low-water line and straight lines which 
connect the points of the hydrotechnical structures or other structures located on 
the opposite side of a specific port, which are located further towards the 
                                                                          
244  Presumably, the limited boundary line as agreed upon in the afore-referred Article 1(a) 
of the 1923 protocol to the 1923 Supplementary Convention on the Estonian-Latvian 
Frontier Questions. 
245  See Franckx 2002, op. cit., p. 3007. 
246  See infra section 5.2 of Part II. 
247  See 1996 Agreement on the Maritime Delimitation in the Gulf of Riga, the Strait of Irbe 
and the Baltic Sea, op. cit. See also maps 5 and 6 in Annex 1. 
248  Franckx 2002, op. cit., p. 2996. 
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sea.”249 Nevertheless, under a 2010 government decree, Latvia has still estab-
lished four sections of straight baselines connecting points along its relatively 
smooth coast in the Gulf of Riga. One of these sections is located on the oppo-
site coast of Ruhnu and runs from the northernmost point of the Courland Pen-
insula many miles southwards.250 
The Latvian coast comprises only coastal land, whereas the most influential 
features on the Estonian coast are islands – primarily Saaremaa and Ruhnu, but 
also Kihnu along with its adjacent Mani and Sorgu islets as well as the Abruka 
(hist. Abro) archipelago composing of Abruka and Vahase (hist. Wahesoo) 
islands and Linnusitamaa, Kasse, Kirju islets in the north-western part of the 
Gulf of Riga. Similarly, in terms of maritime delimitation, the Allirahu Islets 
close to Abruka were of great relevance. This applies also to the Estonian 
Vesitükimaa Islets that are located in the vicinity of the southernmost point of 
the Sõrve Peninsula in the Irbe Strait. 
Due to the complex coastline of the Gulf of Riga, Estonia and Latvia 
employed a wide array of maritime boundary delimitation methods in order to 
reach an equitable solution. Unlike in the maritime boundary delimitation 
between Estonia and the Russian Federation, in the course of which, arguably, 
only the equidistance rule was applied,251 the various sections of the maritime 
boundary between Estonia and Latvia reflect the use of most of the common 
methods for maritime boundary delimitation. 
The maritime boundary between Estonia and Latvia is thus determined not 
only by the application of the equidistance method, as stipulated in Article 15 of 
the LOSC, but also by other methods that fall under the rule as stipulated in 
Article 15 of the LOSC: special circumstances, parallel line, enclaving and per-
pendicular line methods. Next, the application of these methods to the maritime 
boundary delimitation between Estonia and Latvia will be studied more care-
fully with respect to, first, the western part of the Gulf of Riga and, secondly, 
the eastern part of the Gulf of Riga.  
 
 
 
                                                                          
249  On the State Border of the Republic of Latvia. Adopted 12.11.2009, e.i.f. 02.12.2009, 
section 1(10). Accessible: http://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/ 
On_the_State_Border_of_the_Republic_of_Latvia.doc (01.09.2016). 
250  See map 6 in Annex 1. 
251  See Article 1 of the Treaty on the Delimitation of Maritime Areas of Narva Bay and the 
Gulf of Finland between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation. 
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5.2. Delimitation in the Western Part of the Gulf of Riga:  
The Application of the Perpendicular and Equidistance Lines,  
Special Circumstances and Enclaving 
The maritime boundary between Estonia and Latvia in the Baltic Sea proper 
runs as a perpendicular line from the tripoint252 of the Estonian, Latvian and 
Swedish common maritime boundary directly to south-east until it reaches the 
median line of the Irbe Strait.253 The perpendicular line (a direct line as drawn 
from the coast following the general direction of the relevant coasts254) is thus 
relatively long, since the tripoint is situated close to the northernmost point of 
the Swedish Gotland Island.255 
It has been argued that navigational interests influenced the maritime delim-
itation in the Irbe Strait and inspired its coastal States not to use equidistant 
points, but instead refer to the shipping channel which runs closer to the Latvian 
coast on the Courland Peninsula.256 This would imply the use of the thalweg 
method by Estonia and Latvia in the Irbe Strait. Pursuant to the thalweg method, 
the boundary line should follow the lowest points along the shipping route or 
river bed.257 Yoshifumi Tanaka has noted that 
 
“In light of the limited State practice available and the small number of cases, the 
usefulness of the thalweg in the context of maritime delimitation is not evident. 
In addition, few writers support this system as a general rule for maritime delim-
itation. /.../ Owing to the insufficiency of State practice and these practical prob-
lems, the thalweg system appears to be too unstable to serve as a general rule.”258 
 
                                                                          
252  The tripoint was agreed by Estonia, Latvia and Sweden in a treaty concluded shortly 
after the entry into force of the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty. See Agreement between 
the Government of the Republic of Estonia, the Government of the Republic of Latvia 
and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on the Common Maritime Boundary 
Point in the Baltic Sea. Stockholm 30.04.1997, e.i.f. 20.02.1998. See generally on the 
tripoint agreement in E. Franckx. Estonia-Latvia-Sweden. Report No. 10-17. – Charney, 
Smith (eds), op. cit., pp. 3041–3055. 
253  See map 5 in Annex 1.  
254  See also e.g. the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-
Bissau, 14 February 1985, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XIX, pp. 149–
196. The Grisbådarna Case (Norway v. Sweden), Award of the Tribunal, 23.10.1909,  
p. 6. 
255  See map in E. Franckx. Two More Maritime Boundary Agreements Concluded in the 
Eastern Baltic Sea in 1997. – 13 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
1998(2), p. 275. 
256  Franckx 2002, op. cit., p. 3004. 
257  See generally on the thalweg method in Taska 1974, op. cit., p. 126. A. Piip. Rahvus-
vaheline õigus. Tartu: Akadeemiline Kooperatiiv 1936, p. 175. On the historical develop-
ment of the thalweg method, see Tanaka 2006, op. cit., pp. 28–31 and S. M. Rhee. Sea 
Boundary Delimitation between States before World War II. – 76 The American Journal 
of International Law 1982, pp. 561–564, 578–579. 
258  Tanaka 2006, op. cit., p. 31. 
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However, the thalweg method may in principle be a stable and effective method 
of maritime boundary delimitation concerning prima facie shallow straits. Such 
straits may include a shipping channel that follows a relatively direct line. In 
this regard, the Irbe Strait provides a good example. 
The depth of the Irbe Strait is mostly 5–10 meters and may thus be danger-
ous for larger ships. However, the southern part of the Irbe Strait includes a 
narrow shipping channel with a depth of 20–23 m.259 In case the concerns about 
safe navigation would have been paramount, then the boundary line in the Irbe 
Strait should have followed generally the lowest points of the Irbe Strait’s sea-
bed. Thus, the application of the thalweg method would have implied that the 
boundary line should have been drawn south of the equidistance line between 
the Estonian and Latvian coasts on the Sõrve Peninsula and the Courland Penin-
sula, respectively.  
However, the navigational concerns did not influence the boundary delimi-
tation in the Irbe Strait and the thalweg method was not applied. The maritime 
boundary in the Irbe Strait is an equidistant line as measured from the Estonian 
straight baselines that connect the southern cape of the Vesitükimaa islet with a 
rock situated south-west of the Kaavi Cape (to the east), as well as with a rock 
south-west of the Loode Cape (to the west).260 The fact that the equidistance 
method was used in the Irbe Strait was also confirmed by the Estonian foreign 
minister during the reading of the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty in the Esto-
nian Parliament.261 The equidistance line in the Irbe Strait is located in a rela-
tively deep maritime area east of the centre of the strait (depths ranging from 20 
m to slightly over 30 m), whereas in the western part of the strait the boundary 
crosses the relatively shallow waters adjacent to the southern end of the Sõrve 
Shelf, including the Ivanovski Shelf, which is only 5 m deep.262 
Under the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty, there is no divergence between 
the boundary line and the equidistance line in the western part of the Gulf of 
Riga, since the coastal States of the Gulf of Riga decided to draw the equidis-
tance line in the Gulf of Riga and in the Irbe Strait on the basis of the Estonian 
and Latvian straight and normal baselines.263 The boundary line, as agreed 
between Estonia and Latvia, coincides with the equidistance line, including in 
                                                                          
259  2001 chart “Väinameri (West-Estonian Archipelago)”. Charts of Estonia, vol. 2. Tallinn: 
Estonian Maritime Administration 2001, p. 8. See also Eesti Nõukogude Entsüklopeedia, 
vol. 3. – Irbe väin. Tallinn: Valgus 1988, p. 673. 
260  For the coordinates of the points of straight baselines, see Annex 1 of the Estonian 
Maritime Boundaries Act, op. cit. For the boundary line as measured from the Estonian 
straight baselines and the Latvian smooth mainland coast on the Courland Peninsula, see 
Charts of Estonia, vol. 3. Tallinn: Estonian Maritime Administration 2002, p. 8. 
261  Stenographic record of the First Reading of the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty in the 
Estonian Parliament, op. cit. 
262  Maritime Administration. Charts of Estonia 2002, op. cit., p. 8. 
263  Unlike e.g. in the maritime boundary delimitation between Estonia and the Russian 
Federation, in the course of which only base points on the coast were recognised. 
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the maritime area between the eastern coast of the Courland Peninsula and 
Ruhnu Island.264 
Therefore, the equidistance line, as defined in Article 15 of the LOSC, was 
applied in the maritime area ranging from the Irbe Strait to south of Ruhnu 
Island. In this maritime area, the most influential coastal features regarding the 
baselines of the equidistance line were Latvia’s Courland Peninsula, as well as 
Estonia’s Allirahu Islets close to the Abruka archipelago in addition to Ruhnu 
Island.265 According to Artur Taska the equidistance line had been used by Esto-
nia and Latvia in the less than 24-miles-wide maritime area between the Cour-
land Peninsula and Ruhnu Island already in the 1920s under the legal frame-
work of the 1925 Helsinki Convention.266 
Only the turning points number 11 and 12 between the Abruka archipelago 
and the Kolka Cape have been adjusted, presumably due to navigational needs. 
Namely, if the boundary line in this section would have restrictively followed 
the end point of the Estonian straight baseline connecting the Kaavi Cape with 
Allirahu Islets, as well as the starting point of the straight baseline connecting 
Allirahu Islets with Ruhnu Island, then it would have created an acute-angled 
turning point in the middle of the Gulf of Riga similarly to the one shown on the 
1931 Estonian map depicting the Frontière between Estonia and Latvia.267 This 
would not have been in line with navigational interests since e.g. the Estonian 
vessels transiting from the Irbe Strait to Ruhnu Island through the Estonian 
waters would have been required to take an unreasonably long route and follow 
the acute-angled turning point.268 The turning points number 11 and 12 thus 
provide for a smoother boundary line. 
The delimitation methods used in the western and the eastern part of the Gulf 
of Riga resulted in a partial enclave of Ruhnu Island. The territorial sea of 
Ruhnu Island is 12 miles wide, except for a short section bordering the Cour-
land Peninsula where the equidistance method was used. According to the Esto-
nian foreign minister, the position of Latvia during the maritime delimitation 
negotiations was to draw a line from the end point of the land boundary on the 
eastern coast of the Gulf of Riga westwards along the 58th parallel (north) up to 
                                                                          
264  The outcome differs if one disregards the system of straight baselines and uses instead 
basepoints on the coast. See the map in Franckx 2002, op. cit., p. 3013 and argu-
mentation on the sraight baselines in ibid, p. 3007. 
265  See Annex 1 of the Estonian Maritime Boundaries Act, op. cit., as well as the 2002 chart 
“Liivi laht/Gulf of Riga”. Estonian Maritime Administration. Charts of Estonia 2002, op. 
cit., p. 20. See also the map on Latvia’s straight baselines in map 6 in Annex 1. 
266  Convention for the Suppression of the Contraband Traffic in Alcoholic Liquors. Helsinki 
19.08.1925, e.i.f. 24.12.1925. See Eesti lepingud wälisriikidega, vol. 5 (1925–1926). 
Tallinn: Tallinna Eesti Kirjastus-Ühisus 1926, pp. 301–307. See Treaty 1 in Annex 2 for 
the authentic text of the convention in French and Estonian. Taska 1974, op. cit., pp. 62, 
131. On the legal framework of the 1925 Helsinki Convention see in more detail infra 
section 1.3 of Part IV. 
267  1931 map of western Estonia, op. cit. 
268  Notably, Latvia does not recognise the right of innocent passage of foreign warships in 
conformity with the LOSC. See infra section 3 of chapter 1 in Part III. 
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the Irbe Strait, only to enclave Ruhnu Island by according it a 3-miles-wide 
territorial sea.269 Although Ruhnu Island was attributed a 12-miles-wide territo-
rial sea in the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty, the island’s 12-miles-wide ter-
ritorial sea was still mostly left surrounded by the Latvian waters from east, 
south and west.270 
Thus, the enclaving method was used in the maritime boundary delimitation 
for delimiting the maritime boundary between Estonia and Latvia in the waters 
surrounding Ruhnu Island. This did not result in a full enclave. In case of full 
enclave, an island’s (partial) maritime zone is wholly bordered with foreign 
maritime waters. However, this is not the case with Ruhnu Island since it is 
connected with Estonian internal waters and territorial sea to the north-west, 
north and north-east. Hence, Ruhnu Island is partially enclaved.271 This is also 
influenced by the acute-angled turning point of the boundary east of Ruhnu. The 
reasons for the establishment of the acute-angled turning point are examined 
next. For understanding the boundary line in the eastern part of the Gulf of 
Riga, it is above all necessary to take into account historical circumstances. 
 
 
5.3. Delimitation in the Eastern Part of the Gulf of Riga 
5.3.1. The Application of a Prior Partial Territorial Sea Boundary 
The maritime boundary delimitation between Estonia and Latvia has been 
referred to in the legal literature as one of the examples in State practice that 
concerns historical considerations.272 Namely, as discussed earlier,273 a small 
section of the territorial sea in the Ikla-Ainaži section had been delimited by 
Estonia and Latvia already in 1923. However, reference to this partial delimita-
tion does not amount to the use of historic title in the 1996 maritime boundary 
delimitation.274 It simply means that Estonia and Latvia had to delimit the 
remaining part of the territorial sea beyond that partial boundary. 
According to the LOSC Annex VII Tribunal, the concept of historic title 
over sea refers to an area of sea claimed exceptionally as internal waters (or, 
possibly, as territorial sea) on the basis of historical circumstances.275 
The LOSC Annex VII Tribunal has noted that historic title should be distin-
guished from historic rights: 
                                                                          
269  Stenographic record of the First Reading of the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty in the 
Estonian Parliament, op. cit. 
270  See map 5 in Annex 1. 
271  See generally United Nations. Handbook on the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries. 
New York 2000, p. 59. 
272  Franckx 2002, op. cit., pp. 2997–2998, 3007. 
273  See supra section 2 of Part II. 
274  For claims of sovereignty over particular islands in the South China Sea on the basis of 
historic title: see South China Sea Arbitration, op. cit., para 272. See also Van Dyke 
2009, op. cit., pp. 63–65. 
275  South China Sea Arbitration, op. cit., paras 221, 226. See also Fisheries Case 1951, op. 
cit., p. 130.  
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“The term ʻhistoric rights’ is general in nature and can describe any rights that a 
State may possess that would not normally arise under the general rules of inter-
national law, absent particular historical circumstances. Historic rights may 
include sovereignty, but may equally include more limited rights, such as fishing 
rights or rights of access, that fall well short of a claim of sovereignty. ʻHistoric 
title’, in contrast, is used specifically to refer to historical sovereignty to land or 
maritime areas.”276 
 
The Tribunal has also clarified that the formation of the historic title requires 
the continuous exercise of this exceptional claim and acquiescence on the part 
of other affected States.277 These conditions are not met with regard to the mari-
time delimitation in the eastern Gulf of Riga. 
Pursuant to Article I of the 1992 Treaty on the Re-Establishment of the 
Boundary between Estonia and Latvia, the treaties and other legal acts con-
cluded between the two States in the 1920s and 1930s served as the basis for 
their post-1991 boundary. Although the maritime boundary between Estonia 
and Latvia was not the object of the 1992 treaty, it nevertheless had great sig-
nificance for the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Riga, 
which is exemplified by the reference to the 1992 Treaty on the Re-Establish-
ment of the Boundary in the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty.278 
In particular, pursuant to Article 1(a) of the Protocol appended to the 1923 
Supplementary Convention on the Estonian-Latvian Frontier Question, the 
maritime boundary between the two States was drawn from the end point of the 
land boundary to north-east for over 3 miles and ran essentially in parallel with 
the 660-metre-long Ainaži port’s northern jetty, the construction of which was 
finished in 1928.279 Then the boundary line, as agreed under the 1996 Maritime 
Boundary Treaty, turns south-west and runs in that direction for approximately 
0.5 miles.280 The end-point of this section of the maritime boundary (turning 
point number 3) was referred to by the Estonian and Latvian delegations in the 
negotiations as “the historical border point at sea”.281 In order to also guarantee 
entrance to the Ainaži port for modern ships with a deeper draught, the length of 
the historical Estonian-Latvian partial pre-1940 maritime boundary was now 
extended 0.5 miles on the basis of the principles stipulated in Article 1(a) of the 
Protocol appended to the 1923 Supplementary Convention, so as to reach a total 
of 4 miles.282 Thus, this 4-miles-long section of the Estonian-Latvian maritime 
boundary (from the end point of the land boundary up to turning point number 
3) was delimited on the basis of a previous partial territorial sea boundary (in 
light of the Protocol appended to the 1923 Supplementary Convention). 
                                                                          
276  South China Sea Arbitration, op. cit., para 225. 
277  Ibid, para 265. 
278  Franckx 2002, op. cit., p. 2998. 
279  See in more detail supra section 2 of Part II. 
280  See map 5 in Annex 1. 
281  See Franckx 2002, op. cit., p. 2998. 
282  Ibid, p. 3004. 
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However, the remaining section of the eastern part of the Gulf of Riga up to 
the territorial sea of Ruhnu Island was not delimited on the basis of the previous 
partial territorial sea boundary. These waters had been high seas prior to 1940 
and had not been subject to any specific agreement by the States. In this part  
of the maritime area, the parallel line method was used for delimiting the 
boundary. 
 
 
5.3.2. The Application of the Parallel Line Method 
After the 4-miles-long historical boundary, the section of the boundary line 
between its turning points no. 3 and 4 runs as a straight line in the east-west 
direction and is mostly based on the parallel line method. The use of the parallel 
line method enabled to allocate a large maritime area between Ruhnu Island and 
the eastern mainland coast to Latvia. If the States had applied the equdistance 
method instead, this maritime area would have consequently fallen to the Esto-
nian side of the boundary, as the Latvian coast is relatively distant in compari-
son with the Estonian islands Ruhnu and Kihnu, as well as the straight baseline 
which connects them and nearly crosses the terminus of the parallel line.283 
Upon Latvia’s proposal Estonia and Latvia took the “historical border point 
at sea” (turning point no 3 as the starting point for drawing an approximately 
20-miles-long straight line to the west in parallel with the nearby 58th parallel 
north.284 The application of the parallel line method was possible since the east-
ern coast of the Gulf of Riga, which runs almost directly from north to south, is 
smooth and adjacent. 
Notably, the application of the parallel line method is in State practice gen-
erally common for delimiting more distant maritime areas, e.g. in oceans.285 
This relates to the fact that due to its simplicity, the parallel line may not be 
sufficiently accurate and nuanced for reaching an equitable solution.286 Hence, 
the application of the parallel line method by Estonia and Latvia may be consid-
                                                                          
283  By contrast, Erik Franckx has found that the Estonian-Latvian maritime boundary up to 
its turning point number 4, which is located approximately 24 miles west of the end point 
of the land boundary, is based on the historical boundary which was agreed in Article 
1(a) of the Protocol to the 1923 Supplementary Convention. See Franckx 2002, op. cit., 
pp. 2998, 3008. 
284  Stenographic record of the Second Reading of the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty in the 
Estonian Parliament, op. cit. 
285  E.g. Agreement between Portugal and Spain on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone. Lissabon 12.02.1976, not yet ratified. Treaty on the Delimitation 
of Marine and Submarine Areas and Related Matters between the Republic of Panama 
and the Republic of Colombia. Cartagena 20.11.1976, e.i.f. 30.11.1977. Exchange of 
Notes between the United Republic of Tanzania and Kenya concerning the Delimitation 
of the Territorial Waters Boundary between the two States. Dodoma/Nairobi 17.12.1975, 
e.i.f. 09.07.1976. 
286  See United Nations Handbook on the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries, op. cit.,  
p. 57. 
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ered as a rare example of its use for the delimitation of a relatively narrow mar-
itime area. 
The parallel line ends by reaching the boundary’s turning point number 4 
which demarcates the outer limit of the 12-miles-wide territorial sea of Ruhnu 
Island. Also, at this point, the maritime boundary almost overlaps with the 
Estonian straight baseline as drawn between the islands of Ruhnu and Kihnu. 
During the reading of the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty, members of the 
Estonian Parliament proposed to modify the parallel line so as to exclude the 
acute-angled triangle which results from the crossing of the parallel line with 
the territorial sea of Ruhnu Island.287 Navigation as a special circumstance in 
terms of Article 15 of the LOSC would have provided sufficient legal grounds 
for such modification of the boundary line. However, it is likely that the appli-
cation of the parallel line east of Ruhnu Island was part of a package deal by 
which Latvia also recognised the 12-miles-wide territorial sea of Ruhnu Island. 
This would explain why it was not adjusted to navigational needs. 
The Estonian foreign minister was questioned by the members of the Parlia-
ment during the first reading of the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty about the 
potential for a compromise with Latvia for excluding the possibility of Estonian 
ships sailing the Ruhnu-Pärnu waterway in this acute angle to accidentally enter 
the Latvian territorial sea.288 The foreign minister admitted in his later reply 
during the second reading in the Parliament that “it is uncommon in State prac-
tice that an acute triangle is agreed upon in the maritime boundary” as he also 
noted that the proposal made by the Estonian delegation in the course of the 
negotiations to discuss this question further was rejected by Latvia, since it con-
sidered this “neither necessary nor reasonable”.289 At the same time, the Latvian 
Government confirmed that it recognises the right of innocent passage of Esto-
nian ships in this maritime area in accordance with the LOSC.290 
The application of the parallel line method to the maritime boundary delim-
itation in the eastern part of the Gulf of Riga may also be explained by the 
unanticipated fact that in terms of Article 3 of the LOSC, this approximately 20-
miles-wide maritime area (between turning points no. 3 and 4) of the eastern 
part of the Gulf of Riga does not include the territorial sea of Estonia nor Lat-
via. Instead, it was an area in which both Estonia and Latvia could potentially 
have established their EEZ. Yet since Ruhnu Island was attributed only partial 
effect and thus its potential EEZ was omitted, this part of the maritime area fell 
completely under the Latvian EEZ. 
 
 
                                                                          
287  Stenographic record of the First Reading of the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty in the 
Estonian Parliament, op. cit. 
288  Ibid. 
289  Stenographic record of the Second Reading of the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty in the 
Estonian Parliament, op. cit. 
290  Ibid. 
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6. The EEZ in the Gulf of Riga 
The coastal States of the Gulf of Riga (Estonia and Latvia) are not entitled to 
wholly cover the Gulf of Riga with their territorial sea. The Estonian system of 
straight baselines, which is based on the Sõrve Peninsula, Allirahu Islets, Ruhnu 
Island and Kihnu Island, only excludes the possibility of the existence of a nar-
row belt of an EEZ in the Estonian maritime area of the Gulf of Riga. Such an 
EEZ would have otherwise spanned the middle of the triangular area between 
the islands of Abruka, Kihnu and Ruhnu (north-west, north and north-east of 
Ruhnu). 
As analysed above, Latvia tacitly recognised Estonia’s system of straight 
baselines in the Gulf of Riga by agreeing to draw the equidistance line on the 
basis of them. Both States might have presumed that they managed to exclude 
an EEZ from the Gulf of Riga, including in the Latvian maritime area.291 Lat-
via’s rejection of the Estonian system of straight baselines in the Gulf of Riga 
on the basis of a claim that they are excessive and illegitimate under Article 
7(1) of the LOSC would likely have established the cornerstone for any parallel 
legal regime of passage rights in the Gulf of Riga for foreign ships and aircraft. 
The rejection of Estonia’s straight baselines, which would have signalled Lat-
via’s protest against the inclusion of the maritime area north of Ruhnu Island 
into Estonia’s internal waters, would not have been in the interest of Latvia as it 
would have indicated for third States the means for enjoying the right of transit 
passage in the Gulf of Riga. By submitting protests against Estonia’s straight 
baselines (as established under its domestic law) in the Gulf of Riga, the ships 
and aircraft of foreign States could have claimed the right of transit passage in 
this maritime area.292 
The applicability of the right of transit passage in the Gulf of Riga would 
have potentially impacted Latvia as much as Estonia. Thus, by tacitly recognis-
ing Estonia’s straight baselines in the course of the maritime boundary delimi-
tation in the Gulf of Riga, Latvia effectively contributed to mooting any poten-
tial discussion on the applicability of the transit passage regime to foreign ships 
and aircraft in the Gulf of Riga. Yet this co-operation (either intentional or by 
default) between the two States would have been truly effective only if the 
potential for an EEZ in the Latvian maritime area would have been excluded. 
This is not the case. The Latvian maritime area does not include any 
islands,293 which has resulted in the relatively sizeable EEZ in the Gulf of Riga 
proper. The south-eastern part of the Gulf of Riga includes a belt of an EEZ 
which is approximately 40 miles long and up to 25 miles wide.294 This maritime 
area falls outside of Latvia’s 12-miles-wide territorial sea. Also, since the Esto-
nian territorial sea, as measured from the straight baseline connecting the 
                                                                          
291  See infra section 2 of chapter 1 in Part III. 
292  See also infra section 4.2 of chapter 1 in Part III. 
293  Notably, close to the Kolka Cape is located a Latvian artificial island which includes a 
lighthouse. 
294  See map 6 in Annex 1. 
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islands of Ruhnu and Kihnu, could have covered only a small northern part of 
the EEZ area,295 the exclusion of the EEZ in the Gulf of Riga could not have 
been possible by means of transferring sovereignty that Estonia would other-
wise have had over this area to Latvia analogously to the 1990 Bering Sea 
Treaty296 or the 2010 Barents Sea Treaty.297 Likewise, the delimitation of the 
boundary line, by which both States would have agreed to incorporate northern 
parts of the current Latvian EEZ adjacent to the Estonian straight baseline 
between Ruhnu Island and Kihnu Island into the Estonian waters while com-
pensating this in the other sections of the maritime boundary, could not have 
excluded the existence of an EEZ in the Gulf of Riga. 
Neither does the domestic law of Latvia provide that its maritime area in the 
Gulf of Riga falls entirely under Latvia’s sovereignty, i.e. under its territorial 
sea and internal waters. Initially, section 4 of the December 1990 Latvian Law 
On the Border stipulated in accordance with Article 3 of the LOSC that “Among 
the territorial waters of the Republic of Latvia shall be regarded the waters of 
the Baltic Sea to the width of 12 sea miles, counting from the maximum low 
tide line from the Latvian coast.“298 Subsequent to the 1996 Maritime Boundary 
Treaty with Estonia, the corresponding provision on the width of the territorial 
sea was amended and provided as of 1998 that “The territorial sea of the Repub-
lic of Latvia, unless specified otherwise in bilateral agreements, shall be the 
waters 12 nautical miles wide measured from the base line.”299 In 2009, the new 
Latvian Law on the Border entered into force which defines in section 1(9) the 
territorial sea of Latvia as “the waters of the Baltic Sea and of the Gulf of Riga 
of the Baltic Sea in width of 12 nautical miles, counting from the base line, if it 
has not been otherwise specified by international agreements”.300 
                                                                          
295  See maps 5 and 6 in Annex 1. 
296  Article 3 of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the maritime boundary. Washington 01.06.1990, not yet 
ratified. Accessible: http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ 
PDFFILES/TREATIES/USA-RUS1990MB.PDF (01.09.2016). 
297  Article 3 of the Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation 
Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean. Murmansk 15.09.2010, e.i.f. 07.07.2011. Accessible: http://www.un.org/depts/ 
los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/NOR-RUS2010.PDF  
(01.09.2016). See also Ø. Jensen. The Barents Sea: Treaty between the Kingdom of 
Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation 
in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. – 26 The International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 2011(1), p. 155. 
298  Law of the Republic of Latvia „On the Border of the Republic of Latvia“. Adopted 
December 1990, e.i.f. 10.12.1990. Accessible: http://www.un.org/depts/los/ 
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/LVA.htm (01.09.2016). 
299  State Border Law of the Republic of Latvia. Adopted 27.10.1994, e.i.f. 10.11.1994, 
section 4(1) subsequent to the 14.10.1998 amendment. Accessible: http:// 
www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/State_Border_Law_of_the_Rep
ublic_of_Latvia.doc (01.09.2016). 
300  Section 1(9) of the Act on the State Border of the Republic of Latvia, op. cit. 
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Until quite recently, an authoritative map on the Latvian maritime zones in 
the Gulf of Riga was not readily available. Yet on July 13th, 2011, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations communicated to all Member States of the 
United Nations that Latvia had two weeks earlier deposited with him, pursuant 
to Article 16(2) of the LOSC, maps showing the baselines and the outer limits 
of Latvia’s territorial sea, including the lines of delimitation, as well as a list of 
geographical coordinates of points defining Latvia’s baselines.301 The Latvian 
map depicts the limits of the EEZ in the south-eastern part of the Gulf of 
Riga.302  
                                                                          
301  M.Z.N.84.2011.LOS (Maritime Zone Notification). Accessible: http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/mzn_s/mzn84ef.pdf 
(01.09.2016). 
302  See map 6 in Annex 1. 
76 
PART III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OUTER  
LIMITS OF MARITIME ZONES FOR THE LEGAL  
REGIME OF THE ESTONIAN STRAITS 
It has not always been unequivocal that the Gulf of Riga includes an EEZ in the 
Latvian maritime zone. As subsequent analysis shows, many authors have 
examined the passage rights in the Gulf of Riga and the Irbe Strait from the 
perspective of innocent passage. None of them has taken into account the Lat-
vian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga.303 The significance that the Latvian EEZ next to 
Ruhnu Island has on the legal regime of the Irbe Strait and on the Gulf of Riga 
is discussed next. In particular, it is also examined how a potential change in the 
outer limits of the Estonian and/or Latvian maritime zones may result in the 
further alteration of the passage regime in the Irbe Strait and in the Gulf of 
Riga. The significance of the outer limits of maritime zones for the legal regime 
of straits is later in this part of the study also scrutinised in the example of the 
Gulf of Finland. 
 
 
Chapter 1. The Irbe Strait in the Gulf of Riga 
1. The Characteristics of the Irbe Strait 
The Irbe Strait (Estonian: Kura kurk or Irbe väin; Latvian: Irbes jūras šaurums) 
connects the Baltic Sea proper with the Gulf of Riga. It lies between the Esto-
nian Sõrve Peninsula and the Latvian Courland Peninsula and stretches from the 
Ovisi lighthouse in the west to the Abruka meridian in the east.304 
The shallow strait is in its western part generally 5 to 10 m deep due to the 
almost continuous belt of shallows extending from the Latvian coast to the tip 
of the Estonian Sõrve Peninsula.305 However, its narrow shipping channel is 20–
23 m deep.306 Due to the relatively shallow depth and low salinity of the Gulf of 
Riga, the strait is often covered with ice; the Gulf of Riga freezes completely 
over in about a third of winters and the ice cover may last from January to 
April.307 However, even the bays (e.g. Pärnu Bay) of the Gulf of Riga are never 
covered with ice for most of the year. This excludes the applicability of the 
                                                                          
303  This is the general trend. E.g. the maps of the Baltic Marine Environment Protection 
(Helsinki) Commission do not depict the Latvian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga; this maritime 
area has been widely deemed to include only the territorial sea boundary of Estonia and 
Latvia. See e.g. the various maps presented in the Helsinki Commission’s reports on 
shipping accidents in the Baltic Sea area. Accessible: http://helcom.fi/action-areas/ 
shipping/publications (01.09.2016). 
304  Eesti Entsüklopeedia. – Kura kurk. Accessible in Estonian at: http://entsyklopeedia.ee/ 
artikkel/kura_kurk1 (01.09.2016). 
305  The depths in the eastern end of the Irbe Strait reach up to 30 m. 
306  Tea Entsüklopeedia, vol. 11. – Kura kurk. Tallinn: Tea 2014, p. 145. 
307  Eesti Entsüklopeedia, vol. 8, op. cit., Riia laht, p. 128. Eesti Nõukogude Entsüklopeedia, 
vol. 3, op. cit., p. 673. 
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special legal regime of ice-covered areas (Article 234 of the LOSC) to the Gulf 
of Riga.308 
The international sealane of the Irbe Strait leads to the ports of inter alia 
Riga, Pärnu, Kuressaare, Roomassaare and Virtsu. The Irbe Strait has heavy 
traffic, reaching over 10 000 ships a year in 2011 and 2012.309 In 2013, the ship 
traffic crossings in the Irbe Strait amounted to 9639 as compared with the Viro 
Strait’s 38 150 crossings, Øresund’s 29 474 crossings, the Great Belt’s 18 478 
crossings and the Åland Strait’s 14 433 crossings.310 In 2014, the 815-years-old 
Riga port alone accommodated 3797 vessels.311 At the same time, the Irbe Strait 
falls entirely under the European network of nature protection areas (Natura 
2000) and includes the Estonian nature reserve of Vesitükimaa Islets (216,4 ha) 
which is located at the tip of the Sõrve Peninsula. It is an important nesting area 
for sea birds and also has a grey seals’ habitat.312 
At its narrowest section, the Irbe Strait is 14.5 miles wide. The Irbe Strait 
falls entirely within the territorial sea of its coastal States Estonia and Latvia. 
Thus, the Irbe Strait meets the geographic and functional criteria of an inter-
national strait as it is used for international shipping and its width is up to 24 
miles. 
 
 
2. Straits of the Gulf of Riga Linking Two Parts of an EEZ 
The Irbe Strait and the Sea of Straits may potentially fall under the transit pas-
sage regime since they connect the Latvian/Swedish/Estonian/Finnish EEZs in 
the Baltic Sea proper with the Latvian EEZ in the south-eastern part of the Gulf 
of Riga.313 In this case, the right of transit passage would apply also in maritime 
areas that lead to such international straits or from such international straits to 
the respective EEZ, such as the northern part of the Gulf of Riga.314 This would 
                                                                          
308  For a discussion on Article 234 of the LOSC, see supra section 2.2 of Part I. 
309  See the maps and figures in Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission. Report 
on shipping accidents in the Baltic Sea area during 2011. Helsinki 2011, pp. 2–5. Baltic 
Marine Environment Protection Commission. Report on shipping accidents in the Baltic 
Sea area during 2012. Helsinki 2012, pp. 3–7. The figures do not include small craft. 
Accessible: http://helcom.fi/action-areas/shipping/publications (01.11.2015). 
310  Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission. Report on shipping accidents in the 
Baltic Sea area during 2013. Helsinki 2014, p. 3. Accessible: http://helcom.fi/action-
areas/shipping/publications (01.11.2015). 
311  See About Port. – Freeport of Riga Authority, 2015. Accessible: http://www.rop.lv/en 
(01.09.2016).  
312  See also M. Kuris (koost). Vesitükimaa laidude, Vesitükimaa hoiuala ja Kura kurgu 
hoiuala kaitsekorralduskava 2016–2025. Tallinn: Keskkonnaamet 2015, pp. 7–8. 
313  On the legal regime of transit passage see supra section 1.2 of Part I. 
314  See also A. R. Thomas, J. C. Duncan. Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. – 73 International Law Studies 1999, p. 183. 
Schachte, Jr, Bernhardt, op. cit., p. 536. R. I. Clove. Submarine Navigation in Inter-
national Straits: A Legal Perspective. – 39 Naval Law Review 1990, p. 109. M. C. 
Stelakatos-Loverdos. The Contribution of Channels to the Definition of Straits Used for 
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be contrary to inter alia the security interests of the coastal States of the Gulf of 
Riga. 
The Estonian foreign minister commented before the Parliament that during 
the maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Riga, great emphasis was put 
on security concerns in view of finding a solution that would be favourable to 
the interests of Estonia.315 He added that if the maritime boundary delimitation 
between Estonia and Latvia would not have been successful and both States 
would have referred the dispute for international arbitration, then in the end, 
Estonia and Latvia “would have been obliged to guarantee access to third States 
through the Irbe Strait and, besides, it would have been still necessary to delimit 
EEZ in international waters.”316 It thus appears that in the 1996 Maritime 
Boundary Treaty Estonia and Latvia aimed at setting aside Part III of the LOSC 
on the legal regime of straits. With respect to the foreign minister’s comment on 
the EEZ it should be noted that Estonia and Latvia delimited the EEZ by leav-
ing all of the overlapping EEZ on the Latvian side of the boundary.317 
The head of the Parliament’s foreign committee also hinted at the security 
concerns associated with the applicability of transit passage in the Irbe Strait: 
 
“In discussing the question at the [Parliament’s] foreign committee it was not 
understood that the Gulf of Riga would need to be a part of the sea with free 
entrance and I understand that principally we are all of the view that the Gulf of 
Riga should be closed and divided between the territorial sea of Estonia and Lat-
via. In this regard, any talk that it should still include an exclusive economic 
zone similarly to what we provided in the 1993 Maritime Boundaries Act is, 
indeed, outdated.”318 
 
Thus, it appears that during the maritime boundary negotiations, Estonia and 
Latvia strived to exclude the existence of an EEZ in the Gulf of Riga in order to 
avoid the potential applicability of the transit passage regime in the Gulf of 
Riga. However, they did not succeed in this attempt since the failure to agree on 
the status of the Gulf of Riga as a historical bay inevitably lead to the existence 
of a Latvian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga which is beyond 12 miles from the base-
lines of both States.319 
By comparison, due to the relative proximity of the Estonian and Russian 
coasts in Narva Bay and in the Gulf of Finland proper, as well as the fact that by 
virtue of Article 3 of the LOSC, both States have the right to establish the 
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit of 12 miles for islands under their sov-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
International Navigation. – 13 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
1998(1), p. 85. 
315  Stenographic record of the First Reading of the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty in the 
Estonian Parliament, op. cit. 
316  Ibid. 
317  See supra section 6 of Part II. 
318  Stenographic record of the First Reading of the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty in the 
Estonian Parliament, op. cit. 
319  See supra section 6 of Part II. See also infra section 4.3 of Chapter 1 in Part III.  
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ereignty, the relevant maritime area in the Gulf of Finland, as viewed from both 
sides of the agreed median line under the Estonian and Russian Maritime 
Boundary Treaty, falls exclusively to the zones of 12-miles-wide territorial sea 
of both States.320 Hence, the question of the exclusion of an EEZ under the 
Estonian and Russian Maritime Boundary Treaty in the context of the Viro 
Strait’s transit regime was not relevant for the maritime boundary delimitation 
in the Gulf of Finland proper and Narva Bay. Therefore, it would not have been 
even theoretically possible to alter the Viro Strait’s transit regime by means of 
maritime boundary delimitation. 
The reason why strait States generally attempt by any legal means to avoid 
the applicability of the transit passage regime to its strait(s) pertains to the mag-
nitude of limits on the coastal State’s sovereignty over its territory, as provided 
in the legal framework under section 2 of Part III of the LOSC.321 The domestic 
law of Estonia and Latvia on the passage rights of warships and other foreign 
vessels used for national non-commercial purposes does not follow the legal 
framework of transit passage and excludes the possibility of exercising transit 
passage in the relevant maritime area. 
 
 
3. The Domestic Law of Estonia and Latvia on  
the Passage Rights of Warships and other Foreign Vessels  
Used for National Non-Commercial Purposes 
Pursuant to section 13(1) of the Estonian State Borders Act,322 innocent passage 
through the territorial sea of Estonia is permitted. Passage must be continuous 
and expeditious as, pursuant to section 13(5) of the Act, a vessel may only stop 
in case of a marine casualty, due to force majeure, in order to save human lives 
or provide assistance to vessels or aircraft in danger or in distress. According to 
section 13(7) of the Act, the deck armaments of a foreign vessel must be fixed 
in the position for transport and covered. Alex Oude Elferink has pointed out 
that such a specific requirement is not provided for in the LOSC as, according 
to Article 19(2)(b), it merely requires foreign ships in innocent passage to avoid 
“any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind”.323 Additionally, fishing 
                                                                          
320  See also Case Concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and 
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, 
p. 659, para 302. 
321  The transit passage regime is almost always contrary to the interests of the strait States. 
Thus, the strait States generally strongly opposed the establishment of the concept of 
transit passage during the drafting of the LOSC. See e.g. Nandan, Rosenne, op. cit., p. 
284. See also Rothwell 2015, op. cit., p. 122. 
322  Riigipiiri seadus (State Borders Act). Adopted 30.06.1994, e.i.f. 31.07.1994 (RT I 1994, 
54, 902). Accessible: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/520012015001/consolide/ 
current  (14.09.2016). 
323  A. G. Oude Elferink. Estonia: Rules of Navigation of Ships through the Territorial Sea 
and the Internal Waters of Estonia. – 8 International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 
1993, p. 424. 
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and other gear must be placed at the storage facilities upon passage through the 
Estonian territorial sea. The latter requirement is absent from and thus also 
complements the indicative list of activities in Article 19(2) of the LOSC that 
are considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the 
coastal State if carried out in its territorial sea.324 
However, by contrast to the Swedish, Finnish and Russian regulations,325 
section 13(2) of the State Borders Act of Estonia still retains the requirement for 
foreign warships and other government-owned vessels used for non-commercial 
purposes to give a prior notification in order to enter the territorial sea of Esto-
nia. Additionally, section 43(1) of the National Defence Act326 of Estonia stipu-
lates that a permit for entry of a foreign military vessel into Estonian territorial 
waters or inland waters is issued by the minister of defence or a person author-
ised thereby. 
Although according to the wording of the said provision, the permit is neces-
sary “for entry /…/ in territorial waters,” it appears that unlike section 13(2) of 
the State Borders Act, it does not regulate innocent or transit passage through 
the territorial sea or internal waters, but rather the entry and stay of foreign war-
ships in the Estonian territorial sea and internal waters. This is clarified in sec-
tion 2(4) of the procedure for the issue of permits for entry of foreign military 
vessels in Estonian territorial waters or inland waters327 (adopted as a Cabinet 
regulation under section 43(2) of the National Defence Act) which stipulates 
that diplomatic clearances are not required for exercising the right of innocent 
passage in the Estonian territorial sea. Instead, foreign military ships need to 
                                                                          
324  See ibid. 
325  Ordinance concerning the admission to Swedish territory of foreign naval vessels and 
military aircraft (as amended 27.10.1994). Adopted 03.06.1966, e.i.f. 03.06.1966. See 
Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien merioikeusyleissopimuk-
sen ja sen XI osan soveltamiseen liittyvän sopimuksen eräiden määräysten hyväksy-
misestä sekä laiksi aluksista aiheutuvan vesien pilaantumisen ehkäisemisestä annetun 
lain muuttamisesta (Explanatory Note to the Proposal of the Finnish Government) – 2.1. 
Aluemeri. Helsinki 1996, HE 12/1996. Accessible in Finnish at: http://www.finlex.fi/ 
fi/esitykset/he/1996/19960012 (14.09.2016). See also Federal Act on the internal 
maritime waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone of the Russian Federation. Adopted 
16.07.1998, e.i.f. 31.07.1998, sections 2(4) and 10–13. Accessible: http://www.un.org/ 
depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/RUS.htm (01.09.2016). 
326  Riigikaitseseadus (National Defence Act). Adopted 11.02.2015, e.i.f. 01.01.2016 (RT I, 
12.03.2015, 1). Accessible: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/517112015001/consolide/ 
current (01.09.2016). 
327  Välisriigi sõjalaevale territoriaal- või sisevetesse sisenemise loa ning välisriigi riiklikule 
õhusõidukile õhuruumi sisenemise loa andmise kord (Procedure for the Issue of Permits 
for Entry of Foreign Military Vessels in Estonian Territorial Waters or Inland Waters and 
Permits for Entry into Estonian Airspace of Foreign State Military Aircraft, for their 
Landing on Estonian Territory or for their Flying over the Territory). Adopted 
28.01.2016, e.i.f. 05.02.2016 (RT I, 02.02.2016, 2). Accessible in Estonian with an 
English translation of the Application for Diplomatic Clearance of Military Ship at: 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/102022016002 (01.09.2016). 
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comply with the prior notification requirement as stipulated in section 13(2) of 
the State Borders Act. 
The Estonian domestic law is silent on the regulation of transit passage in its 
maritime area. If the regime of transit passage should be applicable in some 
portions of Estonia’s maritime area, then it is unclear whether foreign ships and 
aircraft have an obligation under the Estonian domestic law to get prior permis-
sion for the exercise of such right. Such an obligation would certainly be void 
under Article 38(1) of the LOSC. Yet section 12(2) of the Estonian State Bor-
ders Act currently provides that an aircraft may cross the state border outside 
the established airway only with the permission of an agency authorised by the 
Estonian Government. 
A similar regulation to the afore-mentioned 2016 Estonian Cabinet Decree is 
also in force in Latvia. Under Paragraph 3 of the Latvian regulation, a foreign 
warship is similarly required to apply for a permit from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to enter the Latvian territorial sea.328  The 34-paragraphs long detailed 
regulation stipulates in Paragraph 5 inter alia that the embassy or the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs shall, by diplomatic channels, request a permit for entering 
no later than 30 days prior to the planned entering in the territorial sea, inland 
waters and ports of Latvia by foreign warships if another procedure has not 
been specified in an international agreement. If the Head of State or a member 
of the government is on board a foreign warship as an official person, the war-
ship needs to request a permit no later than 7 days prior to entering the Latvian 
territorial sea, pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the regulation. According to Para-
graph 32 of the regulation, a foreign warship must notify the Latvian authorities 
if it is forced to enter and temporarily stay in the territorial sea due to an acci-
dent or natural disaster, need for medical assistance or other emergency reasons. 
The Latvian Cabinet regulation of 2010 is adopted pursuant to Article 11(3) 
of the Law on the Border of the Republic of Latvia, which distinctly from the 
Estonian State Borders Act does not provide for a prior notification requirement 
for the foreign warships to exercise their right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea. Section 10(9) of the Latvian Law on the Border stipulates that 
vessels of foreign States have the right to cross the State border and enter the 
territorial sea in conformity with the principle of innocent passage in accord-
ance with the LOSC.  
However, section 11(3) of the same Act provides that the procedures by 
which foreign warships enter and stay in the territorial sea, inland waters and 
ports, as well as leave the territorial sea, inland waters and ports, shall be deter-
mined by the Cabinet. Molenaar has noted that it is unclear what this actually 
                                                                          
328  Procedures, by which Foreign Warships shall Enter and Stay in the Territorial Sea, 
Inland Waters and Ports of the Republic of Latvia and Leave Them (Cabinet Regulation 
No. 759). Adopted 10.08.2010, e.i.f. (with amending regulations) 11.11.2011. Access-
ible: http://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/MK_Noteikumi/Cab._Reg._ 
No._759_-_Foreign_Warships_shall_Enter_and_Stay_in_the_Territorial_Sea.doc 
(01.09.2016). 
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amounts to.329 Section 11(3) of the Latvian Law on the Border is not subordi-
nated to other Latvian laws that would clarify the nature of the innocent passage 
as provided in the domestic law. Thus, it is questionable whether section 11(3) 
of the Latvian Law on the Border in combination with the 2010 Cabinet regula-
tion respects the right of innocent passage of foreign warships through the Lat-
vian territorial sea absent of a prior permit. In addition, the Latvian domestic 
law does not regulate the right of transit passage. 
In its Government Decree on territorial surveillance, Finland has also set out 
detailed requirements for foreign government (incl. military) vessels for apply-
ing to enter Finnish territorial sea and internal waters.330 However, similarly to 
section 2(4) of the above-referred Estonian Cabinet Regulation, Finland has also 
unequivocally stated in section 5(1) of its Territorial Surveillance Act that a 
prior permission is not required in cases of innocent passage.331 
The duties to notify the Estonian government in advance of passage through 
its territorial sea, as stipulated in section 13(2) and section 141(1) of the State 
Borders Act of Estonia, as well as to request a permit from the Latvian State 
authority, as seems to be provided in the Latvian regulation, are both in breach 
of the fundamental norm of the LOSC, namely Article 17, according to which 
all ships enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.332 Alex 
Oude Elferink has noted in connection with the Estonian requirement of prior 
notification that its application to foreign warships was generally quite frequent 
in State practice in 1994, whereas its extension to all vessels used for national 
non-commercial purposes at the time goes beyond the practice of most other 
States.333 
Such a restrictive understanding of innocent passage was already adopted in 
Estonia under the Soviet rule by the Estonian scholar Abner Uustal.334 Uustal 
was among the Soviet jurists that opposed to “bourgeois authors”335 who “do 
not recognise the coastal States’ right to prohibit the passage of ships and the 
overflight of aircraft”.336 Uustal was of the view that it is not possible to provide 
for innocent passage of foreign warships through territorial sea because “the 
foreign warships of capitalist States in the territorial sea of other States endan-
                                                                          
329  Molenaar, op. cit., pp. 239–240. 
330  Valtioneuvoston asetus aluevalvonnasta (Government Decree on Territorial Sur-
veillance). Adopted 16.11.2000, e.i.f. 01.01.2001. Accessible: https://www.finlex.fi/ 
fi/laki/kaannokset/2000/en20000971.pdf (01.09.2016). 
331  Aluevalvontalaki (Territorial Surveillance Act). Adopted 18.08.2000, e.i.f. 01.01.2001. 
Accessible:  www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2000/en20000755.pdf (01.09.2016). 
332  See also LOSC: Declarations made upon signature, ratification, accession or succession 
or anytime thereafter, op. cit. – Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands. 
See also e.g. Z. Keyuan. Innocent Passage for Warships: The Chinese Doctrine and 
Practice. – 29 Ocean Development & International Law 1998(3), p. 211. 
333  Oude Elferink 1993, op. cit., p. 423. 
334  Professor of International law at the University of Tartu from 1966 to 1985. See L. 
Mälksoo. Rahvusvaheline õigus Eestis: ajalugu ja poliitika. Tallinn: Juura 2008, p. 111. 
335  A. Uustal. Rahvusvaheline õigus. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat 1984, p. 259. 
336  Ibid, p. 260. 
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ger the security of coastal States due to their weapons.”337 Uustal’s approach to 
international law has been found to be wholly political and subsumed to the 
aims and interests of the politics of the Soviet Union.338 Yet it is notable that 
after the 1989 joint declaration by the Soviet Union and the United States, even 
the Soviet Union abandoned the requirement of a prior notification or request 
for authorisation for a foreign ship to enjoy the right of innocent passage 
through territorial sea.339 Other Estonia’s neighbouring countries Finland and 
Sweden did so some years later, as discussed below.340 
By contrast to Abner Uustal, the pre-1940 Estonian scholar Ants Piip 
favoured innocent passage concordant with the doctrine of mare liberum. Piip 
insisted that “the coastal State cannot prohibit passage through its coastal 
waters, i.e. coastal seas, to foreign ships and therefore, foreign merchant vessels 
as well as warships have so-called right to passage (ius passagii innoxii). Such a 
right is well founded, because the coastal sea is nothing more than a part of the 
high seas that the coastal State may be interested in the most, but in regard to 
which other States also have a certain necessity.”341 Likewise, in the Estonian 
draft reply of November 24th, 1938 to a preliminary notion342 made by the Brit-
ish Foreign Office in its letter from 21st November 1938 on the 1938 Estonian 
Neutrality Act, it was stated that “Pursuant to the general norm of international 
law (XIII Hague Conv. Art. 10), the passage of warships through territorial 
waters is always permitted – it cannot be prohibited”.343 In the official reply by 
the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from October 2nd, 1939 to the memo-
randum344 presented by the British Foreign Office to Estonia on June 5th, 1939, 
it was specified: 
 
“The Estonian Government wish to point out that according to the general prin-
ciples of international law, as well as according to the provisions of Paragraph 1, 
belligerent warships may enter Estonian ports and territorial waters provided 
they, in so doing, comply with the prescriptions in force. The Government of a 
                                                                          
337  Uustal 1977, op. cit., p. 37. 
338  See Mälksoo 2008, op. cit, pp. 111, 119, 123. 
339 Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics: Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent 
Passage. Jackson Hole 23.09.1989, p. 2. Accessible: http://www.un.org/depts/los/ 
doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulE14.pdf (01.09.2016). 
340  Infra section 2.2 of chapter 2 in Part III. 
341  A. Piip. Rahvusvaheline mereõigus. Mereväeohvitseridele peetud loengute kokkuvõte. 
Tallinn: Merejõudude Staap 1926, pp. 10–11. 
342  ERA.957.14.590, p. 2. 
 „In the first place, His Majesty’s Government must make a general reservation regarding 
the prohibition of the stay of belligerent submarines in Estonian waters, and desire to 
point out that it has not hitherto been a practice in any war for neutrals to forbid entry 
altogether to any class of belligerent warship.“  
343  Ibid, p. 68. 
344  An analogous memorandum was presented by the British Foreign Office to the 
governments of all the northern countries that had adopted the neutrality act in 1938, 
including Finland, Latvia and Lithuania. See ERA.957.14.563, pp. 5–6. 
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neutral State is, however, entitled to prohibit, as the British Government them-
selves admit it, in exceptional cases the entry of belligerent warships into its ter-
ritorial waters and ports.”345 
 
Also, in modern Estonian literature on the law of the sea, Heiki Lindpere has 
stated that legal acts that ignore the right of innocent passage or reservations to 
that effect made upon signing, ratifying or acceding to the LOSC are “indisput-
ably void”.346 
Nevertheless, Estonia, similarly to Bangladesh, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, 
Guyana, India, Libya, Malta, Mauritius, Nigeria, Serbia, Montenegro and South 
Korea, still upholds the requirement of prior notification.347 Latvia’s require-
ment of a prior permit for warships to enter its territorial sea also hinders the 
right of innocent passage. Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Barba-
dos, Brazil, Cambodia, Cape Verde, China, Congo, Denmark, Grenada, Iran, 
Maldives, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, St 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, United Arab 
Emirates, Vietnam and Yemen required such a permit.348 While acceding to the 
LOSC, Estonia and Latvia did not make a reservation on their restrictions to the 
right of innocent passage.349 
It follows from the foregoing that the domestic law of Estonia and Latvia is 
in breach of the LOSC with regard to the legal framework applicable to inno-
cent passage, as well as with the right of transit passage in case it should be 
applicable in the straits of the Gulf of Riga. In the case of applicability of transit 
passage regime to the Irbe Strait and/or the Sea of Straits, foreign (military) 
aircraft and (war)ships would essentially have the right to freely enter the Gulf 
of Riga through the Irbe Strait/Sea of Straits in their normal modes, navigate/fly 
around Ruhnu Island (through the Latvian EEZ) if they wish and leave the Gulf 
of Riga through the Irbe Strait and/or the Sea of Straits. This necessitates subse-
quent analysis on whether the transit passage regime is applicable to foreign 
ships and aircraft in the Irbe Strait.350  
 
 
                                                                          
345  Ibid, p. 6. 
346  Lindpere 2003, op. cit., p. 55. See criticism on the current Estonian legal framework on 
innocent passage also in A. Lott. Rahumeelse läbisõidu õigus Eesti territoriaalmeres. – 
Juridica 2015(9), pp. 636, 641–644. See also I. Kaunis, H. Lindpere, A. Lott. Mereõiguse 
kodifitseerimise lähteülesanne. Tallinn: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Commu-
nications 2015, pp. 165–169. 
347  Rothwell, Stephens 2016, op. cit., p. 291. 
348  Ibid. Rothwell and Stephens do not refer to Latvia in their list of countries requiring a 
prior permit. 
349  LOSC: Declarations made upon signature, ratification, accession or succession or 
anytime thereafter, op. cit. – Estonia; Latvia. 
350  The passage regime in the Sea of Straits is examined infra in Part V. 
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4. The Legal Framework Applicable to the Irbe Strait 
4.1. The Inapplicability of Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC to the Irbe Strait 
Artur Taska has noted that the pre-1940 legal status of the Irbe Strait as an 
international strait was beyond doubt,351 although at that time, the 4-miles-wide 
territorial sea of its coastal States did not cover the strait entirely. Nowadays, 
López Martín has in her International Straits: Concept, Classification and Rules 
of Passage categorised the Irbe Strait as an international strait that connects part 
of an EEZ with the territorial sea of a foreign State in terms of Article 45(1)(b) 
of the LOSC.352 Likewise, Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz have referred to the Irbe 
Strait as Article 45(1)(b)-type of strait on the basis of López Martín’s study.353 
In this case, the right of non-suspendable innocent passage would be applicable 
to the ships transiting the Irbe Strait pursuant to Article 45(2) of the LOSC. 
Yet this categorisation is not accurate. First, as López Martín herself seems 
to admit,354 Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC applies to such international straits 
that connect the territorial sea of a foreign State, i.e. not that of a strait State. 
Hence, geopolitically, Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC may potentially be appli-
cable to the Viro Strait (the strait States of which are Estonia and Finland) since 
it connects the territorial sea of a foreign State – that of the Russian Federation. 
By contrast, the Irbe Strait does not meet this geo-political criterion since it 
leads only to the territorial sea of Estonia and Latvia. Both countries are the 
coastal States of the Irbe Strait and may thus not be considered as foreign States 
in terms of the said provision. Thus, if the EEZ in the Gulf of Riga would be, 
hypothetically, non-existent, the Irbe Strait would rather fall under the category 
of non-international straits located in the territorial sea in respect of which none 
of the legal regimes of international straits is applicable (consequently the ordi-
nary regime of suspendable innocent passage applies (Article 17 of the LOSC). 
However, López Martín found that despite the inclusion of the term „foreign 
State“ in Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC, this provision may still be applied to all 
so-called dead-end straits, i.e. international straits which connect the territorial 
sea of a State, and thus also to the Irbe Strait.355 She argued that 
 
“[I]f we carry out an extensive rather than a strict interpretation of this rule, we 
could also consider that the straits located between the high sea or an exclusive 
economic zone and the territorial sea of a State, even if it is a coastal State of the 
                                                                          
351  Taska 1974, op. cit., p. 113. 
352  López Martín, op. cit., p. 100. 
353  Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., p. 58. The authors have not examined the charac-
teristics of the Irbe Strait (Kurk Strait, as the authors incorrectly refer to it) since if the 
authors had actually applied their conclusions on the criteria of Article 45(1)(b) of the 
LOSC to their classification of the Irbe Strait, then it would clearly not have been 
possible to place it in the Article 45(1)(b)-category of strait. This is due to Caminos’ and 
Cogliati-Bantz’s false presumption that the Irbe Strait is only bordered by Estonia (thus 
leading to the territorial sea of a foreign State – Latvia). 
354  López Martín, op. cit., p. 99. 
355  Ibid, p. 100. 
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strait are also included. This interpretation would be founded on two considera-
tions. On the one hand, the stipulations in article 35 a) concerning internal waters 
which we have analysed; on the other hand, the types of straits we refer to are 
clearly “dead-end” straits, a category which is unanimously considered to be the 
objective of article 45.1 b), as was stated above. In addition, this same interpre-
tation would also be supported by the opinion of some States. As regards this 
point, on presenting the proposal of the United Kingdom to the Second Com-
mittee, which is the proposal of article 45, the British delegate referred to these 
types of straits as “linking a part of the high seas with the territorial sea of a 
State”.”356 
 
However, such interpretation would go against not only the ordinary meaning of 
the terms of the said provision, but arguably also against its purpose. Article 
45(1)(b) of the LOSC aims to ensure primarily that a State which does not have 
any control over the strait that connects its territorial sea with either the high 
seas or an EEZ would be vested with a lasting (non-suspendable) right of inno-
cent passage in the strait. Likewise, Nandan and Anderson maintain in this 
context that “‘foreign’ means the same as in Article 16(4) of the CTSCZ, i.e. a 
State situated beyond the coastal State(s) bordering the strait.“357 Also, the Vir-
ginia Commentaries refer that an international strait falling under Article 
45(1)(b) of the LOSC needs to connect the territorial sea of “a foreign State,” 
not that of “a State”.358  
Second, during the time of writing the International Straits: Concept, Clas-
sification and Rules of Passage (published in English 2010, in Spanish in 2008), 
López Martín was not able to take into account the maps that Latvia deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in June 2011 which show the 
baselines and the outer limits of Latvia’s territorial sea, including the limits of 
Latvia’s EEZ in the Gulf of Riga. 
 
 
4.2. Transit Passage in the Irbe Strait 
On the basis of Latvia’s 2011 submission, it may be concluded that although 
Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC is not applicable to the Irbe Strait, it does not nec-
essarily mean that the Irbe Strait may be considered under the LOSC as a non-
international strait in which passage rights of foreign ships would not be safe-
guarded. This is due to the existence of the Latvian EEZ in the south-eastern 
part of the Gulf of Riga. As a result of this, the Irbe Strait may be, in terms of 
Article 37 of the LOSC, used for international navigation between one part of 
an EEZ in the Baltic Sea proper and another part of an EEZ in the Gulf of Riga. 
                                                                          
356  Ibid. 
357  Nandan, Anderson, op. cit., p. 197. 
358  Nandan, Rosenne, op. cit., p. 396. This matter is further analysed in Caminos, Cogliati-
Bantz, op. cit., pp. 57–58. 
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In this case, the Irbe Strait would fall under the above-described legal regime of 
transit passage.359 
Article 37 of the LOSC provides that the regime of transit passage applies to 
international straits which are used for international navigation between two 
parts of an EEZ. In this regard, ships that transit the Irbe Strait do not always 
necessarily cross the Latvian EEZ in the south-eastern part of the Gulf of Riga. 
In case foreign ships are using the sealane leading to the Estonian ports of 
Pärnu, Kuressaare, Roomassaare, Virtsu, etc., they only navigate in the territo-
rial sea and internal waters of Estonia, since the northern part of the Gulf of 
Riga does not include an EEZ. Similarly, although foreign ships using the 
sealane from the Irbe Strait to the port of Riga often cross the Latvian EEZ 
south of Ruhnu Island,360 they may as well navigate solely in the Latvian territo-
rial sea east of the Courland Peninsula for reaching Riga. 
The wording of Article 37 of the LOSC thus raises the question whether an 
international strait needs to be actually used by a ship (or aircraft) for reaching 
another part of an EEZ. In this regard, however, it would be sufficient for for-
eign ships and aircraft to be subject to the right of transit passage only if they 
claim that they will cross the EEZ. The strait States would be able to monitor 
vessel and air traffic in the Gulf of Riga in view of ascertaining whether a for-
eign ship or aircraft that claimed the right of transit passage actually complies 
with its requirements (prima facie the continuous and expeditious transit via the 
Latvian EEZ) as stipulated in section 2 of Part III of the LOSC. The transit pas-
sage regime might also raise tensions in the Gulf of Riga, since although its 
coastal States could potentially order a foreign ship or aircraft to leave the Gulf 
of Riga due to its breach of the rules of transit passage, it would not be ruled out 
that the latter repeats such actions under the right of transit passage (indefi-
nitely361). 
The application of the right of transit passage in the Irbe Strait as well as in 
the maritime areas leading to the Latvian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga (comprising 
the Estonian as well as Latvian maritime areas and thus essentially most parts of 
the Gulf of Riga)362 could be considered as a juridical fact which is not alterable 
by the strait States by means of any control system. The juridical fact – the 
application of the transit passage to foreign ships and aircraft in the Irbe Stait – 
is due to the existence of the Latvian EEZ (previously high seas) in the Gulf of 
Riga. 
In practice, Estonia and Latvia could argue that the EEZ in the Gulf of Riga 
is wholly surrounded by their territorial sea and thefore does not call for the 
application of the transit passage regime. Yet the text of the LOSC does not 
                                                                          
359  See supra section 1.2 of Part I. 
360  See Marine Traffic. – Gulf of Riga. Accessible: http://www.marinetraffic.com 
(01.09.2016). Compare with map 6 in Annex 1. 
361  By analogy, Russian aircraft have made frequent incursions into the Estonian airspace 
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362  The right of transit passage does not apply in the Latvian EEZ (Article 35(b) of the 
LOSC) where foreign ships and aircraft enjoy the freedoms of navigation and overflight. 
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provide a legal basis for such interpretation of the transit passage regime. 
Should the ships and aircraft of a third State exercise transit passage in this 
maritime area despite possible warnings from Estonia and Latvia, it would 
potentially stir up potential conflict and escalate tensions between the user State 
and the strait States. 
Furthermore, in case the rules of transit passage are breached by a foreign 
State’s aircraft, then it would most likely be the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation’s (hereinafter NATO) air defence Quick Reaction Alert’s fighter jets 
deployed in the Ämari air base near Tallinn that would be scrambled. However, 
some NATO member States that contribute to the air-policing mission in the 
Baltic States may not consider breaches of the transit passage regime by a for-
eign ship or aircraft as amounting to an unauthorised transit passage against 
which measures may be taken by the strait State. For example, Oxman has 
argued that 
 
“[E]ven a first-year law student could construct the syllogism that any vessel or 
aircraft that does not comply with any obligation no longer comes within the 
definition of the transit right, and the coastal state is free to deal with its unau-
thorized presence in the same way as with any other unauthorized presence in its 
waters. A similar game could be played in reverse with the sovereignty of the 
coastal states, which ‘is exercised subject to this Convention’ or parts thereof. 
This is not a reasonable interpretation of the transit passage and archipelagic sea 
lanes passage regimes in context. Unilateral enforcement by the coastal state of 
the conditions for transit or its own interpretation thereof was simply not con-
templated or authorized except where expressly permitted.”363 
 
In general, Oxman argues for a very limited strait State’s jurisdiction over air-
craft and ships acting in breach of the transit passage regime. This interpretation 
follows the aim of the legal regime of transit passage. It is clear that due to the 
freedom of navigation and overflight, the coastal State’s jurisdiction over ships 
and aircraft in transit passage is restricted under Articles 38(1), 42(2) and 44 of 
the LOSC and the discretionary right in regard to breaches of the right of transit 
passage or measures aimed at preventing it is reduced to the minimum. 
However, by interpreting the LOSC systematically, it is also possible to 
arrive at a different conclusion of the strait State’s powers against unlawful 
transit passage. Klein argues that 
 
“[I]f a warship is not adhering to the requirements of transit passage (it has 
stopped, is hovering, or is otherwise engaged in non-expeditious passage without 
reason of force majeure or distress), the lawful response of the coastal state 
would be similar to that in response to non-innocent passage. Namely—although 
not stated specifically—the coastal state would be entitled to require the warship 
to leave the strait immediately.”364 
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Molenaar finds that the breach of obligations only under Article 39(1)(a-c) of 
the LOSC ends transit passage and further explains that in this case: 
 
“[I]t seems that ships engaging in activities which are not exercises of the right 
of transit passage, will lose this right. Such ships are to be considered in non-
transit passage, and through Article 38(3), will automatically fall under the gen-
eral regime of innocent passage. /.../ [T]his will usually imply loss of innocence 
as well, and bring the powers under Article 25(2) into view. It is submitted that 
the obligation under Article 44 for strait States not to suspend transit passage 
does not prevent a strait State from suspending a particular case of transit pas-
sage for want of innocence, but rather prohibits the general suspension for secu-
rity or any other reason similar to Article 25(3).”365 
 
Similarly, Jia comes to the conclusion that the strait States may interrupt transit 
passage in case the conditions for exercising this right are violated.366 This view 
is also shared by de Yturriaga as well as Churchill and Lowe.367 Nonetheless, as 
appears from above, State practice and the opinions expressed in the legal liter-
ature are not uniform on the question of strait State’s powers in respect of for-
eign aircraft and ships that do not comply with the regime of transit passage. 
In addition, State practice and the views of legal scholars differ on the legal-
ity of foreign military activities368 in the coastal State’s EEZ. In the Latvian 
EEZ in the Gulf of Riga, the right of foreign military activities implies foreign 
States’ right to send their warships and military aircraft under the regime of 
transit passage to these enclaved international waters, which might then be used 
possibly as inter alia a military practicing field by foreign States. This would be 
against the security interests of Estonia and Latvia as the coastal States of the 
Gulf of Riga. On the same grounds, China and many other States oppose a wide 
discretion of flag States to carry out military activities in another coastal State’s 
EEZ.369 Bangladesh, Brazil, Cape Verde, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Uru-
guay have declared under Article 310 of the LOSC that foreign military activi-
ties in their EEZ are not allowed.370 
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Nevertheless, the majority of States, prima facie Western States, do not 
oppose military activities in another coastal State’s EEZ. Raul Pedrozo notes 
that intelligence collection and other military activities are permitted in another 
coastal State’s EEZ.371 Likewise, Said Mahmoudi comes to the conclusion on 
the basis of the Swedish domestic law and State practice that “foreign military 
activities, strictly under the conditions prescribed in the convention, may be 
permitted, and in case of non-resource-related residual rights, flag states may 
expect a conciliatory attitude from Sweden.”372 Barbara Kwiatkowska also finds 
that peaceful military activities (e.g. naval manouvres, weapons practice, the 
emplacement of sensor arrays, aerial reconnaissance, intelligence gathering) in 
an EEZ are lawful and related to the high seas freedoms in an EEZ.373 Klein, on 
the other hand, argues for “the moderate position of allowing reasonable naval 
activities without the use of weapons.”374 
Pedrozo observes that the United States activities in the EEZ of other coastal 
States have been wide-ranging and include military exercises and manoeuvres, 
weapons firing and testing as well as surveys and surveillance.375 The United 
States has been also assertive in accepting such right of other flag States in the 
Baltic Sea. For example, the Department of State explicitly recognised in 1996 
the right of the Russian Federation to carry out military activities in the Lithua-
nian EEZ.376 
Furthermore, according to the United States’ position, hydrographic survey-
ing is to be distinguished from marine scientific research, for which coastal 
State’s prior permission is required pursuant to Articles 56(1)(b)(ii) and 246(2) 
of the LOSC.377 Thus, while it is prohibited under Article 40 of the LOSC to 
carry out any research or survey activities during transit passage in the Irbe 
Strait and in the Gulf of Riga without the prior authorisation of the strait States 
Estonia and Latvia, it might be lawful to conduct the same surveys with military 
vessels without Latvia’s permission in its EEZ in the Gulf of Riga. In this 
regard, Pedrozo distinguishes military marine data collection and hydrographic 
surveys which fall under the high seas freedoms from marine scientific 
research.378 
Therefore, military activities in the Latvian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga might 
be lawful as long as they are consistent with the United Nations Charter in 
terms of Articles 88 and 301 of the LOSC.379 In particular, such activities may 
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not constitute any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of Latvia and Estonia. 
Subsequently, the option for the strait States to exclude the applicability of 
the transit passage regime and the right of foreign States to carry out military 
activities in the Latvian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga will be examined. Under inter-
national law (particularly LOSC), this possibility stems from the concept of the 
so-called historic waters. In particular, Article 35(a) of the LOSC stipulates that 
nothing in the legal framework on international straits, as provided in Part III of 
the LOSC, affects any areas of internal waters within a strait, except where the 
establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in 
Article 7, has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not pre-
viously been considered as such.  
Due to its great width and the lack of any islands in the centre or southern 
part of the strait, the 14.5-miles-wide narrowest section of the passage through 
the Irbe Strait could not have been and also has not been declared by Estonia 
and Latvia as internal waters under their domestic legal acts. Thus, the applica-
bility of the exception stipulated in Article 35(a) of the LOSC to the Gulf of 
Riga, including the Irbe Strait, may only be founded on the concept of historic 
bay as recognised under the international law of the sea. 
 
 
4.3. The Irbe Strait and the Gulf of Riga in light of  
the Concepts of Historic Strait and Historic Bay 
Article 10(6) of the LOSC provides that inter alia the requirement stipulated in 
its Article 10(2), according to which an indentation is not regarded as a bay 
unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose 
diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation, does not apply to 
historic bays. Subsequent to signing the LOSC on December 10th, 1982, the 
Soviet Union declared under a 1985 decree the Gulf of Riga a historic bay (as it 
had done previously under a 1947 decree) and closed the Irbe Strait by drawing 
a straight baseline from the Cape Loode on the Sõrve Peninsula to the Ovisi 
lighthouse on the Courland Peninsula.380 Pursuant to the position of the Soviet 
Union, the Gulf of Riga was in the immediate vicinity of its coast and thus fell 
under its complete sovereignty, which extended back to the era of imperial Rus-
sia – this, in addition to the lack of specific protests by other States,381 enabled 
the Soviet Union to declare the Gulf of Riga a historic bay.382 Nevertheless, the 
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protests of numerous States against the illegal annexation of Estonia and Latvia 
may potentially be interpreted as the non-recognition of the historic bay status 
of the Gulf of Riga. 
The LOSC does not provide for a legal definition of a historic bay. However, 
pursuant to the customary international law, a historic bay may be recognised as 
such on the condition that the coastal State has made a corresponding declara-
tion and States have generally accepted this or do not oppose it.383 Additionally, 
the coastal State needs to have exercised authority over the relevant maritime 
area consistently and over a long period of time.384 The United States Supreme 
Court has found that in order to establish that a body of water is a historic bay, a 
coastal nation must have “traditionally asserted and maintained dominion with 
the acquiescence of foreign nations” and “that at least three factors are signifi-
cant in the determination of historic bay status: (1) the claiming nation must 
have exercised authority over the area; (2) that exercise must have been contin-
uous; and (3) foreign states must have acquiesced in the exercise of author-
ity.”385 Churchill and Lowe note that the primary prerequisite for the recogni-
tion of a historic bay is the acceptance by other States.386 Also, Caminos and 
Cogliati-Bantz refer to the need for a long and consistent assertion of dominion 
over the bay which has included the coastal State’s right to exclude foreign 
vessels, except on permission, as well as the element of acquiescence by third 
States.387 
Prior to the independence of Estonia, Finland and Latvia in 1918, the Rus-
sian Empire considered both the Gulf of Finland as well as the Gulf of Riga as 
its historic bays.388 That followed the notion made by Friedrich von Martens in 
1886, according to which bays with coasts belonging to a single State comprise 
its territorial sea.389 Martens found that in Europe, such bays include the Gulf of 
Finland and the Gulf of Riga (Russian Empire), Zuiderzee (the Netherlands), 
Solent (British Empire) and, as a historical example, the Gulf of Bothnia (dur-
ing the period when Finland was part of the Swedish Empire).390 Similarly, Lat-
via considered in the beginning of 1920s that the Gulf of Riga is a historic bay 
                                                                          
383  United Nations Secretariat. Judicial Régime of Historic waters including historic bays.  
– Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1962, vol. II, pp. 8–10, 25. 
384  Ibid, p. 25. 
385  US Supreme Court. United States v. Alaska, 23.06.1975, No. 73-1888, Part II. The US 
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needs to be open, notorious and effective. See United States Department of State. China: 
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D.C: US Department of State 2014, p. 10. 
386  Churchill, Lowe, op. cit., p. 37. 
387  Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., pp. 60–61. 
388  Taska 1974, op. cit., p. 86. Piip 1936, op. cit., p. 183. 
389  F. F. von Martens. Völkerrecht: das internationale Recht der civilisirten Nationen, vol. 1. 
Berlin: Weidmann Buchhandlung 1886, p. 382. 
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(closed sea), whereas Estonia rejected this proposition in the Estonian-Latvian 
Border Commision in 1922.391 
Since the restitution of independence of Estonia and Latvia, the coasts of the 
Gulf of Riga belong to two States. Thus, it does not meet the terms of Article 
10(1) of the LOSC. Yet Latvia regarded in the first half of the 1990s the Gulf of 
Riga as a historic bay.392 Latvia’s interpretation of the Gulf of Riga as a historic 
bay was apparently founded on the ICJ’s judgment in the Gulf of Fonseca case, 
in which a Chamber of the Court found in the context of the concept of historic 
bay that 
 
“A State succession is one of the ways in which territorial sovereignty passes 
from one State to another; and there seems no reason in principle why a succes-
sion should not create a joint sovereignty where a single and undivided maritime 
area passes to two or more new States.”393 
 
A similar conclusion had been reached in the study on historic bays as pub-
lished by the United Nations Secretariat in 1962.394 On the basis of the uti possi-
detis juris principle395 as recognised by the Court in 1986,396 the ICJ decided 
that the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca are held in a joint sovereignty of its three 
coastal States (“threefold joint sovereignty”), excluding the 3-miles-wide belt of 
internal waters of the coastal States, over which each coastal State exercised its 
exclusive sovereignty.397 
Analogously, it follows from the foregoing that Estonia and Latvia may have 
been entitled to declare the Gulf of Riga a historic bay upon their restoration of 
independence. On the other hand, the classification of the Gulf of Riga as a 
historic bay on the basis of the Soviet Union’s prior practice and legal frame-
work on this matter would have been in contravention with the doctrine of State 
continuity as adopted by Estonia and Latvia. Thereby, Estonia and Latvia might 
                                                                          
391  Eesti-Läti piirikommisjoni tegewuse tagajärjed. Postimees, 01.04.1922. 
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have indirectly declared themselves as successor States to the Soviet Union – 
not as continuators of the pre-1940 Estonian and Latvian republics.398  
Estonia had already declared on October 8th, 1991 that it does not consider 
itself as a successor State to the Soviet Union.399 As Estonia had principally not 
been against the legal concept of historic bay and had even recognised it during 
the 1930 Hague Codification Conference,400 it rejected Latvia’s proposal to 
declare the Gulf of Riga a historic bay primarily on the grounds of State conti-
nuity.401  
At the same time, Estonia also acknowledged the negative effect that the 
joint sovereignty over the Gulf of Riga would have on its fishing industry.402 
Prior to the break of Estonia’s and Latvia’s independence in 1940, the Gulf of 
Riga fell primarily under the regime of the high seas and, during Soviet rule, 
under the regime of the internal waters of the Soviet Union, which is why Esto-
nian and Latvian fishermen used to catch fish in the whole maritime area of the 
Gulf of Riga. This favoured Latvian fishermen who carried out approximately 
two-thirds of the combined fishing effort in the Gulf of Riga prior to the resto-
ration of Estonia’s and Latvia’s independence.403 
The Estonian foreign minister explained in the Parliament that upon the 
establishment of a regime of joint sovereignty over the Gulf of Riga, Latvian 
fishing vessels would catch fish under their domestic legal framework that pro-
vides lesser protection for the fish stocks in maritime areas that reach even close 
to the Abruka archipelago.404 This could have caused irreversible damage to 
inter alia the spawning grounds around Ruhnu Island.405 
It is also unclear whether the Gulf of Riga is situated wholly in the immedi-
ate vicinity of Estonian and Latvian coasts, which is a prerequisite for the appli-
cation of the joint sovereignty of its coastal States. Distinct from the Gulf of 
Fonseca, which was recognised by the ICJ as a historic bay, the Gulf of Riga 
also includes extensive maritime areas that reach further than 12 miles to the sea 
as measured from the baselines.406 On the other hand, there are also examples of 
                                                                          
398  See on the uti possidetis principle in the context of the restitution of independence of the 
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historic bays which cover more extensive maritime areas than the Gulf of Riga 
(e.g. Hudson Bay).  
In its 1994 Maritime Code,407 Latvia declared the Gulf of Riga enclosed joint 
internal waters of Estonia and Latvia in which their ships enjoy free naviga-
tion.408 By contrast, Estonia sought to divide the maritime area of the Gulf of 
Riga between the two coastal States. Estonia had established its straight base-
lines in the Gulf of Riga under the 1993 Maritime Boundaries Act. Estonia thus 
vetoed Latvia’s endeavours, since the preservation of the legal status of a his-
toric bay necessitates that in the case of the disintegration of the bay’s coastal 
State (in this case the Soviet Union), each of the new coastal States needs to 
recognise the continuous historical status of the bay.409 
In light of Estonia’s rejection of the concept of the Gulf of Riga as a historic 
bay and the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Riga, it is 
highly unlikely that its coastal States would ever again consider the Gulf of 
Riga as falling under the so-called historic waters exception as provided in Arti-
cle 35(a) of the LOSC. Yet such a legal line of argument might have provided 
the only means for the exclusion of the transit passage regime in the Irbe Strait 
(under Article 35 of the LOSC),410 albeit its legal basis is at most far from cer-
tain.411 
In addition to the apparent lack of legal grounds in international law for 
claiming the Irbe Strait a historic strait, it is also doubtful whether third States 
would accept such an act, not least because of the general implications that such 
an introduction of essentially a new category of straits might have on the stabil-
ity and coherence of the catalogue of straits as provided in Part III of the 
LOSC.412 Thus, currently the Gulf of Riga is freely accessible413 for foreign 
aircraft and ships from the Irbe Strait similarly to the pre-1940 situation.  
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5. The Legal Framework Applicable to the Irbe Strait de lege ferenda 
As examined previously, the transit passage regime in the Irbe Strait and in the 
Gulf of Riga hinders the security of Estonia and Latvia.414 It also raises con-
cerns for the safety of international navigation due to e.g. the flights of military 
aircraft with unactivated/absent transponders or the unchecked navigation of 
foreign submarines (incl. in the shallow Irbe Strait). There appears to be two 
possibilities in this instance for limiting the adverse effects of the transit pas-
sage regime for the strait States. The adoption of compulsory routeing measures 
in this maritime area would provide lesser safeguards for the coastal States in 
comparison with the establishment of an EEZ corridor that would exclude the 
transit passage while also limiting the outer limits of the Estonian and Latvian 
territorial sea. 
As a general rule, ships and aircraft transiting the strait continuously and 
expeditiously are not obliged to follow any prescribed trajectory. Pursuant to 
Article 41(1) of the LOSC, strait States may designate sea lanes and prescribe 
traffic separation schemes for transit passage where necessary to promote the 
safe passage of ships, but such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes must 
have been previously developed by the International Maritime Organization in 
accordance with Article 41(4) of the LOSC. Thus, this constitutes an exception 
from the general rule stipulated in Article 22(3)(a) of the LOSC, according to 
which the coastal State only has to take into account the recommendations of 
the International Maritime Organization in the designation of sea lanes and the 
prescription of traffic separation schemes.415 
In case compulsory routeing measures would be adopted by the International 
Maritime Organization in respect of the Gulf of Riga, such sealanes and a traffic 
separation scheme might not address sufficiently the security concerns of Esto-
nia and Latvia.416 According to the United States position, sea lanes and traffic 
separation schemes are not applicable to inter alia warships in transit passage, 
albeit in practice it is still considered advisable to follow them.417 The voluntary 
use of sea lanes and traffic separation schemes by sovereign immune vessels in 
transit passage does not go against the International Maritime Organization’s 
General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing which stipulates that routeing systems 
(incl. traffic separation schemes) are only recommended for use by all ships.418 
In addition, although at least non-State-owned foreign ships would be 
required under Articles 39(2)(a) and 41(7) of the LOSC in the course of transit 
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passage to follow the potential traffic separation scheme, it would not apply to 
foreign aircraft and thus would not limit them in undertaking transit passage in 
the Gulf of Riga (Article 39(3) of the LOSC).419 Likewise, in case ships in 
transit passage would not follow the compulsory routeing measures and might 
violate Article 41 of the LOSC, then the coastal State’s ability to take counter-
measures would be restricted, as the ship would still have the right to continue 
its transit passage.420 
In the course of its decision-making on compulsory routeing measures under 
Article 41(4) of the LOSC, the International Maritime Organization is con-
cerned not only with ensuring safe navigation of ships, but also general naviga-
tional interests, including the freedom of the seas. In this connection, Hugo 
Caminos and Vincent Cogliati-Bantz have concluded on the basis of the appli-
cable legal framework that “the extent of a mandatory routeing system should 
be limited to what is essential in the interest of safety of navigation and the 
protection of the marine environment. The International Maritime Organization 
will not adopt a proposed routeing system until it is satisfied that the proposed 
system will not impose unnecessary constraints on shipping and that the system 
is completely in accordance with the requirements of SOLAS.”421 In particular, 
this follows from section 6(8) of the International Maritime Organization’s 
General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing which stipulates that the extent of a traf-
fic separation scheme should be limited to what is essential in the interests of 
safe navigation. It may be reasonable to expect that such compulsory routeing 
measures would be proportional at least in the shallow Irbe Strait where the 
shipping corridor is at times only approximately one mile wide and where ship-
ping accidents have occurred relatively frequently.422  
The legality of implementing compulsory routeing measures in the wide 
maritime area of the Gulf of Riga proper needs to be further assessed in light of 
the criteria of Article 42(2) of the LOSC. In particular, the application of such 
compulsory routeing measures may not hamper or impair the right of transit 
passage in the Gulf of Riga. Steven Kempton argues that the terms “hampering” 
or “impairing” as used in that provision imply “an action that has the effect of 
physically obstructing passage to the extent that a ship would be required to 
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significantly deviate from its originally intended course, and where the alternate 
route would result in unacceptable delays and increased costs.”423 It appears that 
none of the conceivable compulsory sealanes’ trajectories in the Gulf of Riga 
proper could force ships to significantly deviate from the shortest trajectory and 
in any case should not cause unacceptable delays or additional costs. 
De lege ferenda there is an additional option for the coastal States to more 
thoroughly safeguard their security interests in the Gulf of Riga. If necessary, it 
is possible to consider establishing an EEZ corridor in the Irbe Strait, similar to 
the one agreed upon between Estonia and Finland in the Viro Strait in order to 
exclude the applicability of the regime of transit passage in the Gulf of Riga. 
This follows from Article 36 of the LOSC which provides the only other possi-
bility aside from the afore-mentioned Article 35 for the inapplicability of the 
LOSC legal framework on international straits (Part III). 
Pursuant to Article 36 of the LOSC, its Part III does not apply to an inter-
national strait if it includes a route through the high seas or through an EEZ of 
similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical character-
istics. Although the freedoms of navigation and overflight would apply in such 
prospective corridor analogously with the transit passage, it would limit the use 
of these freedoms to the confines of a narrow EEZ corridor leading from the 
Irbe Strait straight to the Latvian EEZ south of Ruhnu Island. 
By contrast to the regime of transit passage, foreign ships and aircraft would 
not be entitled to the freedoms of navigation and overflight in most of the mari-
time area of the Gulf of Riga. Their use would be restrictively limited to the 
corridor as established under Article 36 of the LOSC. As a result of the estab-
lishment of the EEZ corridor in the western part of the Gulf of Riga, foreign 
ships and aircraft would enjoy the freedoms of navigation and overflight only 
for reaching the EEZ close to the Riga port. It would abolish the currently freely 
usable roundabout in the Gulf of Riga, which encompasses the maritime area of 
Latvia together with the internal waters and territorial sea of Estonia. 
Lewis Alexander has noted that in order to fulfil the condition stipulated in 
Article 36 of the LOSC, according to which the EEZ corridor must be of “simi-
lar convenience” to an ordinary route through the high seas or an EEZ, the cor-
ridor should be at least 2 or 3 miles wide at its narrowest point.424 For the same 
reason, the corridor could not be established by means of limiting the outer lim-
its of both the Estonian and Latvian territorial sea at least 1.5 miles from the 
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equidistant boundary line in the western part of the Gulf of Riga, since it would 
then not overlap with the shipping channel in the southern part of the strait but 
would instead cross the shallow waters in the western part of the Irbe Strait 
(unless expensive dredging would be carried out). A potential EEZ corridor 
along the maritime boundary would also be significantly lengthier and would 
have to follow a relatively sharp angle in the turning points number 11 and 12 
of the maritime boundary, which would not correspond to the main shipping 
route between the Irbe Strait and the Riga Port. 
In case the Irbe Strait’s shipping channel would be included in the potential 
EEZ corridor, then the EEZ corridor west of the Kolka Cape (Kolkasrags) 
would be located in the Latvian maritime area. This could be compensated on 
an equitable basis by the exclusion of the EEZ corridor from the Latvian mari-
time zone east of the Kolka Cape. There the corridor could be established 
within the limits of the Estonian maritime area west and south of Ruhnu Island. 
It would run southwards until it reaches the Latvian EEZ south of Ruhnu 
Island.425 Thus, by limiting slightly the outer limits of their territorial sea, Esto-
nia and Latvia could better address their potential security concerns in respect 
of their internal waters and territorial sea in the Gulf of Riga. As examined next, 
Estonia and Finland have established an EEZ corridor in the Gulf of Finland in 
the same manner.  
 
 
Chapter 2. The Viro Strait in the Gulf of Finland 
1. The Characteristics of the Viro Strait 
From its 70-kilometres-wide mouth (Hanko Peninsula and Osmussaar-Põõsas-
pea Cape line) to the river Neva, the Gulf of Finland is about 420 km long with 
a maximum width of 150 km and comprising 30 000 km2 of maritime area.426 
As a consequence of the Soviet annexation of Estonia in 1940, the Gulf of Fin-
land was a gulf between two States – Finland and the Soviet Union – until 1991. 
The restoration of Estonia’s independence in 1991 fundamentally altered the 
legal status of the Gulf of Finland.427 
As measured from the Estonian and Finnish baselines, the Gulf of Finland is 
less than 24 miles (approx. 17 miles at its narrowest point) wide up to the outer 
limit of the Russian Federation’s territorial sea. This about 100-miles-long nar-
row passage is the Viro Strait (Estonian: Viru väin; Finnish: Viron salmi; Rus-
sian: Bиpycкий пролив),428 running from close to the Osmussaar Island (hist. 
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Odensholm) in the west, approximately reaching the Vaindloo Island (hist. 
Stenskär) in the east. The coastal States of the Viro Strait are Estonia and Fin-
land. 
In legal and geographical terms, the extended spatial scope of the Gulf of 
Finland includes the Viro Strait between the coasts of Estonia and Finland. On 
the other hand, if one excludes the Viro Strait from the the legal and geograph-
ical borders of the Gulf of Finland, then the Gulf of Finland proper would span 
the maritime area between Narva-Jõesuu (to the south-east), St Petersburg (to 
the east), Vyborg (to the north-east) and the imaginary line between the Finnish 
coastal town Loviisa (to the north-west), the Estonian Vaindloo Island (to the 
west) and the Estonian coastal town Kunda (to the south-west).  
In the centre of the Viro Strait are located international sealanes adopted by 
the International Maritime Organization. These east-west sealanes were used by 
well over 40 000 ships a year in 2011 and in 2012.429 In 2013, the east-west ship 
traffic crossings in the Viro Strait amounted to 38 150, as compared with Øre-
sund’s 29 474 crossings, the Great Belt’s 18 478 crossings, the Åland Strait’s 
14 433 crossings and the Irbe Strait’s 9639 crossings.430 Vessel traffic in the 
Viro Strait will likely increase further as a result of the Russian Federation’s 
decision to stop using by 2018 the Baltic States’ ports (e.g. Ventspils, Riga, 
Klaipeda, Muuga) for shipping its petroleum products instead of its own ports 
(e.g. Ust-Luga, Primorsk) on the eastern coast of the Gulf of Finland.431  
To the above-referred rate of crossings should be added the heavy north-
south traffic in the Viro Strait. In the western part of the Gulf of Finland, ships 
in transit via the east-west international sealanes cross the route of passenger 
ferries (incl. high-speed craft) sailing the Helsinki-Tallinn line. The route across 
the strait is heavily used, which is illustrated by the fact that the governments of 
Estonia and Finland are undertaking studies for constructing an underwater 
railway tunnel from Tallinn to Helsinki.432 In 2015, the Port of Tallinn was vis-
ited by nearly ten million passengers, of whom 8.2 million (84%) were using 
the Helsinki-Tallinn line, and in addition to approximately one million passen-
gers on the Tallinn-Stockholm ferries, over a hundred thousand persons trav-
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elled from/to St Petersburg.433 In 2016, the Port of Tallinn received over 10 
million passengers.434 
Consequently, the Tallinn-Helsinki section in the Viro Strait is among the 
busiest maritime areas in the Baltic Sea which, for its own part, is the location 
of one of the heaviest global shipping traffic.435 Therefore, navigating condi-
tions in the Viro Strait are complex. This is also due to the presence of many 
islands and shallows as well as the fact that the maritime area may be covered 
with ice from December to April; in harsh winters the Gulf of Finland freezes 
completely.436 In light of these hazards, the coastal States of the Gulf of Finland 
have implemented a mandatory ship reporting system. 
The mandatory ship reporting system437 entered into force under Chapter V, 
Regulation 11 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea438 in 
the Gulf of Finland on July 1st, 2004.439 Ships of 300 gross tonnage and over are 
required to participate in the mandatory ship reporting system; ships under 300 
gross tonnage should make reports in circumstances where they are not under 
command or at anchor in the traffic separation schemes, are restricted in their 
ability to manoeuvre or have defective navigational aids.440 
The mandatory ship reporting system in the Gulf of Finland covers the EEZs 
in the Gulf of Finland. In addition, under Article 21(1)(a) of the LOSC, Estonia 
and Finland have implemented mandatory ship reporting systems to their terri-
torial sea and internal waters outside vessel traffic services441 areas. These 
reporting systems provide the same services and make the same requirements to 
shipping as the system operating in the EEZs. The mandatory ship reporting 
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system and the Estonian and Finnish national mandatory ship reporting systems 
are together referred as the GOFREP (Gulf of Finland Reporting).442 
 
 
2. The 1994 Agreement on the EEZ Corridor in the Gulf of Finland and 
its Impact on the Domestic Legislation of Estonia and Finland 
2.1. The Establishment of the EEZ Corridor in the Gulf of Finland 
The coastal States of the Gulf of Finland have, pursuant to Article 3 of the 
LOSC, the right to extend their territorial sea up to the limit of 12 miles as 
measured from the baselines. On March 10th, 1993, the Estonian Parliament 
adopted the Maritime Boundaries Act. Pursuant to its Article 6, Estonia estab-
lished a 12-miles-wide territorial sea. Yet according to Annex 2 of the 1993 
Maritime Boundaries Act, which defines the specific outer limits, the boundary 
of the Estonian territorial sea is never closer than 3 miles to the median line in 
the Gulf of Finland.443 
Consequently, the Estonian territorial sea in the Gulf of Finland is not 12 
miles wide, except for parts in Narva Bay bordering the Russian Federation. 
With the exception of Narva Bay, the maximum breadth of the Estonian territo-
rial sea in the Gulf of Finland is 9 miles, whereas at its narrowest point to the 
north of Keri Island (hist. Kockskär), Estonia’s territorial sea is only 3.6 miles 
wide.444 If Estonia and Finland had established a 12-miles-wide territorial sea in 
the Gulf of Finland, their territorial sea would have reached beyond the median 
line and overlapped. 
With the adoption of the Estonian Maritime Boundaries Act in 1993, Finland 
had achieved the aims of its 1992 unofficial negotiations with Estonia in Hel-
sinki. First, Finland anticipated that Estonia guarantees free and unhindered 
passage in the Gulf Finland under the Maritime Boundaries Act, while at the 
same time leaving open the possibility of extending the territorial sea to 12 
miles in breadth in the future, subject to a notice given to Estonia 12 months in 
advance.445 The explanatory note of the Maritime Boundaries Act stressed that 
after Estonia has established in the Gulf of Finland its territorial sea which does 
not reach closer to the median line than 3 miles, Finland may analogously alter 
the maximum breadth of its territorial sea in this body of water.446 
                                                                          
442  Paragraph 2.1 of Annex 3, IMO Resolution MSC.231(82). 
443  See also Explanatory Note to the 1993 Maritime Boundaries Act of Estonia of Estonia. 
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On April 6th, 1993, two weeks after the Estonian President Lennart Meri 
(who served as Estonia’s Ambassador to Finland during the afore-mentioned 
unofficial negotiations in 1992) had proclaimed the Maritime Boundaries Act, 
the Estonian Embassy in Helsinki informed the Finnish Foreign Ministry of 
Estonia’s intention to increase the width of its territorial sea to 12 miles, 
whereby its outer boundary would extend at certain points to the median line of 
the Gulf of Finland. Such an extension of the breadth of the Estonian territorial 
sea would have required amendments to the Maritime Boundaries Act.  
On the other hand, in case Estonia would not have already established its 
part of the Viro Strait’s EEZ corridor in the 1993 Maritime Boundaries Act 
(prior to the 1994 bilateral Agreement), then its establishment under an inter-
national treaty might not have been possible in practice due to constitutional 
requirements. In this case, the 1994 bilateral Agreement would have modified 
the State border (which pursuant to section 2(1) of the State Borders Act 
includes the line that delimits the territorial sea) as established inter alia under 
the Maritime Boundaries Act. Under section 122 of the Estonian Constitu-
tion, the ratification of international treaties which modify the borders of Esto-
nia requires a two thirds majority of the members of the Parliament. This 
majority would have been difficult to achieve as demonstrated by the adoption 
of the Maritime Boundaries Act in the Parliament earlier. 
The Parliament adopted the Maritime Boundaries Act with recorded votes of 
42 in favour, 38 against, 3 neutral.447 The reason why the vote was split might 
be explained by the fact that at the same time a competing draft Territorial Sea 
Act was not passed with recorded votes of 36 in favour, 38 against, 2 neutral.448 
Since the vote was split primarily due to the establishment of the Estonian part 
of the EEZ corridor under the Maritime Boundaries Act, it would have been 
unlikely that the two thirds majority would have been reached as required under 
the Constitution in respect of international treaties (but not in respect of unilat-
eral modifications of the State border under Estonia’s domestic law).  
The Estonian Embassy stressed in its note from April 6th, 1993 that if Fin-
land were also to extend its territorial sea to 12 miles, “the international channel 
in the Gulf of Finland would be completely closed.”449 Thus, it was proposed, 
 
“In order to maintain free passage through the Gulf of Finland, the Republic of 
Estonia is prepared to limit the width of its territorial waters in the Gulf of Fin-
                                                                          
447  Minutes of the second reading of the draft Maritime Boundaries Act in the Estonian 
Parliament. The stenographic record of the VII Riigikogu, 10.03.1993. Accessible in 
Estonian at: http://stenogrammid.riigikogu.ee (14.09.2016). 
448  Minutes of the second reading of the draft Territorial Sea Act in the Estonian Parliament. 
The stenographic record of the VII Riigikogu, 10.03.1993. Accessible in Estonian at: 
http://stenogrammid.riigikogu.ee (14.09.2016). See also supra section 2.2 of chapter 2 in 
Part III. 
449  Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement on the Procedure to be followed in the 
Modification of the Limits of the Territorial Waters in the Gulf of Finland. 
Tallinn/Helsinki 04.05.1994, e.i.f. 31.07.1995. Accessible:http://www.un.org/depts/ 
los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/EST.htm (14.09.2016). 
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land, so that it extends no closer than 3 nautical miles from the centre line. This 
is presuming that Finland, for its part, is prepared to limit the width of its own 
territorial waters correspondingly. If the Republic of Estonia decides at a later 
stage to depart from the afore-mentioned and expand its territorial waters in the 
Gulf of Finland, it will inform Finland no less than 12 months in advance. This is 
presuming that Finland is also prepared correspondingly to inform Estonia of any 
possible expansion of territorial waters. Should the afore-mentioned be found 
satisfactory to the Government of Finland, this note and its reply shall constitute 
an Agreement regarding this subject.”450 
 
On May 4th, 1994, Finland’s Foreign Ministry informed the Estonian Embassy 
in Helsinki of its acceptance of the proposal.451 On March 3rd, 1995, the Finnish 
Parliament adopted a law on certain amendments to the 1956 Act on the Delim-
itation of Territorial Waters of Finland.452 Pursuant to its section 5, Finland 
extended the breadth of its territorial sea from 4 miles453 to 12 miles, subject to 
exceptions provided in section 5a of the Act concerning the Gulf of Finland as 
well as the Gulf of Bothnia. The 1994 bilateral Agreement entered into force 
one day after the entry into force of the afore-mentioned Act, i.e. on July 31st, 
1995. 
The boundary between the Estonian EEZ and the Finnish continental shelf, 
as well as the fishing zone454 in the Gulf of Finland and the Northern Baltic Sea 
was agreed on in an agreement from October 18th, 1996.455 Hence, as the mari-
time boundary in the Viro Strait is an equidistance line, Estonia and Finland 
agreed on a symmetrical corridor which is at least 6 miles wide and separates 
the territorial sea of Estonia and Finland in the Gulf of Finland.456 This corridor 
thus comprises the EEZs of Estonia and Finland in which certain high seas free-
                                                                          
450  Ibid. 
451  Ibid. 
452  Act Changing the Act on the Delimitation of Territorial Waters of Finland, op. cit. 
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455  Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the Republic of Estonia on the 
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doms apply, including the freedom of navigation and overflight as well as the 
right to lay cables and pipelines.457  
Furthermore, in establishing the geographical coordinates of the boundary of 
Estonia’s territorial sea in Annex 2 of the 1993 Maritime Boundaries Act, the 
Estonian Parliament had agreed on a further limitation to the reach of Estonia’s 
territorial sea in addition to the 3-miles-rule. Namely, the coordinates stipulated 
in the Maritime Boundaries Act imply that the boundary of the territorial sea 
does not reach closer than 1 mile to the international sealanes approved by the 
International Maritime Organization in sections where the international sealanes 
exit the 3-miles-wide Estonian part of the corridor.458 The combined EEZ of 
Estonia and Finland in the Gulf of Finland is in some sections thus wider than 
the 6-miles-wide corridor that was agreed on in the 1994 bilateral Agreement. 
 
 
2.2. The Impact of the 1994 Agreement  
on the Estonian and Finnish Legislation 
The primary aim of both States Parties to the 1994 Agreement was to ensure 
free passage through the Gulf of Finland. The Estonian foreign minister 
explained at the Parliament that this was “a completely voluntary political self-
limitation.”459 This was interpreted in Estonia as a concession to the Russian 
Federation.460 The foreign minister of Estonia noted during the reading of the 
Maritime Boundaries Act draft in the Parliament that “There is no legal limita-
tion, no legal factors that would commit us to it. I repeat, we do it on the basis 
of a voluntary decision.”461 The explanatory note of the Maritime Boundaries 
Act adds that the boundary of the Estonian territorial sea in the Gulf of Finland 
“reflects Estonia’s geopolitical position.”462 Founding the territorial sea bound-
ary in the Gulf of Finland on such political arguments did not coincide well 
with popular sentiments in Estonia, which had only recently regained its inde-
pendence. This was further aggravated by the lack of legal arguments on behalf 
of the Estonian politicians for the establishment of the EEZ corridor in the Gulf 
                                                                          
457  See more specifically on the high seas freedoms in the Gulf of Finland in A. Lott. Marine 
Environmental Protection and Transboundary Pipeline Projects: A Case Study of the 
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of Finland during the drafting of the Maritime Boundaries Act, its passing in the 
Parliament and thereafter.463 
At the same time, the Parliament’s defence committee had presented a com-
peting draft act – the Territorial Sea Act. The 1993 draft Territorial Sea Act 
would have extended Estonia’s territorial sea up to 12 miles in the Gulf of Fin-
land and thus abolished the EEZ corridor.464 The extension of the width of the 
Estonian territorial sea was also proposed in another draft act from 2007. 
According to the 2007 draft act, the EEZ corridor in the Gulf of Finland 
comprises approximately 1250 km2 of Estonian maritime area that should 
instead be declared Estonia’s territorial sea.465 This proposition had been sup-
ported in 2005 inter alia by the recent Prime Minister of Estonia Juhan Parts, 
renowned Estonian scholar on the international law of the sea Heiki Lindpere, 
Member of the Parliament professor Igor Gräzin and the former mayor of Tal-
linn Hardo Aasmäe.466 The authors were primarily motivated by the aim of pre-
venting the laying of the Nord Stream transboundary pipeline in the Gulf of 
Finland due to security and environmental considerations.467 Particularly, in 
case the EEZ corridor in the Gulf of Finland would have been abolished by 
Estonia and Finland prior to the establishment of the Nord Stream submarine 
pipeline, then the States behind that project would not have enjoyed the freedom 
of laying submarine cables and pipelines in this maritime area, as stipulated in 
Article 58(1) of the LOSC. 
The extension of the width of the Estonian territorial sea would have brought 
to the fore the likely non-conformity of the Estonian domestic law on the right 
of innocent passage with the LOSC and potential conflict with other States, as 
the 2007 draft act did not propose to annul the requirement of prior notification 
for a foreign military vessel or other foreign vessel used for national non-com-
mercial purposes to sail through the Estonian territorial sea in the Gulf of Fin-
land (Section 13(2) of the State Border Act). The draft act proceeded from the 
misconception that “pursuant to the [law of the sea] convention, foreign war-
ships must ask for a permission from the coastal State to exercise the right of 
innocent passage.”468 This misconception was employed even though it had 
been stressed in the Estonian legal literature that a possible expansion of the 
territorial sea in the Gulf of Finland to the median line should be coupled with 
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been advanced in favour of the establishment of the EEZ corridor. 
464  Second reading of the draft Territorial Sea Act. Stenographic record of the Parliament, 
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The Parliament rejected the draft Act with a narrow margin, as examined previously (36 
for, 38 against, 2 neutral). 
465  Explanatory Note to the 1993 Maritime Boundaries Act of Estonia 3 SE. Tallinn 2007,  
p. 2. Accessible in Estonian at: http://www.riigikogu.ee/?op=ems&page=eelnou&eid= 
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the amendment of section 13(2) of the Estonian State Border Act, so as to aban-
don the requirement of prior notification or authorisation for innocent pas-
sage.469 
By comparison, the Finnish legislators were more elaborate in their reasons 
on the legal necessity for establishing the EEZ corridor in the Gulf of Finland. 
Finland established its 3-miles-wide EEZ corridor in the Gulf of Finland in 
1995 in the course of amending the Act on the Delimitation of the Territorial 
Waters of Finland. The aim of the Act was to ensure its conformity with the 
LOSC, which had entered into force in the previous year. In its section 5, the 
breadth of the Finnish territorial sea was extended from 4 miles to 12 miles. 
Sweden had already established a 12-miles-wide territorial sea in 1979,470 
whereas Finland had thus far refrained from doing so to avoid a common terri-
torial sea boundary with the Soviet Union in the Gulf of Finland.471 Yet in the 
aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the restoration of Estonia’s 
independence, Finland considered it necessary to extend its territorial sea in order 
to enhance the effectiveness of its coast guard, particularly against smuggling.472 
Exceptions to the 12-miles-wide territorial sea were stipulated in section 5a 
of the Act on the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters of Finland. In particular, 
its section 5a(2) guaranteed that in the Gulf of Bothnia and in its southern and 
northern parts, in the Åland Sea and in the northern part of the Baltic Sea, no 
point of the outer limits of the territorial sea overlaps with the Swedish maritime 
zones as agreed upon in bilateral treaties. Additionally, its section 5a(1) pro-
vides that in the Gulf of Finland, the outer limits of the territorial sea consist of 
a line which runs at a distance of at least 3 miles from the median line and every 
point of which is located north of channels customarily used for international 
navigation. Thus, section 5a(1) corresponds to the 1994 agreement between 
Estonia and Finland. 
The explanatory note of the amendments to the Act on the Delimitation of 
the Territorial Waters of Finland refers to the 1979 agreement between Den-
mark and Sweden concerning the delimitation of the territorial waters between 
Denmark and Sweden473 as an example for the 1994 agreement between Finland 
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and Estonia on the establishment of the EEZ corridor in the Gulf of Finland.474 
Likewise, it should be noted that Denmark and Germany have limited their ter-
ritorial sea in the Femer and Kadet straits so as to guarantee a 4-miles-wide 
channel through their EEZ which links the Great Belt and the Little Belt with 
the Baltic Sea proper.475  
With respect to the Danish Straits, for maintaining the freedom of passage 
subsequent to the extension of their territorial sea to 12 miles, Sweden and 
Denmark limited their territorial sea in the channels between the Swedish coast 
and the Danish coast at Skagen, as well as at Laeso, Anholt and Bornholm so 
that on both sides of the median line there is an area of high seas at least 3 miles 
wide.476 Both States agreed to make it possible for foreign vessels and aircraft to 
transit the high seas in Øresund.477 Under the 1944 Chicago Convention,478 for-
eign aircraft would not have had the freedom of overflight in the absence of 
such a corridor. The corridor was also necessary for safeguarding passage rights 
since at the time both Denmark and Sweden required a notification from foreign 
warships or other government ships operating for non-commercial purposes 
prior to exercising innocent passage.479 
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Similarly, at the time of the conclusion of the 1994 bilateral Agreement, both 
Finland and Estonia required a prior notification from a foreign warship or 
another government ship operating for non-commercial purposes that was about 
to exercise its innocent passage in the Estonian or Finnish territorial sea.480 The 
Finnish legislators noted that if Estonia and Finland were to expand their territo-
rial sea up to 12 miles in the Gulf of Finland, then foreign ships would have no 
other option but to sail through the territorial sea of either of the coastal States 
in order to reach the other side of the passage through the Gulf of Finland and 
thus foreign warships or other government ships operating for non-commercial 
purposes and sailing to or from e.g. St Petersburg or Kronstadt would have to 
give a prior notification to the coastal State.481 The legislators noted that such an 
extension of the territorial sea would have also closed the international corridor 
for overflights.482 The explanatory note of the amendments to the Act on the 
Delimitation of the Territorial Waters of Finland states that the aim of the EEZ 
corridor in the Gulf of Finland is to guarantee an unhindered passage for ships 
and aircraft to St Petersburg and Kronstadt.483  
The above-mentioned arguments for the establishment of the EEZ corridor 
would be relevant if the strait States’ assumption on the general applicability of 
the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage to the Viro Strait under Article 
45(1)(b) of the LOSC was correct. If, instead, the regime of transit passage 
(Article 37 of the LOSC) would have been applicable to ships and aircraft 
transiting the Viro Strait, then the establishment of the EEZ corridor would not 
have been necessary for the purposes of safeguarding the freedoms of naviga-
tion and overflight in the strait. Therefore, it is examined next whether the Gulf 
of Finland proper (excl. the Viro Strait) falls entirely under the territorial sea of 
its coastal States. In case an EEZ would exist in the Gulf of Finland proper (to 
the east of Vaindloo Island), then it would have profound implications to the 
passage regime of the Viro Strait, as studied above in the example of the Irbe 
Strait in the Gulf of Riga.484  
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3. The Inapplicability of Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC to the Viro Strait 
and the Existence of the Russian EEZ in the Gulf of Finland 
The applicability of Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC to the Viro Strait depends on 
whether the Viro Strait connects the EEZs of Estonia and Finland in the west to 
the territorial sea of the Russian Federation in the east. Pursuant to Article 
45(1)(b) in combination with Article 45(2) of the LOSC, the right of non-sus-
pendable innocent passage applies in straits between a part of the high seas or 
an EEZ and the territorial sea of a foreign State. It is commonly assumed that 
foreign ships would have had the right of innocent passage for sailing through 
the Gulf of Finland if Estonia and Finland would not have limited their territo-
rial sea in the Viro Strait under the 1994 bilateral Agreement.  
The right of non-suspendable innocent passage applies to foreign ships. 
Under the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage, foreign ships would not 
be entitled to pass the strait in their normal modes of transit. They would have 
to comply with the rules of innocent passage as stipulated in Article 19 of the 
LOSC. Pursuant to Article 20 of the LOSC, submarines and other underwater 
vehicles would be required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag. 
Clove has observed that surfaced submarines are “less maneuverable and more 
likely to become involved in a collision – especially in dense shipping areas 
such as straits.”485 In case Article 20 of the LOSC would be applicable to the 
Russian submarines of its Baltic Fleet en route to/from Kronstadt throughout 
the Viro Strait, it might further complicate the already complex navigational 
conditions in the strait. 
Additionally, since foreign aircraft would then cross the territory of Estonia 
or Finland instead of an EEZ, they would not be entitled to the freedom of over-
flight that is granted under the right of transit passage or in the EEZ under the 
high seas freedoms (Article 2(2) of the LOSC). Instead, they would have to 
comply with the 1944 Chicago Convention. In effect, it would close the only 
free traffic lane for the civil and military aircraft of the Russian Federation from 
the Russian mainland to the Kaliningrad exclave. Therefore, if Article 45(1)(b) 
of the LOSC would apply to the Viro Strait, then the establishment of the EEZ 
corridor in the Gulf of Finland would have been necessary to achieve the aim of 
the strait States Estonia and Finland to maintain free passage through the strait. 
It would be reasonable to expect that the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland 
includes only the territorial sea and internal waters of its coastal States, since, 
due to its coastal geography, the 12-miles-wide territorial sea, as measured from 
the relevant baselines, could cover the whole relevant maritime area. Nonethe-
less, the Russian maritime area includes a tiny EEZ with the aim to safeguard 
free passage of ships north of Gogland Island.486 Due to the existence of the 
Russian EEZ in the Gulf of Finland, the regime of non-suspendable innocent 
                                                                          
485  Clove, op. cit., p. 107. 
486  See also US Department of State. Finland-U.S.S.R. Boundary. – International Boundary 
Study. Washington D.C: US Department of State 1967, p. 24. Oude Elferink 1994. The 
Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation, op. cit., p. 186. 
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passage cannot apply to the Viro Strait, since the strait connects two EEZs. The 
tiny Russian EEZ is founded on the 1940, 1965 and 1985 maritime boundary 
agreements concluded between Finland and the Soviet Union.487 
Article 2 of the 1940 Treaty of Peace between Finland and the Soviet Union 
provides that the state frontier between Finland and the Soviet Union runs along 
a new line so that inter alia the entire Karelian Isthmus with the city of Viipuri 
(Russian: Выборг) and Viipuri Bay and the islands in the centre of the Gulf of 
Finland proper were included in the territory of the Soviet Union. A mixed 
commission was set up to provide a more detailed establishment of the frontier 
line, including in the Gulf of Finland proper.488 A month later, the commission 
provided a detailed description of the new boundary line between the two 
States. The coordinates of the outer limits of the Russian territorial sea to the 
north and west of Gogland Island are provided in section VI(a) of the 1940 
Protocol.489  
According to section VI(a) of the 1940 Protocol, Gogland Island was not 
attributed full effect in the maritime boundary delimitation, since the breadth of 
its territorial sea to the north of the island was fixed at only marginally over 2 
miles and to the west of the island slightly less than 4 miles (which was the 
maximum breadth of the territorial sea of both States at the time).490 The maxi-
mum breadth of the Russian Federation’s territorial sea is still measured in this 
section of its maritime area on the basis of section VI(a) of the 1940 Protocol.491 
In addition, Article 1 of the 1965 treaty between Finland and the Soviet 
Union on the territorial sea, continental shelf and fishing zone boundary con-
firms the outer limits of the Soviet Union’s territorial sea to the north and west 
of Gogland Island (as established under the 1940 Protocol) and adds a new east-
ernmost coordinate to the outer limit of the Soviet Union’s territorial sea.492 The 
outer limits of the Finnish territorial sea were fixed analogously in the 1940 
                                                                          
487  See also map 7 in Annex 1. 
488  Treaty of Peace between the Soviet Union and Finland. Moscow 12.03.1940, e.i.f. 
13.03.1940. Accessible in Finnish at: http://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/ 
1940/19400003/19400003_2 (14.09.2016). 
489  Protocol to Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of Finland and the 
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics signed at Moscow on March 12th, 1940. Moscow 
29.04.1940, e.i.f. 29.04.1940, section VI(a). Accessible in Finnish at: http:// 
www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/1941/19410012/19410012_3#idp3938192 
(31.01.2017). 
490 The outer limit of the Soviet Union’s territorial sea was fixed on the basis of the 
following coordinates: 60°08'49.0" (N) and 27°04'36.0" (E); 60°08'30.0" (N) and 
27°04'07.0" (E); 60°08'30.0" (N) and 26°57'25.0" (E); 60°08'12.0" (N) and 26°54'25.0" 
(E); 60°04'60.0" (N) and 26°49'00.0" (E). 
491  See map 7 in Annex 1. 
492  Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Boundaries of Sea Areas and of 
the Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Finland. Helsinki 20.05.1965, e.i.f. 25.05.1966, 
Article 1. Accessible: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid= 
080000028012b6b9 (31.01.2017). See also Oude Elferink 1994. The Law of Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation, op. cit., p. 185. 
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Protocol and the 1965 Maritime Boundary Treaty. Consequently, a high seas 
corridor (now an EEZ corridor) was established to the north and west of 
Gogland Island. The Russian EEZ is approximately 9 miles long and approxi-
mately 2 miles wide (at maximum, slightly less than 4 miles wide). 
The coordinates of the Finnish-Russian boundary line in the above-referred 
high seas corridor are stipulated in Article 2 of the 1965 Maritime Boundary 
Treaty. Under Article 2 of the 1965 Treaty, this section of the boundary line is a 
median line as measured from the outer limits of the Finnish and Russian terri-
torial sea. In connection with the establishment of the Soviet Union’s EEZ 
under the 1984 Decree,493 the Soviet Union and Finland agreed under Article 1 
of the 1985 Maritime Boundary Treaty that the boundary of the EEZ, the fish-
ing zone and the continental shelf between Finland and the Soviet Union in the 
Gulf of Finland and the north-eastern part of the Baltic Sea shall be the line 
designated in the 1965 Maritime Boundary Treaty.494 The tiny Russian EEZ in 
the Gulf of Finland spans the maritime area which is located between the coor-
dinates of the EEZ boundary and the outer limits of the Russian territorial sea to 
the north and west of Gogland Island, as stipulated in section VI(a) of the 1940 
Protocol and Article 1 of the 1965 Maritime Boundary Treaty.495 
The existence of the Russian EEZ to the north of Gogland Island has been 
acknowledged in practice, e.g. in planning the laying of the Nord Stream 
pipelines.496 Yet the existence of the Russian EEZ in the Gulf of Finland is not a 
common knowledge in the coastal States of the Gulf of Finland. As studied 
above, Estonia and Finland apparently assumed in establishing the Viro Strait’s 
EEZ corridor in 1994 that the strait connects the EEZs in the Baltic Sea proper 
with the Russian Federation’s territorial sea in the Gulf of Finland proper. This 
follows from the strait States’ assumption that the regime of innocent passage 
generally applies to the strait. Likewise, in the recent commentaries to the 
Estonian Constitution, it is mistakenly argued that if Estonia and Finland would 
abolish the EEZ corridor, then the regime of innocent passage would be 
applicable to ships transiting the Gulf of Finland.497 Similarly, the Estonian 
Maritime Administration has had no information on the existence of the Russian 
                                                                          
493  Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the Economic Zone of 
the USSR. Adopted 28.02.1984, e.i.f.01.03.1984. 
494  Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the delimitation of the economic zone, 
the fishing zone and the continental shelf in the Gulf of Finland and in the North-Eastern 
part of the Baltic Sea. Moscow 05.02.1985, e.i.f. 24.11.1986, Article 1. 
495  See also map 7 in Annex 1. 
496  See Nord Stream Press Release. Nord Stream Completes Additional Route Investigations 
at Request of the Baltic Sea Countries, 30.05.2008. Accessible: http://www.nord-
stream.com/press-info/press-releases/nord-stream-completes-additional-route-
investigations-at-request-of-the-baltic-sea-countries-153/ (31.01.2017). See also Nord 
Stream. Natural Gas Pipeline through the Baltic Sea. Environmental Impact Assessment 
in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Finland: Summary, 2009, p. 1. Accessible: 
https://www.nord-stream.com/download/document/122/?language=en (31.01.2017). 
497  L. Mälksoo et al. Välissuhted ja välislepingud. – Madise, op. cit., p. 711.  
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EEZ in the Gulf of Finland.498 Notably, most nautical charts do not depict the 
Russian EEZ in the Gulf of Finland.499 The existence of the Russian EEZ in the 
Gulf of Finland is forgotten in the coastal States of the Viro Strait. 
Therefore, the Viro Strait connects the EEZs in the Baltic Sea proper with 
the EEZ in the Gulf of Finland proper. Consequently, the right of transit passage 
would be applicable to foreign ships and aircraft transiting this maritime area if 
Estonia and Finland would not have decided to establish the EEZ corridor in the 
Viro Strait. This means that Estonia and Finland were not correct in stating that 
the establishment of the EEZ corridor is necessary in order to safeguard free 
passage in the Viro Strait. This, however, does not imply that the establishment 
of the EEZ corridor is contrary to their interests and law. 
The 1994 Agreement500  is in accordance with the LOSC. Pursuant to its 
Article 311(2), the LOSC does not alter the rights and obligations of States Par-
ties which arise from other agreements that are compatible with the LOSC and 
which do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the 
performance of their obligations under the LOSC. Article 311(2) applies also to 
such agreements as the 1994 Agreement, which was concluded before the 
LOSC entered into force.501 An agreement would be considered compatible with 
Article 311(2) of the LOSC in case it does not give less right to third States as 
compared to Part III of the LOSC.502 The 1994 Agreement favours international 
passage and overflight through the Viro Strait due to the EEZ corridor. The 
passage rights in the EEZ corridor are regulated under Articles 35(b) and 36 of 
the LOSC. 
 
 
4. The EEZ Corridor in the Viro Strait under  
Articles 35(b) and 36 of the LOSC 
Ships can transit maritime areas that are over 24 miles wide (as measured from 
the baselines) through the EEZ that separates the territorial sea of the coastal 
States. Yet, as in the Viro Strait, such an EEZ corridor may also be established 
in straits that are less than 24 miles wide. The LOSC framework on inter-
national straits (Part III) is not applicable to such straits on the condition that the 
EEZ corridor is of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydro-
graphical characteristics.503 
                                                                          
498  Information kindly obtained from Mr Taivo Kivimäe, the Estonian Maritime Admin-
istration on 20.12.2013. 
499  See e.g. the Estonian Maritime Administration’s 2010 nautical chart no. 300. Gulf of 
Finland: Paldiski to Narva. 
500  The 1994 Agreement meets the definition of a “treaty” as stipulated in Article 2(1)(a) of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention. It is an international agreement concluded between States 
in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.  
501  See López Martín, op. cit., p. 81. 
502  Thomas, Duncan, op. cit., p. 80. Caminos 2007, op. cit., p. 588. 
503  LOSC, Article 36. See also Nandan, Rosenne, op. cit., p. 310. 
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The latter requirement means that the right of innocent passage or transit 
passage under Part III of the LOSC would still be applicable if the EEZ corridor 
is not suitable for transiting the strait.504 In practice, such instances (due to shal-
low waters, adverse currents etc.) have not been identified.505  
The Article 36-condition of similar convenience to an ordinary route through 
the high seas or an EEZ is met with regards to the EEZ corridor in the Viro 
Strait, as it is 6 miles wide and Estonia further explicitly specified in its domes-
tic law that its territorial sea boundary does not reach closer than 1 mile to the 
international sealanes in sections where the international sealanes are south of 
the 3-miles-wide Estonian part of the EEZ corridor. Considering that other sig-
nificant obstacles (e.g. shallow waters, islets) to international navigation 
through the EEZ corridor in the Viro Strait are also lacking, it is clearly a route 
of similar convenience. 
Pursuant to Article 36 of the LOSC, other relevant parts instead of Part III of 
the LOSC apply to an EEZ route in a strait, including the provisions regarding 
the freedoms of navigation and overflight. Article 35(b) confirms that nothing 
in the LOSC framework on international straits (Part III) affects the legal status 
of the EEZ beyond the territorial sea of strait States. The aim of this provision is 
to supplement Article 34(1) of the LOSC so as to safeguard that strait States do 
not infer from Part III of the LOSC additional rights or jurisdiction over the 
EEZ or the high seas located in an international strait.506 Thus, as a result of the 
1994 Agreement, a ship or an aircraft transiting the Viro Strait via the EEZ cor-
ridor enjoys the freedom of navigation or overflight, unless it enters Estonia’s or 
Finland’s territorial sea or airspace above it.507 However, it needs to be exam-
ined which consequences would follow in case Estonia and Finland would 
decide to abolish the current EEZ corridor by extending the outer limits of their 
territorial sea in the Viro Strait.  
 
 
5. The Viro Strait in the Context of a Potential Transit Passage Regime 
The extension of the territorial sea of Estonia and Finland up to 12 miles in the 
Viro Strait might not necessarily be in the best interests of the strait States. In 
principle, although Estonia and Finland may extend their territorial sea in the 
Viro Strait up to the median line in accordance with the 1994 bilateral Agree-
ment, nothing could avert the Russian Federation in such circumstances from 
limiting the width of its territorial sea under its domestic law unilaterally analo-
gously to the bilateral 1994 Agreement with the aim of creating an EEZ in the 
eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, even if its EEZ to the north of Gogland 
Island would be non-existent. Thus, the Russian Federation would in any case 
have the option of altering the outer limits of its territorial sea with the aim of 
                                                                          
504  Thomas, Duncan, op. cit., pp. 121, 176. 
505  Ibid, p. 127. Alexander 1987, op. cit., p. 481. 
506  Nandan, Rosenne, op. cit., p. 307. 
507  See also Thomas, Duncan, op. cit., p. 127. 
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applying transit passage to the Viro Strait. The alteration of the strait’s classifi-
cation through the domestic law of a State not littoral of the strait in this manner 
would be at least technically possible. 
In an international strait, the right of transit passage applies from coast to 
coast,508 except for internal waters within a strait where the establishment of a 
straight baseline had the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had 
not previously been considered as such (Article 35(a) of the LOSC).509 There-
fore, the right of transit passage (and innocent passage) could not be applicable 
in the Finnish internal waters in the Viro Strait due to the fact that Finland 
declared the relevant maritime area as its internal waters already in 1938,510 thus 
long before it established a system of straight baselines in 1956.511 In the Viro 
Strait, straight baselines connect numerous skerries that are located many miles 
south of the Finnish mainland, including in the area of Helsinki. 
Estonia established its system of straight baselines after the restoration of its 
independence in Annex 1 of the 1993 Maritime Boundaries Act. At first sight, 
the Estonian internal waters in the Viro Strait may thus not be regarded as hav-
ing had the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously 
been considered as such in terms of Article 35(a) of the LOSC. In spite of the 
absence of an internationally recognised methodology for establishing straight 
baselines prior to the break of Estonia’s independence in 1940, Estonia never-
theless had declared a considerable part of its coastal waters as internal waters. 
Initially, pursuant to Article 2 of the 1918 Estonian Temporary Administra-
tive Laws,512 the cannon-shot rule was used for delimiting bays and their inner 
parts over which it was possible to exercise complete dominion from the coast; 
such waters formed the internal sea of Estonia.513 This regulation was in force 
until 1938 when it was replaced by the Waterways Act,514 which, however, did 
not distinguish bays (formerly internal waters) from the territorial sea. How-
                                                                          
508  See e.g. Schachte, Jr, Bernhardt, op. cit., p. 536. 
509  See supra section 2.1 of Part I. 
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ever, on November 3rd, 1938, the Neutrality Act515 was passed, which provided 
in section 2(3) that the Estonian internal waters shall be deemed to include 
ports, entrances to ports, gulfs and bays, and the waters between those Estonian 
islands, islets and reefs which are not constantly submerged, and between the 
said islands, islets and reefs and the mainland.516 
Internal waters of Estonia were thus maritime areas that were connected to 
the coast due to the location of its islands and bays. The main islands which 
contributed to the extension of the Estonian internal waters in the Gulf of Fin-
land under section 2(3) of the Neutrality Act were Pakri Islands (hist. 
Rågöarna), Naissaar (hist. Nargö/Nargen), Aegna (hist. Ulfsö/Wulf), Prangli 
(hist. Vrangö), Aksi (hist. Lilla Wrangelsö), Mohni (hist. Ekholm), Rammu 
(hist. Ramö), Malusi (hist. Malö), Keri and Vaindloo. As Naissaar, Aegna, 
Prangli, Keri, Aksi, Rammu and Malusi together with smaller islands in their 
vicinity comprise a long line of islands (approximately 40 km from east to west) 
situated in front of Tallinn Bay, Muuga Bay and Kolga Bay, they consequently 
enclosed a large maritime area falling under the internal waters of Estonia. Of 
those islands, Keri lies furthest to the north: approximately 13 miles as meas-
ured from the coast of Muuga Bay. Thus, internal waters closed inter alia Tal-
linn Bay and Muuga and Kolga bays in its immediate vicinity as well as Pal-
diski Bay along Pakri Islands. 
It follows from the foregoing that after the restoration of Estonia’s independ-
ence in 1991 the internal waters, as established in the framework of straight 
baselines, were to a significant extent such internal waters that had been previ-
ously considered as such in terms of Article 35(a) of the LOSC.517 Therefore, 
from the perspective of States that recognise Estonia’s State continuity, foreign 
ships and aircraft cannot enjoy the right of innocent passage or transit passage 
in such internal waters, particularly in Tallinn Bay. However, as the Russian 
Federation does not recognise Estonia’s State continuity, it might object to this 
under international law.518 Thereby it might not feel itself curtailed by the limits 
of the right of transit passage in the afore-mentioned internal waters of Estonia. 
In any case, if Estonia and Finland would abolish the EEZ corridor, then the 
maritime area in the Viro Strait where ships and aircraft would be entitled to 
transit passage (primarily the territorial sea of both States) would still be sig-
nificantly greater in comparison to the limits of the EEZ corridor. 
Thus, when enjoying the right of transit passage, foreign ships (including 
submarines) and aircraft could transit the strait very close to Tallinn and Hel-
sinki (essentially up to Naissaar-Aegna line near Tallinn and the skerries near 
Helsinki). In order to limit such transit passage, Estonia and Finland could pos-
sibly retain the existing ship routes in the Gulf of Finland under Article 41 of 
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the LOSC. Foreign ships in passage would have to follow and respect the man-
datory ship routes under Articles 39(2)(a) and 41(7) of the LOSC if undertaking 
transit passage. 
The International Maritime Organization as the competent organisation has 
adopted the traffic separation scheme in respect of the Gulf of Finland.519 Since 
the traffic separation scheme for the Gulf of Finland was adopted by the Inter-
national Maritime Organization, it may be considered as “generally accepted” in 
terms of Articles 39(2)(a) and 41(7) of the LOSC and necessary for the safety of 
navigation as required under both of the afore-referred provisions.520 In effect, 
non-State-owned ships would be required to comply with the traffic separation 
scheme in the Gulf of Finland if they should potentially exercise the right of 
transit passage. However, as examined above,521 this would not limit the spatial 
extent of the right of transit passage of sovereign immune vessels (incl. war-
ships). Furthermore, the traffic separation scheme does not apply to aircraft 
(Articles 39(3) and 41 of the LOSC).522 
Albeit civil aircraft are required under Article 39(3)(a) of the LOSC to 
observe the Rules of the Air established by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), this is not always the case for State aircraft.523 State air-
craft are required to normally comply with the Rules of the Air and at all times 
operate with due regard for the safety of navigation as well as monitor the radio 
frequency assigned by the competent internationally designated air traffic con-
trol authority or the appropriate international distress radio frequency (Article 
39(3)(a) and (b) of the LOSC). Nandan and Anderson explain about the drafting 
of Parts III and IV of the LOSC that 
 
“For strategic reasons the US did not want military aircraft to be subject to 
reporting requirements at all times. The normal practice is for military aircraft to 
observe and comply with ICAO rules, even though strictly they apply only to 
civil aircraft.”524  
 
Oxman observes that the wide regulatory powers of the International Civil Avi-
ation Organization are not applicable to military aircraft and refers to problems 
with flight plans, flight control and two-way communication as the main safety 
concerns in regard to such aircraft.525 These problems are pertinent especially in 
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525  Oxman, op. cit., p. 400. 
118 
the narrow Viro Strait which is heavily navigated by Russian military aircraft. 
In view of improving air safety, the Russian Federation has recently accepted 
the Finnish President Sauli Niinistö’s proposal to fly its aircraft over the Baltic 
Sea with activated transponders so as to allow commercial radars to detect their 
movement and minimise the threat of collisions.526 Nevertheless, Russian mili-
tary aircraft continue to fly over the Viro Strait with mostly unactivated tran-
sponders. According to the Estonian Air Navigation Services, the Estonian part 
of the Viro Strait’s EEZ corridor is crossed annually by approximately 400 Rus-
sian military aircraft of which only 50–70 aircraft use activated transponders.527 
Since the Estonian commercial radars are not able to detect the movement of 
most of the military aircraft transiting the EEZ corridor in the Viro Strait, the 
Estonian Air Navigation Services will automatically receive information on 
aircraft flying with unactivated transponders from the Estonian Defence Forces’ 
military radars.528 
The Viro Strait is the only passage linking the Russian mainland with the 
Kaliningrad exclave for Russian aircraft. It is vital for inter alia the Russian air 
force to maintain freedom of overflight in the Viro Strait. In case the regime of 
transit passage would be applicable to the Viro Strait, then the Russian military 
aircraft and potentially also warships could cross the Viro Strait close to Tallinn 
or Helsinki. This would create further hazards to civilian air-traffic even if the 
Russian military aircraft would have their identification transponders installed 
and activated.529 The distance between the Tallinn airport and Tallinn Bay is 
only approximately 3 km and the Helsinki airport is also less than 20 km away 
from the Helsinki South Harbour. In a similar geographical setting, a Russian 
intelligence plane nearly collided in 2014 with a commercial airline over Swe-
den shortly after the airplane had taken off from the Copenhagen airport.530 If 
the Russian military aircraft could transit the strait outside the limits of the 
existing EEZ corridor in the Gulf of Finland closer to the Tallinn and Helsinki 
airports, the risk of air-collisions might increase significantly. 
It is doubtful whether the sealanes and traffic separation scheme in the Gulf 
of Finland would address the security interests of Estonia and Finland suffi-
ciently if the Viro Strait should fall under the regime of transit passage in case 
of the abolishment of the EEZ corridor. Firstly, the strait State does not have the 
right to adopt any air routes in respect of aircraft exercising the right of transit 
passage.531 Also, the military aircraft exercising the right of transit passage are 
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not legally bound to comply with the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion’s Rules of the Air, as examined above. Secondly, foreign warships could 
transit the Viro Strait close to the mainland coasts and capitals of the strait 
States. Thirdly, it would be significantly more difficult for Estonia and Finland 
to exercise control over their territorial sea boundary and take countermeasures 
against the violations of the passage and border regime.  
In this connection, Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz have noted, “Should com-
pulsory routeing measures not be respected, for instance, when a ship navigates 
outside a designated traffic lane, the ship concerned would be in breach of Arti-
cle 41 [of the LOSC – A. L.], but that does not entitle the State bordering the 
strait to consider the right of transit to have been lost.”532 Hence, the ship in 
transit passage might be entitled to continue its passage in spite of the breach of 
the transit passage regime.533 In any case, the abolishment of the EEZ corridor 
would make it more difficult for the coastal States of the Viro Strait to detect 
and take measures against illegal entries. 
Likewise, if the EEZ corridor would be abolished and the transit passage 
regime would be applicable to the Viro Strait instead, then foreign sovereign 
immune vessels and (military) aircraft could potentially navigate in/above the 
Russian Federation’s territorial sea and its internal waters in eastern Gulf of 
Finland – on the condition that the Russian internal waters do not meet the crite-
ria of long-standing internal waters under Article 35(a) of the LOSC, as studied 
above. In addition, the Russian Federation could not enjoy the freedom to lay 
submarine cables and pipelines in the Viro Strait anymore. 
Under the regime of transit passage, foreign sovereign immune vessels and 
(military) aircraft might enter the Viro Strait and, in principle, head freely to the 
waters located between the islands in the centre of the Gulf of Finland proper, 
enter e.g. Vyborg Bay and areas close to Kronstadt and St Petersburg and then 
leave the Gulf of Finland proper by crossing the tiny Russian EEZ north of 
Gogland Island.534 Prior to leaving the Gulf of Finland proper, foreign ships and 
aircraft could also make a stop in the Russian EEZ (next to the Russian military 
intelligence unit on Gogland Island) to conduct inter alia military activities 
under the applicable high seas freedoms.535 
Under the current Viro Strait’s legal regime, this would not be possible. The 
eastern Gulf of Finland includes the Russian Federation’s territorial sea and 
internal waters where the freedoms of navigation and overflight do not apply. 
Instead, the general legal regime of innocent passage is applicable to the Rus-
sian Federation’s territorial sea and potentially to its internal waters if they meet 
the criteria of Article 8(2) of the LOSC. Foreign aircraft cannot fly above the 
Russian Federation’s territorial sea and internal waters without the Russian 
                                                                          
532  Ibid, p. 242. 
533  See further discussion on this aspect and e.g. the United States position on this matter in 
supra section 5 of chapter 1 in Part III. 
534  See in detail the analogous case study on the Gulf of Riga in section 4.2 of chapter 1 in 
Part III. 
535  Ibid. 
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Federation’s prior permission (Article 2(2) of the LOSC). Foreign ships are 
required to comply with the rules of the St Petersburg Coastal Vessel Traffic 
Service which covers nearly the entire Russian Federation’s maritime area in 
the Gulf of Finland, except for the ones covered by the spatially more limited 
vessel traffic services of Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Vyborg, Vysotsk and St Peters-
burg Port.536 Under the rules of the St Petersburg Coastal Vessel Traffic Ser-
vice, ships entering the Russian territorial sea from west must receive a prior 
permission from the Russian Federation’s authorities.537 Therefore, foreign 
ships and aircraft can only navigate in/above the eastern Gulf of Finland if the 
Russian Federation has granted its prior authorisation. 
The above-mentioned examples serve to illustrate that the applicability of 
the regime of transit passage to the Viro Strait might not necessarily be in the 
interests of the Russian Federation. Rather, it would pose security concerns to 
the Russian Federation analogous to the ones of Estonia and Finland if the EEZ 
corridor were to be abolished. 
In this context, the problem with illegal incursions should also be acknowl-
edged. This is illustrated by the fact that the Swedish and Finnish navies spotted 
and chased – most recently in the end of 2014 and in the beginning of 2015 – 
suspected foreign submarines in their territorial waters close to Stockholm and 
Helsinki.538 Also, Russian-signed submarine signal buoys have often been found 
on the Estonian coast.539 In this regard, an Estonian Navy officer has noted that 
Estonia has little surveillance capabilities for detecting submerged foreign sub-
marines that have illegally entered its waters.540 If detected, however, it may be 
lawful on the basis of the Finnish and Swedish practice to fire depth charges 
against a suspected foreign submarine which has illegally entered into the 
coastal State’s waters in order to force it surface and threat to sink it in case it 
does not.541 
                                                                          
536  See e.g. a map of the vessel traffic services in the Russian Federation’s maritime area of 
the Gulf of Finland, in National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Sailing Directions 
(Enroute): Gulf of Finland and Gulf of Bothnia. Springfield: US Government 2017,  
p. 62. 
537  Rosmorport. – VTS services, ‘Terms and conditions of navigation’. Accessible: http:// 
www.rosmorport.com/spb_serv_nav.html (14.03.2017). See also Министе́рство 
тра́нспорта Росси́йской Федера́ции. Правила плавания в районе действия 
Прибрежной СУДС в составе Региональной Системы Управления Движением 
Судов в восточной части Финского залива (РСУДС), 20.12.2007. 
538  J. Rosendahl.  Finnish military fires depth charges at suspected submarine. Reuters, 
28.04.2015. Sweden confirms submarine violation. The Guardian, 14.11.2014. Such 
illegal entries by foreign submarines have allegedly occurred also previously: See e.g. 
New submarine search off Porvoo. Helsingin Sanomat, 15.08.2001. 
539  D. Cavegn. Russian submarine signal buoy found on Saaremaa island. ERR News, 
22.07.2016.  
540  See M. Männi. Mereväelane: Eestil ei ole täielikku ülevaadet, mis meie vetes toimub. 
Postimees, 19.10.2014. 
541  See also Klein, op. cit., p. 41. 
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Yet in some instances, illegal foreign military entries to the territory in the 
immediate vicinity of a coastal State’s capital may not be carried out under-
cover. At the end of 2003 (just before Estonia joined the NATO), two Russian 
fighter jets violated Estonia’s airspace and flew approximately 200 km in Esto-
nia’s airspace along its coastline and over Tallinn.542 Estonian airspace viola-
tions by the Russian aircraft have been frequent, in particular close to Vaindloo 
Island in the Viro Strait.543 The Russian fighter jets have recently also violated 
the Finnish airspace close to Helsinki.544 In light of such instances and the pre-
sent state of affairs,545 it would be advisable to maintain the limitation on the 
freedoms of navigation and overflight in the form of a relatively narrow EEZ 
corridor in the Viro Strait, instead of broadening the passage rights throughout 
the Gulf of Finland to a greater extent. It appears that the EEZ corridor balances 
the interests of the coastal States of the Gulf of Finland better as compared with 
the potential applicability of the transit passage regime to the Viro Strait. Yet it 
must be established next whether it is actually possible to abolish the EEZ cor-
ridor in the Viro Strait under previous international agreements concluded by 
Estonia and Finland with their eastern neighbouring State. 
  
                                                                          
542  T. Sildam, K. Kaas. Vene hävituslennukid tungisid Eesti taevasse. Postimees, 
05.03.2004. 
543  In 2014, there were ten incursions by the Russian aircraft to the NATO Member States’ 
airspace, eight of which occurred in Estonia and six of which took place over Vaindloo 
Island. See A. Nardelli, G. Arnett. NATO reports surge in jet interceptions as Russia 
tensions increase. The Guardian, 03.08.2015. See also Anonymous. Typhoon jets 
intercept Russian planes that committed 'act of aggression'. The Guardian, 13.05.2016. 
544  M. Salomaa. Ulkoministeriö kutsui Venäjän suurlähettilään puhutteluun – “Suomi ottaa 
alueloukkaukset aina vakavasti”. Helsingin Sanomat, 07.10.2016. Vene sõjalennukid 
rikkusid Eesti ja Soome õhupiiri. ERR Uudised, 07.10.2016. 
545  Circumstances may change, e.g. if the Russian Federation engages in military activities 
in the Viro Strait’s narrow EEZ corridor or in the Latvian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga that 
hinders navigation or constitutes a threat to the strait States. See also supra section 4.2 of 
chapter 1 in Part III. 
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PART IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LONG-STANDING 
TREATIES AND THE LEGAL REGIME OF SUI GENERIS 
STRAITS FOR THE VIRO STRAIT 
 
1. The Legal Framework of the Viro Strait under Previous 
International Agreements 
Estonia’s independence in 1918 raised problems for its eastern neighbouring 
State in terms of its vessels’ passage rights in the Gulf of Finland. These essen-
tially corresponded to the ones which the Russian Federation encountered due 
to the restoration of Estonia’s independence in 1991 and which led to the estab-
lishment of the EEZ corridor in the Gulf of Finland under the 1994 bilateral 
Agreement. In spite of a time lag of over 70 years and the profound develop-
ments in the international law of the sea that occurred in the course of this 
period, it is important to scrutinise the problems and solutions with regard to the 
legal framework applicable to the Viro Strait in the 1920s and 1930s. Thereby, 
it is possible to comprehend its possible significance for the contemporary EEZ 
corridor in the Viro Strait. 
Following 1922 Estonian-Finnish bilateral negotiations, the 1923 Oslo Con-
ference between Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Germany and the 
Helsinki Conference from November 24th to December 4th, 1924 (attended by 
all Baltic Sea coastal States), the Helsinki Convention for the Suppression of the 
Contraband Traffic in Alcoholic Liquors was concluded between all of the Bal-
tic Sea coastal States.546 The Helsinki Convention provided for a 12-miles-wide 
control zone which would have significantly impaired the passage rights of the 
Soviet ships in the Viro Strait. Namely, the 12-miles-wide maritime zones of 
Estonia and Finland would have covered most of the Viro Strait, including areas 
where the international sealanes were located.547 Therefore, upon the Soviet 
Union’s initiative, the three coastal States of the Gulf of Finland adopted a 
sophisticated legal framework to safeguard high seas freedoms in this maritime 
area. 
Unlike the generally recognised Article 35(c)-type of treaties on straits (e.g. 
the Danish Straits and the Åland Strait), the Helsinki international agreements 
pertaining to the passage rights in the Viro Strait have not been applied over a 
prolonged period of time. More significantly, they were not referred to and 
appear to have gone unnoticed in concluding the 1994 bilateral Agreement on 
the EEZ corridor in the Viro Strait. Yet it is necessary to acknowledge the exist-
ence of these agreements as they ascertain that the 1994 bilateral Agreement 
does not stand in isolation from previous international agreements, but rather 
continues their aim with regard to the passage rights in the Viro Strait. 
                                                                          
546  Initially, it was projected as an Estonian-Finnish bilateral treaty. See ERA.31.3.5424, p. 1. 
547  See map 4 in Annex 1. 
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In this context, a 1932 judgment of the Estonian Supreme Court is of partic-
ular assistance for assessing the previous international agreements in the context 
of the passage rights in the Viro Strait in the 1920s and 1930s. It is also 
important to examine this judgment since the parties to that legal dispute were 
in disagreement about the need to recognise freedom of navigation in the Viro 
Strait similarly to how the parties to the modern debate in Estonia argue about 
the usefulness of maintaining the EEZ corridor in the Viro Strait. The judgment 
and its aftermath have significant implications for the current legal regime of 
the Viro Strait. 
 
 
1.1. The Context of the 1932 Judgment of the Estonian Supreme Court 
en banc on Passage Rights in the Viro Strait  
In 1932, the Estonian Supreme Court en banc had to solve a dispute on passage 
rights in the Viro Strait.548 The case concerned a Hungarian-flagged steamship 
Hullam which was involved in traffic in alcoholic liquors 9.6 miles north of 
Vaindloo Island in the Estonian 12-miles-wide customs zone (exact location: 
Latitude 59 59,0 (N), longitude 26 23,0 (E)).549 The ship was anchored and its 
cargo550 was being unloaded to a Panama-flagged yacht Elba and to Estonian 
boats for shipping to Estonia.551 The ship (along with its cargo) was arrested by 
the Estonian Coast Guard and her deputy captain (Estonian citizen) charged 
with breaching of the Estonian Tolls Act.552 The courts of first and second 
instance together with the Estonian Prosecutor’s Office found that the Estonian 
Coast Guard did not have the right to arrest the ship under the legal framework 
of the 1925 Helsinki Convention, whereas the Estonian Ministry of Economics 
and the Customs Authority were of the opposite opinion.553 
It is a rare case in the jurisprudence of the Estonian Supreme Court, as it 
focuses on issues of the law of the sea, not civil, criminal or administrative law 
upon which the court mostly had to decide. The main competence of the 
Supreme Court lay in the review of court judgements by way of cassation pro-
ceedings in its Administrative, Civil and Criminal Chambers. At the time, the 
Court did not exercise formally constitutional review. The Supreme Court en 
banc was competent inter alia to review cases that had caused disputes in prac-
tice.554 To this category falls also the case on passage rights in the Viro Strait. 
Due to the disparate views on the passage rights in the Gulf Finland between 
the Estonian Border Guard and the Ministry of Economics on the one hand and 
                                                                          
548  Judgment of the Supreme Court of Estonia en banc, 01.10.1932. – R. Rägo (toim). 
Riigikohtu 1932. a. otsused. Tartu: Õigus 1934, p. 8. Reprinted in T. Anepaio (koost). 
Riigikohus. Otsuste valikkogumik 1920–1940. Tartu: Elmatar 1999, pp. 57–64. 
549  ERA.1356.1.302, pp. 1, 24. 
550  For the detailed description of its cargo, see ERA.1356.1.302, p. 24(verso). 
551  Ibid, pp. 8, 25(verso).   
552  Ibid, pp. 1–2, 9(verso), 24(verso), 
553  Ibid, p. 1. 
554  T. Anepaio. Eesti Vabariigi Riigikohus. Eesti Jurist 1994(4), p. 26. 
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the Tallinn-Haapsalu circuit court and the national Court of Appeal on the other, 
the Supreme Court of Estonia en banc had to decide upon the request of the 
Ministry of Economics in 1932 whether foreign ships were entitled to freedom 
of navigation under the high seas freedoms through the Estonian 12-miles-wide 
control zone in the Gulf of Finland as established under the 1925 Helsinki Con-
vention for the Suppression of the Contraband Traffic in Alcoholic Liquors. The 
Estonian Border Guard and the Ministry of Economics maintained that Estonia 
was bound to ensure compliance with its legal acts on tax and customs in the 
Viro Strait in view of ships involved in contraband traffic in alcoholic liquors in 
the high seas, whereas the courts found that under the legal framework of the 
1925 Helsinki Convention, ships transiting the Gulf of Finland in its high seas 
corridor enjoy freedom of navigation and thus cannot be subjected to any cus-
toms control or other hindrances to their passage. 
The line of argumentation in the Supreme Court’s judgment reflected at the 
time to a significant extent the views of the persons that drafted it. In the mod-
ern Supreme Court of Estonia, the draft judgment, which is deliberated by the 
Chamber in private, is generally drafted by a justice and the Chamber’s coun-
sellor, whereas prior to 1940, the judgment of the Supreme Court was drafted 
essentially solely by the justice that had to present the case in the private delib-
erations of the Chamber.555 Also, the State prosecutor (somewhat similar institu-
tion to the nine Advocates General of the European Court of Justice), who was 
solely appointed to the Supreme Court along with his aid, had to deliver his 
independent556 opinion on the case. This opinion was also discussed during the 
deliberations in the Chamber. It may be assumed that the decisive figures in 
connection with the 1932 judgment of the Supreme Court en banc were the 
presenting justice Peeter Kann,557 Kaarel Parts as the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court from 1920 to 1940 (acted also as the chairman in the proceed-
ings) and the prosecutor Richard Rägo.558 
The Supreme Court was independent of the Estonian Government as its jus-
tices were appointed by the Parliament.559 Many justices had been active in 
Estonian politics previously. The Chief Justice Kaarel Parts had been the 
founding member of the centre-right Estonian People’s Party, member of the 
Russian II State Duma and the chairman of the Estonian Maanõukogu,560 which 
was the first Estonian Parliament-like assembly established in the Russian 
Empire in 1917. Unlike many other justices of the Supreme Court, who had 
studied law in the university of St Petersburg (where their fellow-Estonian 
                                                                          
555  Oral explanations of T. Anepaio, 12.10.2015.  
556  The prosecutor was also independent of the justices (including the Chief Justice) of the 
Supreme Court. 
557  ERA.1356.1.302, p. 1. 
558  See Judgment 01.10.1932, op. cit., p. 8. R. Rägo was appointed later as justice of the 
Supreme Court in 1939. 
559  Anepaio 1994, op. cit., p. 29. 
560  Ibid, p. 31. 
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Friedrich Martens lectured on international law), Kaarel Parts graduated from 
Tartu University.561 
At the time of the 1932 judgment, the Supreme Court composed of well-
experienced justices. Five (38 %) of the thirteen justices had been in office 
since the establishment of the Supreme Court in 1920 (i.e. 13 years).562 At the 
time, three justices were non-ethnic Estonians:  Dmitri Verhoustinski was Rus-
sian, whereas Harald Johannes Jucum and Victor Karl Maximilian Ditmar were 
Germans.563 In general, the justices were not outstanding experts on inter-
national law.564 The Supreme Court en banc decided to consult the Professor of 
International law at the University of Tartu Ants Piip for expert advice and 
asked the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send the map of the high seas 
corridor in the Gulf of Finland.565 
It is, however, likely that in addition to the Chief Justice, presenting justice 
and the prosecutor, one of the justices that had significant influence on the sub-
stance of the 1932 judgment en banc was the member of the former Baltic 
nobility Victor Ditmar. Justice Ditmar had prior to his appointment to the 
Supreme Court in 1924 been counsellor at the Estonian Embassy in the Soviet 
Union, senator at the highest judicial organ of the imperial Russia – the Gov-
erning Senate – and had also worked at the appellate court in St Petersburg.566 
Although generally the deliberations of the justices in the Chamber did not nec-
essarily have a profound influence on the text of the draft judgment as prepared 
by the presenting justice, this might not have been the case with regard to the 
1932 judgment en banc due to its political connotations567 and great importance. 
It is possible that at least during the private deliberations in the Chamber, justice 
Ditmar was active since he was well-experienced in the field of international 
law.568 Notably, the judgment includes a hand-written short comment to testify 
that justice Jaan Lõo disagreed with the ruling.569 
As will be subsequently examined,570 the judgment is in many aspects diffi-
cult to explain as being in accordance with international law, in particular with 
the legal framework of the 1925 Helsinki Convention. However, in other 
                                                                          
561  Ibid, p. 32. 
562  Ibid, pp. 32–33. 
563  Ibid, p. 31. 
564  Notably, the former Estonian foreign minister and ambassador Aleksander Hellat was 
appointed as the justice of the Supreme Court a year after the 1932 judgment en banc 
(served from February 9th, 1933 to October 18th, 1940). See Supreme Court of Estonia.  
– Previous Members of the Supreme Court. Accessible: http://www.riigikohus.ee/ 
?id=103 (14.09.2016). 
565  ERA.1356.1.302, p. 10. The map is accessible at the Estonian National Archives: 
ERA.957.13.651, p. 4. For a copy of the map see map 2 in Annex 1. 
566  Anepaio 1994, op. cit., p. 31. 
567  See e.g. ERA.957.14.327, pp. 3–76. 
568  Oral explanations of T. Anepaio, 12.10.2015. 
569  ERA.1356.1.302, p. 18(verso). 
570  See infra section 2 of Part IV. 
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aspects it did and, more significantly, it was in some instances not in accordance 
with the then current law but similar in content to the later LOSC straits regime. 
 
 
1.2. Passage Rights in the Viro Strait in the 1920s and 1930s in the 
Context of the Estonian Supreme Court’s 1932 Judgment 
In the 1920s and 1930s, the territorial sea of Estonia and Finland did not cover 
most of the maritime area in the passage through the Gulf of Finland. At the 
time, both States applied normal baselines for measuring the breadth of their 
territorial sea. Pursuant to Article 3 of the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty between 
Finland and Soviet Russia, the breadth of the Finnish territorial sea was 4 
miles.571 
The Estonian territorial sea was considered 3 miles wide up until 1938, alt-
hough it was not stipulated in its domestic law.572 A Government commission 
composed of high-level representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Interior and War as well as the Maritime Administration had proposed on May 
2nd, 1923 that the width of the Estonian territorial sea should be declared 4 miles 
as in Sweden and Finland.573 This proposal did not succeed. During the 1930 
Hague Codification Conference, Estonia declared that the breadth of its territo-
rial sea was 3 miles.574 Following the practice of Sweden, Finland and the 
Soviet Union, Estonia established under section 1 of its 1938 Waterways Act 
the 4-miles-wide territorial sea.575 
The extensive maritime area in between the opposite territorial seas of Fin-
land and Estonia was the high seas. For this reason, presumably, the passage 
through the Gulf of Finland was not regarded as an international strait in the 
legal literature unlike, for example, the Sea of Straits or the Irbe Strait.576 
The Supreme Court of Estonia found in its 1932 judgment, which included 
many references to international as well domestic legal literature on the law of 
                                                                          
571  However, as confirmed by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the limit of the 
Finnish territorial sea was not stipulated under its domestic law at least prior to 1940. See 
ERA.957.14.583, p. 26. More generally, the Scandinavian States already referred to the 
4-miles-wide continuous belt of coastal sea as part of their dominion in the 18th century. 
See A. Uustal. Международно-правовой режим территориальных вод. Таrtu: Tartu 
State University Press 1958, p. 156. 
572  Taska 1974, op. cit., pp. 43, 48. Piip 1936, op. cit., pp. 177–179.  
573  ERA.957.12.389, p. 11. This proposal had been made also in 1921 by an earlier commis-
sion, see Piip 1936, op. cit., p. 178. See also map 3 in Annex 1. 
574  Taska 1974, op. cit., p. 43. 
575  Generally, the Waterways Act followed the legal framework on the territorial sea as 
agreed on during the 1930 Hague Codification Conference and pursuant to which the 
coastal State’s sovereignty extends to the territorial sea as well as to the seabed, subsoil 
and airspace of the territorial sea. See Anonymous. Uus veeteede seadus valmis: 
territoriaalmere laiuseks 4 meremiili, merekitsuse laiuseks 10 meremiili. Uus Eesti. 
Tallinn 23.01.1938, No. 22, p. 1. 
576  See on the classification of the Irbe Strait and the Sea of Straits as international straits in 
Taska 1974, op. cit., p. 112. 
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the sea, that the notion of international straits includes straits that are used for 
international navigation between the high seas and the territorial sea. The 
Supreme Court found that straits that connect two parts of the high seas or the 
high seas with a territorial sea are deemed to be free for any orderly, i.e. 
unthreatening passage, but overall they are subject to the same kind of regula-
tions on State supremacy that apply in regards to the territorial sea.577 Thus, the 
Supreme Court seems to have recognised the right of non-suspendable innocent 
passage in the Viro Strait which was considered due to the 12-miles-wide con-
trol zones as a strait that connects the high seas with a territorial sea (of the 
Soviet Union). The Supreme Court did not lay great emphasis on the functional 
element of international straits – it stems from its reasoning that the legal 
regime of straits would be applicable irrespective of whether or not a strait has a 
heavy traffic of foreign vessels.578 
The Supreme Court defined the term “unthreatening passage” by referring to 
the agreement reached in the 1930 Hague Codification Conference, according to 
which passage is not deemed unthreatening (inoffensif, innocent) if the vessel is 
using a foreign State’s territorial sea in order to take any measures against the 
coastal State’s security, public order or fiscal interests and, finally, that 
unthreatening passage includes the right of stopping and anchoring, but only in 
so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered neces-
sary by force majeure or a dictated halt.579 In the terms of contemporary legal 
framework, this generally accords with the concept of innocent passage under 
Articles 19(1) and 18(2) of the LOSC. 
The position, according to which there can be no suspension of innocent pas-
sage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation 
between one part of the high seas and the territorial sea of a foreign State, was 
first stipulated in Article 16(4) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone. Although the legal framework on the law of the sea 
had not changed significantly since the time of Estonian Supreme Court’s 
judgment in 1932, the ICJ found in its first judgment delivered in 1949 that the 
right of non-suspendable innocent passage applies only in international straits 
that connect two parts of the high seas.580 Thus, unlike the ICJ, the Supreme 
Court of Estonia appears to have found, prior to the international conventions 
on the law of the sea as adopted in the latter part of the 20th century, that the 
regime of non-suspendable innocent passage may also be applicable in straits 
that connect a part of the high seas with the territorial sea of a foreign State. The 
passage through the Gulf of Finland was considered by the Supreme Court to 
fall under this category of straits. The Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the 
                                                                          
577  Judgment 01.10.1932, op. cit., p. 9. 
578  The functional element of a strait was downplayed also by the ICJ and the States 
themselves during the codification of the law of the sea in the latter part of the 20th 
century. Some authors have criticised this approach. See e.g. E. Somers. The Legal 
Regime of the Danish Straits. – Öztürk, Özkan (eds), op. cit., p. 14. 
579  Ibid. 
580  Corfu Channel Case, op. cit., p. 28. 
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Gulf of Finland, in parts where its width from coast to coast does not exceed 24 
miles, should not be regarded as high seas, but instead (due to the establishment 
of the 12-miles-wide control zone) as a strait where the right to free (non-sus-
pendable) innocent passage applies.581 Therefore, the Supreme Court denied the 
existence of the Viro Strait’s high seas corridor where ships and aircraft could 
enjoy the freedoms of navigation and overflight. 
The Supreme Court found that the coastal State’s right to repel vessels in its 
territorial sea as well as in its 12-miles-wide customs zone and zone for the 
suppression of contraband traffic in alcoholic liquors to ensure compliance with 
the coastal State’s legal acts on tax and customs also applied in the Viro 
Strait.582 Consequently, the Hungarian ship Hullam was arrested lawfully and 
the rulings of the lower courts were repealed.583 This conclusion followed the 
aim of the 1925 Helsinki Convention to suppress alcohol smuggling and the 
concept of non-suspendable innocent passage. However, the judgment’s con-
formity with a reservation made by the Soviet Union to the 1925 Helsinki Con-
vention is more ambiguous. To examine this more closely, it is necessary to 
assess the legal framework of the 1925 Helsinki Convention. 
 
 
1.3. The Legal Framework of the 1925 Helsinki Convention and the 
Soviet Union’s Reservation on Passage Rights in the Viro Strait 
Under Article 9(1) of the 1925 Helsinki Convention, the States Parties under-
took the obligation to adopt legal acts against ships involved in contraband traf-
fic in alcoholic liquors. For the effective application of such acts, they estab-
lished a control zone with a breadth of up to 12 miles.584 Pursuant to Article 
9(2) of the 1925 Helsinki Convention, the States Parties had the right of hot 
pursuit onto the high seas (up to the boundary of another State’s control zone)585 
where the coastal State was entitled to take such measures against the ship pur-
sued as within its 12-miles-wide control zone.  
                                                                          
581  Judgment 01.10.1932, op. cit., p. 14. 
582  Ibid, p. 12. 
583  ERA.1356.1.302, pp. 20, 26. 
584  Estonia’s jurisdiction also extended to 12 miles under the maritime customs zone which 
was established under section 5 of the 1922 Border Guard Corps Act. In practice, 
reportedly, the Estonian customs authority had stopped using the customs zone in the 
middle of the 1920s and limited its reach of conduct to a 4-miles-wide zone. However, 
the Estonian Coast Guard exercised such jurisdiction in 1932 by arresting the Hungarian 
ship Hullam in the Gulf of Finland. See supra section 1.1 of Part IV. From 1934, the 
Estonian customs authority implemented such jurisdiction in the 12-miles-wide zone 
again under section 34 of the 1936 Border Guard Act. The special zone for the salvage of 
goods from ships in distress, as established under section 7 of the 1938 Waterways Act, 
was also 12 miles wide. See ERA.31.3.5424, p. 4. See also Iseäralise piirivalve korpuse 
seadus (Border Guard Corps Act). Adopted 30.05.1922, e.i.f. 1922 (RT 1922. Nr 74/75) 
and Piirivalve seadus (Border Guard Act). Adopted 27.05.1936, e.i.f. 05.06.1936 (RT 
1936, 47, 375). 
585  ERA.957.2.641, pp. 2–3, 8. 
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Pursuant to the declaration made by the States Parties to the Protocol586 on 
Article 9 of the 1925 Helsinki Convention, the maritime areas in the Baltic Sea 
that were less than 24 miles wide were divided by a median line between the 
opposite coastal States in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. Conse-
quently, some sections in the Viro Strait would have fallen entirely under the 
Estonian and Finnish control zones for the suppression of contraband traffic in 
alcoholic liquors. 
This triggered the Soviet Union’s reservation to the 1925 Helsinki Conven-
tion, according to which the precondition for joining the convention was the 
conclusion of an additional agreement between the Soviet Union, Finland and 
Estonia in connection with the declaration by States Parties to the Protocol on 
Article 9 of the 1925 Helsinki Convention. Such an agreement was signed by 
the representatives of the three States on the same day as the 1925 Helsinki 
Convention.587 The aim of the agreement was clearly established. Section 2 of 
the trilateral Agreement provided that “the principles recognised in international 
law on the freedom of the seas” apply “to the international sealanes from the 
ports of the Soviet Union to the Baltic Sea and vice versa”.588 
The applicability of the high seas freedoms in the passage through the Gulf 
of Finland was reiterated in the 1926 trilateral Protocol between Estonia, Fin-
land and the Soviet Union.589 This Protocol was signed by six high-level experts 
of the three States on April 22nd, 1926 in Moscow and pursuant to section 2 of 
the Protocol, it entered into force on the same date as the Agreement signed in 
Helsinki between Estonia, Finland and the Soviet Union on August 19th, 1925. 
The Protocol was concluded in order to set the exact boundaries of the inter-
national sealanes referred to in section 2 of the 1925 trilateral Agreement. 
Thus, section 1 of the 1926 trilateral Protocol delimited “the borders of the 
international sealanes over which the supervision envisaged in the general 
[1925 Helsinki] convention was inapplicable, but to which the principles of 
                                                                          
586  Protocol to the 1925 Helsinki Convention for the Suppression of the Contraband Traffic 
in Alcoholic Liquors. Helsinki 19.08.1925, e.i.f. 24.12.1925. See Eesti lepingud 
wälisriikidega, vol. 5, op. cit., pp. 307–310. See Treaty 1 in Annex 2 for the authentic 
text of the protocol in French and Estonian. 
587  Agreement between Estonia, Finland and the Soviet Union. Helsinki 19.08.1925, e.i.f. 
24.12.1925. See Treaty 2 in Annex 2 for the authentic text of the agreement in French 
and Estonian.  
588  At times, the high seas corridor was referred to by seafarers as the Russian Canal. See 
ERA.1356.1.302, p. 8. 
589  Protocol Concluded between Estonia, Finland and the Soviet Union in the Expert 
Conference in Moscow (held April 15th to 22nd, 1926) to the Agreement between Estonia, 
Finland and the Soviet Union Signed on 19.08.1925. Moscow 22.04.1926, e.i.f. 
24.12.1925 (pursuant to the Protocol’s section 2). For the text of the Protocol, see 
Decision of the Estonian Government on the Protocols Signed in the Estonian, Finnish 
and the Soviet Union’s Experts’ Conference in Moscow on 22 April 1926. Adopted 
22.12.1926, e.i.f. 22.12.1926. See Eesti lepingud wälisriikidega, vol. 6 (1926–1927). 
Tallinn: Riigi trükikoda 1927, pp. 47–49. See the French and Estonian text of the 
Protocol in Treaty 3 in Annex 2. 
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international law on the freedom of the seas applied”. According to the coordi-
nates stipulated in the 1926 trilateral Protocol, the international sealanes and the 
high seas corridor in the Gulf of Finland were more extensive in comparison to 
the EEZ corridor that was created in the Gulf of Finland under the 1994 Esto-
nian-Finnish Agreement. The approximate geographical boundaries of the cur-
rent EEZ corridor in the Gulf of Finland are the island of Vaindloo (in the east) 
and the island of Osmussaar (in the west), whereas the approximate geograph-
ical borders of the high seas zone (international sealanes), as fixed in the 1926 
trilateral Protocol, reached beyond Pieni-Tytärsaari Island590 near the imaginary 
line of Suur-Tytärsaari591 (in the east) and almost to the westernmost point of 
the Ristna Peninsula of Hiiumaa Island (hist. Dagö) in the west.592 
The spatial extent of the high seas corridor was fixed in the map that was 
appended by the States Parties to the 1926 Moscow Protocol pursuant to the last 
paragraph of its section 1.593 The map was initially signed by the six high-level 
delegates-experts of Estonia, Finland and the Soviet Union in Moscow on the 
same day as they signed the Moscow Protocol, i.e. on April 22nd, 1926, which 
was also affirmed by the signatures of the three delegates that signed the 1925 
Helsinki Convention and the 1925 trilateral Agreement on behalf of Estonia, 
Finland and the Soviet Union.594 Additionally, the map, as preserved at the 
Estonian National Archives, is affirmed by the signatures of the Head of the 
Archives of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Head of the Political 
Department of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (along with his certifi-
cation that the map depicts “the boundaries of the international seaways pro-
vided in the protocol”) and the Head of the Topo-Hydrographic Department of 
the Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces (accompanied with his certifi-
cation that the map depicts “the lane of free passage on the basis of the agree-
ment between Estonia-Finland-Russia”).595 
It follows from the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement and the 1926 Moscow 
Protocol that the coastal State’s jurisdiction, as provided in Article 9(1) of the 
1925 Helsinki Convention, does not apply to the international seaways in the 
Gulf of Finland, over which the freedom of the high seas is applicable instead. 
However, the implementation of the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement by the 
                                                                          
590  Estonian: Väike-Tütarsaar; Russian: Малый Тютерс. 
591  Estonian: Suur-Tütarsaar; Russian: Большой Тютерс. 
592  One of the two substantial sections of the 1926 Moscow Protocol, concerning the 
maritime area as divided between the Soviet Union and Finland in the eastern part of the 
Gulf of Finland under the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty, was changed completely by the e.i.f. 
of the 1940 Peace Treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland. Due to the 1940 Peace 
Treaty, the Finnish islands in the centre of the Gulf of Finland (including Tytärsaari 
islands) were ceded to the Soviet Union.  
593  ERA.957.13.651, p. 4. For a copy of the map see map 2 in Annex 1. 
594  Ibid. With the exception of the Soviet delegate that had been replaced from G. Maltzeff 
to A. Tchernikh. The Estonian and Finnish delegates in the 1925 Helsinki Conference A. 
Hellat and E. Böök also signed the 1926 map. 
595  ERA.957.13.651, p. 4. See map 2 in Annex 1. 
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Estonian government authorities turned out to be controversial and was finally 
subject to the Estonian Supreme Court’s judgment from 1932.  
The Supreme Court of Estonia declared Article 9 of the 1925 Helsinki Con-
vention applicable over the 1925 trilateral Agreement concluded as a result of 
the Soviet Union’s reservation. It came to the conclusion that “it is clear that a 
multilateral agreement cannot be modified by one group of States Parties to the 
convention.”596 Yet declarations and reservations to international agreements 
have been commonplace as they promote the conclusion of treaties by a greater 
number of States. Depending on the nature of the agreement, its wider ratifica-
tion may be necessary for reaching its aims. This applies especially with regards 
to regional agreements, such as the 1925 Helsinki Convention. Most States Par-
ties to the 1925 Helsinki Convention made reservations or declarations pertain-
ing to the text of the treaty. 
It is evident from the Protocol on Article 9 of the 1925 Helsinki Convention 
that the States Parties agreed to the reservation made by the Soviet Union. Such 
acquiescence was at the time a general prerequisite in the international treaty 
law for the reservation to take effect.597 Notably, the other States Parties to the 
1925 Helsinki Convention stated in the Protocol that they are conscious about 
this reservation and, in proof of this, have signed the Protocol which contained 
the reservation. No objections against this reservation were made. Thus, the 
1925 trilateral Agreement between the Soviet Union, Estonia and Finland was 
an integral part of the 1925 Helsinki Convention. This effectively modified the 
legal effect of certain provisions of the 1925 Helsinki Convention in relation to 
their application to the three States. 
Therefore, the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Estonia, according to 
which “it is clear that a multilateral agreement cannot be modified by one group 
of States Parties to the convention,”598 did not reconcile well with the 
contemporary international treaty law or the intent of the States Parties to the 
1925 Helsinki Convention.599 The 1932 judgment by the Supreme Court of 
Estonia could not have altered the legal effect of the reservation or the sub-
stance of the ensuing trilateral treaty between the Soviet Union, Estonia and 
Finland. In spite of the 1932 judgment by the Supreme Court to the contrary, 
Estonia was thus obliged under the principle of pacta sunt servanda and section 
4 of its 1920 Constitution to respect and abide by the obligations it undertook 
under the 1925 trilateral Agreement. 
                                                                          
596  Judgment 01.10.1932, op. cit., p. 12. 
597  D. S. Jonas, T. N. Saunders. The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretative 
Methods. – 43 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 2010(3), p. 583. 
598  Judgment 01.10.1932, op. cit., p. 12. 
599  Notably, however, albeit Estonia was also a State Party to the Convention, its Ministry of 
Economics and Border Guard that participated in the court proceedings advocated for the 
restrictive interpretation of Article 9 of the 1925 Helsinki Convention against the aim 
and meaning of the Soviet Union’s reservation and the ensuing 1925 and 1926 trilateral 
treaties. 
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At the same time, the Supreme Court’s judgment had a significant impact on 
the application of the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement, since the Estonian 
authorities were domestically expected to follow the Supreme Court’s judgment 
despite of its dubious compatibility with the text of the treaty. Therefore, it is 
necessary to assess the Supreme Court’s argumentation in detail to comprehend 
its reasons and motives that resulted in such a conclusion as reached in the 1932 
judgment. 
 
 
2. The Estonian Supreme Court’s 1932 Interpretation  
of the Purpose of the 1925 Treaty between  
Estonia, Finland and the Soviet Union 
2.1. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the 1925 Trilateral Treaty 
In interpreting the purpose of the 1925 agreement between Estonia, Finland and 
the Soviet Union, the central question for the Supreme Court of Estonia was 
whether the three coastal States of the Gulf of Finland wanted to forfeit their 
rights granted to them under Article 9 of the 1925 Helsinki Convention in the 
relevant seaways in the Gulf of Finland, either in relation to the ships of one 
another or other States.600 The Supreme Court found that 
 
“On the basis of the relevant acts, there is no ground to assume that they would 
have disclaimed their rights in relation to other States and it would be absurd to 
assert such an intention. As absurd would be the idea that Finland and the Soviet 
Union would have aspired to ease the contraband traffic in alcoholic liquors 
mutually in respect of their ships in the Gulf of Finland. The aim of the agree-
ment (Accord) between Estonia, Finland and the Soviet Union could not have 
been to paralyze the convention or lessen their rights in the Gulf of Finland in the 
fight against the contraband traffic in alcoholic liquors in the scope of the above-
referred 12-miles [zone as measured] from the borders of those States’ coasts or 
islands along with the right to hot pursuit in relation to ships suspected of carry-
ing out such contraband traffic in this area – after all, Estonia’s 12 miles of cus-
toms zone had been already in effect and it was namely Finland that initiated this 
convention. The aim of the agreement was only to address the question of sea-
ways from the ports of the Soviet Union to the Baltic Sea and vice versa since 
those ways mostly fell into the area of control zones and it was naturally neces-
sary for the Soviet Union to acquire a clear recognition from the coastal States of 
this bay – Estonia and Finland – for the freedom of the seaway.”601 
 
The term “freedom of the seaway” in the context used by the Supreme Court in 
its 1932 judgment is synonymous to the “freedom of navigation” as provided 
for in Article 87(1) a) of the LOSC. The freedom of navigation applied in the 
                                                                          
600  Judgment 01.10.1932, op. cit., p. 12. 
601  Ibid. 
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high seas of the Gulf of Finland in the 1920s and 1930s.602 Yet coastal States’ 
right to arrest ships in the high seas of the narrow passage through the Gulf of 
Finland under Article 9 of the 1925 Helsinki Convention and in the scope of 
their 12-miles-wide control zones posed a challenge to foreign ships enjoying 
the freedom of navigation in this maritime area. 
 
 
2.2. The 1932 Judgment’s Controversy 
In the above-referred passage, the Supreme Court of Estonia refers to the exist-
ing 12-miles-wide Estonian customs zone. Yet the court seems not to have 
acknowledged that many of the States Parties to the 1925 Helsinki Convention 
(Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Norway) were willing to accept the Estonian, 
Latvian and Finnish customs zones of greater breadth than the territorial sea 
only on the basis of an international treaty.603 Hence, the pre-existing Estonia’s 
customs zone should not have been accorded in the Supreme Court’s judgment 
much significance as it had not been generally recognised by other States. Esto-
nia’s 12-mile-wide jurisdictional zone (the control zone as established under the 
1925 Helsinki Convention; not the pre-existing customs zone) was given such 
recognition under the Helsinki Convention. However, the 1925 trilateral 
Agreement (as an inseparable part of the Helsinki Convention) provided an 
exception according to which Estonia’s and Finland’s 12-miles-wide control 
zones as established under the Convention may not hamper the freedom of 
navigation in the high seas corridor of the Gulf of Finland. 
The Supreme Court of Estonia interpreted the coastal State’s right to take 
measures against the contraband traffic in alcoholic liquors similarly to the 
contemporary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction in a coastal State’s territo-
rial sea to suppress illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances as 
stipulated in Article 27(1) d) of the LOSC. Thus, albeit recognising navigational 
interests, the court found that the public interest to fight against alcohol smug-
gling prevails over the former. Likewise, it is also possible under the modern 
law of the sea to stop a vessel, which is exercising its right of innocent passage, 
if it is suspected of illicit traffic in alcoholic liquors.604 Yet under the LOSC, 
such measures may be taken by the coastal State against vessels that are situated 
in its territorial sea, whereas the maritime area in question was in the 1920s and 
1930s high seas. In high seas, the freedom of navigation applied, as was recog-
nised by the Supreme Court. 
The Estonian Supreme Court’s interpretation of the purpose of the 1925 
trilateral Agreement is controversial since it recognises, on the one hand, the 
freedom of the seaway in the Gulf of Finland, whereas, on the other hand, it 
also recognises the coastal State’s jurisdiction over the ships transiting it. Nota-
                                                                          
602  See also Taska 1974, op. cit., p. 24. 
603  Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 445–446. 
604  K. Hakapää, E. J. Molenaar. Innocent Passage – past and present. – 23 Marine Policy 
1999(2), p. 133. 
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bly, paragraph 2 of the 1925 trilateral treaty stipulated explicitly that the free-
dom of navigation in the high seas corridor of the Gulf of Finland is guaranteed 
by means of not extending the strait State’s 12-miles-wide control zone to that 
area: 
 
“The control zones envisaged in this agreement will not expand to the inter-
national sealanes that are heading in the Gulf of Finland, in the west of the 270 
meridian of Greenwich, from the ports of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
to the Baltic Sea and vice versa, located outside the present area of the Finnish 
territorial waters, and which will be settled in detail by the experts of the three 
interested parties. The principles recognized in international law on the freedom 
of the seas shall be applied to these sealanes.”605 
 
In terms of the LOSC, “the principles of the international law on the freedom of 
the seas,” as used in the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties between Estonia, Fin-
land and the Soviet Union, should be understood due to its object as referring to 
the freedom of the high seas. Pursuant to Article 87(1) of the LOSC, the free-
dom of the high seas comprises inter alia freedom of navigation and overflight 
as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, freedom to construct 
artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, free-
dom of fishing in addition to freedom of scientific research. 
Only the flag State exercises jurisdiction over a ship that enjoys the freedom 
of navigation and may authorise the boarding of such a ship by the coastal 
State’s authorities.606 Freedom of navigation was also understood to imply this 
prior to the Geneva conventions on the law of the sea, i.e. before the rapid 
development of the modern law of the sea.607 At the 1930 Hague Codification 
Conference, all participating States recognised the principle of freedom of navi-
gation.608 Therefore, the collision between the freedom of navigation and the 
need to fight against smuggling in the high seas is inherent in the law. This 
                                                                          
605  „Les zones de contrôle prèvues par cet Accord ne s’ètendront pas sur les routes 
maritimes internationales conduisant à l’ouest du méridien 27o de Greenwich dans les 
eaux du golfe de Finlande des ports de l’Union des Républiques Soviétistes Socialistes à 
la Mer Baltique et vice-versa en dehors des eaux territoriales finlandaises actuelles et 
dont la position précise sera déterminée par les experts des trois Etats intéressés. A 
l’égard des routes maritimes internationales sus-mentionnées seront appliqués les 
principes reconnus par le droit international concernant la liberté des mers.” See Treaty 2 
in Annex 2. 
606  See P. Wendel. State Responsibility for Interferences with the Freedom of Navigation in 
Public International Law. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer 2007, p. 166. See also 
LOSC Article 110(1). 
607  J. Balicki. Régime of the High Seas: Observations of the Government of Poland, 
concerning freedom of navigation on the high seas. – Yearbook of the International Law 
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608  M. H. Nordquist, S. Rosenne, S. N. Nandan. United Nations Convention on the Law of 
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contradiction between competing interests proved to be difficult to solve for the 
Estonian Supreme Court in 1932. 
The aim of the 1925 trilateral Agreement and the 1926 trilateral Protocol 
was to maintain the high seas zone in the Gulf of Finland and guarantee the 
freedom of navigation (and overflight) in it. The Supreme Court of Estonia 
regarded in its 1932 judgment the waterway in the Gulf of Finland as “a free 
belt of water”609 and “a free seaway,”610 but in essence came to the conclusion 
that what was stipulated in the 1926 trilateral Protocol, namely “as if the 
[coastal State’s] supervision envisaged in the general convention would not be 
applicable to these seaways (§ 1) [has] no significance since the experts were 
mandated under paragraph 2 of the [1925 trilateral] agreement to only fix the 
area of the international free seaways, but not to regulate the applicable regime 
in this area.”611 Thus, the Estonian Supreme Court downplayed in its judgment 
the significance of section 1 of the 1926 trilateral Protocol. In this regard, the 
Supreme Court found that under the 1925 trilateral Agreement, the Estonian 
Government had not agreed to limit its jurisdiction over the seaways falling 
under the 12-miles-wide control zone in the high seas of the Gulf of Finland.612  
The court also took the position that “Were it differently and the intention 
[of the States Parties to the 1925 trilateral Agreement] would have been to 
exclude the seaways in the part of the Gulf of Finland that lies between Estonia, 
Finland and the USSR from the scope of Article 9 of the convention and the 
regulation pertaining to the median line, then such an exception should have 
been expressly stated. This has not been done.”613 In this regard, the Supreme 
Court had left paragraph 2 of the 1925 trilateral Agreement without notice, 
under which Estonia, Finland and the Soviet Union had agreed expressis verbis 
that “the control zones [stipulated in Article 9 of the 1925 Convention] are not 
applicable to the international seaways in the Gulf of Finland.” Hence, the 
States Parties reiterated in section 1 of the 1926 trilateral Protocol only what 
had already been stipulated in section 2 of the 1925 trilateral Agreement. 
Furthermore, as the Estonian Ambassador to the Soviet Union commented in 
1933, the view of the Supreme Court, as if the 1926 trilateral Protocol did not 
have the same legal status as the 1925 trilateral Agreement, was ill-founded, 
“since the Soviet delegation set a precondition for signing the 1925 Convention 
that the experts’ protocol will be an organic part of the convention.”614 He also 
assured that the principal conclusions and the content of the 1926 trilateral 
Protocol was discussed already during the 1925 Helsinki Conference and States 
Parties were aware of the limitations which it was about to set.615 
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610  Ibid, p. 14. 
611  Ibid, p. 11. 
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613  Ibid, p. 14. 
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In this light, the Supreme Court was not correct in stating that the intention 
of the States Parties was not to exclude the international seaways from the scope 
of Article 9 of the 1925 Helsinki Convention. 
 
 
3. The Soviet Union’s Reaction to the 1932 Judgment and  
the Following Decision of the Estonian Government on  
the Freedom of Navigation in the Gulf of Finland 
The Soviet Union reacted sharply to the 1932 judgment of the Estonian 
Supreme Court. The Estonian foreign minister Ants Piip was informed by the 
Soviet Ambassador to Estonia Fyodor Raskolnikov (Ilyin) about the Soviet 
Government’s discontent with the ruling of the Supreme Court.616 The Estonian 
foreign minister gave a digest of this conversation to the members of the Esto-
nian Government in a classified document from July 29th, 1933: 
 
“The Soviet Government is of the position that the international seaway as 
established in the 1925 agreement on the control zones, concluded in Helsinki 
between Estonia, Finland and the Soviet Union, enjoys full right of the freedom 
of the seas. It would thus follow that Estonia does not have the right to stop a 
ship in this international zone, except for instances of piracy, international traffic 
in arms and slavery. The judgment of the Supreme Court goes against this prin-
ciple and jeopardises the freedom of the seas and breaches the maritime interests 
of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government would like to solve this question in 
a friendly manner in this way that the judgment of the Supreme Court, which 
goes against the norms of international law, would be changed. Otherwise the 
Soviet Union is forced to see in this Estonia’s attempt to constrain the freedom 
of an international seaway and by protesting against this to also inform other 
interested States.”617 
 
The Estonian foreign minister noted that the Soviet Ambassador had confirmed 
his State’s interest in “safeguarding real freedom in maritime connections with 
Leningrad, which is ever more important as it is the only passage to the Russian 
ports.”618 Pursuant to the order of the Estonian Government, the Estonian for-
eign minister spoke to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Kaarel Parts who 
observed that 
 
“The Supreme Court made a strong judgment which allows the Estonian Gov-
ernment to act according to its political needs, if necessary by giving new laws or 
regulations. The Supreme Court cannot change its judgment.”619 
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After consulting the Soviet Ambassador, the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, the Estonian Embassy in Moscow and ministers of the Government, the 
foreign minister proposed to the Estonian Government to guarantee for the 
Soviet Union “free and unhindered passage with Leningrad”.620 Pursuant to a 
classified decision of the Estonian Government from August 2nd, 1933, a com-
mission was established that included the ministers of foreign affairs, econom-
ics, defence as well as the minister of courts and interior.621 The commission 
approved the afore-mentioned proposition of the minister of foreign affairs on 
August 15th, 1933.622 Subsequently, on August 18th, 1933, the State Elder 
(Prime Minister) Jaan Tõnisson approved the following decision: 
 
“a) Order the Ministry of Courts and Interior and the Ministry of Economics to 
give an instruction to their subordinate customs and border guard institutions 
according to which: 
1) Act on the import and transit of spirit and alcoholic drinks (RT 53/54-1921) is 
to be implemented with caution, only in extreme and ascertained instances, in 
accordance with the meaning of the 1925 convention and agreement and the 
general explanations of the Supreme Court in this part of the Baltic Sea that is 
agreed under the 1925 control zones agreement between Estonia, Finland and the 
Soviet Union to fall under the seaways from ports of the Soviet Union to the 
Baltic Sea and vice versa; 
2) The ships bona fide heading to or coming from Leningrad may in no circum-
stances be disturbed, except for instances of piracy, international traffic in arms 
and slavery; 
3) Avoid disturbing ships involved in traffic in spirits sailing in the referred free 
maritime belt if their pursuit in the sense of customs control has not commenced 
in territorial waters outside the international seaway; 
4) Only anchored, stationed ships involved in traffic in spirits may be subject to 
arrest in the free zone; 
b) Authorise the Minister of Foreign Affairs to inform the Ambassador of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics about the content of this instruction.”623 
 
On September 5th, 1933, the Estonian minister of foreign affairs presented a 
copy of this instruction in Russian to the Soviet Ambassador and notified the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as well as the Estonian Embassy in Moscow 
about this.624 
Thus, the Estonian Government principally decided to recognise the freedom 
of navigation as envisaged in the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement and the 
1926 Helsinki trilateral Protocol in the high seas corridor of the Viro Strait. 
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However, it follows from the Estonian Government’s 1933 decision that there 
were some exceptions to this general rule. Outside Estonia’s territorial waters 
and in the international seaways as well as the high seas as determined by the 
three coastal States of the Gulf of Finland in the 1925 Helsinki Agreement and 
the 1926 Moscow Protocol, Estonia’s jurisdiction extended up to 12 miles from 
the coast in respect of anchored, stationed ships involved in traffic in spirits in 
addition to vessels involved in piracy, international trade in arms and slavery. 
This constituted a narrowly constructed exception to the principle of the 
freedom of navigation in the Estonian part of the 12-miles-wide control zone in 
the high seas corridor of the Viro Strait. This implies that the Estonian Govern-
ment essentially decided not to follow the interpretation of the 1925 Helsinki 
trilateral Agreement and the 1926 Moscow Protocol by the Supreme Court in its 
1932 judgment. Instead, it predominantly recognised the freedom of navigation 
in the high seas corridor of the Viro Strait in the spirit of the object and purpose 
of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties. 
It follows from the foregoing that the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties clearly 
regulated passage comprehensively in the Viro Strait in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Next, their significance for the legal regime applicable to the Viro Strait subse-
quent to the restoration of Estonia’s independence in 1991 will be analysed 
from the perspective of Article 35(c) of the LOSC. 
Article 35(c) of the LOSC provides that nothing in its Part III on inter-
national straits affects the legal regime in straits in which passage is regulated in 
whole or in part by long-standing international conventions in force specifically 
relating to such straits. The most recent convention that is deemed by States 
unequivocally to fulfil the conditions stipulated in Article 35(c) of the LOSC 
was concluded in 1936: the Montreux Convention on the Bosporus and the 
Dardanelles.625 In this regard, as the 1925 Helsinki and 1926 Moscow trilateral 
agreements were concluded ten years in advance of the Montreux Convention, 
they may well be considered as long-standing conventions, provided that they 
satisfy other requirements stipulated in Article 35(c) of the LOSC. This con-
cerns prima facie their validity. 
Finland withdrew from the 1925 Helsinki Convention as well as the 1925 
and 1926 trilateral treaties in 2010.626 This in combination with the rejection of 
Estonia’s State continuity by the Russian Federation resulted in the definite 
termination of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties.627 Nonetheless, the question 
about the validity of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties from 1940 to 2010 is 
more complex and subject to further discussion. 
 
 
                                                                          
625  Convention regarding the Régime of the Straits. Montreux 20.07.1936, e.i.f. 09.11.1936. 
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4. The Legal Effect of the 1925 and 1926  
Trilateral Treaties from 1940 to 1991 
4.1. The Bilateral Treaty Relationships under  
the 1925 Trilateral Agreement post-1940 
The Soviet Union annexed Estonia in 1940. Thereafter, Estonia was de facto not 
a State Party to these treaties any more. The question of Estonia’s State conti-
nuity is not decisive in assessing the general validity of the 1925 and 1926 tri-
lateral treaties post-1940. Even the potential omission of Estonia from the 1925 
trilateral Agreement and the 1926 Moscow Protocol could not have directly 
impacted the validity of the treaties since it was provided in section 3 of the 
1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement that the treaty stays in force “also if two of 
the three interested Parties have adopted it inasmuch it is relevant to the two 
States.”628 According to its Article 2 the 1926 Moscow trilateral Protocol is to 
stay in force on the same grounds as the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement. 
Thus, the trilateral treaties provided for their continued validity in circum-
stances when they are binding only for two States. This also followed the gen-
eral understanding at the time of concluding the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agree-
ment on the grounds of voidance with regard to multilateral treaties in cases of 
e.g. extinction of one of its State Parties. Oppenheim observed in 1905 that 
treaties become void when one of the two contracting parties becomes 
extinct.629 Notably, the author did not refer to the extinction of a State Party as 
grounds for the voidance of a multilateral treaty and there is no indication that 
he took it for granted. 
The rationale behind the insertion of this clause into the 1925 trilateral 
Agreement may also be explained by the interest of the Soviet Union to ensure 
that if either one of the two coastal States of the Viro Strait (Estonia or Finland) 
decides to withdraw from the trilateral treaties then the other half of the high 
seas corridor, which falls under the jurisdiction of the other State Party, remains 
intact and free for use by the Soviet vessels. Such a continued validity of the 
1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties between only two States Parties post-1940 
would have been in accordance with the general aim of the 1925 and 1926 tri-
lateral treaties, i.e. ensuring freedom of navigation in the passage through the 
Gulf of Finland. 
Hence, from 1940 the legal commitments under the 1925 Helsinki trilateral 
Agreement should be distinguished as between Finland and the Soviet Union 
and later between the Russian Federation as well as Finland and Estonia. The 
continued validity of the trilateral 1925 and 1926 treaties between Finland and 
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oblivion. 
629  L. Oppenheim. International Law: A Treatise, vol. I. Peace. London: Longmans 1905,  
p. 553. 
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the Soviet Union (the Russian Federation) as well as between Finland and Esto-
nia, in case of loss of the treaty relationship between Estonia and the Soviet 
Union (the Russian Federation), would also follow the general logic of treaty 
law. The International Law Commission commented on the draft articles of the 
law of treaties that 
 
“Again, although a change in the legal personality of a party resulting in its dis-
appearance as a separate international person may be a factual cause for the ter-
mination of a bilateral treaty, this does not appear to be a distinct legal ground 
for terminating a treaty requiring to be covered in the present articles. A bilateral 
treaty, lacking two parties, may simply cease any longer to exist, while a multi-
lateral treaty in such circumstances may simply lose a party.”630 
 
Thus, in case of omission of any treaty relationship between Estonia and the 
Russian Federation within the legal framework of the 1925 Helsinki Conven-
tion, the coastal States of the Gulf of Finland would have had to follow the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda (Article 26 of 1969 Vienna Convention) 
towards each other from 1940 possibly until the definite termination of the 1925 
and 1926 treaties in 2010, except between the Russian Federation and Estonia. 
Yet first it needs to be examined whether the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties 
remained in force between Finland and the Soviet Union after 1940. This is 
scrutinised subsequently. 
 
 
4.2. The Impact of the Annexation of Estonia on  
the Validity of the 1925 Trilateral Treaty 
Subsequent to the annexation of Estonia in 1940, Finland and the Soviet Union 
could have potentially invoked the rebus sic stantibus principle631 for withdraw-
ing from the 1925 trilateral Agreement. Lassa Oppenheim considered in 1905 
the rebus sic stantibus clause as grounds for cancelling a treaty by arguing that 
“A cause which ipso facto cancels treaties in such subsequent change of status 
of one of the contracting States as transforms it into a dependency of another 
State. As everything depends upon the merits of each case, no general rule can 
be laid down as regards the question when such change of status must be con-
sidered to have taken place /.../”.632 The author also contended that 
 
                                                                          
630  International Law Commission. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Comment-
aries: 1966. United Nations 2005, p. 52. Accessible: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/ 
instruments/english/commentaries/1_1_1966.pdf (14.09.2016). 
631  See also Article 62(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. See further on the principle of the 
fundamental change of circumstances: Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Jurisdiction, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 3, 
paras 36–40. See also M. Fitzmaurice, O. Elias. Contemporary Issues in the Law of 
Treaties. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing 2005, pp. 174–185. 
632  Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 556. 
141 
“A certain amount of disagreement over the cases in which the clause [of vital 
change of circumstances – A. L.] might or might not be justly applied will, of 
course, always remain. But the fact is remarkable that during the nineteenth 
century, not many cases of the application of the clause have occurred.”633 
 
By 1940 the 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact had become the applicable law and 
under its Article II the States Parties had agreed that the settlement or solution 
of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be 
shall never be sought except by pacific means.634 It bound Estonia and the 
Soviet Union as the States Parties to the Pact to refrain from the threat or use of 
force and, more generally, going against its object and purpose. William J. H. 
Hough III has pointed out that by annexing Estonia in 1940, the Soviet Union 
breached also other bilateral and multilateral agreements: 
 
“[T]he occupation of the three Baltic nations was a breach of every major treaty 
signed between the Soviet Union and the Baltic States subsequent to the USSR’s 
recognition of the Baltic States’ perpetual right to sovereignty and independence 
in the early 1920’s. The use of force had been outlawed in Soviet-Baltic relations 
by the treaties of non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes of 1926 and 
1932. Moreover, “aggression” had been clearly defined in the Conventions for 
the Definition of Aggression of July 3rd, 1933. The Soviet invasion was an 
“aggressive act” as defined by those agreements. Article 3 declared that “no 
political, military, economic, or other considerations may serve as an excuse or 
justification for aggression. /.../” 
Besides being a clear breach of the bilateral agreements between the Baltic 
States and Soviet Russia, the invasion and incorporation flagrantly disregarded 
the major multilateral agreements signed by the Soviet Union, particularly article 
10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Paris of 1928. 
Indeed, only two years before the seizure of the Baltic States, the Soviet delegate 
to the League of Nations had strongly defended the principle of mutual respect 
for territorial integrity in a speech before the League Assembly. The Soviet dele-
gate declared: 
“It must be clear that the League of Nations has no intention of changing its 
attitude, whether to the direct seizures of and annexations of other people’s 
territory, or to those cases where such annexations are camouflaged by the 
setting-up of puppet “national” governments, allegedly independent, but in 
reality serving merely as a screen for, and an agency of, the foreign 
invader.”635 
                                                                          
633  Ibid, p. 552. 
634  See General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy. Paris 
27.08.1928, e.i.f. 24.07.1929. See on its interrelations with the League of Nations 
Covenant (particularly its Article 10) in W. J. H. Hough, III. The Annexation of the 
Baltic States and Its Effect on the Development of Law Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of 
Territory. – 6 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 
1985(2), p. 326. See also Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Paris 
28.06.1919, e.i.f. 10.01.1920. 
635  Hough, op. cit., pp. 389–390. 
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It is thus doubtful that the annexation of Estonia in 1940, which was not in 
accordance with the applicable law, provided the grounds for withdrawing from 
the 1925 trilateral Agreement on the basis of the fundamental change of circum-
stances that came about by the manifestly illegal conduct by one of its States 
Parties against the sovereignty of another. 
Moreover, the 1925 trilateral Agreement was not a treaty between Estonia 
and the Soviet Union inter se but also included Finland, the status of which as a 
State after 1940 remained unaffected. Notably, Finland and the Soviet Union 
did not invoke the annexation of Estonia as a ground of fundamental change of 
circumstances with respect to the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties.636 Also, even 
if either State would have done so, it should have followed the applicable pro-
cedure under the customary law, which is also reflected in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention in addition to the more specific requirements stipulated in the 1925 
Helsinki Convention’s legal framework for withdrawing from the treaties. 
Pursuant to its Article 4, the 1969 Vienna Convention does not apply to the 
1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties directly because the treaties were concluded 
prior to the entry into force of the Vienna Convention. Yet under the said pro-
vision, this is without prejudice to the application of any (e.g. customary) rules 
set forth in the 1969 Vienna Convention to which treaties would be subject 
under international law independently of the Convention. 
Anthony Aust has noted that the ICJ has thus far refrained from declaring 
any provision of the 1969 Vienna Convention as not part of the customary 
international law and courts may consider each provision of the Convention as 
customary law.637 Thus, the norms of the 1969 Vienna Convention may be 
considered to be part of the international customary law as long as the ICJ has 
not decided to the opposite. 
In the case of rebus sic stantibus, the State must, under the procedure set 
forth in Articles 65(1) and 67 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, notify the other 
States Parties of its claim and indicate the measure proposed to be taken with 
respect to the treaty and the reasons thereof. Such a requirement was also com-
mon in pre-1940 Europe, as illustrated by the 1923 position of the Swiss Fed-
eral Court, “the state which wishes to avail itself of the right to terminate the 
treaty must inform the other contracting party of its intention in the form pre-
scribed by international law... and it is only through such notice that a lawful 
                                                                          
636  See Hallituksen esitys alkoholitavarain salakuljetuksen ehkäisemistä tarkoittavan sopi-
muksen irtisanomisen hyväksymisestä sekä laiksi Suomen ja Ruotsin välillä yhteisestä 
valvonnasta alkoholitavarain luvattoman maahantuonnin ehkäisemiseksi tehdyn sopi-
muksen hyväksymisestä annetun lain kumoamisesta (Explanatory Note to the Proposal 
of the Finnish Government). Helsinki 2008, HE 10/2008, pp. 1–4. Accessible in Finnish 
at: https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/HallituksenEsitys/Documents/he_10+2008.pdf 
(14.09.2016). Accessible in Finnish and Swedish also at: http://www.finlex.fi/fi/ 
esitykset/he/2008/20080010 (14.09.2016). 
637  A. Aust. Modern Treaty Law and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2007, p. 13. 
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release from the treaty may be achieved.”638 Such notice was not presented by 
any State Party to the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties. Oppenheim also 
observes that in case of withdrawal of one State Party, a prior notice needs to be 
given.639 
However, if the treaty itself regulates the procedure for withdrawing from it, 
then under the international law of treaties, the legal situation with regard to the 
principle of rebus sic stantibus is much less complicated. In this connection, the 
withdrawal from the treaties was regulated in the 1925 and 1926 trilateral trea-
ties. Therefore, any unilateral withdrawal from the 1925 and 1926 treaties with-
out adhering to the procedure stipulated therein would have been void.640 
Notably, the Soviet Union did not withdraw from the 1925 trilateral Agreement 
(nor the 1925 Helsinki Convention), at least not on the basis of the procedure 
stipulated therein. 
It is also notable that, as confirmed by the Finnish Government, the Soviet 
Union did not notify Finland of the cancellation of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral 
treaties post-1940.641 In this regard, Article 12 of the 1947 Treaty of Peace with 
Finland provided that 
 
“1. Each Allied or Associated Power will notify Finland, within a period of six 
months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, which of its pre-war 
bilateral treaties with Finland it desires to keep in force or revive. Any provisions 
not in conformity with the present Treaty shall, however, be deleted from the 
above-mentioned treaties. 
2. All such treaties so notified shall be registered with the Secretariat of the 
United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
3. All such treaties not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.”642 
 
The Finnish Government explained in 2010 on this matter that 
 
“The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has not expressed intention to keep in 
force or reinforce the agreement and the protocol that are an inseparable part of 
the afore-mentioned treaty (SopS 9/1948). On the other hand, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics has not declared the agreement or the protocol to be 
abrogated (SopS 14/1948), nor are they registered with the United Nations 
Treaty Series. It is also possible that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has 
considered that the afore-mentioned agreement and protocol concluded between 
                                                                          
638  Judgment of the Swiss Federal Court in Lepeschkin v. Gossweiler el Cie, 02.02.1923, 
RS, I, 264) (referred in B. Conforti, A. Labella. Invalidity and Termination of Treaties: 
The Role of National Courts. – 44 European Journal of International Law 1990(1),  
p. 61). 
639  Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 549 
640  See also L. R. Helfer. Terminating Treaties. – D. B. Hollis (ed). The Oxford Guide to 
Treaties. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014, p. 636. 
641  HE 10/2008 vp, op. cit., p. 3. 
642  Treaty of Peace with Finland. Paris 10.02.1947, e.i.f. 16.09.1947. 
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Estonia, Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are multilateral 
treaties which remained unaffected by the procedure stipulated in Article 12 of 
the Paris Peace Treaty. The validity of the afore-referred agreement and protocol 
may at any rate for the above mentioned reasons be considered as unclear.”643 
 
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained to Latvia in a note of 
November 17th, 1992 on the legal force of treaties concluded with the Baltic 
States prior to 1940 that “It is known that the incorporation of a State into the 
composition of another brings about the termination of any bilateral treaties 
concluded between them as independent States.”644 The Russian note referred to 
only bilateral treaties concluded prior to 1940. In case the Soviet Union consid-
ered the 1925 Helsinki Convention, of which the 1925 and 1926 trilateral trea-
ties were an inseparable part, as multilateral treaties which do not fall under the 
Article 12 clause of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, then the treaties should have 
remained valid in the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. This 
should be assumed since Article 12 of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty explicitly 
referred to only bilateral treaties. Nevertheless, it requires first a further legal 
analysis on whether the treaties may have become void post-1940 due to their 
possible obsolescence or desuetude. 
 
4.3. Obsolescence and Desuetude of  
the 1925 and 1926 Trilateral Treaties 
As discussed above, it is unclear whether the 1925 Helsinki Convention and the 
trilateral Agreement as its inseparable part were in terms of law generally still in 
force between Finland and the Soviet Union subsequent to the annexation of 
Estonia in 1940. Among other provisions, Article 2 of the 1925 Helsinki trilat-
eral Agreement, under which the freedom of navigation in the high seas corridor 
of the Gulf of Finland was stipulated, lost its actuality since the Soviet Union 
controlled the whole eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. Hence, the Soviet ships had 
unhindered access to the ports in Leningrad (St Petersburg), absent of any legal 
arrangement with Finland. Thus, the legal circumstances which necessitated the 
conclusion of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties essentially disappeared. This 
raises the question whether the treaties may have been considered terminated on 
the grounds of obsolescence. 
In the law of treaties, the conception of obsolescence refers to a situation of 
impossibility of performing a treaty due to the disappearance of the legal cir-
cumstances that had constituted one of the treaty’s essential conditions.645 
                                                                          
643  HE 10/2008 vp, op. cit., p. 3. 
644  See Mälksoo 2003, op. cit., p. 70. 
645  M. G. Kohen. Desuetude and Obsolescence of Treaties. – E. Cannizaro (ed). The Law of 
Treaties beyond the Vienna Convention. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, p. 358. 
M. G. Kohen, S. Heathcote. 1969 Vienna Convention. Article 42: Validity and continu-
ance in force of treaties. – O. Corten, P. Klein (eds). The Vienna Conventions on the 
Law of Treaties: A Commentary, vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, p. 1025. 
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Oppenheim provided the following example with regard to the impossibility of 
performing a treaty: 
 
“A frequently quoted example is that of three States concluding a treaty of alli-
ance and subsequent war breaking out between two of the contracting parties. In 
such case it is impossible for the third party to execute the treaty, and it becomes 
void.”646 
 
Thus, obsolescence means juridical impossibility.647 Kohen and Heathcote have 
referred to the regulation on the “enemy state”648 in Articles 53, 106 and 107 of 
the United Nations Charter as an example of obsolescence.649 Desuetude, on the 
other hand, refers to a situation of non-application of a treaty over a prolonged 
period of time, which includes a prolonged practice contrary to what is foreseen 
by the treaty, on the basis of which one can imply the consent of States Parties 
to abandon it.650 
The 1969 Vienna Convention, which mostly codified the applicable law on 
treaties, does not recognise the disappearance of the legal situation which was 
the essential condition for the application of the treaty as a ground for the ter-
mination of such a treaty. In this connection, Article 42(2) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention stipulates that “The termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the 
withdrawal of a party, may take place only as a result of the application of the 
provisions of the treaty or of the present Convention. The same rule applies to 
suspension of the operation of a treaty.” The International Law Commission 
noted in this regard: 
 
“The words “only through the application of the present articles” and “only as a 
result of the application of the present articles” used respectively in the two par-
agraphs are also intended to indicate that the grounds of invalidity, termination, 
denunciation, withdrawal and suspension provided for in the draft articles are 
exhaustive of all such grounds, apart from any special cases expressly provided 
for in the treaty itself. In this connexion, the Commission considered whether 
“obsolescence” or “desuetude” should be recognized as a distinct ground of ter-
mination of treaties. But it concluded that, while “obsolescence” or “desuetude” 
                                                                          
646  Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 554. 
647  By contrast, the conception of supervening impossibility of performance as stipulated in 
Article 61(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention implies material impossibility of 
performance, which results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object 
indispensable for the execution of the treaty. See Kohen, Heathcote, op. cit., p. 1025. 
648  Pursuant to Article 53(2) of the United Nations Charter, the term “enemy state” applies 
to any State which was an enemy of the initial signatory States of the United Nations 
Charter during the Second World War. Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco 
26.06.1945, e.i.f. 24.10.1945. 
649  Kohen, Heathcote, op. cit., p. 1025. 
650  See ibid, p. 1023. See also T. Giegerich. Termination and Suspension of the Operation of 
Treaties. – O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (eds). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
A Commentary. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer 2011, p. 959. See also Kohen, op. cit.,  
p. 352. 
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may be a factual cause of the termination of a treaty, the legal basis of such ter-
mination, when it occurs, is the consent of the parties to abandon the treaty, 
which is to be implied from their conduct in relation to the treaty. In the Com-
mission’s view, therefore, cases of “obsolescence” or “desuetude” may be con-
sidered as covered by article 51, paragraph (b), under which a treaty may be ter-
minated “at any time by consent of all the parties”.”651 
 
Likewise, Kohen and Helfer have observed that during the drafting of the 1969 
Vienna Convention, obsolescence and desuetude were not considered as suffi-
cient grounds for the termination of a treaty and the grounds for ending treaty 
obligations, as enumerated in Article 42(2) of the 1969 Vienna Convention, 
were supposed to be exhaustive.652 In legal literature it is still suggested by 
some authors that State practice recognises also desuetude as an additional 
means for ending treaty obligations.653 However, in this regard Giegerich has 
come to the conclusion that customary international law on the concept of desu-
etude could not provide an additional legal basis for the termination of a treaty 
since Article 42(2) of the 1969 Vienna Convention explicitly states that no 
grounds for terminating a treaty beyond those mentioned in the convention shall 
be applied.654 
Thus, obsolescence and desuetude were considered in the drafting of the 
1969 Vienna Convention as falling under the scope of its Article 54(b) which 
provides that the termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a State Party may 
take place at any time by consent of all the States Parties after consultation with 
the other contracting States.655 This provision was aimed at encompassing also 
tacit agreement as a separate ground for ending treaty obligations,656 e.g. the 
termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty implied by the conclusion 
of a later treaty (Article 59 of the 1969 Vienna Convention). 
Hence, the termination of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties on the basis of 
obsolescence or desuetude could potentially be implied only by a tacit agree-
ment of Estonia, Finland and the Soviet Union or an explicit agreement. How-
ever, it would be difficult to argue for Estonia’s consent (inter alia Finland 
refused de jure recognition of the occupation of Estonia; the State continued to 
exist de jure as recognised by most States)657 for the termination of the 1925 
                                                                          
651  ILC Commentaries to the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, op. cit., p. 52. 
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and 1926 trilateral treaties prior to the restitution of its independence in 1991 
because the reasons for such termination could only be derived from the loss of 
its independence de facto due to the annexation of it by another State Party to 
the trilateral treaties. 
In connection with the concept of obsolescence, it is also doubtful whether it 
was impossible658 for Finland and the Soviet Union to perform the 1925 and 
1926 trilateral treaties subsequent to the annexation of Estonia since Finland 
and the Soviet Union could have retained the high seas corridor under the 
referred treaties. The high seas corridor granted passage rights essentially not 
only to the Soviet Union but also to third States. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
all relevant transit routes were completely on the Soviet side of the median line 
of the 12-miles-wide control zones. The high seas corridor encompassed an 
extensive maritime area in the Gulf of Finland, much of which also fell under 
the Finnish jurisdiction after 1940.659 Thus, although the object of the 1925 Hel-
sinki trilateral Agreement may have become certainly less relevant after the 
annexation of Estonia in 1940, it could not have become extinct. 
Significantly, Finland refrained from extending its territorial sea in the Viro 
Strait post-1940, thus keeping the strait’s corridor on its own part intact until the 
conclusion of the 1994 bilateral Agreement with Estonia and also thereafter.660 
As explained above,661 Finland adopted a 12-miles-wide territorial sea (previ-
ously 4 miles) only in 1995 by amending the Act on the Delimitation of Territo-
rial Waters of Finland. Therefore, a corridor with a width of at least 4.5 miles 
granting unhindered passage through the Gulf of Finland continued to exist after 
1940 and prior to the 1994 bilateral Agreement.662 It implies that the grounds of 
obsolescence were not satisfied in regards to the 1925 and 1926 trilateral trea-
ties from 1940 to 1991.  
However, it is still likely that the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties did meet 
the precondition for desuetude, i.e. a prolonged practice on behalf of the States 
Parties contrary to what is foreseen by the treaty. On the basis of the available 
information there is no indication that Finland would have hampered free pas-
sage of ships and aircraft in and over its part of the corridor from 1940 until the 
conclusion of the 1994 bilateral Agreement. By contrast, the Soviet Union’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
prior to 1940 expressly stated re-establishment (not establishment) of diplomatic 
relations. See J. Salulaid. Restoration of the Effect of Estonian International Treaties. – 2 
Baltic Yearbook of International Law 2002, p. 225. 
658  The precondition for obsolescence, as referred above. 
659  See map 2 in Annex 1. It does not depict the 12 mile maritime zone of Finland, but one 
could draw an analogy from the extent of the Estonian 12 mile maritime zone, which in 
many areas had the potential of covering the whole section of the high seas corridor as 
shown on map 4 in Annex 1. 
660  It should be noted, however, that there is no indication that Finland maintained its part of 
the high seas corridor intact as a result of its obligations under the 1925 and 1926 
trilateral treaties. 
661  Supra section 2.1 of chapter 2 in Part III. 
662  Alexander 1987, op. cit., p. 482.  
148 
State practice during that period of time was clearly contrary to the 1925 and 
1926 trilateral treaties. 
In 1950, the Soviet Union asserted for the first time officially that its territo-
rial sea in the Baltic Sea is up to 12 miles wide.663 It claimed a 12-miles-wide 
territorial sea also in the Gulf of Finland.664 This is also reflected by the Finnish 
Government’s notion that it refrained from extending the outer limit of its ter-
ritorial sea to 12 miles in order to avoid a common territorial sea boundary with 
the Soviet Union in the Gulf of Finland.665 The Soviet Union’s 12-mile-wide 
territorial sea in the Gulf of Finland covered the formerly Estonian part of the 
high seas corridor. Therefore, by extending its territorial sea into the maritime 
area where the high seas freedoms should have applied under the 1925 and 1926 
trilateral treaties, the Soviet Union effectively negated free passage in this mar-
itime area against the terms of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties. Also, the 
Soviet Union’s territorial sea in the Gulf of Finland overlapped with its 12-mile-
wide coastal security zone as established first in 1927.666 The spatial extent of 
this security zone significantly broadened in the Gulf of Finland as a result of 
the annexation of Estonia in 1940. The Soviet Union thus consistently breached 
the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties after 1940 since its maritime zones (as 
measured from the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland) were not in conform-
ity with the aim, spatial extent667 and rules of the high seas corridor. Conse-
quently, there was prolonged practice contrary to the trilateral treaties on the 
Soviet Union’s part. 
This is also confirmed by the fact that in November, 1948, the Swedish 
fishing boat Hamnfjord, as she was sailing in the Gulf of Finland, was taken 
into custody by the Soviet Union’s Coast Guard.668 Gene Glenn observes that 
 
“After an exhaustive interrogation of its crew members, the Hamnfjord was 
released from Soviet custody. In a subsequent diplomatic note to Sweden, the 
Soviet Union asserted that the Hamnfjord had been observed within the borders 
of the Soviet coastal defense zone and that it had disregarded signals to stop; 
therefore, the ship and crew had been held for investigation concerning violation 
of maritime regulations within the Soviet territorial sea. The note in conclusion 
urged Swedish authorities to inform sailing captains of existing Soviet maritime 
regulations.”669 
 
                                                                          
663  G. Glenn. Notes and Comments: The Swedish-Soviet Territorial Sea Controversy in the 
Baltic. – 50 The American Journal of International Law 1956, p. 944. 
664  United States Department of State. Continental Shelf Boundary: Finland-Soviet Union.  
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669  Ibid. 
149 
It appears from the circumstances of the Hamnfjord incident that the ship was 
likely not engaged (yet) in fishing activities.670 The author does not explain in 
detail where this incident occured. Yet it is beyond reasonable doubt that it took 
place in the high seas corridor. The high seas corridor, as established under the 
1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties, stretched much further to the west than the 
contemporary EEZ corridor.671 This incident was a flagrant breach of the 1925 
and 1926 trilateral treaties which guaranteed free passage and the freedom of 
the seas in the high seas corridor. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it appears that the Soviet Union’s prolonged 
State practice was contrary to what was foreseen by the 1925 and 1926 trilateral 
treaties. Notably, however, it seems that Finland and Sweden might not have 
submitted that the Soviet Union was acting in breach of its commitments under 
these treaties.672 On the basis of the foregoing, it appears that solely from the 
perspective of the Soviet Union, the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties had fallen 
into desuetude after 1940. However, this might not have resulted in the desue-
tude of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties. 
The above-referred definition of desuetude implies that the termination of a 
multilateral treaty on the basis of desuetude requires that all of its States Parties 
(or at least the number of States Parties required for terminating the treaty on 
the basis of withdrawal) have been in a long period of time constantly acting in 
breach of the terms of a multilateral treaty, from which one may imply that 
States Parties have consented to abandoning the treaty. This does not seem to be 
the case in the instance of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties. 
Finland did not consent to abandoning the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties 
and its State practice reflected this as it kept its part of the high seas corridor 
intact. Clearly, Estonia did not consent to abandoning the treaty after 1940 
either and Finland refused to recognise the occupation of Estonia de jure. This 
implies that the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties remained legally dormant in the 
relations between Estonia and Finland until Estonia regained its independence 
in 1991 on the basis of its State continuity. 
The 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties might have fallen into desuetude after 
1940 in case Finland had extended the maximum breadth of its territorial sea to 
12 miles prior to the conclusion of the 1994 Estonian-Finnish bilateral agree-
ment on the establishment of the EEZ corridor in the Viro Strait. In combination 
with the Soviet Union’s State practice, this would have probably resulted in the 
termination of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties. 
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672  Although the author of the 1950 note (Gene Glenn) had at his disposal the complete texts 
or summations of diplomatic correspondence between Sweden and the Soviet Union, he 
does not refer to any diplomatic protests that would have been aimed against the Soviet 
Union’s violations of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties. 
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Additionally, the procedure to be followed by the Soviet Union or Finland 
with respect to the termination or withdrawal from the 1925 and 1926 trilateral 
treaties as provided in the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties or in Article 65 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention was not applied, as analysed above. Furthermore, the 
validity of the 1925 and 1926 treaties was not connected to any period of time. 
The latter is also confirmed by the fact that in 1996, the Finnish Parliament 
and the Government declared in the draft Act on the ratification of the LOSC 
that the 1925 Helsinki Convention for the Suppression of the Contraband Traf-
fic in Alcoholic Liquors, of which the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement was 
“an inseparable part” (according to its section 3), is still in force (sopimus onkin 
edelleen voimassa).673 Notably, the 1925 Helsinki Convention is also still 
referred to in the legal acts of Germany.674 In 1979, it was deemed in the Ger-
man legal literature as one of the most important international treaties in the 
field of criminal law.675  
In light of this historical-legal quagmire, the question about the potential 
validity of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties after 1940 apparently cannot be 
answered in definite terms. However, it appears that although the Soviet Union 
acted after 1940 consistently against the terms of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral 
agreements, this certainly might not have resulted in the termination of the mul-
tilateral treaty under international treaty law. Therefore, it follows from the 
foregoing that under the law of treaties, it is reasonable to assume that the 1925 
and 1926 trilateral treaties might have been valid after 1940 (at least between 
Estonia and Finland). Thus, it raises the question of the relationship of the 1994 
bilateral Agreement to the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties prior to the 2010 
Finnish withdrawal from the 1925 Helsinki treaty framework. 
 
 
5. The Relationship of the 1994 Agreement on  
the EEZ Corridor to the 1925 and 1926 Trilateral  
Treaties Prior to Finland’s 2010 Withdrawal 
5.1. The Termination of the 1925 and 1926 Trilateral Treaties  
by the Conclusion of the 1994 Bilateral Agreement 
In connection with the restoration of Estonia’s independence in 1991, the legal 
status of the passage through the Gulf of Finland changed once again to an 
international strait. Thus the same legal problems on passage rights arose in this 
                                                                          
673  Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien merioikeusyleissopi-
muksen ja sen XI osan soveltamiseen liittyvän sopimuksen eräiden määräysten hyväk-
symisestä sekä laiksi aluksista aiheutuvan vesien pilaantumisen ehkäisemisestä annetun 
lain muuttamisesta – 2.6. Aava meri. HE 12/1996, op. cit. 
674  Gesetz über die Verfrachtung alkoholischer Waren (Act on the Transport of Alcoholic 
Beverages). 02.01.1975 (BGBl. I S. 289), section 3. Accessible in German: http:// 
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/alkoverfrg/BJNR202300926.html (14.09.2016). 
675  A. Elster, H. Lingermann (Hrsg.). Handwörterbuch der Kriminologie. Berlin/New York: 
De Gruyter 1979, pp. 54–55. 
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maritime area as had initiated the coastal States of the Gulf of Finland to con-
clude the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties. The legal circumstances that had 
triggered the conclusion of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties were hence 
restored in 1991. The fact that the adoption of the LOSC had not altered the 
need for the establishment of a corridor in which the high seas freedoms would 
be applicable was illustrated by the conclusion of the 1994 Agreement between 
Estonia and Finland. Notably, the 1994 Agreement did not refer to the 1925 and 
1926 trilateral Agreements. 
Taking into account the profound changes that accompanied the restoration 
of Estonia’s independence in 1991 and the entry into force of the LOSC in 
1994, it was rational for Estonia and Finland as the States Parties of the 1925 
and 1926 trilateral treaties to renew their legal commitments in view of consid-
ering inter alia the extension of the maximum breadth of the territorial sea as 
well as the creation of new maritime zones, the EEZ and the contiguous zone.  
Thus, the modification of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties might have 
been necessary by the conclusion of a new treaty on the same subject matter, i.e. 
passage rights in the Viro Strait. However, in terms of law, the conclusion of 
such a new treaty might not have altered the applicability of the 1925 and 1926 
trilateral treaties to the Viro Strait post-1993, i.e. after the adoption of a 12-
miles-wide territorial sea by Estonia and Finland. This is due to the fact that the 
1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties referred also to the territorial sea of the coastal 
States. 
Article 9 as the key provision of the legal framework of the 1925 Helsinki 
Convention explicitly referred in an abstract manner to a “zone which stretches 
up to 12 miles from the coast of mainland or islands”.676 Thus, Article 9, in 
respect of which the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties were concluded, also reg-
ulated the rights and obligations of States Parties within their territorial sea that 
fell within the limits of 12 miles. The above-referred abstract “zone which 
stretches up to 12 miles from the coast of mainland or islands” could as well 
have referred to the 12-miles-wide territorial sea post-LOSC. Since Article 9 of 
the 1925 Helsinki Convention created new rights and obligations for the States 
Parties in their adjacent waters within the limits of 12 miles from their coast, it 
also stipulated that the applicability of the regulations provided therein do not 
depend on the particular (potentially diverging) positions of the States Parties 
on the legal principles governing the territorial sea and customs zone. 
The extension of the width of the Finnish territorial sea from 4 miles to 12 
miles in 1994 and the corresponding act by Estonia as a result of adopting the 
Maritime Boundaries Act in 1993 meant that it became important again for their 
neighbouring State in the Gulf of Finland to ensure freedom of navigation and 
overflight with regard to the Viro Strait. Setting the 1979 agreement between 
Denmark and Sweden on the delimitation of the territorial waters as an exam-
                                                                          
676  Les Parties contractantes s’engagent à ne faire aucune objection à ce que chacune d’entre 
elles applique, dans une zone s’étendant jusqu’à douze milles marins de la côte ou de la 
limite extérieure des archipels, ses lois aux navires qui se livrent manifestement à la 
contrebande. See Treaty 1 in Annex 2. 
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ple,677 the two coastal States of the Viro Strait concluded an agreement in 1994 
on the initiative of Finland on the establishment of the EEZ corridor in the Viro 
Strait. 
Under Article 59(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention (applicable to all three 
coastal States of the Gulf of Finland),678 the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties 
would be considered terminated if all the States Parties to it, i.e. Estonia, Fin-
land and the Russian Federation as the continuator State of the Soviet Union,679 
concluded a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter. The 1925 and 1926 
trilateral treaties could have been terminated on the basis of the conclusion of 
the 1994 bilateral Agreement (Article 59(1) of the Vienna Convention). The 
1994 agreement was a bilateral treaty concluded between Estonia and Finland. 
The Russian Federation was not a State Party to this agreement, nor took part in 
the negotiations. However, it was established above that the 1925 and 1926 
trilateral treaties had apparently fallen into desuetude from the Soviet Union’s 
perspetive. Therefore, in terms of law, the criteria for the termination of the 
1925 and 1926 treaties by the conclusion of the 1994 bilateral Agreement under 
Article 59(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention were likely met, since under this 
provision all States Parties to the previous 1925 and 1926 agreements should 
also have been contracting States to the 1994 treaty. By 1994, the States Parties 
to the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties could have included (beyond reasonable 
doubt) only Estonia and Finland. 
In addition, the provisions of the later treaty (the 1994 bilateral Agreement) 
are not incompatible with those of the earlier ones. The 1994 Estonian-Finnish 
treaty on the establishment of the EEZ corridor in the Gulf of Finland had the 
same subject matter as the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement. Both treaties 
were concluded with the aim of safeguarding the freedom of navigation as well 
as freedom of overflight in the Gulf of Finland. Such freedoms apply in the EEZ 
corridor, which was established in 1994, as well as in the high seas corridor that 
was established in 1925. 
Therefore, it appears that the conclusion of the 1994 bilateral Agreement 
terminated the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties. This is also in conformity with 
State practice since Estonia and Finland have tacitly interpreted the previous 
1925 and 1926 trilateral agreements seemingly as no longer regulating passage 
rights in the Viro Strait. Yet in the interests of legal clarity it is also considered 
next if Estonia and Finland would have been entitled to modify the 1925 and 
1926 trilateral treaties strictly as between themselves alone if, theoretically, the 
Russian Federation would have been still a State Party to these trilateral treaties 
(despite the Soviet Union’s contrary State practice). 
                                                                          
677  Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi Suomen aluevesien rajoista annetun lain muutta-
misesta, op. cit. 
678  See also United Nations Treaty Collection. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Status as at 14.09.2016. – Estonia, Finland, the Russian Federation. Accessible: https:// 
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXIII-1&chapter=23& 
Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (14.09.2016). 
679  Mälksoo 2015, op. cit., p. 9. 
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5.2. The 1994 Agreement as an Agreement to Modify  
the 1925 and 1926 Trilateral Treaties between Estonia and  
Finland Prior to the 2010 Termination of the Treaties if  
the Russian Federation was still a State Party 
The 1994 Agreement between Estonia and Finland on the establishment of the 
EEZ corridor in the Gulf of Finland may be considered an agreement to modify 
the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties between only themselves in terms of Article 
41 of the 1969 Vienna Convention if the Russian Federation was still a State 
Party to the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties. This would not have been the first 
modification of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties between only two parties to 
the agreements. Finland and the Soviet Union concluded on March 12th, 1940 
the Winter War Peace Treaty, according to which Finland inter alia ceded its 
islands in the centre of the Gulf of Finland proper to the Soviet Union. 
In effect, the boundaries of the high seas corridor in the Gulf of Finland as 
stipulated in the 1926 Moscow trilateral Protocol changed as a result of the 
1940 Treaty. It was now necessary for the Soviet Union in the short period of 
time between the conclusion of the 1940 Peace Treaty and the annexation of 
Estonia in the summer of 1940 to safeguard the freedom of navigation in the 
Gulf of Finland, not close to the island of Suur-Tytärsaari (in the east) as previ-
ously but instead to the island of Vaindloo, as currently under the 1994 bilateral 
Agreement. Finland and the Soviet Union did not appear to have notified Esto-
nia about such modification of the 1926 Moscow trilateral Protocol. However, 
neither did the 1940 Peace Treaty have a direct impact on Estonia’s interests. 
The update of the rights and obligations in the form of concluding the 1994 
Agreement between Estonia and Finland was in the interests of the Russian 
Federation, since the establishment of an EEZ corridor omitted any hindrances 
to prima facie the Russian ships and aircraft to transit the Viro Strait. Hence, its 
conclusion may not have required a prior consent from the Russian Federation 
if, hypothetically, it was still a State Party to the 1925 and 1926 trilateral trea-
ties (in spite of what was established in the previous sections). Pursuant to Arti-
cle 39 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, amendments do not require the consent 
of all States Parties to the original treaty.680 The 1994 bilateral Agreement does 
not appear to have any unfavourable effect on the Russian Federation since, by 
adapting to the changed circumstances, Estonia and Finland guaranteed the aim 
of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties, i.e. freedom of navigation in the Viro 
Strait. 
Thus, although there is no reference by the States Parties to that effect, the 
1994 bilateral Agreement could then, theoretically, be considered in terms of 
law as an agreement to modify the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties between 
only Estonia and Finland under Article 41 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The 
spatial extent of the high seas corridor as fixed under the 1926 Moscow Proto-
col (which included the coordinates as well as an appended map of the corri-
                                                                          
680  J. Brunnée. Treaty Amendments. – Hollis, op. cit., p. 350. 
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dor)681 was outdated by 1994. In this sense, if the 1925 and 1926 trilateral trea-
ties stayed in force after 1940, then their amendment – in light of the cession of 
the previously Finnish islands in the Gulf of Finland proper to the Soviet Union 
in 1940 and the newly introduced maritime zones in international law – would 
have been in any case appropriate on behalf of the strait States (Estonia and 
Finland) as soon as Estonia regained its independence. 
The modification of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties was not prohibited 
by the treaties as such. Pursuant to Article 41(1)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention, a modification by two States Parties of the trilateral 1925 and 1926 
treaties between themselves alone would be lawful if i) it does not affect the 
enjoyment by the Russian Federation of its rights under the 1925 and 1926 trea-
ties or the performance of its obligations and ii) it does not relate to a provision, 
derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object 
and purpose of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties as a whole. 
According to drafters of the 1969 Vienna Convention, Article 41(1)(b)(i) is 
aimed at protecting the rights of the States Parties to the original treaty that are 
not States Parties to the inter se agreement as the provision means that the 
modifying treaty “must not prejudice their rights or add to their burdens”.682 The 
high seas corridor was established under the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties to 
guarantee the freedom of passage in the Viro Strait. The EEZ corridor clearly 
does not prejudice the rights or add to the burdens of the Russian Federation in 
comparison to the high seas corridor since the Russian Federation enjoys under 
Article 36 of the LOSC the high seas freedoms in the Viro Strait, prima facie 
the freedoms of navigation, overflight and the laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines. 
Although the EEZ corridor is geographically more limited than the high seas 
corridor, it does not affect the enjoyment by the Russian Federation of its rights 
under the 1925 and 1926 treaties or the performance of its obligations. This 
relates to the cession of the Finnish islands in the centre of the Gulf of Finland 
proper under the 1940 Winter War Peace Treaty to the Soviet Union. Also, the 
western end of the EEZ corridor connects it with the EEZs of Estonia, Finland 
and Sweden, thereby posing no obstacles for the Russian Federation in enjoying 
its high seas freedoms in this maritime area. 
The conclusion of a treaty which provides the possibility for the Estonian 
and Finnish authorities to abolish the international corridor in the Gulf of Fin-
land, in which the freedom of navigation is guaranteed, might constitute a 
breach of the effective execution of the object and purpose of the 1925 and 
1926 trilateral treaties as a whole in terms of Article 41(1)(b)ii) of the 1969 
Vienna Convention. Notably, such a possibility is foreseen in the 1994 Agree-
ment concluded between Estonia and Finland which provided that should both 
or either of the two States decide to depart from the voluntarily imposed limita-
                                                                          
681  See infra map 2 in Annex 1 and Treaty 3 in Annex 2. 
682  A. Rigaux. D. Simon, J. Spanoudis, E. Weemaels. Article 41, Convention of 1969.  
– Corten, Klein, op. cit., p. 1002. 
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tions on the width of the territorial sea in the Gulf of Finland, they will inform 
the other State no less than twelve months in advance of such planned extension 
of its territorial waters in this maritime area.683 This is not against the spirit of 
the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties. 
The possibility of denouncing or withdrawing from the 1994 bilateral 
Agreement should be considered as supplementary to the corresponding provi-
sions of the 1925 trilateral Agreement. Thus, it appears that even if, hypotheti-
cally, the Russian Federation was still a State Party to the 1925 and 1926 trilat-
eral treaties, then Estonia and Finland only specified their obligations with 
regard to giving such a notice while the general grounds for denouncing or 
withdrawing from the 1925 trilateral Agreement, as well as its 1926 Moscow 
Protocol, remained unchanged. Under the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties, 
Estonia and Finland would not have been explicitly obligated to give a prior 
notice of withdrawing from the treaties a long period of time in advance, while 
such a requirement was stipulated in the 1994 bilateral Agreement. This should 
be viewed as compatible with the interests of the Russian Federation. 
It follows from the foregoing that the 1994 bilateral Agreement may be 
regarded in accord with the object and purpose of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral 
treaties in case it would be considered under the 1969 Vienna Convention as a 
successive treaty to the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties from 1994 to 2010. 
However, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the trilateral treaties did not stay in 
force after the conclusion of the 1994 bilateral Agreement (as was examined in 
the previous section). 
It is scrutinised subsequently whether the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement 
may have been a long-standing convention regulating passage in the Viro Strait 
after the restoration of Estonia’s independence in 1991 until the termination of 
the trilateral treaty by the conclusion of the 1994 bilateral Agreement or, alter-
natively, Finland’s withdrawal from the 1925 Helsinki Convention and the 1925 
and 1926 trilateral treaties in 2010.  
 
 
5.3. The 1925 Helsinki Agreement in light of the LOSC  
Framework on Sui Generis Straits and Long-Standing  
Conventions Regulating Passage in a Strait  
According to Article 35(c) of the LOSC, nothing in its Part III on international 
straits affects the legal regime in straits in which passage is regulated in whole 
or in part by long-standing international conventions in force specifically relat-
ing to such straits. International straits that have been recognised as falling 
                                                                          
683  Such a requirement for at least 12 months’ notice is also stipulated in Article 56(2) of the 
1969 Vienna Convention if a State Party intends to denounce or withdraw from a treaty 
in accordance with Article 56(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and its general grounds 
regulating such procedure. 
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under Article 35(c) of the LOSC are the Danish Straits, Åland Strait, the Strait 
of Magellan and the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and the Dardanelles).684 
The Viro Strait may have been in terms of law and, more specifically, Arti-
cle 35(c) of the LOSC a strait regulated by the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agree-
ment and its supplementary 1926 Moscow Protocol (as modified under the 1994 
bilateral Agreement) until the conclusion of the 1994 bilateral Agreement or, 
alternatively, until 2010, since there is also uniform State practice with regard to 
the freedoms of navigation and overflight as guaranteed by the 1994 bilateral 
Agreement. However, it is noted in legal literature that a well-established 
recognition by States is a necessary precondition for the applicability of Article 
35(c) of the LOSC.685 This would above all require the recognition of the strait 
States themselves. Yet the Viro Strait as a strait falling potentially under the 
Article 35(c)-exception lacked the recognition (opinio juris) of even of its strait 
States to be considered as such in practice.686 It follows from the foregoing that 
the Viro Strait in principle could have qualified as a strait falling under the cat-
egory of straits regulated by a long-standing convention in terms of Article 
35(c) of the LOSC until 1994/2010, but in State practice (prima facie Estonia 
and Finland) it was clearly not considered as such.687 
It was established that subject to the terms of the bilateral agreement 
between Estonia and Finland, the Viro Strait has been from 1991 onwards688 an 
Article 36-type of strait which includes an EEZ corridor. However, the Viro 
Strait might have been theoretically also a sui generis strait from 1991 until the 
conclusion of the 1994 bilateral Agreement (which most likely terminated the 
trilateral treaties as analysed above) as the passage regime provided in the 1925 
and 1926 trilateral agreements was in conformity with the LOSC in terms of its 
Article 311(2).689 Thus, two parallel legal categories of straits were possibly 
applicable to the Viro Strait from 1991 to 1994 (or, alternatively, until 2010 if, 
hypothetically, the 1994 bilateral Agreement did not terminate the trilateral 
treaties). The primary distinction between the two legal regimes was that under 
the sui generis regime which might have applied under the 1925 and 1926 tri-
lateral treaties (from which at that time Finland had not withdrawn), Finland 
and Estonia could not have extended their territorial sea up to 12 miles in the 
Viro Strait absent of prior consent from each other. 
It was established above that the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties fell into 
desuetude post-1940 solely on the Soviet Union’s part and the treaties appar-
ently remained in force between Estonia and Finland inter se.690 Thus, Estonia 
                                                                          
684  See supra section 3 of Part I. 
685  Caminos 2007, op. cit., p. 583.  
686  Estonia and Finland also did not make a declaration to that effect. 
687  On the discretion of strait States with regard to invoking the Article 35(c)-exception see 
supra section 3 of Part I. 
688  The restitution of Estonia’s independence subjected the western part of the Gulf of 
Finland to the legal regime of straits. 
689  On the sui generis straits see supra section 2.3 of Part I. 
690  See supra section 4.3 of Part IV. 
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and Finland would have not been obligated under the sui generis strait regime to 
seek Russia’s prior consent for the extension of their territorial sea up to 12 
miles in the Viro Strait. Yet, until the 1994 bilateral Agreement was concluded, 
Estonia and Finland apparently could not have extended under the terms of the 
1925 trilateral Agreement their territorial sea up to 12 miles in the Viro Strait 
absent of prior consent from each other. This would have been the essence of 
the sui generis strait regime which might have been applicable to the Viro Strait 
potentially from 1991 to 1994. Presumably, both States had a veto-right against 
any planned extension of each other’s territorial sea at the expense of the EEZ 
corridor in the Viro Strait if it threatens the freedoms of the high seas in this 
maritime area (section 2 of the 1925 trilateral Agreement; section 1 of the 1926 
trilateral Protocol), particularly the freedom of navigation and overflight as well 
as the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines (Article 58(1) of the 
LOSC).691 
In practice, even if the 1925 trilateral Agreement was acknowledged at the 
time, it was considered out of date in 2008, as will be subsequently explained. 
In any case, the question about the applicability of the Article 35(c) and Article 
311(2)-exceptions to the Viro Strait do not require a definitive answer due to 
Finland’s withdrawal from the legal framework of the 1925 Helsinki Conven-
tion in 2010. The legal implications of this decision will be analysed next. 
 
 
6. The Termination of the 1925 and 1926 Trilateral Treaties 
6.1. Finland’s Withdrawal from the 1925 Helsinki Convention 
The withdrawal of a State Party from the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties is 
regulated under the 1925 Helsinki Convention and in the provisions of the tri-
lateral treaties.692 Article 2 of the 1926 Moscow trilateral Protocol provides that 
“This protocol enters into force and it may be denounced on the same time and 
manner as the above-referred treaty which is concluded between Estonia, Fin-
land and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” Although the 1925 trilateral 
Agreement does not regulate in detail its termination, denunciation or with-
drawal of a State Party, it nevertheless stipulates in section 2 that it is an “insep-
arable part” of the 1925 Helsinki Convention concluded on the same day. 
Article 14 of the 1925 Helsinki Convention provides that “In an instance 
when one of the States Parties desires to withdraw from this Convention, it 
needs to file a written notification to the Finnish Government that will immedi-
                                                                          
691  In this period from 1991 to 1994, neither State had established its contiguous zone in the 
narrow EEZ corridor of the Viro Strait. Estonia has still not established its contiguous 
zone under Article 33 of the LOSC. Pursuant to section 3(1) of Finland’s Customs Act, 
the Finnish customs territory extends 2 miles further than the outer limit of the territorial 
sea, unless otherwise provided in an international agreement. This 2-miles-wide zone 
was established in 1994. See section 2(5) of the Tullilaki (Customs Act). Adopted 
29.04.2016, e.i.f. 01.05.2016. 
692  See also Article 54 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. 
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ately notify the other contracting States about the date of the withdrawal. The 
withdrawal from the Convention only concerns the State that did so. It enters 
into effect after one year from the date when the Finnish Government received 
it.” Thus, under Article 2 of the 1926 Moscow trilateral Protocol and section 2 
of the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement in combination with Article 14 of the 
1925 Helsinki Convention, the possibility of the termination of the treaty was 
not foreseen. Instead, only the possibility of unilateral withdrawal from the 
treaty was provided for. 
On February 15th, 2008, the Finnish Government referred to the Parliament a 
draft Act in which it proposed to withdraw from the 1925 Helsinki Convention 
since the treaty had become out of date and void of any practical effect between 
its States Parties as well as due to its conflict with the primary law of the Euro-
pean Union.693 The draft Act noted that this also concerns the 1925 and 1926 
trilateral treaties as they are an “inseparable part” of the Convention.694 The 
Finnish Government thus observed that it is not necessary to withdraw from the 
1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties separately, but instead as a result of withdraw-
ing from the 1925 Helsinki Convention, Finland would also withdraw from the 
trilateral treaties.695 Further, the Government pointed to the Swedish withdrawal 
from the 1925 Helsinki Convention on May 10th, 2007 due to the same rea-
sons.696 
Following the deliberations of a committee of the Finnish Parliament on 
March 7th, 2008,697 the Parliament accepted the Government’s proposal for 
withdrawing from the 1925 Helsinki Convention on March 26th, 2008, absent of 
any discussion during either the first or the second reading of the draft Act.698 
The Finnish withdrawal from the 1925 Helsinki Convention came into effect on 
November 17th, 2010 under the legal act of the Finnish President which repealed 
the 1925 legal act on the domestic entry into force of the 1925 Helsinki Con-
vention.699 
                                                                          
693  HE 10/2008 vp, op. cit., pp. 1–3, 6. 
694  Ibid, p. 1. 
695  Ibid, pp. 3–4. At the same time, the Government noted in the draft Act that despite 
withdrawing from the 1925 Helsinki Convention, it still maintains its role as the 
depositary of the Convention pursuant to Article 14 of the Convention.  
696  Ibid, pp. 1–2. The Swedish withdrawal entered into force a year later pursuant to Article 
14 of the Helsinki Convention.  
697  Hallintovaliokunnan mietintö 2/2008vp, 07.03.2008. – Hallituksen esitys alkoholi-
tavarain salakuljetuksen ehkäisemistä tarkoittavan sopimuksen irtisanomisen hyväksy-
misestä sekä laiksi Suomen ja Ruotsin välillä yhteisestä valvonnasta alkoholitavarain 
luvattoman maahantuonnin ehkäisemiseksi tehdyn sopimuksen hyväksymisestä annetun 
lain kumoamisesta. Accessible in Finnish at: https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/Vaski/sivut/ 
trip.aspx?triptype=ValtiopaivaAsiakirjat&docid=havm+2/2008 (14.09.2016). 
698  HE 10/2008 vp, op. cit. – Päätökset. See Täysistunnon pöytäkirja (Stenographic Records 
of the Plenary Session). 24/2008 vp, 13.03.2008. See also Täysistunnon pöytä-
kirja 27/2008 vp, 26.03.2008. Accessible in Finnish at: https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/ 
Vaski/sivut/trip.aspx?triptype=ValtiopaivaAsiakirjat&docid=ptk+27/2008 (14.09.2016). 
699  Tasavallan presidentin asetus alkoholitavarain salakuljetuksen ehkäisemistä tarkoittavan 
sopimuksen voimaansaattamisesta annetun asetuksen kumoamisesta (President’s Act 
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6.2. The Legal Consequences of Finland’s Withdrawal  
from the 1925 Helsinki Convention 
Following its restitutio ad integrum in 1991, Estonia declared that it inherits its 
international duties and responsibilities stemming from treaties that were in 
force in relation to it prior to the loss of its independence in June 1940,700 except 
for treaties in regards of which Estonia has explicitly made a declaration to the 
contrary. Estonia has not withdrawn from the 1925 Helsinki Convention nor 
from the trilateral treaties concluded to supplement it.701 
However, it is essentially not possible to argue for the validity of the 1925 
and 1926 trilateral treaties subsequent to the Finnish 2010 withdrawal. First, it 
was established above that the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties had fallen into 
desuetude on the Soviet Union’s part after the annexation of Estonia in 1940.702 
Second, even if this would not have been the case and, theoretically, the Rus-
sian Federation would have been still a State Party to the 1925 and 1926 trilat-
eral treaties, then the treaties would still have been terminated as a result of 
Finland’s withdrawal due to the fact that the Russian Federation has not recog-
nised Estonia’s State continuity.703 Albeit the overwhelming majority of States 
did not recognise Estonia’s annexation by the Soviet Union and Estonia 
remained independent de jure as well as restored its independence under the 
principle of restitutio ad integrum,704 it does not bear much legal weight in the 
context of the validity of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties between Estonia 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Repealing the Act on the Entry into Force of the Convention for the Suppression of the 
Contraband Traffic in Alcoholic Liquors). 956/2010, 12.11.2010. Accessible in 
Finnish/Swedish at: http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2010/20100956 (14.09.2016). 
700  D. A. Loeber. Legal Consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for the Baltic States 
on the Obligation to ´Overcome the Problems Inherited from the Past´. – Baltic 
Yearbook of International Law 2002, op. cit., p. 138. See Salulaid, op. cit., p. 226.  
T. Kerikmäe, H. Vallikivi. State Continuity in the Light of Estonian Treaties Concluded 
before World War II. – 5 Juridica International 2000, p. 31. See also I. Ziemele. State 
Continuity and Nationality: The Baltic States and Russia. Past, Present and Future as 
Defined by International Law. Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 2005, p. 80. 
701  J. Salulaid as a lawyer of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has examined the 
validity of the pre-1940 multilateral treaties one by one but has not singled out the 1925 
Helsinki Convention as a treaty from which Estonia would have withdrawn post-1991 
(more precisely, the author did not refer to it at all by contrast to other multilateral 
treaties). He also notes that Estonia has withdrawn from a pre-1940 multilateral treaty on 
the basis of the rebus sic stantibus clause only in one instance. This concerned the 
International Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens 
and Mortgages (1926). Salulaid, op. cit., pp. 227–229. 
702  Supra section 4.3 of Part IV. 
703  Mälksoo 2003, op. cit., p. 64. 
704  Hough, op. cit., pp. 391–447. Mälksoo 2005, op. cit., pp. 72–74, 128–132. In the legal 
literature on maritime boundary delimitation, the legal continuity of the Baltic States is 
also acknowledged, albeit initially with some caution. See e.g. E. Franckx. Baltic Sea 
Update. Report No. 10-14. – J. I. Charney, L. M. Alexander (eds). International Maritime 
Boundaries, vol. 3. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff 1998, pp. 2562–2563. 
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and the Russian Federation absent of Russia’s recognition of Estonia’s State 
continuity. 
The Russian Federation has upon the restoration of Estonia’s independence 
in 1991 consistently maintained that the treaties concluded by the Soviet Union 
with pre-1940 Estonia became defunct in 1940 due to the termination of Esto-
nia’s independence.705 It would be reasonable to assume that the bilateral treaty 
relationship between Estonia and the Russian Federation within the framework 
of the 1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties ended in 1940, since the Russian Federa-
tion considers Estonia a new State and Estonia has not claimed that these trea-
ties (unlike e.g. the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty706) are valid in its relations with the 
Russian Federation. The Russian Federation has so far refrained from recog-
nising the bilateral validity of any pre-1940 treaties which the Soviet Union had 
concluded with the Baltic States.707 Hence, as a result of Finland’s withdrawal 
from the 1925 Helsinki Convention, the trilateral treaties may be considered as 
terminated due to the termination of the bilateral treaty relationship between 
Finland and Estonia. Therefore, as a result of Finland’s withdrawal from the 
1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties, it is clear that only the 1994 bilateral Agree-
ment currently regulates passage rights in the Viro Strait. 
  
                                                                          
705  See Mälksoo 2005, op. cit., pp. 87–88. 
706  Treaty of Peace between Russia and Estonia. Tartu 02.02.1920, e.i.f. 30.03.1920. 
Accessible: http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1922/92.html (14.09.2016). 
707  Ziemele, op. cit., p. 81. 
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PART V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DOMESTIC LAW ON  
THE INTERNAL WATERS AND STATE CONTINUITY FOR 
THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE SEA OF STRAITS  
In addition to the above-studied legal categories of straits regulated by a long-
standing convention (Article 35(c) of the LOSC) and sui generis straits (311(2) 
of the LOSC), another distinct type of straits, namely straits comprising long-
standing internal waters (Article 35(a) of the LOSC), is intertwined with his-
torical associations and facts of the past. The close connections between legal 
history and Article 35(a)-category of straits are studied next in detail in the 
example of the Sea of Straits in the West Estonian Archipelago. 
The Sea of Straits is located between the northern end of the Gulf of Riga 
and south-western end of the Viro Strait. Thus, similarly to the Irbe Strait, it 
also links two parts of an EEZ. Yet instead of the transit passage regime, it pro-
vides a distinct example of the application of Article 35(a) of the LOSC on 
straits comprising long-standing internal waters.708 The process of establishing 
whether the legal regime of Article 35(a) applies to a strait which is otherwise 
regulated by either transit or non-suspendable innocent passage regime is in 
many aspects similar to that of examining the applicability of Article 35(c) of 
the LOSC to a particular strait. In the case of the Viro Strait, the main problem 
was determining whether there are any previous international treaties regulating 
passage rights in this maritime area. After identifying the 1925 and 1926 trilat-
eral agreements as such treaties, their legal effect had to be established. 
Likewise, in the case of the Sea of Straits, it bears consideration whether 
there are any legal instruments under which Estonia might have declared this 
semi-enclosed sea as its internal waters already prior to the first use of straight 
baselines by Estonia under its 1993 Maritime Boundaries Act. In case Estonia 
had considered the Sea of Straits as its internal waters prior to the 1993 Mari-
time Boundaries Act, then it needs to be established under Article 35(a) of the 
LOSC whether this legal status of the Sea of Straits was also in effect at the 
time when the Maritime Boundaries Act entered into force. In any case, Article 
35(a) of the LOSC can be applicable to the Sea of Straits only due to its special 
geographic and legal-historical characteristics. 
 
 
1. The Characteristics of the Sea of Straits 
Etymologically, Väinameri stands for the Sea of Straits (in Estonian väin means 
a strait and meri a sea) as well as the waterway leading to the River Daugava 
(Estonian: River Väina, Väinameri thus implying the sea of/to River Väina). 
Daugava served as an important waterway from Scandinavia to southern Europe 
in the medieval ages and its river mouth is home to the city of Riga. Yet as the 
name Väinameri was commonly adopted only in the 1930s and prior to that this 
                                                                          
708  On the interpretation of Article 35(a) of the LOSC generally see supra section 2.1 of Part I. 
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maritime area was mostly referred to as the Muhu Strait (hist. Moonsund),709 it 
should therefore be presumed that the name Väinameri refers to the Sea of 
Straits. 
The size of the Sea of Straits is 2243 km2, it is up to 35 miles long from 
north to south (the Muhu Strait) and up to 38 miles wide from west to east 
(from the Soela Strait to Matsalu Bay). The shallow Sea of Straits includes 
numerous shoals, shallows and hundreds of islands. Its mean depth is approxi-
mately 5 m, but may reach up to 20 m in some areas.710 Thus, it is not navigable 
for larger ships,711 although in extreme instances, ships with a draught of up to 
4.9 m have reportedly navigated the Muhu Strait.712 The Estonian Maritime 
Administration has been planning to run a project for the reconstruction of 
shipping routes in the western Estonian archipelago in order to allow ships with 
a draught of up to 5.5 m to transit the Muhu Strait sealane.713 
The Sea of Straits falls almost entirely under the European network of nature 
protection areas (Natura 2000) and includes many Estonian nature reserves,714 
including the Matsalu National Park which extends from Matsalu Bay to the 
middle of the Sea of Straits near Kumari Island. In view of its fragile ecosystem 
and relatively dangerous sealanes (e.g. shallow waters, presence of hundreds of 
islands), the Sea of Straits is sensitive to extensive commercial shipping. The 
Sea of Straits is mostly navigated by the small craft of the Nordic countries and 
domestic ferries. In 2013, the ferries transported approximately 2 million pas-
sengers and over 800 000 vehicles between the mainland coast and islands of 
western Estonia. 715 
The historically important north-south waterway from the Gulf of Finland to 
the Gulf of Riga traverses the Big Strait separating the mainland coast from the 
Muhu Island (hist. Moon) and the Hari Strait between the islands of Hiiumaa 
and Vormsi (hist. Ormsö/Worms). This approximately 35-miles-long sealane 
located in the eastern part of the Sea of Straits is commonly known as the Muhu 
Strait. Additionally, Vormsi is separated from the mainland coast by the Voosi 
                                                                          
709  Eesti Entsüklopeedia, vol. 10. – Väinameri. Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus 1998, 
p. 548. 
710  2001 chart “Väinameri (West-Estonian Archipelago)”. Maritime Administration. Charts 
of Estonia 2001, op. cit., p. 5. 
711  M. Kuris (koost). Väinamere hoiuala mereosa kaitsekorralduskava aastateks 2009–2018. 
Tallinn: Keskkonnaamet 2009, p. 11. 
712  A. Lember. Süvendatud laevatee neljakordistab laevade arvu Väinameres. Saarte Hääl, 
30.12.2008. 
713  See Estonian Maritime Administration. MA Contract for Site Investigations in West 
Estonian Archipelago. 2008. Accessible: http://www.vta.ee/index.php?id=3660& 
highlight=archipelago (14.09.2016). The artificial works, such as dredging, which have 
been carried out in the Sea of Straits before (particularly prior to the First World War 
when the Rohuküla Port on the eastern coast of the Sea of Straits was established as the 
naval base of the Russian Empire) do not impact the legal regime of straits as applicable 
under the LOSC. See e.g. López Martín, op. cit., p. 46. 
714  See Kuris, op. cit., p. 4. 
715  P. Luts. Saartele reisis läinud aastal ligi kaks miljonit inimest. ERR Uudised, 04.01.2014. 
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Strait (approx. 8 miles long) which links the Gulf of Finland with Haapsalu Bay 
as well as the rest of the Sea of Straits. 
The Hiiu Strait is located between the islands of Hiiumaa and Saaremaa. It 
includes the Soela Strait (hist. Seelesund) as well as Kassari Bay,716 and is cur-
rently less important as international and internal navigation is not so frequent 
in the western part of the Sea of Straits. This western passage in combination 
with the Big Strait is slightly longer than the Muhu Strait. 
A shorter link between the Soela Strait and the Gulf of Riga is the Small 
Strait between the islands of Muhu and Saaremaa. However, this extremely 
shallow strait is not navigable and hence cannot be used by ships for inter-
national navigation. It is also closed by a 3.6-kilometres-long road-dam since 
1896.717 Notably, it has neither been used by foreign aircraft for transiting 
between the EEZs in the Baltic Sea proper and the Latvian EEZ in the south-
eastern part of the Gulf of Riga. Thus, the Small Strait falls under the legal cat-
egory of non-international straits because it does not meet the functional crite-
rion of an international strait.718 
 
 
2. The Sea of Straits under the Potential  
Regime of Transit Passage 
The Sea of Straits connects the EEZ of Estonia as well as the EEZs of Finland 
and Sweden in its immediate vicinity with the Latvian EEZ in the south-eastern 
part of the Gulf of Riga. Thus, it is a waterway of international importance as it 
leads from Latvia to Sweden, Finland and the Russian Federation. Historically, 
Estonia considered the Sea of Straits as international straits through which, 
according to Ants Piip, “passage must be free”719 similarly to the passage 
through the territorial sea.720 This understanding is based on a centuries-long 
tradition and on the importance of international waterways that cross the Sea of 
Straits.721 Likewise, under the contemporary legal framework, the Sea of Straits 
may potentially be considered as comprising international straits. 
Omitting the exceptions of Article 35 of the LOSC, foreign ships should, 
similarly to the Irbe Strait, enjoy the right of transit passage in the internal 
                                                                          
716  Taska 1974, op. cit., p. 113. See also Maritime Administration. Charts of Estonia 2001, 
op. cit., p. 5. 
717  Eesti Entsüklopeedia, vol. 10, op. cit., Väinatamm, p. 548. However, the Estonian 
Parliament and Government are considering options for opening the Small Strait for 
small boats by making the necessary adjustments to the dam. See A. Krjukov. 
Keskkonnakomisjon arutab Väikese väina tammi probleemi. ERR Uudised, 21.09.2015. 
Marine scientists do not support this idea. See M. Kuul. Teadlased ei toeta Väikese väina 
tammi avade tegemist. ERR Uudised, 19.09.2016. 
718  In addition, on the question of the applicability of the Article 35(a)-exception, see infra 
section 4 of Part V. 
719  Piip 1926, op. cit, p. 11. 
720  Piip 1936, op. cit, p. 339. 
721  Taska 1974, op. cit, p. 113. 
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waters of the Sea of Straits under Part III of the LOSC. As the Sea of Straits is 
used for international navigation from the EEZs of Estonia, Sweden and Finland 
to the EEZ of Latvia (e.g. for navigating from Stockholm or Helsinki to Riga), 
Estonia would be prohibited under Part III of the LOSC to suspend the passage 
of a foreign ship or aircraft in the Sea of Straits as well as in parts of its internal 
waters leading to the Sea of Straits (e.g. in the Gulf of Riga). 
The potential applicability of transit passage in the Sea of Straits has a wide 
array of implications for Estonia, including in the fields of security, environ-
mental protection and communications. If the regime of transit passage would 
be applicable to the Sea of Straits, then Russian warships and aircraft would be 
entitled to transit the straits en route to, e.g. Kaliningrad or St. Petersburg. This 
would run counter to the security interests of Estonia. 
Additionally, the applicability of the right of transit passage in the Sea of 
Straits would strictly exclude under Article 44 of the LOSC the right of the 
Estonian Maritime Administration to suspend navigation in the Sea of Straits, 
including in the Big Srait, so as to provide the necessary conditions for the for-
mation of ice and thereby allow the Estonian Road Administration to establish 
ice-roads between the Estonian mainland coast and islands, including Muhu, 
Saaremaa and Hiiumaa islands. Thick ice may cover the relatively shallow and 
semi-enclosed Sea of Straits from the middle of December until the end of 
April.722 Also, in the context of a much deliberated plan in Estonia to build a 
bridge from the mainland coast to Muhu Island,723 Estonia might potentially 
have to engineer a bridge (or decide instead in favour of a tunnel) so as to allow 
more sizeable foreign ships to still transit the Sea of Straits in accordance with 
Article 44 of the LOSC.724 
Furthermore, the potentially increasing rate of crossings and particularly 
transits by larger ships would be burdensome for the particularly sensitive sea 
area of the Sea of Straits due to inter alia oil and noise pollution. It would also 
threaten the habitats of ringed seals on Sipelgarahu and Ahelaid islets as well as 
those of the grey seal on the strips of land and rocks in the Sea of Straits, e.g. on 
Eerikulaid and Pujurderahu. Although Sipelgarahu Islet is located in the middle 
of the Muhu Strait and thus has relatively heavy vessel traffic, it is prohibited to 
approach the islet from the sea anywhere closer than 500 m. The same rule also 
applies with regard to many other islets in the Sea of Straits that are part of the 
Estonian nature reserves.725 In case the regime of transit passage would be 
applicable to the Sea of Straits under international law, Estonia would lose most 
                                                                          
722  Eesti Entsüklopeedia, vol. 10, op. cit., Väinameri, p. 548. 
723  See e.g. A. Peetersoo. Suure väina püsiühenduse planeerimisest Saare maakonnaplanee-
ringus. Kuressaare: Saare Maavalitsus 2014. 
724  See Case Concerning Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order, 
29.07.1991. 
725  Section 47 of the Matsalu rahvuspargi kaitse-eeskirja ja välispiiri kirjelduse kinnitamine 
(Confirmation of the Regulation of the Matsalu National Park and its Outer Limits). 
Adopted 05.05.1997, e.i.f. 15.05.1997 (RT I 1997, 36, 546). Accessible in Estonian at: 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/977195?leiaKehtiv (14.09.2016). 
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of its control over the vessel traffic in this sensitive area. This would also 
require profound changes to the Estonian domestic legal framework on the Sea 
of Straits, as will be discussed subsequently. 
 
 
3. The Domestic Law of Estonia on Passage  
Rights in the Sea of Straits  
The domestic law of Estonia does not recognise the right of transit passage of 
foreign ships and aircraft in the Sea of Straits. Section 14(1) of the State Bor-
ders Act stipulates that a foreign civil vessel may cross, enter or exit the inland 
maritime waters in order to proceed to an Estonian port or exit it, sail from the 
Gulf of Finland to the Gulf of Riga and vice versa, save a human life, prevent 
an accident or reduce damage arising from an accident or due to force majeure 
or for bunkering. Thus, innocent passage is granted to foreign civil ships cross-
ing the Muhu Strait. The right of innocent passage is not provided for govern-
ment-operated vessels. More generally, it stems from section 14(1) of the State 
Borders Act that innocent passage is excluded in toto in the Soela Strait, which 
in combination with the Big Strait leads from the Gulf of Riga to the Estonian 
EEZ west of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa islands and further to the Swedish EEZ. 
Innocent passage in the Muhu Strait, as provided in the State Borders Act, is 
suspendable. In addition, a foreign vessel may navigate the internal sea only 
along the shipping route, if established, and by using a pilot.726 Under Article 22 
of the LOSC, the coastal State may require, where necessary having regard to 
the safety of navigation, foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage 
through its territorial sea to use such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as 
it may designate or prescribe for the regulation of the passage of ships. This 
right applies also in such internal waters that fall under the regime of innocent 
passage (Article 8(2) of the LOSC; in straits comprising long-standing internal 
waters the coastal State may naturally designate sealanes and traffic separation 
schemes as well as require the use of a pilot as it deems necessary).727  
                                                                          
726  Section 14(4) of the State Borders Act. It is ambiguous whether the requirement of 
compulsory pilotage has been also practicable with regard to foreign ships absent of any 
significant exceptions to this rule and whether the Estonian authorities have implemented 
it in this restrictive manner in practice. 
727  In international straits where the innocent passage applies and which do not include long-
standing internal waters, the sea lanes and traffic separation schemes must be adopted by 
taking into account the relevant factors, including the recommendations of the competent 
international organisation. In this regard, the International Maritime Organization is 
considered as the only competent international organisation according to the Inter-
national Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. The sea lanes and traffic separation 
schemes have to be indicated on charts and duly published by the coastal State (Article 
22(4) of the LOSC). Similarly, foreign ships have the right, under Article 24(2) of the 
LOSC to receive due information on any danger to navigation, of which the coastal State 
has knowledge of within its territorial sea. See Nandan, Rosenne, op. cit., pp. 205, 212. 
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This right of the coastal State is particularly relevant in connection with 
tankers and ships carrying dangerous or noxious substances (Article 22(2) of the 
LOSC). Subject to section 14(41) of the State Borders Act, the requirement to 
follow a shipping route and use a pilot does not apply to pleasure boats, vessels 
which enter the internal waters due to force majeure, for saving a human life, 
preventing an accident or reducing damage arising from an accident as well as if 
a ship proceeds to the internal waters by the shortest route to take a pilot on 
board or if a ship proceeds to the territorial sea by the shortest route after the 
pilot has disembarked, in addition to other grounds provided in the Maritime 
Safety Act.728 
The procedure for vessels and recreational craft to enter and exit the internal 
sea, ports and Estonian waters of trans-boundary water bodies729 adopted by the 
Government pursuant to section 14(2)(1) of the State Borders Act stipulates in 
section 1(5) that the captain of a ship is required to notify the Police and Border 
Guard Board two hours in advance of entering the internal sea or Estonian 
waters of trans-boundary water bodies. In accordance with section 3(2) and 3(3) 
of the procedure on entering internal waters, this requirement of notification 
also applies to vessels entering internal waters in order to save a human life, 
eliminate marine pollution, for icebreaking purposes or bunkering as well as 
due to force majeure.  
Pursuant to sections 6(1) and 6(2) of the procedure to enter the internal sea, a 
small craft is also required to immediately clear its entrance in a port open for 
international traffic in order to continue sailing in the internal sea. Additionally, 
under section 2(1) of the procedure for the issue of permits for entry of foreign 
military vessels in Estonian territorial or internal waters, foreign military vessels 
need to apply for a permit from the Ministry of Defence in order to cross the 
Sea of Straits.  
It follows from the foregoing that the applicable legal framework does not 
recognise the right of transit passage of foreign vessels in the Sea of Straits. Its 
compatibility with the international law of the sea depends on whether the 
regime of transit passage and other requirements as provided in the LOSC 
framework on international straits apply to the Sea of Straits under Article 35(a) 
of the LOSC. 
 
 
                                                                          
728  Meresõiduohutuse seadus (Maritime Safety Act). Adopted 12.12.2001, e.i.f. 01.01.2003 
(RT I 2002, 1, 1). Accessible: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/518062015003/consolide 
(14.09.2016). 
729  Laevade ja väikelaevade sisemerre, sadamatesse ning piiriveekogude Eestile 
kuuluvatesse vetesse sisenemise ja neist väljumise kord (The Procedure for Vessels and 
Recreational Craft to Enter and Exit the Inland Maritime Waters, Ports, and Estonian 
Waters of Trans-boundary Water Bodies). Adopted 19.05.2004, e.i.f. 15.06.2004 (RT I 
2004, 44, 312). Accessible in Estonian at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/759321? 
leiaKehtiv (14.09.2016). 
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4. The Sea of Straits as Non-International Straits 
The Sea of Straits is included within Estonia’s straight baselines. Thus, the legal 
framework on internal waters is applicable to this maritime area. Yet this does 
not exclude under the LOSC the potential applicability of the transit passage 
regime. The right of transit passage of foreign ships and aircraft would apply in 
the Sea of Straits, unless its waters fall under the exceptions provided in Article 
35 of the LOSC. Pursuant to Article 35(a) of the LOSC, the right of transit pas-
sage would apply to foreign ships in the Sea of Straits if its waters had not been 
considered as internal waters before the establishment of the Estonian straight 
baselines.730 
 
 
4.1. The Sea of Straits in light of the 1938 Waterways Act 
Prior to its annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940, Estonia had not established 
a system of straight baselines. According to section 2(1) of the 1938 Waterways 
Act, only normal baselines were used for determining the 4 mile breadth of the 
territorial sea. The normal baselines were waterlines along the coast, which 
implies that the waters bordering it were generally territorial, not internal waters 
(except for small maritime pockets of internal waters, such as bays) under the 
1938 Waterways Act.731  
Under section 1 of the Waterways Act, Estonia stipulated the width of its ter-
ritorial sea (4 miles) in its domestic law for the first time in clear terms. How-
ever, in view of section 1 of the Estonian Waterways Act, the waters of the Sea 
of Straits exceeded the 4 mile width of the Estonian territorial sea in some sec-
tions. This would have resulted in an unhindered passage for foreign ships in 
the Sea of Straits. Therefore, section 3 of the 1938 Waterways Act of Estonia 
provided that straits, which are used for passage between two parts of the high 
seas and the coasts of which are both situated in the territory of Estonia, are 
regarded as coastal seas (i.e. territorial sea), unless the breadth of the strait 
exceeds 10 miles.  
Already in the 1930 Hague Codification Conference, Estonia had considered 
the maximum breadth of a strait to be 10 miles.732 Erik Brüel has also noted that 
during the Conference, the committee of experts had limited the maximum 
breadth of an international strait from 12 miles, as proposed in the preparatory 
documents, to 10 miles.733 As Gerard Mangone observes, this exception 
(opposed by the United States) implied that “when the width of a strait 
                                                                          
730  See supra section 2.1 of Part I. 
731  By comparison, as the Estonian coast is deeply indented and accompanied by over 2000 
islands, nowadays the 1993 Maritime Boundaries Act applies a normal baseline a couple 
of kilometres long only close to the Ontika cliff in Narva Bay. Explanatory Note to the 
1993 Maritime Boundaries Act of Estonia, op. cit., p. 2. 
732  Taska 1974, op. cit, pp. 114–115. 
733  E. Brüel. International Straits. A Treatise on International Law, vol. I. The General Legal 
Position of International Straits. London: Sweet & Maxwell 1947, p. 177. 
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exceeded “two belts” of the territorial sea, the waters between the belts would 
be high seas, except that where the area between the belts was not greater than 
two miles, it could be assimilated into the territorial sea of the coastal state or 
states.”734 Estonia had approved this exception.735 
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom decided to protest against section 3 of the 
Waterways Act: 
 
“His Majesty’s Government are only able to recognise the whole of the waters of 
a strait as territorial waters if the width of each entrance does not exceed six 
miles and both shores belong to the same country. In straits the entrance of 
which exceeds six miles in width, territorial waters are, in the view of His Maj-
esty’s Government, limited to a belt three miles in width on either side and fol-
lowing the sinuosities of the Coast.”736 
 
The Estonian Government did not reply to this protest specifically. Yet the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed on December 15th, 1939 the Estonian 
Ministries of Interior, Roads and War to apply the 3-miles-wide territorial sea in 
times of war.737 
The sole maritime area along the coast of Estonia that met the requirements 
of section 3 of the Waterways Act was the Sea of Straits.738 The Sea of Straits 
was thereby considered Estonia’s territorial sea, thus excluding the high seas in 
its central part.739 This was aimed at omitting the right of innocent passage of 
foreign warships through the Sea of Straits (with the exceptions of 
force majeure, distress or in cases of serious harm), unless an agreement had 
been concluded to that effect or unless the Estonian authorities had granted 
prior permission for such passage.740 
Thus, on the basis of solely the 1938 Waterways Act, the maritime area of 
the Sea of Straits was not part of the internal waters of Estonia prior to the 
establishment of its straight baselines under the 1993 Maritime Boundaries Act. 
Pursuant to Article 35(a) of the LOSC, the legal regime of straits as provided in 
Part III of the LOSC would hence apply to the Sea of Straits if the 1938 Water-
ways Act alone was taken into account. 
Some authors have come to the conclusion that non-suspendable innocent 
passage should apply to the Sea of Straits, although they have neither taken into 
account the above-referred exception provided in Article 35(a) of the LOSC nor 
the Estonian legal acts prior to 1940 in this connection.741 Caminos and 
Cogliati-Bantz have followed López Martín’s classification of the Sea of Straits 
                                                                          
734  Mangone, op. cit., p. 396. 
735  Brüel, vol. I, op. cit, p. 180. 
736  ERA.957.14.583, p. 10. 
737  Ibid, p. 5. 
738  See also the press article on the adoption of the Waterways Act in Uus Eesti 23.01.1938, 
op. cit., p. 1. 
739  See also Taska 1974, op. cit., pp. 114, 157. 
740  See Uus Eesti 23.01.1938, op. cit., p. 1. 
741  See Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., p. 166. López Martín, op. cit., p. 99. 
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as falling under the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage.742 They have 
thus pointed to the incompatibility of Estonia’s requirement of prior authorisa-
tion for nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently 
dangerous or noxious substances or materials to transit the Sea of Straits.743 The 
United States also does not recognise the requirement stipulated in Article 141 
of the State Borders Act of Estonia, according to which for entry in the inland 
maritime waters of a foreign vessel with a nuclear engine or which is carrying a 
nuclear weapon or radioactive substances on board or for entry of another ves-
sel used for national non-commercial purposes, the foreign state shall apply for 
a diplomatic clearance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through diplomatic 
channels at least 14 calendar days before the planned entry.744 
Yet these views and classification of the Sea of Straits are not correct. This 
can be explained by the fact that the legal regime applicable to the Sea of Straits 
has thus far not been subject to any in-depth scrutiny. It is not possible to pro-
vide a definitive classification on this matter absent of archival materials. It 
follows from the domestic law of Estonia that in spite of the absence of an 
internationally recognised methodology for establishing straight baselines prior 
to the termination of Estonia’s independence in 1940, Estonia had declared a 
considerable part of its coastal waters as internal waters. This matter is further 
considered in the next section. 
 
 
4.2. The Passages to the Sea of Straits Proper as Long-Standing Internal 
Waters in the Context of the 1938 Nordic Rules of Neutrality 
Some parts of the Estonian maritime area were already declared internal waters 
in 1918. Pursuant to Article 2 of the 1918 Estonian Temporary Administrative 
Laws, the cannon-shot rule was used for delimiting bays and their inner parts 
over which it was possible to exercise complete dominion from the coast. These 
waters formed the internal waters of Estonia. This regulation was in force until 
1938 when it was replaced with the Waterways Act which, however, did not 
distinguish bays (formerly internal waters) from the territorial sea. 
However, in the autumn of 1938, the Neutrality Act was passed by the Esto-
nian Parliament. It provided in section 2(3) that the Estonian internal waters 
shall be deemed to include ports, entrances to ports, gulfs and bays, and the 
waters between those Estonian islands, islets and reefs which are not constantly 
submerged, and between the said islands, islets and reefs and the mainland. 
Internal waters of Estonia, as well as of Finland (incl. its Archipelago Sea),745 
                                                                          
742  The authors have not taken the Latvian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga into account, which is 
why this categorisation is not correct in any case, since the Sea of Straits would prima 
facie fall under the regime of transit passage. 
743  Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., p. 166. 
744  See US Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps. – Estonia, op. cit. 
745  See Article 2(2) of Suomen puolueettomuutta koskevia määräyksiä (Neutrality Act), 
17/1938. Accessible in Finnish at: https://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/ 
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thus comprised maritime areas that were strongly connected to the coast due to 
the location of bays746 or islands. The Neutrality Act was proclaimed by the 
Estonian President on December 3rd, 1938.747 
The explanatory note of the draft law underlines that the Neutrality Act of 
Estonia was drafted on the basis of the neutrality acts that were adopted in 1938 
by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, all of which had been harmonised 
between those States.748 Although the explanatory note does not refer to Iceland, 
it was also a signatory State to the Declaration between Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, Norway and Sweden for the Purpose of Establishing Similar Rules of 
Neutrality.749 On the basis of the Scandinavian rules of neutrality, as stipulated 
in the 1938 Declaration,750 the above-referred countries adopted domestic 
legislation on neutrality which pertained prima facie to the law of the sea from 
the perspective of the coastal State’s maritime security in times of war. 
Estonia took the Swedish Neutrality Act as an example and made only few 
modifications so that its Neutrality Act would better suit its needs.751 With the 
aim of establishing a harmonised legal framework in the coastal States of the 
Baltic Sea, the Estonian Government sent its draft law on neutrality to the Lat-
vian and Lithuanian governments a couple of days after its referral to the Esto-
nian Parliament on October 1st, 1938.752 On November 18th, 1938, the foreign 
ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed in Riga a protocol which had 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1938/19380017 (14.09.2016). See also ERA.957.14.627, p. 2. Article 2(2) of the said 
Act provided analogously to the Estonian above-referred provision that 
 ”Suomen sisäisillä aluevesillä tarkoitetaan tässä asetuksessa Suomen satamia, satama-
väyliä, lahtia ja lahdelmia sekä niitä osia Suomen aluevedestä, jotka ovat Suomelle 
kuuluvien saarien, luotojen ja ainakin ajoittain vedenpinnalla näkyvien karien sisä-
puolella tai välissä.” 
746  E.g. Tallinn Bay along the line between the islands of Aegna and Naissaar, as well as 
Paldiski Bay along Pakri Islands and Pärnu Bay taking also into account with the islands 
of Manilaiu, Sorgu and Kihnu. This also included Matsalu and Haapsalu bays in the Sea 
of Straits. 
747  Rahvusraamatukogu. Meie parlament ja aeg: VI Riigikogu (Riigivolikogu ja 
Riiginõukogu) 17.04.1938 – 05.07.1940. Accessible in Estonian at: https://www.nlib.ee/ 
html/expo/p90/p1/38.html (14.09.2016). 
748  ERA.957.14.561, p. 3. On the minor variations between the otherwise identical acts see 
N. J. Padelford. The New Scandinavian Neutrality Rules. – 32 The American Journal of 
International Law 1938 (4), pp. 789–790. 
749  Declaration between Denmark, Finland Iceland, Norway and Sweden for the Purpose of 
Establishing Similar Rules of Neutrality. Stockholm 27.05.1938. Accessible: 
http://www.histdoc.net/history/nordic1938_en.html (14.09.2016). For the text of the 
Declaration see also: Denmark-Finland-Iceland-Norway-Sweden: Declaration Regarding 
Similar Rules of Neutrality. – 32 The American Journal of International Law 1938 (4), 
pp. 141–163. 
750  The Scandinavian Neutrality Rules were drafted on the basis of meetings of the foreign 
ministers in April 1937 (Helsinki), September 1937 (Stockholm) and in April 1938 
(Oslo). See ERA.957.14.627, p. 20(verso). 
751  ERA.957.14.561, pp. 3–4. 
752  ERA.957.14.563, p. 3. 
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been discussed earlier by experts of the three Baltic States in Tallinn on 
November 3rd, 1938.753 
The protocol – essentially a counterpart to the 1938 Scandinavian declara-
tion – stipulated the neutrality rules of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and 
included the text of the rules. The rules were drafted on the basis of the Esto-
nian Neutrality Act.754 Upon the Estonian proposal,755 the Protocol foresaw 
prior consultations between the three Baltic States in case any of them should 
decide to introduce any modifications to their domestic Neutrality Act diverging 
from the Baltic neutrality rules as agreed between them in the text of Loi 
portant réglementation de la neutralité.756 Latvia and Lithuania thereby adopted 
the definition of internal waters as provided in the Estonian Neutrality Act.757 In 
broader terms, all the northern countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, 
Norway and the three Baltic States – adopted an identical general definition of 
internal waters in 1938.758 
As examined below,759 it appears that only the United Kingdom explicitly 
objected to the adoption of this definition of internal waters in the Estonian 
Neutrality Act (as it did also with the other Nordic States). Yet, as noted by 
Estonia and the other Nordic States in their replies to the United Kingdom’s 
protest,760 this particular definition had already been settled in the 1912 
Scandinavian Rules of Neutrality in the spirit of the 1907 Hague Convention 
XIII.761 Section 1(c) of the 1912 Scandinavian Rules of Neutrality stipulated 
that “Interior waters include, in addition to ports, entrances to ports, roads and 
bays, the territorial waters situated between islands, islets, and reefs which are 
not constantly submerged, and between these and the mainland.”762 This defini-
tion is the same as that included in the 1938 Nordic Neutrality Rules (except 
                                                                          
753  See a copy of the protocol in ERA.957.14.562, p. 2. 
754  See the text of the Baltic neutrality rules in, ibid, pp. 3–8. 
755  ERA.957.14.563, p. 7. 
756  ERA.957.14.562, p. 2. Analogously, the Scandinavian neutrality rules provided that, 
“And have agreed that, should any of them desire, in the light of their own experience, to 
modify the said Rules, as contemplated by the Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
Neutral Powers in Naval War, signed at The Hague on October 18th, 1907, they shall not 
do so without first giving, if possible, sufficient notice to the other four Governments to 
permit of an exchange of views in the matter.” See the 1938 Declaration between 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, op. cit. 
757  ERA.957.14.562, p. 3. 
758  ERA.957.14.561, p. 3. 
759  See infra section 4.3 of Part V.  
760  See infra section 4.3 of Part V. 
761  Convention (XIII) concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. 
The Hague 18.10.1907, e.i.f. 26.01.1910. 
762  Declaration by Norway, Denmark and Sweden relative to the Establishment of Uniform 
Rules of Neutrality. Stockholm 21.12.1912. See also Rules of Neutrality established by 
order of H. M. the King of Norway. 18.12.1912, section 1(c). Both accessible: Declar-
ation by Norway, Denmark and Sweden Relative to the Establishment of Uniform Rules 
of Neutrality. – 7 The American Journal of International Law 1913(3), pp. 187–191. 
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some minor differences in wording) as well as in section 2(3) of the Estonian 
Neutrality Act. 
It appears that in the course of this nearly three decades long timeframe, the 
United Kingdom was the principal and seemingly the only protesting State 
against the neutrality rules (incl. the definition of internal waters). On this basis, 
it may be concluded that generally, other States tacitly accepted the definition of 
internal waters as included first in the 1912 Scandinavian Rules of Neutrality 
and repeated in the 1938 Neutrality Acts. The Estonian Neutrality Act falls into 
this broader context. 
As examined below, even the content of the United Kingdom’s protest 
against the Estonian Neutrality Act overlapped with those protests made against 
the other Nordic States. Likewise, Estonia’s reply to the United Kingdom’s 
protest was almost a verbatim copy of its Nordic counterparts’ responses. As the 
Estonian archival materials include no indication that any other State aside the 
United Kingdom protested against the 1912 Scandinavian Rules of Neutrality 
and its 1938 counterpart, it is reasonable to suggest that States tacitly acqui-
esced to the definition of internal waters as included inter alia in the 1938 Esto-
nian Neutrality Act. 
The passages to the Sea of Straits – Hari Strait, Voosi Strait, Soela Strait and 
Big Strait, as well as Small Strait – meet the conditions of the above-cited sec-
tion 2(3) of the 1938 Neutrality Act. They are narrow passages with a width of 
no more than 2.5 miles – although the absolute width of the Hari Strait and the 
Big Strait is slightly greater, their width in terms of section 2(3) of the 1938 
Neutrality Act should be measured on the basis of the maximum distances 
between the islands that are located in the strait (incl. the islets of Viirelaid 
(hist. Pater Noster), Kesselaid (hist. Sköld/Schildau) and Harilaid (hist. Hares)). 
Thus, the passages to the Sea of Straits proper satisfy the criteria of section 2(3) 
of the 1938 Neutrality Act and should be considered in terms of Article 35(a) of 
the LOSC as such internal waters that were internal waters also prior to the es-
tablishment of straight baselines by Estonia. Hence, the right of transit passage 
does not apply in the Sea of Straits. 
The current Estonian domestic legal framework on passage rights in the Sea 
of Straits is thus generally in conformity with the LOSC. This follows also from 
the teleological interpretation of Article 35(a) of the LOSC since, as the transit 
passage does not apply in the passages to the Sea of Straits, then even if such a 
right would potentially exist in small maritime pockets in the Sea of Straits 
proper, e.g. in some sections of the Hiiu Strait763 or Muhu Strait, it would be 
void of any practical meaning because, in any case, foreign ships and aircraft 
would not have the right of transit passage for reaching these small maritime 
areas. 
                                                                          
763  In the 1920s and 1930s as well as in the 19th century, this maritime area was commonly 
known as Kassari Bay. Since section 2(3) of the Neutrality Act refers explicitly to bays 
as internal waters, this maritime area should, following the literal interpretation, also be 
considered as internal waters. See maps: ERA.T-6.3.1249, p. 1, ERA.T-6.3.1250, p. 1, 
ERA.T-6.3.1251, p. 1, ERA.T-6.3.1302, p. 1. 
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Due to the above-mentioned reasons, the passages in the Sea of Straits 
should not be considered international straits. Instead, they are non-international 
straits in terms of LOSC Article 35(a) through which foreign ships and aircraft 
cannot exercise transit passage. Likewise, as will be examined next, the Sea of 
Straits proper (in addition to its passages) also meets the criteria of Article 35(a) 
of the LOSC. 
 
 
4.3. The Sea of Straits Proper as Long-Standing Internal Waters 
As in respect of all the other Nordic countries that adopted the neutrality rules 
in 1938,764 the British Foreign Office made certain protests in its memoran-
dum765 of June 5th, 1939 against some of the provisions of the Estonian Neutral-
ity Act. The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to the British Foreign 
Office on October 2nd, 1939 by stating inter alia that 
 
“The Estonian Government wishes to point out that the rules of international law 
which regulate neutrality often comprise only a minimum of obligations neces-
sary for safeguarding neutrality. It is quite clear in such cases that a neutral State 
is entitled, within the limits of its sovereignty, to issue, at its own discretion and 
for the protection of its interests, more extensive rules than those prescribed by 
international law. 
In the sphere of neutrality law, new situations may arise for the regulation of 
which no precedent producing recognised principles of international law and 
practice can be invoked. In cases where neither any precise international rules 
nor the generally accepted principles of international law give direct guidance, 
every particular State has to decide for itself in which way and by which means 
its position as a neutral should most appropriately be maintained.”766 
 
These passages in the Estonian reply, just like most of the others, were identical 
to the ones in the prior responses made by the Nordic countries to the British 
protest. Also, as a standard reply to the British Foreign Office with regard to its 
comments on the Nordic definition of internal waters, the Estonian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs explained that 
 
“The Estonian Government has adopted for the definition of the interior waters 
the principles embodied in the Neutrality Rules of 1912 of the Scandinavian 
States. The Estonian Government has, in consequence, introduced into their leg-
islation no innovation unknown to the international practice.”767 
 
                                                                          
764  ERA.957.14.563, p. 5. 
765  An analogous memorandum was presented by the British Foreign Office to the govern-
ments of all the northern countries that adopted the neutrality act in 1938, including 
Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden. Ibid, pp. 5–6. See also ERA.957.14.768, pp. 1–5. 
766  ERA.957.14.590, pp. 5–6. 
767  Ibid, p. 7.  
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This reply followed mutatis mutandis the words of inter alia the Swedish and 
Finnish responses to the British Foreign Office,768 which also referred to the 
1912 Declaration by Denmark, Norway and Sweden of Neutrality and Rules of 
Neutrality. Yet the Estonian response included also an exceptional clause, 
according to which, 
 
“At the same time, it should be realised that the interior waters as defined by this 
law do not in practice extend beyond the limits of the Estonian territorial 
waters.”769 
 
Notably, the breadth of the Sea of Straits exceeded the 8 miles breadth of the 
territorial sea of Estonia as provided in the 1938 Waterways Act and measured 
from the opposite coasts of the Sea of Straits. Ants Piip noted in 1926 that the 
coastal State has the same rights over its straits that apply to its coastal sea (i.e. 
territorial sea), which implies that if the breadth of a strait is narrower than the 
double breadth of the territorial sea, it is wholly a coastal sea (i.e. territorial 
sea).770 According to this rule, the central area of the Sea of Straits would have 
been high seas which would not have been covered by the initial 3-miles-wide 
or, as of 1938, the 4-miles-wide territorial sea. It follows from this that in terms 
of section 2(3) of the Neutrality Act, Estonia’s internal waters could neither 
have covered this central maritime area. However, as discussed above, section 3 
of the 1938 Waterways Act provided that the waters of the Sea of Straits are 
part of the territorial sea of Estonia. 
The neutrality acts of 1938 did not provide for a specific limit for the breadth 
of the coastal State’s internal waters. However, an early draft of the 1938 Esto-
nian Neutrality Act included handwritten amendments to its section 2(3), 
according to which the limit of the internal waters would have been “up to four 
nautical miles.”771 Most likely, this proposal for the modification of section 2(3) 
was abandoned in order to maintain the uniform wording of the definition of 
internal waters with the Nordic neutrality rules. However, it might have also 
been wise since, as confirmed by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its 
afore-referred reply to the British Foreign Office, the internal waters of Estonia 
did not extend beyond the limit of its territorial sea. 
Namely, the limit of the breadth of the Estonian territorial sea in the Sea of 
Straits differed from the usual 4 miles and was instead up to 5 miles. If section 
2(3) of the Neutrality Act would have stipulated as the limit of the width of 
Estonia’s internal waters 4 miles, then it would have resulted in the exclusion of 
the possibility to consider the whole maritime area of the Sea of Straits as inter-
nal waters. Under section 2(3) of the Neutrality Act, the whole maritime area of 
the Sea of Straits may be considered as internal waters due to its deeply 
indented coastline that encloses the Sea of Straits and the presence of hundreds 
                                                                          
768  See the Swedish and Finnish replies in: Ibid, pp. 36–38 and 53–54. 
769  ERA.957.14.590, p. 7. 
770  Piip 1926, op. cit., p. 11. 
771  ERA.957.14.590, p. 11. 
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of islands which extend in many sections even to the most distant maritime 
areas in the centre of the Sea of Straits.772 
In the Northern Baltic Sea, the Article 35(a)-exception of the LOSC thus 
applies to the Sea of Straits in Estonia, but most likely also to the multiple 
straits in the Åland region of Finland, both areas of which are part of the inter-
nal waters of the coastal State under the Nordic neutrality rules of 1938. It is 
also likely that it applies to the narrow Kalmarsund in Sweden. Albeit Gunnar 
Alexandersson regarded Kalmarsund as an international strait,773 it may not be 
considered as such since its waters, which are in many sections not more than 2 
miles wide, may potentially be considered as falling under the definition of 
internal waters under section 2 of the 1938 Nordic neutrality rules. 
In particular, the Swedish 1938 Neutrality Act774 included in its section 2 a 
definition of internal waters which was identical with the one provided in the 
Estonian Neutrality Act, except for a clause according to which the Swedish 
waters in Øresund are not internal waters, save for the ports and entrances to the 
ports in Øresund.775 It did not provide for any exception with regard to Kalmar-
sund, the waters of which are even narrower (in many sections approx. 2 miles 
or less) as compared to the waters of Øresund. In contemporary legal literature 
it is usually understood that under Article 38(1) of the LOSC, the above-
referred Messina clause should apply to Kalmarsund.776 Yet in light of the fore-
going, under section 2 of its 1938 Neutrality Act, it might be possible for Swe-
den to exclude, in accordance with Article 35(a) of the LOSC, the right of 
transit and innocent passage in the strait altogether. 
The above-referred conclusion on the application of the LOSC Article 35(a)-
exception to the Sea of Straits is further confirmed by the fact that already on 
May 2nd, 1923, a high-level Estonian Government commission (comprised of 
representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War and Interior as well as 
the Maritime Administration) composed a map of the outer limits of the Esto-
nian maritime zones upon the request of the Parliament and the decision of the 
Government (dated March 21st, 1923) in which they declared that “the Muhu 
                                                                          
772  By contrast, e.g. the waters north of Ruhnu Island cannot meet the conditions of section 
2(3) of the Neutrality Act. See map 3 in Annex 1. It depicts the outer limit of the 
Estonian 3-miles-wide territorial sea (incl. in the Gulf of Riga). The outer limit of the 
Estonian pre-1940 internal waters may have in some instances nearly overlapped with 
that line (particularly in regards to the Abruka archipelago but to a great extent also in 
connection with the Kihnu archipelago). Generally, the rest of the maritime area north of 
Ruhnu Island would not be covered by the Article 35(a)-exception and would be subject 
to the regime of transit passage. In case of the Latvian maritime area, where there are no 
islands and the coastline is smooth, the spatial extent of the transit passage regime has 
even lesser constraints. 
773  G. Alexandersson. The Baltic Straits. The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff 
1982, p. 69. 
774  Innefattande vissa neutralitetsbestämmelser (Neutrality Act). 1938, No. 187, 27.05.1938, 
section 2(2). 
775  ERA.957.14.590, p. 29. ERA.957.14.583, p. 31. 
776  López Martín, op. cit., p. 95. Alexander 1991, op. cit., p. 101. Platzöder, op. cit., p. 148. 
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Strait [at the time, this was the common name used for Väinameri since the term 
“Väinameri” was adopted only in the latter part of the 1930s777 – A. L] stays 
completely within the internal waters of Estonia”, while “the Estonian Republic 
permits innocent passage through it for all ships”.778 At the same time, it is 
unclear on what legal basis the commission declared the whole Sea of Straits as 
internal waters. Since the width of the Estonian territorial sea was 3 miles in the 
1920s,779 it would have been clearly insufficient for covering the whole mari-
time area of the Sea of Straits. Nevertheless, the decision of this commission 
and its accompanying map (presented to the Government and the Parliament) 
shows clearly Estonia’s intent to regard the Sea of Straits as wholly comprising 
internal waters. 
In fact, although Estonia generally granted permission to foreign ships for 
exercising the right of innocent passage in the Estonian territorial sea,780 in at 
least one instance it refused to grant permission and this concerned in particular 
the Sea of Straits. On June 14th, 1934, the German Embassy in Tallinn sent a 
Verbal Note to the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting permission 
for its cruiser Königsberg to enter Tallinn port, for its first minesweeper flotilla 
(comprised of five minesweepers accompanied by a torpedo boat) to enter 
Narva port as well as the right for them to stay in Tagalaht (bay on the north-
west coast of Saaremaa) and transit the Soela Strait, Kassari Bay, Muhu Strait, 
Gulf of Riga and Irbe Strait as well as for its second torpedo boat flotilla to 
transit the Muhu Strait and the Irbe Strait.781 
As usual, the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the position of 
the Estonian Defence Forces Board on the German request. The Defence Forces 
Board was not against the entrance of the German cruiser into Tallinn port nor 
the stay of minesweepers in the Tagalaht and their transit through the Irbe 
Strait, but found the potential entrance of the minesweepers into Narva port 
unacceptable since it would create a precedent which might be followed by 
similar requests by other States, including the Soviet Union (it also noted that 
the River Narva is not sufficiently deep for the minesweepers). The Defence 
Forces Board also deemed the requested right of transit through the Soela Strait, 
Kassari Bay and Muhu Strait as unacceptable, since it may be followed by anal-
ogous counterclaims by the Soviet Union.782 A corresponding Verbal Note by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was sent to the German Embassy in Tallinn on 
                                                                          
777  Eesti Entsüklopeedia, vol. 10,  op. cit., Väinameri, p. 548. 
778  ERA.957.12.389, p. 11. See also map 3 in Annex 1. 
779  See map 3 in Annex 1. 
780  See ERA.957.14.85, pp. 1–61, ERA.957.14.347, pp. 1–36, ERA.957.14.617, pp. 17–27, 
ERA.957.14.618, pp. 1–4. 
781  ERA.957.14.85, pp. 17–18. 
782  Ibid, p. 19. 
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June 26th, 1934.783 Notably, the ministry did not refer to any legal basis for its 
refusal.784 
The Defence Forces Board also noted, however, that foreign warships have 
previously transited the Muhu Strait, including German torpedo boats in 
1927.785 It also referred to the 1920 Riga Agreement,786 concluded in the Buldur 
Conference between Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland, according to which 
the Finnish, Latvian and Polish navies may use the Muhu Strait for innocent 
passage, which they, indeed, repeatedly made use of.787 It thus follows from the 
foregoing that due to the apparent absence of an applicable domestic law, the 
Estonian authorities’ refusals from granting the right of innocent passage in the 
Sea of Straits to foreign warships was based on custom, rather than on any legal 
basis derived from international law. It seems that Germany did not protest 
against this decision. 
However, as will be examined below, Germany was one of the two States 
(the other being the United Kingdom) that filed a protest against the extension 
of the Estonian territorial sea up to 4 miles in 1938 under the Waterways Act. 
The existence of the EEZ in the Gulf of Riga might thus have a significant 
effect for Estonia as it resulted potentially in the application of the right of 
transit passage in the Sea of Straits for States that may uphold their protest 
against the 1938 Neutrality Act and Waterways Act. It thus necessitates further 
scrutiny on whether the transit passage regime may be applicable in the Sea of 
Straits to the ships and aircraft of such States. 
 
 
                                                                          
783  Ibid, p. 20. 
784  Procedurally, the right to such refusal was most likely based on the Välisriikide sõja-
laevade külaskäikude kord (Reglement Concernant la Visite de Batiments de Guerre 
Etrangers en Estonie). Adopted 18.10.1922, e.i.f. 18.10.1922. For the French version of 
the text, see ERA.957.3.30, pp. 2–5. 
785  See ERA.957.14.85, p. 19. 
786  Proposal adopted in the joint session of political and military commissions on the 
freedom of passage of foreign warships in the waters of the contracting States. Riga 
04.09.1920. For the versions of the proposal in Estonian and Russian, see 
ERA.957.11.383, pp. 9–10. The proposal was affirmed by the Latvian Government on 
October 10th, 1920 and by the Estonian Government on October 31st, 1924. Ibid, pp. 3, 7. 
787  ERA.957.14.85, p. 19. See also ERA.957.14.617, pp. 24–27. The 1920 Riga Agreement 
(originally concluded in Russian) comprises two sections. Its first section regulates the 
use of ports by the contracting States’ warships whereas the second section provides for 
“complete freedom of navigation for training purposes” for the warships of Estonia, 
Finland, Latvia and Poland in their territorial waters. As the result of the 1938 Neutrality 
Act, the Sea of Straits became part of the Estonian internal waters, which is why the 
second section of the 1920 Riga Agreement should not be considered applicable to this 
maritime area anymore and therefore not, in any case,  as falling under the exception of 
Article 35(c) of the LOSC. 
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5. The Applicability of the Messina  
Exception to the Sea of Straits 
The extension of the width of the Estonian territorial sea to 4 miles under sec-
tion 1 of the 1938 Waterways Act triggered protests from the United Kingdom 
and Germany. They were exceptional in that such protests had not been filed 
against the 4-miles-wide territorial sea of e.g. Finland or Sweden, although the 
latter (unlike the former) had declared its territorial sea 4 miles wide in its 
domestic law.788 Analogously to Germany, which sent its Verbal Notes against 
section 1 of the Waterways Act to the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
May 30th, 1938 and March 30th, 1939,789 the British Embassy in Tallinn directed 
its protest against inter alia section 1 of the Waterways Act on March 24th, 
1939, stating that 
 
“As the Estonian Government are doubtless aware His Majesty’s Government 
are unable to recognise any claim to jurisdiction over waters beyond the limit of 
three miles from low water mark, following the sinuosities of the Coast.”790 
 
The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to the British Chargé 
d'Affaires in Tallinn on November 25th, 1939: 
 
“Considering that there exists no generally recognised international rule con-
cerning the extent of territorial waters, the Estonian Government claims the right 
to fix for themselves the extent of the Estonian territorial waters. 
Nevertheless, they take notice of the British Government’s objection and, in par-
ticular, are prepared to take into account the British point of view as regards 
enactment of neutrality in case of war. They are namely prepared to limit, by 
way of exception to the provision fixing the extent of their territorial waters in 
peace time and in accordance with the generally accepted international rule, to 
three miles the extent of their territorial waters for the purpose of application of 
their neutrality law in respect of belligerent powers.”791 
 
An identical Verbal Note was sent to the German Embassy in Tallinn on 
December 2nd, 1939.792 The German Government upheld its protest in a Verbal 
Note sent to the Estonian Government on February 7th, 1940 in spite of the 
above-referred explanations made by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.793 
The protests made by the United Kingdom and Germany in respect of sec-
tion 1 of the 1938 Waterways Act are relevant for the contemporary passage 
                                                                          
788  ERA.957.14.583, pp. 29–30. By contrast to Sweden, the width of the Finnish territorial 
sea was established in the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty, as discussed above. 
789  Ibid, pp. 2–3. 
790  Ibid, p. 10. 
791  Ibid, p. 7. 
792  Ibid, p. 6. 
793  Ibid, pp. 8–9. 
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regime in the Sea of Straits since, on this basis, these two States might not con-
sider the Sea of Straits as entirely comprising long-standing internal waters in 
terms of Article 35(a) of the LOSC. Thus, it is not ruled out that the United 
Kingdom and Germany consider themselves not bound by the exclusion of the 
transit passage in the Sea of Straits under Estonia’s domestic law in case they 
should uphold their protests against section 1 of the Waterways Act.794 In such 
an instance, both States should also reason why they do not consider the pas-
sages to the Sea of Straits as having fallen entirely under the regime of internal 
waters in terms of section 2(3) of the Neutrality Act, as discussed above.795 
Also, the Russian Federation may object to the concept of long-standing inter-
nal waters in the Sea of Straits on the basis of its rejection of Estonia’s State 
continuity. 
Yet in this case, it is doubtful that the regime of transit passage would apply 
to the Sea of Straits in respect of the protesting States. According to Article 
38(1) of the LOSC, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, 
which shall not be impeded in straits that connect two parts of an EEZ; except if 
the strait is formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland, 
transit passage shall not apply if there exists seaward of the island a route 
through an EEZ of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydro-
graphical characteristics. This exception for the inapplicability of the regime of 
transit passage was included in the LOSC expressly in reference to the Messina 
Strait between Sicily and Italy’s mainland and hence is commonly known as the 
Messina exception.796 
The Sea of Straits is entirely bordered by Estonia, thus meeting the first cri-
terion of Article 38(1) of the LOSC. Yet only the Big Strait (between Muhu 
Island and the mainland coast) and the Voosi Strait (between Vormsi Island and 
the mainland coast) are formed by an island and the Estonian mainland in literal 
terms of the provision. It is possible to navigate via the Big and Voosi straits 
from the Gulf of Finland to the Gulf of Riga. However, the Muhu Strait, which 
is commonly used for such navigation, comprises the Big Strait and the Hari 
Strait. Unlike the Big Strait, the Hari Strait is formed by two islands (Vormsi 
Island and Hiiumaa Island) similarly to the Hiiu Strait between Hiiumaa Island 
and Saaremaa Island and the currently non-navigable Small Strait between 
Saaremaa Island and Muhu Island. 
Therefore, some of the straits in the Sea of Straits do not meet the literal 
terms of Article 38(1) of the LOSC. By contrast, it is clear that since the mari-
time area of the Muhu Strait (north-south passage in the Sea of Straits) is gener-
ally formed by Hiiumaa Island and the Estonian mainland (northern east-west 
                                                                          
794  The United Kingdom also protested against section 3 of the 1938 Waterways Act that 
provided the extended width of the Estonian territorial sea in the Sea of Straits. See 
supra section 4.1 of Part V.  
795  See supra section 4.2 of Part V. 
796  See Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., p. 46. López Martín, op. cit., p. 93. In 1992, only 
19 straits had been identified as falling under the Messina exception. See Rothwell 1992, 
op. cit., p. 474. 
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section of the strait) as well as Muhu Island and the Estonian mainland (south-
ern east-west section of the strait), the strait geographically satisfies the criteria 
of the Messina exception.797 As analysed above, the same might not necessarily 
apply in regards to the Hiiu Strait (east-west passage in the Sea of Straits with 
very light traffic). Although the exception would not apply to the Small Strait 
either, this is practically irrelevant since, due to its shallow waters and a road-
dam (since 1896), it does not have any vessel traffic. 
However, despite the potential inapplicability of the Article 38(1)-exception 
to the Hiiu Strait under its literal terms, under the teleological interpretation of 
the said provision, it might still be considered as exempted from the transit pas-
sage regime. This follows from the fact that since the transit passage regime 
could not apply to the Muhu Strait under Article 38(1) of the LOSC, it would 
not be possible to exercise continuous and expeditious transit of the Sea of 
Straits through neither of its possible routes: neither from the EEZ in the Gulf of 
Finland nor from the Latvian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga to the EEZ in the Baltic 
Sea proper west of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa islands. Particularly, the ships or 
aircraft transiting the Sea of Straits would have to cross either the northern or 
southern section of the Muhu Strait.  
It may be presumed that the object and purpose of the Messina exception in 
Article 38(1) of the LOSC is not to establish in the waters of an archipelago 
adjacent to the mainland coast multiple passage regimes, some of which cannot 
be enforced in practice. The application to the Soela Strait of the transit passage 
regime would be meaningless, since it would not enable ships in the EEZ in the 
Baltic Sea proper to reach the EEZs in the Gulf of Riga or in the Gulf of Fin-
land. The maritime area in the Soela Strait, where the transit passage regime 
would be applicable, would be only a few miles long, reaching to Kassary Bay. 
After passing Kassari Bay, the ships and aircraft could no longer use the right of 
transit passage since it would be replaced with the regime of non-suspendable 
innocent passage in the Muhu Strait. 
Pursuant to the object and purpose of the Messina exception, it would be 
reasonable to conclude that where it would not apply under its literal interpreta-
tion because a particular strait is formed only by islands (instead of islands and 
a mainland coast), it could still be applied in such a strait if it forms a continu-
ous waterway that only leads further to such straits where the transit passage 
regime clearly cannot be applicable under the ordinary meaning of the terms of 
the Messina exception. Hence, by applying common sense, the Article 38(1)-
exception would geographically cover the whole maritime area of the Sea of 
Straits. Also, in such a geographical context, scholars tend to approach Article 
38(1) of the LOSC rather liberally.798 Likewise, Nandan and Anderson (who 
were among the drafters of Part III of the LOSC) maintain in respect of Article 
                                                                          
797  The only minor exception in that regard is the Hari Strait at the northern end of the Muhu 
Strait since it is formed by islands. 
798  Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., p. 47. In addition, Rothwell argues that the 38(1)-
regime applies to the strait formed by the King Island and Tasmania Island in the Bass 
Strait. See Rothwell 1992, op. cit., p. 475. 
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38(1) of the LOSC that “The application of the exception in particular geo-
graphical situations (e.g. where there is an archipelago as in the Aegean or 
where there are several islands lying together, or where it is not clear what is a 
State’s ‘mainland’) may not be free from difficulty; but the words should not be 
interpreted too mechanically. Instead, all the relevant geographical and other 
circumstances should be taken into account and a ‘commonsense’ interpretation 
given”.799 
Thus, in the context of the Sea of Straits, it would be wise to interpret Article 
38(1) of the LOSC so that if the strait is formed by an island or a group of 
islands of a State bordering the strait and its mainland, transit passage shall not 
apply if there exists seaward of the island a route through the high seas or 
through an EEZ of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydro-
graphical characteristics. This somewhat liberal interpretation of the said pro-
vision, which adds the terms “or a group of islands” in its geographical scope, 
does not, in the view of the present author, go against its ordinary meaning in its 
context and the provision’s object and purpose. 
Yet Article 38(1) of the LOSC also includes functional criteria for the 
applicability of the clause. Namely, the seaward route through an EEZ needs to 
be of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical char-
acteristics. This concerns also the length of the route.800 The distance from a 
point in the EEZ in the western end of the Gulf of Finland directly north of the 
Hari Strait to the northernmost point of the Latvian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga 
through the Muhu Strait is approximately 100 miles. By contrast, the seaway 
between the same points in the EEZs of the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of 
Riga through the Estonian EEZ west of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa islands would 
be slightly less than double the distance. However, this ratio is grosso modo 
commensurate with the difference of distances between the routes from the 
Ionian Sea to the Tyrrhenian Sea if comparing the seaway through the Messina 
Strait with the one around Sicily Island. Thus, the Sea of Straits may be consid-
ered as also satisfying the navigational criterion for the applicability of the Mes-
sina exception as stipulated in Article 38(1) of the LOSC. 
It also meets the hydrographical criterion since in comparison with the Muhu 
Strait, the seaway around Saaremaa and Hiiumaa islands is generally signifi-
cantly less dangerous both from the perspective of the safety of a ship and its 
crew as well as the environment.801 By contrast to the route through the Irbe 
Strait and around the Estonian western archipelago, the Sea of Straits has shal-
low waters, hundreds of islands and many reefs in addition to the heavy traffic 
of passenger ferries between the islands and the Estonian mainland coast. 
                                                                          
799  Nandan, Anderson, op. cit., p. 181. See also ibid, pp. 166–167. 
800  See e.g. Caminos, Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit., p. 52. Rothwell 1992, op. cit., p. 474. 
801  Small craft are not taken into account since in respect of such vessels innocent passage 
grosso modo applies in the Sea of Straits. On the impact of transit passage on the marine 
environment and the relevant legal framework, see M. George. Transit Passage and 
Pollution Control in Straits under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. – 33 Ocean 
Development & International Law 2002(2), pp. 198–202. 
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Therefore, the Messina exception, as provided in Article 38(1) of the LOSC, 
could be considered applicable to the ships of States that may reject the concept 
of Estonian long-standing internal waters in the Sea of Straits on the basis of 
their previous practice. Consequently, their ships and aircraft would not enjoy 
the right of transit passage. Instead, their ships (but not aircraft) are entitled to 
the right of non-suspendable innocent passage in the Sea of Straits since it 
applies pursuant to Article 45(1)(a) in combination with Article 45(2) of the 
LOSC to the straits that satisfy the criteria of the Messina exception. 
The difference between the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage and 
the one of common innocent passage as defined in Article 18 of the LOSC lies 
in the strait State’s right to suspend the passage through the strait.802 Pursuant to 
Article 25(3) of the LOSC, the coastal State may, after due publishing and 
without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, decide to suspend 
temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of for-
eign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security, 
including weapons exercises.803 By contrast, according to Article 45(2) of the 
LOSC, non-suspendable innocent passage cannot be suspended. Thus, although 
the right of innocent passage does not generally apply to ships transiting the Sea 
of Straits, Estonia would still have to permit under international law the inno-
cent passage of ships of the afore-referred protesting States in the Sea of Straits, 
as examined above. 
  
                                                                          
802  For the differences between transit passage and innocent passage, see supra section 1.2 
of Part I. 
803  The protection of national security provides relatively wide discretion for the strait 
State(s). See D. R. Rothwell. Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea: The UNCLOS 
Regime and Asia Pacific State Practice. – D. R. Rothwell, S. Bateman (eds). Navig-
ational Rights and Freedoms, and the New Law of the Sea. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
2000, p. 93. See more generally on the right to suspend innocent passage in F. Ngantcha. 
The right of innocent passage and the evolution of the international law of the sea: the 
current regime of ‘free’ navigation in coastal waters of third states. London: Pinter 
Publishers 1990, pp. 163–166. 
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CONCLUSION 
A. The Legal Categories of Straits and their Interrelationship 
Straits comprise international and non-international straits. The terms strait, 
international strait and non-international strait have not been defined in posi-
tive law. The author came to the conclusion that one may consider international 
straits as natural sea passages that connect two larger maritime areas and which 
are used for international navigation and are not more than 24 miles wide as 
measured from coast to coast or from baseline to baseline and which are due to 
the applicable legal regime different from non-international straits. 
Non-international straits include straits that are located either in long-stand-
ing internal waters (Article 35(a), e.g. the Sea of Straits in the Estonian western 
archipelago) or in such territorial sea in respect of which none of the legal 
regimes of international straits applies. The latter may be referred to as Article 
17-category of straits where the ordinary regime of suspendable innocent pas-
sage applies (e.g. the Irbe Strait if the Latvian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga would be 
non-existent). Also, straits which could in other aspects be categorised as inter-
national straits but are in practice not used for international navigation fall 
under a distinct category of non-international straits in respect of which the 
strait State is not required to guarantee the passage regimes of international 
straits (e.g. the Small Strait in the Estonian western archipelago). The passage 
rights of foreign ships and aircraft are not internationally safeguarded under Part 
III of the LOSC in respect of the afore-referred legal categories of non-inter-
national straits. 
In addition to these legal categories of non-international straits, the LOSC 
enables distinguishing between seven categories of international straits. These 
may be referred to as: 
1) Straits which link two parts of an EEZ or the high seas (Article 37); 
2) Straits which are regulated by long-standing international conventions 
(Article 35(c)); 
3) Straits which are formed by an island of a strait State and its mainland 
coast (Article 38(1)); 
4) Straits which connect an EEZ or the high seas with the territorial sea of 
a foreign State (Article 45(1)(b)); 
5) Straits in the archipelagic waters (Article 53); 
6) Straits which include an EEZ or the high seas corridor (Article 36); 
7) Sui generis straits (Article 311(2)). 
 
Some States and legal scholars also assert the existence of a distinct category of 
ice-covered straits under Article 234 of the LOSC. However, its legal basis is 
far from clear (see supra section 2.2 of Part I). 
All of the above-listed legal categories, except for straits in the archipelagic 
waters and ice-covered straits, are (potentially) applicable or have been (poten-
tially) applicable to the Estonian Straits. The Estonian Straits demonstrate the 
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strong interrelationship between the various legal categories of straits. The legal 
regime of the Estonian Straits has been and continues to be determined by such 
factors as the outer limits of maritime zones, treaties, islands, maritime bound-
ary delimitation, domestic law on internal waters and baselines as well as geo-
political implications (particularly the concept of State continuity). These may 
be referred to as the primary determinants of the legal categories of the Estonian 
Straits. They have enabled and still enable to change the legal regimes appli-
cable to the Estonian Straits mostly under the strait States discretion. This does 
not apply to all straits in the same manner as the range of factors which can 
potentially influence the legal categorisation of a strait varies and depends on 
the characteristics of a particular strait. 
Since the restoration of independence of the Baltic States, the Viro Strait has 
potentially been the subject of five different legal categories of straits under the 
LOSC. Six distinct legal regimes have been or are potentially applicable under 
the LOSC to the Irbe Strait and the Sea of Straits (incl. the shallow Small Strait 
which falls under the category of non-international straits that are not used for 
international navigation in practice). Only recently has it become possible to 
establish the legal regimes of the Estonian Straits with a degree of certainty. In 
particular, prior to the 2010 Finnish withdrawal from a potentially long-standing 
convention on the legal regime of the Viro Strait, the legal categorisation of the 
Viro Strait would have been to some extent unclear. Additionally, the maps and 
legislation depicting Latvia’s EEZ in the Gulf of Riga, submitted to the United 
Nations in 2011, have clarified the Latvian maritime zones and their extent in 
the Gulf of Riga, implying that the regime of transit passage applies in that 
maritime area. 
Furthermore, in some instances, parallel legal regimes may be applicable to a 
particular strait under international law, e.g. if a State has protested against the 
domestic legislation on maritime zones of the strait State or has objected to the 
strait State’s concept of State continuity. This is also the case with e.g. the Sea 
of Straits, which comprises long-standing internal waters (Article 35(a) of the 
LOSC). The protesting States are not bound to follow the general passage 
regime in the Sea of Straits. Also, the Viro Strait may have been from 1991 to 
1994 both a strait which includes an EEZ corridor (Article 36 of the LOSC) as 
well as a sui generis strait (Article 311(2) of the LOSC). 
Generally, the legal regime of a strait may change fundamentally depending 
on the legal acts of its strait State(s) or even of a State not bordering the strait. 
In particular, the latter was illustrated by the example of the Viro Strait.  The 
Russian Federation has established an EEZ in the Gulf of Finland proper under 
the 1940, 1965 and 1985 maritime boundary agreements between Finland and 
the Soviet Union, thereby potentially altering the legal regime of the strait. If 
the Russian Federation’s EEZ would be non-existent, then the Russian Federa-
tion could establish one unilaterally by limiting the breadth of its territorial sea 
under its domestic legislation. 
Likewise, the outer limits of maritime zones, maritime boundary delimita-
tion, State continuity, domestic law on the internal waters and treaties on the 
185 
straits regime may have a decisive impact on the legal classification of straits. 
The legal classification and regime of straits is thus inextricably linked not only 
to the outer limits of maritime zones, domestic law on internal waters and to the 
treaties on the straits regime, but also intertwined with the law of maritime 
boundary delimitation and State continuity. 
Therefore, when making decisions on the questions of State continuity, mar-
itime boundary delimitation or outer limits of maritime zones, one should also 
acknowledge the potential side-effects on the legal regime of its straits and vice 
versa. Principal decisions in any one of these fields may have a significant 
impact on the others, since the range of problems pertaining to the outer limits 
of maritime zones, maritime boundary delimitation, State continuity as well as 
to the domestic law on internal waters, long-standing international conventions 
and other treaties on the straits regime may all be interlinked. Subsequently, the 
significance of the afore-mentioned factors for the legal regime of straits and 
vice versa is discussed in more detail on the basis of the conclusions reached in 
this study. 
 
 
B. The Significance of Outer Limits of Maritime Zones for  
the Legal Regime of the Estonian Straits 
The modification of the outer limits of maritime zones of a coastal State may 
alter the legal regime of a strait as provided for in Article 36 of the LOSC. The 
provision stipulates that Part III of the LOSC on international straits does not 
apply to an international strait if there exists through the strait a route through 
the high seas or through an EEZ of similar convenience with respect to naviga-
tional and hydrographical characteristics. Other relevant parts of the LOSC, 
including the provisions regarding the freedoms of navigation and overflight, 
are applicable in such routes. 
The Viro Strait has had decisive significance for the outer limits of maritime 
zones in the Gulf of Finland. With the aim of ensuring the freedoms of naviga-
tion and overflight, Estonia and Finland guaranteed under the 1994 Agreement 
that the minimal width of the Estonian and Finnish territorial sea boundaries 
from the median line in the Gulf of Finland is 3 miles. In addition, for safe-
guarding the freedom of navigation in this maritime area, the Maritime Bounda-
ries Act of Estonia provides that in sections where the international sealanes 
exit the 3-miles-wide Estonian part of the EEZ corridor, the boundary of the 
territorial sea shall not reach closer than 1 mile to the international sealanes 
approved by the International Maritime Organization. 
The Estonian minister of foreign affairs claimed in Parliament that the 
establishment of the EEZ corridor in the Viro Strait was a political decision and 
abstained from presenting any legal arguments to substantiate its establishment. 
This has caused misconceptions in Estonia about the purpose of the EEZ corri-
dor. Two draft acts have been presented in 1993 and 2007 to the Parliament 
which provided for the abolishment of the Estonian part of the EEZ corridor and 
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for the extension of Estonia’s territorial sea in the Gulf of Finland to the maxi-
mum width. 
Nevertheless, the EEZ corridor in the Viro Strait is compatible with the 
LOSC and follows the aim of previous international agreements on the passage 
rights in this maritime area. Estonia and Finland declared in the 1994 bilateral 
Agreement that the purpose of the establishment of the EEZ corridor was to 
ensure freedoms of navigation and overflight in the Viro Strait. As is evident 
from inter alia the minutes of the parliamentary proceedings, the Finnish Gov-
ernment and the Parliament were of the opinion that the purpose for guarantee-
ing the freedoms of navigation and overflight by such means was also con-
nected to the requirement of prior notification for innocent passage as stipulated 
in the Finnish and Estonian law in contravention to the LOSC. Finland annulled 
this requirement in 1996, but it is still upheld in the Estonian legal acts. 
Estonia and Finland were not correct in stating that the establishment of the 
EEZ corridor is necessary for ensuring the freedoms of navigation and over-
flight in the Viro Strait. Apparently, the two strait States did not acknowledge 
the existence of the tiny Russian EEZ in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland 
and its significance for the legal regime of the Viro Strait. Neither is its exist-
ence commonly acknowledged nowadays in Estonia and Finland. 
Even if, hypothetically, the relevant provisions of the 1940, 1965 and 1985 
maritime boundary agreements and, consequently, the Russian EEZ in the Gulf 
of Finland proper would be non-existent, then the Russian Federation could still 
unilaterally limit the width of its territorial sea analogously to the bilateral 
action by Estonia and Finland in 1994 with the aim of creating an EEZ in the 
eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. In case the Russian Federation would not 
unilaterally establish such an EEZ under its domestic legislation, foreign war-
ships could likely still (notwithstanding the existence of the traffic separation 
scheme and sea lanes), under the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage, 
transit the strait close to the Estonian and Finnish capitals, in an area ranging 
from the Finnish southernmost skerries to Estonian northernmost islands. 
Under Article 38 of the LOSC, the right of transit passage is used without 
giving prior notification or asking for permission from the strait State. Since the 
requirement of prior notification for transiting the territorial sea, as was stipu-
lated in the Finnish and Estonian law in contravention to the LOSC, concerned 
the right of innocent passage, this requirement could not have (at least directly) 
impeded the exercise of the right of transit passage in the Estonian and Finnish 
territorial sea in the Viro Strait. Hence, the establishment of the EEZ corridor 
was also not necessarily relevant for the purposes of ensuring transit rights in 
light of the requirement of prior notification for exercising the right of innocent 
passage as was stipulated in the Estonian and Finnish domestic law at the time. 
Nevertheless, the existence of the Russian tiny EEZ in the eastern part of the 
Gulf of Finland provides ample reasons why the extension of the width of the 
Estonian and Finnish territorial sea in the Viro Strait might be equally against 
the interests of the strait States Estonia and Finland and those of the Russian 
Federation. Article 36 of the LOSC would be inapplicable if the strait States of 
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the Viro Strait would both extend their territorial sea to the maximum width of 
12 miles in accordance with the 1994 bilateral Agreement. It would also 
exclude the enjoyment of the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, but 
not the freedoms of navigation and overflight in the Viro Strait. The freedoms 
of navigation and overflight could be enjoyed by foreign ships and aircraft 
under the right of transit passage nearly throughout the whole maritime area of 
the Gulf of Finland, including potentially the territorial sea and internal waters 
of the Russian Federation. This is due to the fact that passage in the Viro Strait 
would be regulated under Article 38 (not Article 45(1)(b) as is commonly 
assumed) of the LOSC. Consequently, at least the sovereign immune vessels 
(e.g. warships) and aircraft would not be required to transit the strait in the rela-
tively narrow international corridor as under the current regime. 
Thus, the establishment of an EEZ corridor in an international strait limits as 
much as it safeguards the sovereignty of a strait State over its maritime area. 
This is also confirmed by the example of the passage regime of the Gulf of Riga 
and that of its straits. In this particular instance, it underlines the potential 
advantages of an EEZ corridor for excluding the broad spatial extent of the right 
of transit passage in an international strait and its adjoining waters. 
In 1996, Estonia and Latvia reached an equitable solution on the territorial 
division of the Gulf of Riga. Yet despite their apparent aim, the parties were not 
able to exclude the existence of an EEZ in the Gulf of Riga. In this connection, 
the classification by international experts of the Irbe Strait and the Sea of Straits 
as straits between a part of an EEZ and the territorial sea of a foreign State in 
terms of Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC is not accurate. On the basis of Latvia’s 
2011 submission to the UN, it is clear that the Irbe Strait as well as the Sea of 
Straits link two parts of an EEZ between the Baltic Sea proper and the Gulf of 
Riga.  
No exceptions under Article 35 of the LOSC for the exclusion of the transit 
passage regime apply to the Irbe Strait. This implies that foreign ships (includ-
ing warships) and aircraft are permitted currently under the LOSC – irrespec-
tively of the domestic law of Estonia and Latvia, which do not recognise such 
right – to enter the Gulf of Riga in their normal modes for reaching the Latvian 
EEZ. In the course of this, foreign ships and aircraft may navigate under the 
right of transit passage (and under the similar freedoms of navigation and over-
flight in the Latvian EEZ pursuant to Article 35(b) of the LOSC) in/over essen-
tially the whole maritime area of the Gulf of Riga. This includes the extensive 
internal waters of Estonia, since they were not considered as internal waters 
under the 1938 Neutrality Act in light of the Article 35(a) exception of the 
LOSC. 
For example, the warships and aircraft of third States exercising the freedom 
of navigation or overflight under Article 38(2) of the LOSC may enter the Gulf 
of Riga through the Irbe Strait, head to the Estonian internal waters north of 
Ruhnu Island, sail/fly around Ruhnu Island in order to reach and cross the Lat-
vian EEZ and then leave the Gulf of Riga via the waters between the Kolka 
Cape and Ruhnu Island through the Irbe Strait. Under Article 58 of the LOSC 
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and State practice, when foreign ships and aircraft reach the Latvian EEZ, they 
may carry out military activities there. Since foreign ships and aircraft are not 
required to give a prior notice of their planned entry to the Gulf of Riga, it 
would mean that submerged foreign submarines would be able to navigate 
around the Gulf of Riga, including its southern part close to Latvia’s capital, 
without either of the coastal State potentially being aware of it. 
If necessary, it would be possible to avoid this under Article 36 of the LOSC 
by establishing an EEZ corridor in the Irbe Strait. The slight adjustment of the 
outer limits of the Estonian and Latvian territorial sea in the western Gulf of 
Riga on an equitable basis would enable to limit the use of the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight to the borders of approximately a 3-miles-wide EEZ 
corridor leading from the Irbe Strait to the Latvian EEZ in the south-eastern part 
of the Gulf of Riga. Consequently, the freedoms of navigation and overflight 
would not be applicable to the rest of the Gulf of Riga. Instead, their use would 
be possible only in the narrow EEZ corridor solely for reaching the Latvian 
EEZ close to the Riga port.  
 
 
C. The Significance of Long-Standing International Conventions 
and Sui Generis Passage Regimes for the Estonian Straits 
The significance of long-standing international conventions for the legal regime 
of straits is provided for in Article 35(c) of the LOSC. According to this pro-
vision, nothing in Part III of the LOSC, which stipulates the legal regime of 
international straits, affects the legal regime in straits in which passage is regu-
lated in whole or in part by long-standing international conventions in force 
specifically relating to such straits. Thus, the existence of a long-standing inter-
national convention on a particular strait has a direct impact on its legal regime. 
Pursuant to the wording of Article 35(c) of the LOSC, a long-standing con-
vention would regulate passage in an international strait ipso facto on the con-
ditions that the convention is in force and, in whole or in part, specifically reg-
ulates passage in such a strait. The provision does not set the strait State’s sub-
jective element for the applicability of such a convention to an international 
strait as a fourth criterion. This poses not merely a theoretical, but also a practi-
cal problem as illustrated by the difficulties of drawing clear conclusions on the 
Viro Strait’s legal regime until 2010. 
In particular, the Viro Strait may have been in terms of law a strait regulated 
by a long-standing international convention under Article 35(c) of the LOSC 
analogously to the Danish Straits, the Åland Strait, the Strait of Magellan and 
the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and the Dardanelles). As established in this study, 
this one of the busiest straits globally (in terms of vessel traffic) may have been 
subject to the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement and its supplementary 1926 
Moscow Protocol from 1991 to 1994/2010. In this case, the termination of the 
1925 and 1926 trilateral treaties by the conclusion of the 1994 bilateral Agree-
ment between Estonia and Finland or, alternatively, Finland’s withdrawal from 
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these treaties may have represented the first and thus far only instance where a 
long-standing international convention satisfying the criteria of Article 35(c) of 
the LOSC has become void. 
In practice, the 1994 bilateral Agreement between Estonia and Finland on 
the establishment of the EEZ corridor in the Viro Strait was regarded as a new 
and sole treaty on the subject matter and a regional analogue of the 1979 
Agreement between Denmark and Sweden concerning the delimitation of their 
territorial waters. Since the well-established recognition by States may also be 
considered a necessary precondition for the applicability of Article 35(c) of the 
LOSC to a specific strait, the Viro Strait should thus not be regarded as being 
regulated under the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement after the restitution of 
Estonia’s independence in 1991. This is primarily due to the fact that the Viro 
Strait did not have the recognition of its strait States of falling under the Article 
35(c)-exception. 
Nonetheless, in terms of law, the subject matter of the 1994 bilateral Agree-
ment corresponded to the one in the 1925 Agreement between Estonia, Finland 
and the Soviet Union. This trilateral treaty became void, at the latest, in 2010 as 
a result of Finland’s withdrawal from the 1925 treaty system. Similarly to the 
1994 bilateral Agreement, the aim of this trilateral Agreement was to ensure 
freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Finland by excluding the possibility of 
extending Estonia’s and Finland’s jurisdiction (up to 12 miles under the 1925 
Helsinki Convention), which would have otherwise completely covered some 
sections of the Viro Strait. 
In terms of law, the 1925 Helsinki trilateral Agreement may have been valid 
after the restitution of Estonia’s independence in 1991. On the basis of the 
Soviet Union’s State practice, it appears that the 1925 trilateral Agreement fell 
into desuetude (solely on the Soviet Union’s part) subsequent to the annexation 
of Estonia in 1940. Yet, on the basis of the treaty law, it does not appear that the 
1925 trilateral treaty lost its legal effect post-1940 since it remained in force 
between Estonia and Finland (Finland did not recognise Estonia’s occupation de 
jure). 
The 1925 trilateral Helsinki Agreement provided that (in modern terms) the 
high seas freedoms are applicable to the international corridor of the Gulf of 
Finland. This was reasserted in the 1926 Moscow trilateral Protocol which also 
fixed the spatial extent of the high seas corridor. Such high seas freedoms are 
also applicable to the EEZ corridor that was established under the 1994 bilateral 
Agreement. The enjoyment of inter alia the freedoms of navigation and over-
flight are crucial for the ships and aircraft transiting the Gulf of Finland from 
the Russian ports to the Baltic Sea and vice versa.  
The 1925 trilateral treaty thus also satisfied the criterion of Article 311(2) of 
the LOSC as it was more liberal in comparison with the legal regimes otherwise 
applicable to the Viro Strait under Articles 36 or 38 of the LOSC. Hence, if the 
treaty was in force from 1991 to 1994/2010, then two legal categories of straits 
were applicable to the Viro Strait simultaneously. From 1991 onwards, the Viro 
Strait has been a strait which is crossed by an EEZ corridor (Article 36 of the 
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LOSC). In parallel, it is not excluded that under the potentially applicable sui 
generis regime of the 1925 trilateral treaty, Estonia and Finland could not have 
extended their territorial sea up to 12 miles in the Viro Strait absent of prior 
consent from each other (until the conclusion of the modifying 1994 bilateral 
Agreement). 
The importance of the 1925 trilateral Agreement for the Soviet Union is 
illustrated by the fact that its conclusion by the coastal States of the Gulf of 
Finland was set as a precondition for joining the 1925 Helsinki Convention. 
This was also exemplified by the Soviet Union’s strong reaction to the 1932 
judgment of the Estonian Supreme Court in which the importance of the 1925 
and 1926 trilateral agreements was downplayed, as a result of which the Esto-
nian Government subsequently had to issue a new regulation to guarantee the 
freedom of navigation in its part of the international corridor in the Gulf of 
Finland. The Soviet Union’s reaction to the 1932 judgment may also bear sig-
nificance for projecting the reaction of the Russian Federation in case Estonia 
and Finland should extend their territorial sea in the Viro Strait up to 12 miles, 
the possibility of which is expressly provided for in the 1994 bilateral Agree-
ment.  
 
 
D. The Significance of Islands and Domestic Law on the Internal 
Waters for the Legal Regime of the Estonian Straits 
In general, the strait State’s domestic law on its internal waters does not have 
the potential of altering the legal regime of a particular strait. Under Part III of 
the LOSC, transit or non-suspendable innocent passage would also be appli-
cable in a strait if the relevant maritime area is entirely included within the sys-
tem of straight baselines and forms internal waters of the strait State. This fol-
lows from Article 35(a) of the LOSC which stipulates that the right of transit 
passage or non-suspendable innocent passage is applicable in those internal 
waters, including straits where the establishment of a straight baseline has the 
effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been con-
sidered as such. However, its practical application inter alia in the Canadian 
and Russian Arctic as well as its legal criteria as referenced in the legal litera-
ture has caused some confusion. In this connection, the Sea of Straits in the 
Estonian western archipelago provides a notable example for testing the mean-
ing and application of Article 35(a) of the LOSC. 
The Sea of Straits comprises internal waters which are wholly included 
within the Estonian system of straight baselines. It links the Estonian as well as 
the Finnish and Swedish EEZ in the Baltic Sea proper with the Latvian EEZ in 
the south-eastern part of the Gulf of Riga. Nevertheless, the domestic law of 
Estonia does not recognise the right of transit passage of foreign ships and air-
craft in the Sea of Straits as well as in parts of its internal waters leading to the 
Sea of Straits (e.g. in the Gulf of Riga). Neither does the Estonian legal frame-
work fully recognise the right of innocent passage in the Sea of Straits. In 
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effect, Estonia does not consider the Sea of Straits as an international strait 
subject to Part III of the LOSC. Its compatibility with the international law of 
the sea is dependent on whether the Sea of Straits meets the criteria of Article 
35(a) of the LOSC. This is a narrowly construed exception for the inapplica-
bility of the legal regime of transit or non-suspendable innocent passage in a 
particular strait on the basis of the strait State’s domestic law on its internal 
waters. 
Article 35(a) of the LOSC has been interpreted differently in legal literature, 
causing misconceptions about its meaning. In this connection, the test to be 
applied in respect of the Sea of Straits, as with other straits and maritime areas 
that potentially fall under the scope of Article 35(a) of the LOSC, is whether its 
waters had been considered as internal waters before the establishment of the 
straight baselines. In case they had not been considered as such, the right of 
transit passage would prima facie apply to foreign ships in the Sea of Straits 
pursuant to Article 35(a) of the LOSC (which would be in practice, however, 
replaced with the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage under the Mes-
sina exception as stipulated in Article 38(1) of the LOSC, see below). In the 
opposite instance, the regime of internal waters would apply absent of any 
exceptions under Part III of the LOSC on the legal regime of international 
straits. This creates a direct link between the domestic law of the strait State on 
its internal waters and the strait’s legal regime. 
Estonia established straight baselines upon regaining its independence. Prior 
to its annexation in 1940, only normal baselines were used for limiting the 4-
mile breadth of the Estonian territorial sea. In addition, the 1938 Waterways Act 
provided that straits which are used for passage between two parts of the high 
seas and the coasts of which are both situated in the territory of Estonia are 
regarded as territorial sea, unless the breadth of the strait exceeds 10 miles. This 
exception only applied to the Sea of Straits which was declared the territorial 
sea of Estonia in its entirety. The right of innocent passage was not applicable in 
this maritime area, with the exceptions of a prior agreement to the contrary or a 
prior permission by the Estonian authorities granted for such passage. However, 
since the regime of territorial sea was applicable to the Sea of Straits pursuant to 
the 1938 Waterways Act and this law did not establish the legal framework of 
internal waters, it is not of direct relevance in light of the exception as stipulated 
in Article 35(a) of the LOSC. 
Significantly, Estonia had established its internal waters shortly after the 
passing of the Waterways Act under the 1938 Nordic Neutrality Rules. The 
1938 Neutrality Act of Estonia followed the suit of the neutrality acts adopted in 
the same year by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. These neu-
trality acts were adopted on the basis of the Scandinavian rules of neutrality as 
stipulated in the 1938 Declaration. They primarily regulated matters of the law 
of the sea for strengthening the coastal State’s maritime security during war. 
Estonia’s Neutrality Act was drafted on the basis of the Swedish law. Further-
more, as agreed in the November 1938 Riga Protocol between the Baltic States, 
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the Estonian law served subsequently as the model for the neutrality acts of 
Latvia and Lithuania. 
The Estonian Neutrality Act stipulated analogously to the other Nordic neu-
trality acts in its section 2(3) that the Estonian internal waters shall be deemed 
to include ports, entrances to ports, gulfs and bays, the waters between those 
Estonian islands, islets and reefs which are not constantly submerged, and 
between the said islands, islets and reefs and the mainland. This definition of 
internal waters was adopted by all Nordic States: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Sweden, Norway and the three Baltic States. In this context and particularly in 
light of the Article 35(a)-exception of the LOSC, the problem lies in determin-
ing whether the entire maritime area of the Sea of Straits met this definition of 
internal waters as provided for in the Estonian domestic law. Similarly, this 
appears to be the determinative factor in establishing also whether e.g. the 
Finnish Archipelago Sea comprises long-standing internal waters in terms of 
Article 35(a) of the LOSC. 
On the basis of the State practice as well as the relevant archival materials, it 
is clear that the passages to the Sea of Straits – Hari Strait, Voosi Strait, Soela 
Strait, Big Strait and Small Strait – in addition to the rest of the maritime area of 
the Sea of Straits meet the conditions of the above-cited section 2(3) of the 1938 
Neutrality Act. Therefore, in terms of Article 35(a), the Sea of Straits should be 
considered among such internal waters that were already internal waters prior to 
the establishment of the Estonian straight baselines. As a result, the right of 
transit passage (and, as a general rule, the Messina exception) does not apply in 
the Sea of Straits. Although Estonia has established to a limited extent the right 
of innocent passage under its domestic law to certain categories of vessels in the 
Sea of Straits, it has no obligation to extend its scope in the Sea of Straits so as 
to fully meet the definition and criteria of innocent passage under the LOSC. 
These findings are contrary to the conclusions of authors, who have analysed 
the legal regime of the Sea of Straits and claim that the regime of non-suspend-
able innocent passage should apply to this maritime area as it is a so-called 
dead-end strait. This position made by international experts seems to be shared 
by the United States. However, in drawing their conclusions, they apparently 
have not taken into account the Latvian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga, the Estonian 
domestic law on internal waters in terms of Article 35(a) of the LOSC nor the 
archival materials pertaining to this matter. Without access to such relevant 
materials, it is not possible to draw accurate conclusions on the legal regime of 
a strait which falls potentially under the Article 35(a)-exception of the LOSC. 
In light of the foregoing, the Sea of Straits comprises non-international 
straits through which foreign ships and aircraft cannot exercise transit passage. 
It was established in this study that in the Baltic Sea proper, such straits that fall 
under the Article 35(a)-exception of the LOSC in light of the 1938 Nordic Neu-
trality Rules may also potentially include the multiple straits in the Åland region 
of Finland as well as the narrow Kalmarsund between the Swedish mainland 
coast and Öland Island.  
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Notably, since the strait State’s domestic law on its internal waters may have 
a decisive impact on a strait’s legal regime, the corresponding diplomatic pro-
tests may likewise have a significant effect as the protesting State may conse-
quently retain its particular passage rights in the relevant strait. In particular, the 
United Kingdom and Germany sent Verbal Notes to the Estonian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in protest against some of the sections of the Waterways Act 
and the Neutrality Act of 1938, just as they did with other Nordic States that 
adopted the uniform neutrality acts of 1938. As a result of these protests, the 
United Kingdom and Germany may potentially not consider the Sea of Straits 
as comprising entirely long-standing internal waters in terms of Article 35(a) of 
the LOSC. 
Hence, it is not ruled out that the United Kingdom and Germany consider 
themselves not bound by the exclusion of the right of transit passage and inno-
cent passage in the Sea of Straits in case they uphold their protests against those 
parts of the Estonian domestic law, which serve as the legal basis for the appli-
cation of the Article 35(a)-exception of the LOSC to the Sea of Straits. More 
broadly, this also points to the importance of the protests made by the European 
Union and the United States against the Canadian and Russian straight baselines 
in the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route which also enclose as internal 
waters such Arctic straits that may not meet the criteria of the Article 35(a)-
exception of the LOSC. 
In particular, if the United Kingdom and Germany should uphold their pro-
tests against the relevant Estonian domestic legal acts of 1938, their ships might 
be entitled to the right of non-suspendable innocent passage in the Sea of 
Straits. This follows from the so-called Messina exception as established in 
Article 38(1) of the LOSC. It provides that if the strait is formed by an island of 
a State bordering the strait and its mainland, transit passage shall not apply if 
there exists seaward of the island a route through an EEZ of similar conven-
ience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics. The Sea 
of Straits meets the geographical and functional criteria of the Messina excep-
tion as stipulated in Article 38(1) of the LOSC. 
Likewise, the legal regime of the Sea of Straits may differ for the Russian 
Federation. However, in this case the principal reason for such a particular 
regime of passage lies not in the opposition towards a specific domestic law of 
the strait State but instead in the rejection of Estonia’s State continuity. As a 
result, the ships of the Russian Federation may potentially have, similarly to the 
ships of the United Kingdom and Germany, the right of non-suspendable inno-
cent passage in the Sea of Straits under the Messina exception. Notably, the 
concept of State continuity has also had a significant impact on the legal regime 
of the Estonian Straits in other respects, as explained next. 
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E. The Significance of Maritime Boundary Delimitation and State 
Continuity for the Legal Regime of the Estonian Straits 
The legal regime of the Estonian Straits exemplifies a very practical and direct 
effect of the principle of State continuity. If Estonia would have been willing to 
abandon its strict adherence to the principle of State continuity similarly to Lat-
via, the current legal regime of the passages to the Gulf of Riga would be very 
different. The Irbe Strait and the Sea of Straits as well as the whole Gulf of Riga 
would then potentially comprise long-standing internal waters in terms of Arti-
cle 35(a) of the LOSC due to effectuating the historic bay-claim. 
In addition, it would not be possible for Estonia to exclude the application of 
the transit passage regime in the Sea of Straits if it could not effectuate the Arti-
cle 35(a)-exception of the LOSC. The latter is only applicable to the Sea of 
Straits on the basis of the 1938 Nordic Neutrality Rules in combination with the 
principle of State continuity. Thus, the principle of State continuity forms one 
of the cornerstones of the legal regime of the Estonian Straits. 
This also presupposes Estonia’s readiness under the principle of State conti-
nuity to recognise and accept such pre-1940 legal instruments which it had 
become a State Party of, even in cases where such legal acts might not be 
favourable from the strait State’s perspective. This theoretical postulate would 
have the clearest practical effect for Estonia if the 1925 Helsinki trilateral 
agreements between Estonia, Finland and the Soviet Union guaranteeing free 
passage in the Viro Strait would still be in force. As examined above, this has 
not been the case, at least since Finland withdrew from the 1925 and 1926 tri-
lateral Agreements in 2010.  
In addition to the State continuity, maritime boundary delimitation may also 
have an impact on the passage regime of straits. It is settled in the law of mari-
time boundary delimitation that navigational interests are relevant for the 
delimitation of the territorial sea boundary. The legal regime of straits may be 
considered one of such navigational factors since it determines passage rights in 
straits and in waters leading to straits. Principally, it can thus be included in the 
list of special circumstances in terms of the second sentence of Article 15 of the 
LOSC. The significance of the legal regime of straits for maritime boundary 
delimitation (and vice versa) can be as direct as the interrelationship between 
the legal regime of straits with the outer limits of maritime zones, treaties on 
straits regime, State continuity and domestic law of internal waters. 
This is confirmed by the fact that due to the establishment of the tiny Rus-
sian EEZ in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland under the 1940, 1965 and 
1985 maritime boundary agreements between Finland and the Soviet Union, the 
regime of transit passage would be applicable to the Viro Strait in case Estonia 
and Finland were to abolish the EEZ corridor by extending the breadth of their 
territorial sea in the Viro Strait to 12 miles. The relevant maritime area where 
the tiny Russian EEZ is located in is within 12 miles distance as measured from 
the Russian baselines. Therefore, in the absence of the relevant provisions of the 
said maritime boundary agreements, this maritime area would be wholly within 
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the limits of the Russian territorial sea. In this case, the regime of non-suspend-
able innocent passage (instead of the transit passage regime) would be applica-
ble to the Viro Strait if its EEZ corridor were to be abolished. 
However, the potential interrelationship between maritime boundary delim-
itation with the legal regime of straits does not occur in every instance. The 
presence of this linkage depends primarily on the characteristics of a particular 
strait and the relevant maritime area subject to delimitation as well as on the 
specific terms of the relevant maritime boundary agreement. The maritime 
boundary delimitations between Estonia and Latvia in the Gulf of Riga and 
between Estonia and the Russian Federation in the Gulf of Finland demonstrate 
that in most instances the maritime boundary delimitation does not have an 
impact on the legal regime of straits. 
Contrary to what is commonly presumed in the legal literature, the maritime 
boundary in the Gulf of Riga delimits not only the territorial sea of Estonia and 
Latvia. It also serves as the single maritime boundary for the EEZ, continental 
shelf and potential contiguous zone. This implies the applicability of the transit 
passage regime to the Irbe Strait. In the course of the maritime boundary delim-
itation, Estonia and Latvia appeared to have generally acknowledged the effect 
that the application of the right of transit passage has on the passage rights in 
the Gulf of Riga. Yet the two States did not manage to avoid this by means of 
excluding an EEZ in the Gulf of Riga as illustrated by the maps and domestic 
legislation, submitted to the United Nations in 2011, depicting Latvia’s EEZ in 
the Gulf of Riga. 
The solution for altering the legal category of the Irbe Strait with the aim of 
excluding the transit passage regime would have been accepting the continu-
ance of force of the Soviet legal regime of the Gulf of Riga as a historic bay by 
both Latvia and Estonia. Latvia insisted that such a regime of joint sovereignty 
in the Gulf of Riga should be agreed upon on the basis of the LOSC and the 
ICJ’s 1992 judgment in the Gulf of Fonseca case and also effectuated this claim 
in its domestic law, whereas Estonia rejected the proposition due to multiple 
reasons. Of those, its potential effect on the principle of State continuity was of 
primary concern. 
The legal status of a gulf is a separate matter from the law of maritime 
boundary delimitation. Since the potential declaration of the Gulf of Riga as a 
historic bay and the establishment of an Article 36-type of EEZ corridor in the 
Irbe Strait and the Gulf of Riga, as the only available means for excluding the 
transit passage regime in the Irbe Strait and in the Gulf of Riga, are not related 
to maritime boundary delimitation, it is thus clear that the delimitation of the 
single maritime boundary in the Gulf of Riga did not have an impact on the 
legal categorisation of the Irbe Strait. Yet Latvia’s tacit recognition of Estonia’s 
system of straight baselines in the Gulf of Riga is of significance, as Latvia 
agreed to draw the equidistance line on the basis of it. 
Latvia’s recognition would have had a substantial effect on the passage 
regime of the Irbe Strait and the Gulf of Riga if the EEZ in the Gulf of Riga 
would have been located only in the Estonian maritime area. The other strait 
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State’s recognition of Estonia’s straight baselines in the delimitation process 
provided greater leverage under international law for the exclusion of the exist-
ence of an EEZ by Estonia in its maritime area north of Ruhnu Island. Yet nei-
ther the exclusion of this potential Estonian EEZ or, in this connection, Latvia’s 
recognition of Estonia’s straight baselines in the Gulf of Riga did have any 
effect from the perspective of the legal regime of straits. Due to the Latvian 
EEZ in the south-eastern part of the Gulf of Riga the right of transit passage 
nevertheless applies to the Irbe Strait and to most of the Gulf of Riga. The 
existence of the Latvian EEZ in the Gulf of Riga could not have been excluded 
by means of maritime boundary delimitation. However, the maritime boundary 
delimitation between Estonia and Latvia indicates that it could have determined 
the legal category of the Irbe Strait if the geographical setting in the eastern part 
of the Gulf of Riga would have been slightly different and the Latvian EEZ 
would have been of a much more limited extent and included only a small 
northern section of its actual size close to the Estonian territorial sea boundary.  
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RESÜMEE (SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN) 
Eesti väinad: erandid väina rahumeelse või  
takistamatu läbisõidu õigusraamistikust 
A. Väinade õiguslikud kategooriad ja nendevahelised seosed 
Uurimuse eesmärk on selgitada välja mereõiguse konventsiooni alusel väinade 
peamiste õiguslike kategooriate vahelised seosed, mille kaudu on võimalik 
kohaldada ühele väinale erinevaid läbipääsukordi. Töö peamiseks uurimisobjek-
tiks on Eesti väinad ja nende rannikuriikide Eesti, Soome ja Läti merevööndi-
tele – esmajoones sisevetele (sisemerele) ja territoriaalmerele – kohalduv õigus-
lik raamistik. Viru väin (Soome lahe läbipääs), Kura kurk ja Väinameri liigita-
takse kohaldunud, kohalduvatesse ja potentsiaalselt kohalduvatesse väinade 
õiguslikesse kategooriatesse ning selgitatakse välja välisriikide laevade ja õhu-
sõidukite läbipääsuõigused Soome lahes, Liivi lahes ja Väinameres. 
Väinad jagunevad õiguslikult rahvusvahelisteks ja mitte-rahvusvahelisteks 
väinadeks. Terminite „väin“, „rahvusvaheline väin“ ja „mitte-rahvusvaheline 
väin“ legaaldefinitsiooni ei ole mereõiguse konventsioonis sätestatud. Rahvus-
vahelisteks väinadeks võib lugeda looduslikke merekitsusi (mitte kanaleid), 
mida kasutatakse rahvusvaheliseks navigatsiooniks (õhu- ja meresõiduks) ning 
mis ei ole üle 24 meremiili laiad mõõdetuna rannikust rannikuni või lähtejoo-
nest lähtejooneni ja mis on kohalduva õigusraamistiku poolest erinevad mitte-
rahvusvahelistest väinadest. 
Mitte-rahvusvahelised väinad hõlmavad väinu, mis paiknevad pikaajalistes 
sisevetes (mereõiguse konventsiooni art 35(a), nt Väinameri) või sellises territo-
riaalmeres, mille suhtes ükski rahvusvaheliste väinade õiguslik kategooria ei saa 
kohalduda. Viimati nimetatud on art 17-kategooria väinad (siin ja edaspidi: 
viited artiklitele mereõiguse konventsioonis), kus kohaldub tavaline peatatav 
rahumeelse läbisõidu õigus (nt Kura kurk, kui Läti majandusvööndit Liivi lahes 
ei eksisteeriks). Samuti on mitte-rahvusvahelisteks sellised väinad, mis muude 
tunnuste poolest on käsitatavad rahvusvaheliste väinadena, kuid mida praktikas 
rahvusvaheliseks navigatsiooniks ei kasutata (nt Väike väin). Eelnimetatud 
väinade õiguslike kategooriate puhul ei ole välisriikide laevade ja õhusõidukite 
läbipääsuõigused mereõiguse konventsiooni osa III (või IV) alusel rahvusvahe-
liselt täiendavalt tagatud. 
Töös leiti, et lisaks eelnimetatud mitte-rahvusvaheliste väinade õiguslikele 
kategooriatele võimaldab mereõiguse konventsioon eristada seitset kategooriat 
rahvusvahelisi väinu. Nendeks on: 
1) väinad, mille kaudu sõidetakse avamere ühest osast või majandusvöön-
dist teise (art 37); 
2) väinad, mida reguleerivad pikaajalised rahvusvahelised konventsioonid 
(art 35(c)); 
3) väinad, mille moodustavad väinaga piirneva riigi saar ja maismaaterri-
toorium (art 38(1)); 
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4) väinad, mis ühendavad majandusvööndit või avamerd välisriigi territo-
riaalmerega (art 45(1)(b)); 
5) arhipelaagivetes asuvad väinad (art 53); 
6) väinad, mida läbib avamere või majandusvööndi koridor (art 36); 
7) sui generis väinad (art 311(2)). 
 
Mõned riigid ja teadlased leiavad, et eraldi õigusliku kategooria moodustavad 
enamuse aastast jääga kaetud väinad (art 234). Sellise potentsiaalse rahvusvahe-
liste väinade kategooria olemasolu ei ole selge (vt ptk 2.2 osas I). 
Kõik eelnimetatud väinade õiguslikud kategooriad peale arhipelaagivetes 
asuvate väinade (art 53) ja enamuse aastast jääga kaetud väinade (art 234) on 
(potentsiaalselt) kohalduvad või kohaldunud Eesti väinade suhtes. Iga väinade 
õigusliku kategooria puhul kehtib iseäralik läbipääsuõiguste raamistik. Samas 
on väinade suhtes õiguslike kategooriate täpne kohaldamine sageli keeruline. 
See sõltub juriidilistest nüanssidest, mida võib olla keeruline tuvastada. Väinade 
täpne kategoriseerimine on aga vajalik, et vältida mh konflikte riikide vahel 
läbipääsu üle nendest olulistest veeteedest. 
Eesti väinad näitlikustavad väinade õiguslike kategooriate vahelisi tugevaid 
seoseid. Eesti väinadele ja seeläbi Soome lahele, Liivi lahele ja Väinamerele 
kohalduvate  läbipääsuõiguste määravateks mõjuriteks on merevööndite välimi-
sed piirid, lepingud, saared, merepiiride delimiteerimine, siseriiklik õigus sise-
vete ja lähtejoonte kohta ning geopoliitilised muutused (sh õigusliku järjepide-
vuse põhimõte). Nendel teguritel põhinevad väinade õiguslike kategooriate 
vahelised seosed. Tegemist ei ole numerus clausus loeteluga. 
Eelnimetatud tegurid määravad väinade jaotumise erinevate õiguslike kate-
gooriate vahel. Nad võimaldavad seeläbi muuta väinale kohalduvat läbipääsu-
korda, luues mh eeldused mereõiguse konventsioonis sätestatud erandite raken-
damiseks takistamatu või mittepeatatava rahumeelse läbisõidu õigusraamistiku 
suhtes. Enamjaolt on väinale kohalduva õigusliku kategooria muutmine väina 
rannikuriigi või -riikide kaalutlusotsus. 
Teatud juhtudel võib väinale kohalduda rahvusvahelise õiguse alusel paral-
leelselt kaks õiguslikku kategooriat. Sellised paralleelsed läbipääsukorrad või-
vad olla tingitud näiteks mõne lipuriigi protestist väina rannikuriigi merevöön-
deid reguleerivate õigusaktide või õigusliku järjepidevuse vastu. Väinamerele 
kohalduvad potentsiaalselt paralleelsed väinade õiguslikud kategooriad, sest 
kummalgi eelnimetatud alusel protestinud riigid (Suurbritannia, Saksamaa ja 
Venemaa Föderatsioon) ei ole rahvusvahelise õiguse järgi kohustatud järgima 
Väinamerele kohalduvat läbipääsukorda. Samuti ei saa välistada, et Viru väin 
võis olla ajavahemikus 1991–1994/2010 lisaks väinale, mida läbib majandus-
vööndi koridor (art 36), ka sui generis väin (art 311(2)). 
Üldjuhul võib väina õiguslik kategooria muutuda väina rannikuriigi, kuid 
potentsiaalselt ka väinaga mittepiirneva riigi õigusaktide tõttu. Kui Soome lahe 
idaosas asuvas Venemaa Föderatsiooni merealas majandusvööndit ei asuks, 
oleks Venemaa Föderatsioonil võimalik kehtestada siseriikliku õiguse alusel 
majandusvöönd näiteks Suursaare või Tütarsaarte piirkonnas. Selle tulemusel 
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kohalduks tema ja teiste välisriikide laevadele ning õhusõidukitele Viru väinas 
takistamatu läbisõidu õigus (art 37). 
Eesti iseseisvuse taastamise järel on Viru väinale potentsiaalselt kohaldunud 
mereõiguse konventsiooni alusel viis väinade õiguslikku kategooriat. Kokku 
kuus väinade õiguslikku kategooriat on potentsiaalselt kohaldunud või kohal-
duvad Liivi lahega piirnevate Kura kurgu ja Väinamere suhtes (arvestades Väi-
kese väina kui mitte-rahvusvahelise väinaga, mida ei kasutata rahvusvaheliseks 
meresõiduks). Eesti väinadele kohalduvate õiguslike kategooriate selge määra-
mine on osutunud võimalikuks aga alles hiljuti. Enne Soome väljumist 2010. 
aastal potentsiaalselt pikaaegsest lepingust Viru väina läbipääsuõiguste kohta 
oleks Viru väina õiguslik kategoriseerimine olnud mõneti ebaselge. Samuti esi-
tas Läti 2011. aastal Ühinenud Rahvaste Organisatsioonile oma õigusaktid ja 
kaardid, mis loovad õiguslikku selgust Läti merevööndite (sh majandusvööndi) 
ja nende ulatuse kohta Liivi lahes.  Nendest tulenevalt kohaldub Kura kurgus ja 
Liivi lahes välisriikide laevadele ja õhusõidukitele takistamatu läbisõidu õigus. 
Merevööndite välimised piirid ja õigusliku järjepidevuse põhimõte, nagu ka 
välislepingud, merealade delimiteerimine ja siseriiklikud õigusaktid sisevete 
kohta, võivad evida määravat mõju väinade õiguslikule kategoriseerimisele. 
Väinade õiguslik kategoriseerimine ja nende õiguslik raamistik on seega lahuta-
matult seotud mitte üksnes merevööndite välimiste piiridega, siseriikliku õigu-
sega sisevete kohta ja välislepingutega, vaid ka merealade delimiteerimise ja 
õigusliku järjepidevuse põhimõttega. 
Eelnevast tulenevalt on õigusliku järjepidevuse põhimõtet, merealade deli-
miteerimist või merevööndite välimisi piire puudutavate otsuste tegemisel olu-
line arvestada nende võimalike mõjudega väinade õiguslikule raamistikule ja 
vastupidi. Väina rannikuriigi põhimõttelised otsused mõnes neist valdkondadest 
võivad samavõrra mõjutada teisi, sest reeglina on väinade läbipääsukord, mere-
vööndite välimised piirid, merealade delimiteerimine, õigusliku järjepidevuse 
põhimõte, väina rannikuriigi õigusaktid sisevete kohta ja väinade õigusraamis-
tikku puudutavad välislepingud omavahel seotud. Need on lisaks saartele, jääle 
ja arhipelaagivetele peamised mõjurid, mis määravad väinade õiguslikud kate-
gooriad. Järgnevalt hinnatakse üksikasjalikumalt selliste tegurite vastastikkust 
mõju väinade õigusraamistikuga. 
 
 
B. Merevööndite välimiste piiride mõju  
Eesti väinade õigusraamistikule 
Mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 36 järgi ei kohaldata konventsiooni III osa 
rahvusvahelisele väinale, kui väina läbib laevatee, mille navigatsiooni- ja hüdro-
graafilised tingimused on sama laadi kui avamere laevateel või majandus-
vööndit läbival laevateel. Niisugustele väina läbivatele laevateedele kohalda-
takse mereõiguse konventsiooni teisi asjakohaseid osi, sh meresõidu- ja üle-
lennuvabadust käsitlevaid sätteid. Sellest tuleneb, et rannikuriigi merevööndite 
välimiste piiride muutmine võib põhjustada ka selles merealas paikneva või 
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sellega piirneva väina õigusliku kategooria muutumise. Seda kinnitab Viru 
väina oluline mõju merevööndite välimistele piiridele Soome lahes. 
Eesmärgiga tagada meresõidu- ja ülelennuvabadust, nõustusid Eesti ja 
Soome 1994. a lepingus, et nende territoriaalmere vähim kaugus keskjoonest 
Soome lahes on kolm meremiili. Eesti sätestas merealapiiride seaduses täien-
davalt, et nendes kohtades, kus rahvusvahelised laevateed väljuvad Eesti kolme 
meremiili laiusest Soome lahe majandusvööndi koridori osast, ei ulatu Eesti 
territoriaalmere piir lähemale kui üks meremiil Rahvusvahelise Mereorganisat-
siooni heakskiidetud rahvusvahelistest laevateedest. 
Eesti välisminister väitis parlamendis, et majandusvööndi koridori kehtesta-
mine Soome lahes on poliitiline otsus ega esitanud õiguslikke argumente selle 
vajalikkuse põhjendamiseks. See on põhjustanud Eestis väärarusaamu majan-
dusvööndi koridori eesmärgist. Riigikogus esitati 1993. ja 2007. aastal seadus-
eelnõud, mille vastuvõtmise korral oleks majandusvööndi koridori Eesti osa 
kaotatud Viru väinas territoriaalmere kuni 12 meremiilini laiendamise tõttu. 
Soome lahe majandusvööndi koridor on kooskõlas mereõiguse konvent-
siooniga ja järgib Soome lahe rannikuriikide varasema (1925. a) kolmepoolse 
lepingu eeskuju selles merealas läbipääsuõiguste tagamiseks (vt lähemalt järg-
misest alaptk-st). Nagu nähtub mh Eduskunta stenogrammidest, leidsid Soome 
valitsus ja parlament, et Viru väinas meresõidu- ja ülelennuvabaduse tagamise 
vajalikkus oli seotud ka toona Eesti ja Soome seadustes sätestatud, ent mere-
õiguse konventsiooniga vastuolus nõudega eelnevalt teatada rannikuriigile rahu-
meelsest läbisõidust territoriaalmeres. Soome loobus sellisest nõudest 1996. 
aastal, kuid see on jätkuvalt kehtiv Eesti õigusaktides. 
Eesti ja Soome leidsid 1994. aastal ebaõigesti, et majandusvööndi koridori 
kehtestamine on vajalik meresõidu- ja ülelennuvabaduse tagamiseks Viru väi-
nas. Ilmselt ei võtnud Eesti ja Soome arvesse Venemaa Föderatsiooni väikest 
majandusvööndit Soome lahe idaosas ja selle tähendusest Viru väina läbipääsu-
režiimile. Selle väikese majandusvööndi olemasolust Soome lahe idaosas ei 
olda tänini laiemalt teadlikud. 
Takistamatu läbisõidu õiguse kasutamiseks ei pea välisriigi laev või õhu-
sõiduk sellest väina rannikuriigile eelnevalt teatama ega küsima selleks luba. 
Eesti ja Soome õigusaktides sätestatud, ent mereõiguse konventsiooniga vastu-
olus nõue eelnevalt teatada rannikuriigile territoriaalmeres sõitmisest puudutas 
rahumeelset läbisõitu. See ei oleks saanud vähemalt otseselt takistada Eesti või 
Soome territoriaalmeres asuvatel välisriigi laevadel ja õhusõidukitel kasutada 
õigust takistamatuks läbisõiduks Viru väinast. Seetõttu ei olnud täpne Eesti ja 
Soome väide majandusvööndi koridori vajalikkusest põhjendusel, et vastasel 
juhul ei oleks tagatud väinast vaba läbipääs kohustuse tõttu teatada rahumeelse 
läbisõidu õiguse kasutamise kavatsusest. 
Ka juhul kui 1940. ja 1965. ning 1985. a Soome ja Nõukogude Liidu vahel 
sõlmitud merepiiri lepingus ei oleks sätestatud õiguslikku alust tänasele Vene-
maa Föderatsiooni majandusvööndile, oleks Venemaa Föderatsioonil võimalik 
oma huvide tagamiseks vähendada sarnaselt Eesti ja Soome 1994. a lepinguga 
ühepoolselt oma territoriaalmere ulatust Soome lahe idaosas, et kehtestada seal 
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majandusvöönd. Kui Venemaa Föderatsioon ei kehtestaks sellises olukorras 
majandusvööndit Soome lahe idaosas, võivad välisriikide laevad läbida Viru 
väina mitte-peatatava rahumeelse läbisõidu õiguse alusel. Sarnaselt takistamatu 
läbisõidu õigusraamistikuga ei oleks läbisõidu õigus piiratud praeguse koridori 
piiridega, vaid see kohalduks Soome lõunapoolsetest skääridest Eesti põhja-
poolseimate saarteni – seega mõlema riigi pealinnade läheduses. 
Sellegipoolest esineb kaalukaid põhjusi, miks Eesti ja Soome territoriaal-
mere laiendamine võib olla vastuolus nii väina rannikuriikide Eesti ja Soome  
kui ka Venemaa Föderatsiooni huvidega. Mereõiguse konventsiooni artikkel 36 
ei kohalduks Viru väinale juhul, kui Eesti ja Soome laiendaksid oma terri-
toriaalmerd Soome lahes 1994. a kahepoolse lepingu alusel 12 meremiilini. See 
välistaks merealuste kaablite ja torujuhtmete paigaldamise vabaduse, kuid mitte 
meresõidu- ja ülelennuvabaduse Viru väinas. Läbipääs Viru väinast kui sumb-
väinast ei oleks reguleeritud mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 45 lg 1 punktis b 
sätestatud mittepeatatava rahumeelse läbisõidu õiguse alusel, vaid takistamatu 
läbisõidu õiguse alusel (art 38). Venemaa Föderatsiooni majandusvööndi tõttu 
kohalduks sellisel juhul välisriikide laevadele ja õhusõidukitele peaaegu kogu 
Soome lahe ulatuses takistamatu läbisõidu õigus, sh potentsiaalselt Venemaa 
Föderatsiooni territoriaalmeres ja sisevetes. Välisriigi omandis või valduses ole-
vad suveräänse puutumatusega laevad ja õhusõidukid ei peaks sellisel juhul 
Viru väina läbima kitsas koridoris nagu praegu. 
Eelnevast tulenevalt vähendab majandusvööndi koridor samavõrra kui see 
tagab väinas selle rannikuriigi suveräänsust oma mereala üle. Seda kinnitab ka 
Liivi lahe ja selle väinade näide, mis ilmestab võimalust piirata rahvusvahelises 
väinas ja sellega külgnevas merealas vastasel juhul potentsiaalselt ülemäära 
avaralt kohalduvat välisriikide laevade ja õhusõidukite takistamatu läbisõidu 
õigust majandusvööndi koridori kehtestamise kaudu. 
Eesti ja Läti jõudsid 1996. aastal õiglasele kokkuleppele Liivi lahe mere-
alade piiritlemiseks. Hoolimata Eesti ja Läti sellekohasest nähtavast taotlusest, 
ei suutnud nad välistada aga majandusvööndi olemasolu Liivi lahes. Liivi lahe 
majandusvööndi tõttu on olnud väär erialakirjanduses seni levinud Kura kurgu 
ja Väinamere kategoriseerimine sumbväinadena (art 45 lg 1 p b). Sellised sumb-
väinad peavad ühendama majandusvööndit välisriigi territoriaalmerega. Läti 
2011. aastal Ühinenud Rahvaste Organisatsioonile esitatud õigusaktide ja kaar-
tide põhjal on aga selge, et Liivi laht ja Väinameri ühendavad majandusvöön-
deid omavahel. 
Kura kurgule ei kohaldu ükski mereõiguse konventsiooni artiklis 35 sätesta-
tud eranditest välisriikide laevade ja õhusõidukite takistamatu läbisõidu õiguse 
välistamiseks. See tähendab, et välisriikide laevad (sh sõjalaevad) ja õhusõidu-
kid võivad mereõiguse konventsiooni alusel – sõltumata Eesti ja Läti õigus-
aktidest, mis ei tunnista sellist õigust – siseneda Liivi lahte nende tavapärasel 
moel, et jõuda Läti majandusvööndisse. Selle käigus võivad välisriikide laevad 
ja õhusõidukid navigeerida takistamatu läbisõidu õiguse järgi kohalduvate 
meresõidu- ja ülelennuvabadaduste alusel läbi/üle sisuliselt kogu Liivi lahe. Sel-
line õigus on neil ka Ruhnust põhjasuunda jäävates ulatuslikes Eesti sisevetes, 
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sest tegemist ei ole pikaaegsete sisevetega mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 
35(a) mõttes. 
Näiteks võivad välisriikide laevad ja õhusõidukid siseneda mereõiguse kon-
ventsiooni artikli 38 lg 2 alusel takistamatu läbisõidu käigus Kura kurgu kaudu 
Liivi lahte, sõita Ruhnust põhjasuunda jäävatesse Eesti sisevetesse selleks, et 
seejärel läbida Läti majandusvöönd ja suunduda läbi Kolka nina ning Ruhnu 
vahelise mereala ja Kura kurgu tagasi Läänemerre. Mereõiguse konventsiooni 
artikli 58 ja riikide sellekohase praktika järgi on välisriikide laevadel ja õhu-
sõidukitel õigus Läti majandusvööndisse jõudes viia seal läbi ka sõjaväelisi 
tegevusi. Kuna välisriikide laevad ja õhusõidukid ei pea takistamatu läbisõidu 
õigust kasutades teatama sellest eelnevalt Eestile ja Lätile, võivad allveelaevad 
oma tavapärasel moel (vee all) sõita läbi Liivi lahe, sh läbi lahe lõunaosa Riia 
lähistel, ilma et kumbki Liivi lahe rannikuriik oleks sellest teadlik. 
Liivi lahes kohalduva takistamatu läbisõidu õiguse välistamiseks on ranniku-
riikidel võimalik mereõiguse konventsiooni artiklist 36 juhindudes kehtestada 
seal majandusvööndi koridor. Sarnaselt majandusvööndi koridoriga Viru väinas 
piisab mereõiguse konventsiooni artiklis 36 sätestatud erandi kohaldumiseks 
sellest, et Eesti ja Läti piiravad pariteetselt oma territoriaalmere välimist piiri 
Liivi lahe lääneosas. Seeläbi on võimalik praegu Liivi lahes kohalduva mere-
sõidu- ja ülelennuvabaduse kasutamine piirata umbes 3 meremiili laiuse kori-
doriga, mis ulatuks Kura kurgust Läti majandusvööndini Liivi lahe kaguosas. 
Selle tulemusel ei kohalduks välisriikide laevade ja õhusõidukite suhtes mere-
sõidu- ja ülelennuvabadus ülejäänud Liivi lahe merealas. Neid vabadusi oleks 
võimalik kasutada üksnes kitsas majandusvööndi koridoris Läti majandus-
vööndisse jõudmiseks. 
 
 
C. Pikaajaliste konventsioonide ja sui generis läbipääsukordade  
mõju Eesti väinade õigusraamistikule 
Pikaajaliste konventsioonide olulisus väinade õiguslikule raamistikule tuleneb 
mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punktist c, mille järgi ei reguleerita mere-
õiguse konventsiooni III osaga õiguskorda väinades, mille läbimist täielikult või 
osaliselt reguleerivad neid väinu käsitlevad pikaajalised konventsioonid. Seega 
omab mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punkti c tingimusi täitva pikaajalise 
konventsiooni olemasolu otsest mõju väina õiguslikule raamistikule. 
Mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punkti c sõnastusest tuleneb, et pika-
ajaline konventsioon kohaldub rahvusvahelisele väinale ipso facto, kui konvent-
sioon on jõus ja see reguleerib osaliselt või täielikult õiguskorda väinas. Sätte 
grammatilise tõlgenduse järgi ei ole pikaajalise konventsiooni kohaldumiseks 
vaja väina rannikuriigi sellekohast subjektiivset otsust. See põhjustab praktilisi 
probleeme, nagu näitab Viru väinale 2010. a eelselt kohaldunud õigusliku kate-
gooria määramise keerukus. 
Viru väin võis olla pärast Eesti iseseisvuse taastamist 1991. aastal mere-
õiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punkti c järgi väin, mida reguleerib pikaajaline 
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konventsioon sarnaselt Taani ja Türgi väinadega ning Ahvenamaa väina ja 
Magalhãesi väinaga. Selliseks pikaajaliseks lepinguks oli 19. augustil 1925 Hel-
singis sõlmitud Läänemere riikide alkoholikaupade salaveo vastu võitlemise 
konventsiooni juurde kuuluva lõpp-protokolli juurde sõlmitud kokkulepe Eesti, 
Soome ja Nõukogude Liidu tolliterritooriumide ja avamere koridori kohta 
Soome lahes. Selle kolmepoolse kokkuleppe punktis 2 nimetatud rahvusvahe-
liste mereteede piiritlemiseks sõlmisid 22. aprillil 1926 Eesti, Soome ja Nõu-
kogude Liit Moskva protokolli. 1925. a lepingu kehtetuks muutmine 1994. a 
Eesti ja Soome lepingu sõlmimisega majandusvööndi koridori kohta Viru väi-
nas või alternatiivselt Soome väljaastumine sellest lepingulisest raamistikust 
2010. aastal on tõenäoliselt ainsaks näiteks sellest, kuidas potentsiaalselt mere-
õiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punkti c tingimusi täitev leping on lõpetatud. 
Riikide praktikas käsitati 1994. a Eesti ja Soome kahepoolset lepingut 
Soome lahe majandusvööndi koridori kehtestamise kohta uue ja eraldiseisva 
lepinguna, mis reguleerib läbipääsukorda Viru väinas. Soome pidas seda regio-
naalseks analoogiks Rootsi ja Taani vahel 1979. aastal sõlmitud lepingule, mil-
lega majandusvööndi koridori loomise eesmärgil piirasid need Taani väinade 
rannikuriigid samuti oma territoriaalmere välimist piiri. Kuna riikide, esma-
joones väina rannikuriikide, selge tunnustus pikaajalises lepingus sätestatud 
väina õigusliku raamistiku kohta tuleks lugeda täiendavaks eeltingimuseks 
mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punktis c sätestatud erandi kohaldumiseks, 
ei olnud pärast Eesti iseseisvuse taastamist Viru väina läbipääsukord seega 
siiski reguleeritud 1925. a Helsingi kolmepoolse lepinguga. 
Eesti ja Soome 1994. a lepingu objekt vastas aga 1925. a Helsingi lepingule 
Eesti, Soome ja Nõukogude Liidu vahel. See kolmepoolne leping lõppes hilje-
malt 1994. a Eesti-Soome lepingu sõlmimisega või alternatiivselt 2010. aastal 
Soome väljaastumisega 1925. a Helsingi konventsiooni lepingulisest raamisti-
kust. Sarnaselt 1994. a kahepoolse lepinguga oli 1925. a kolmepoolse lepingu 
eesmärk säilitada Viru väinas meresõiduvabadus, piirates 1925. a Helsingi 
konventsioonis sätestatud rannikuriikide kuni 12 meremiili laiuste kontrollvöön-
dite ulatust selles merekitsuses. Vastasel juhul oleks Viru väin teatud lõikudes 
langenud täielikult Eesti ja Soome jurisdiktsiooni alla. 
Nõukogude Liidu praktikast nähtub, et pärast Eesti annekteerimist 1940. 
aastal ei pidanud Nõukogude Liit end enam seotuks 1925. a kolmepoolse lepin-
guga. Sellest hoolimata paistab, et 1940. a järel ei kaotanud rahvusvaheliste 
lepingute õiguse järgi kehtivust 1925. a kolmepoolne leping, sest see jäi edasi 
kehtima Eesti ja Soome vahel. 1925. a Helsingi kolmepoolse lepingu järgi 
kohaldusid Viru väina rahvusvahelisele koridorile avamerevabadused. Eesti, 
Soome ja Nõukogude Liit kinnitasid seda 1926. a Moskva protokollis, kus 
sätestati avamere koridori piirid. Sellised avamerevabadused kohalduvad ka 
1994. a Eesti ja Soome lepingu alusel Viru väina majandusvööndi koridorile. 
Venemaa Föderatsioonile on strateegiliselt oluline tagada Viru väinas enne-
kõike meresõidu- ja ülelennuvabadus, et hoida avatuna mere- ja õhutee Soome 
lahe idaosast Läänemerre (sh Kaliningradi vetesse), Atlandi ookeanile ja Põhja-
Jäämerele. 
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1925. a ja 1926. a kolmepoolsed lepingud täitsid samuti mereõiguse kon-
ventsiooni artikli 311 lg 2 tingimused, sest olid mereõiguse konventsiooni 
jõustumise järel läbipääsukorra mõttes sama liberaalsed või liberaalsemad nen-
dest väinade õiguslikest kategooriatest, mida Eesti ja Soome saavad Viru väi-
nale kohaldada mereõiguse konventsiooni artiklite 36 või 38 järgi. Seega, juhul, 
kui 1925. a kolmepoolne leping oli jõus ajavahemikus 1991–1994/2010, kohal-
dus Viru väinale paralleelselt kaks väina õiguslikku kategooriat. Viru väin on 
Eesti iseseisvuse taastamisest alates mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 36 kate-
gooria väin, sest seda läbib majandusvööndi koridor. Ei ole aga välistatud, et 
1991. aastast kuni 1994. a Eesti ja Soome lepingu sõlmimiseni (või alternatiiv-
selt Soome väljaastumiseni 1925. ja 1926. a lepingutest 2010. aastal)  kohaldus 
1925. a Helsingi kolmepoolse lepingu alusel Viru väinale ka sui generis väina 
kategooria. Selle järgi ei oleks Eesti ja Soome saanud sel perioodil oma territo-
riaalmerd Viru väinas laiendada kuni 12 meremiilini üksteise nõusolekuta, kuigi 
vastupidist võimaldas mereõiguse konventsioon. 1994. a kahepoolses Eesti ja 
Soome lepingus nähti ette võimalus majandusvööndi koridori kaotamiseks üks-
nes eelneva 12-kuu pikkuse etteteatamise alusel. 
1925. a Helsingi kolmepoolse lepingu tähtsust Nõukogude Liidu jaoks 
ilmestab asjaolu, et ta seadis selle sõlmimise eeltingimuseks Läänemere riikide 
vahelise 1925. a Helsingi konventsiooni osapooleks astumisele. Lepingu oluli-
sust näitab ka Nõukogude Liidu tugev reaktsioon Riigikohtu 1932. a üldkogu 
otsusele, milles vähendati 1925. a ja 1926. a Helsingi kolmepoolsete lepingute 
tõlgendamisel nende olulisust Viru väina läbipääsukorra jaoks. Selle tulemusel 
pidi Eesti valitsus vastu võtma määruse, et tagada Riigikohtu otsusest sõltumata 
jätkuvalt meresõiduvabadus Viru väina rahvusvahelises koridoris. 1932. a Riigi-
kohtu otsuse diplomaatiline järelkaja võimaldab projitseerida ka Venemaa 
Föderatsiooni eeldatavalt tugevat reaktsiooni juhul, kui Eesti ja Soome peaksid 
Viru väina majandusvööndi koridori kaotama territoriaalmere laiendamisel 
asjassepuutuvas merealas 12 meremiilini. 
 
 
D. Sisevete-alase siseriikliku õiguse ja saarte  
mõju Eesti väinade õigusraamistikule 
Väina rannikuriigi siseriiklik õigus sisevete kohta ei saa üldjuhul mõjutada 
läbipääsukorda väinast. Mereõiguse konventsiooni III osa alusel kohaldub väi-
nas takistamatu läbisõidu õigus või mittepeatatava rahumeelse läbisõidu õigus 
reeglina ka juhul, kui väin on ümbritsetud sirgete lähtejoontega ja on seega osa 
rannikuriigi sisevetest. See tuleneb mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punktist a, 
mille järgi konventsiooni III osaga ei reguleerita väina sisevete alasid, välja 
arvatud juhul, kui sirge lähtejoonega hõlmatakse siseveteks ka merealad, mis 
seda varem ei olnud. 
Mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punkti a on kohaldatud vastuoluliselt 
mh Kanada ja Venemaa Föderatsiooni väinadele Arktikas. Ka erialakirjanduses 
on esitatud vastuolulised tõlgendused selle sätte rakendamise õiguslike tingi-
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muste kohta. See on põhjustanud teataval määral õigusselgusetust selle erandi 
kohaldamisala suhtes. Mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punkti a puutumus 
Väinamerega võimaldab kombata selle sätte kohaldamise piire, luues selles 
küsimuses vajalikku õigusselgust. 
Väinameri on ümbritsetud sirgete lähtejoontega ja koosneb seega täielikult 
Eesti sisevetest. Väinameri ühendab Eesti, aga ka Soome ja Rootsi majandus-
vööndeid Läänemeres Läti majandusvööndiga Liivi lahe kaguosas. Eesti sise-
riiklikus õiguses ei tunnustata välisriikide laevade ja õhusõidukite takistamatu 
läbisõidu õigust Väinameres ja sellega külgnevates sisevetes (nt Eesti sisevetes 
Liivi lahes). Samuti ei tunnustata Eesti seadustes rahumeelse läbisõidu õigust 
Väinameres. Sellest järeldub, et Eesti ei käsita Väinamerd rahvusvahelise väi-
nana. See on kooskõlas rahvusvahelise mereõigusega juhul, kui Väinameri täi-
dab mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punkti a tingimused. Tegemist on kitsa 
erandiga, mis võimaldab välistada takistamatu või rahumeelse läbisõidu õiguse 
väinas selle rannikuriigi siseriikliku õiguse põhjal. 
Mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punktis a sätestatud erandi kohaldu-
miseks tuleb välja selgitada, kas asjassepuutuv väin oli siseveteks ka enne selle 
ümber sirgete lähtejoonte kehtestamist. See loob otsese seose väina rannikuriigi 
sisevete-alase siseriikliku õiguse ja väina läbipääsukorra vahel. Kui Väinameri 
ei olnud siseveteks enne selle ümber sirgete lähtejoonte kehtestamist, kohaldub 
seal välisriikide laevadele ja õhusõidukitele prima facie takistamatu läbisõidu 
õigus (mis aga praktikas asenduks nn Messina erandiga mereõiguse konvent-
siooni artikli 38 lg 1 mõttes, vt allpool). Vastasel juhul kohaldub Väinamerele 
sisevete õigusraamistik ilma mereõiguse konventsiooni III osas sätestatud 
piiranguteta läbipääsukorra osas. Kuna Eesti kehtestas Väinamere ümber sirged 
lähtejooned iseseisvuse taastamisel, tuleb mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 
punkti a kohaldumise üle otsustamiseks hinnata Eesti 1940. a eelseid õigus-
norme sisevete kohta. 
Enne 1940. aastat kasutas Eesti sirgete lähtejoonte asemel üksnes standard-
lähtejooni oma 4 meremiili laiuse territoriaalmere välispiiri määramiseks. Li-
saks sätestas 1938. a veeteede seaduse § 3, et merekitsused, mis on läbikäiguks 
ulgumere kahe osa vahel ja mille mõlemad rannikud kuuluvad riigi territoo-
riumi hulka, loetakse territoriaalmereks, kui merekitsuse laius ei ületa kümmet 
meremiili. See erand kohaldus üksnes Väinamerele, mis kuulutati täielikult 
Eesti territoriaalmereks. 1938. a veeteede seaduse § 4 järgi ei kohaldunud 
Väinameres välisriikide sõjalaevadele rahumeelse läbisõidu õigus, välja arvatud 
merehäda puhul või riikidevahelise kokkuleppe või valitsuse loa alusel. 
Eelnevast tulenevalt kohaldus Väinamerele 1938. a veeteede seaduse järgi 
territoriaalmere õigusraamistik. Veeteede seadus ei määranud ka sisevete 
määramise aluseid. Seetõttu ei ole veeteede seadus otseselt asjassepuutuv 
Väinamere läbipääsukorra hindamiseks mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 
punktis a sätestatud erandi tähenduses. Eesti kehtestas oma siseveed aga vahe-
tult pärast veeteede seaduse vastuvõtmist 1938. a Põhjala neutraliteedireeglite 
alusel. 
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Eesti 1938. a erapooletuse korraldamise seadus järgis samal aastal vastu võe-
tud Islandi, Norra, Rootsi, Soome ja Taani neutraliteediseaduste eeskuju. Need 
neutraliteediseadused võeti vastu harmoneeritult 1938. a Skandinaavia neutrali-
teedireeglite deklaratsiooni alusel. 1938. a neutraliteediseadustega, sh Eesti era-
pooletuse korraldamise seadusega, reguleeriti valdavalt mereõigusesse puutu-
vaid küsimusi, et tugevdada rannikuriigi julgeolekut sõjatingimustes. Eesti era-
pooletuse korraldamise seadus töötati välja Rootsi neutraliteediseaduse põhjal. 
Eesti erapooletuse korraldamise seadus oli 1938. a Riia protokolli järgi oma-
korda aluseks Läti ja Leedu neutraliteediseadustele. 
Eesti erapooletuse korraldamise seaduse § 2 lg 3 sätestas sarnaselt teiste 
1938. a neutraliteediseadustega, et Eesti siseveteks loetakse sadamad, sadama-
suudmed, lahed ja merelõukad, samuti veealad, mis asetsevad mittealaliselt vee 
all olevate Eesti saarte, laidude ja karide vahel ning seespool neid. See definit-
sioon kohaldus mutatis mutandis kõigis Põhjala riikides. Mereõiguse konvent-
siooni artikli 35 punkti a kohaldumise seisukohalt seisneb küsimus selles, kas 
kogu Väinameri oli tunnistatud Eesti siseveteks 1938. a erapooletuse korral-
damise seaduse § 2 lg 3 mõttes. Analoogilist kontrolliskeemi tuleks kohaldada 
ka näiteks Ahvenamaa saarestiku vete suhtes, et välja selgitada, kas saarestiku-
vahelised väinad täidavad mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punkti a tingi-
mused. 
Riikide praktika ja arhiiviallikate põhjal on selge, et Väinamere läbipääsud – 
Hari kurk, Voosi kurk, Soela väin ja Suur väin, nagu ka Väike väin – lisaks 
ülejäänud Väinamere merealale täidavad 1938. a erapooletuse korraldamise sea-
duse § 2 lg-s 3 sätestatud tingimused. Seetõttu tuleks kogu Väinamerd käsitada 
selliste sisevetena mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punkti a tähenduses, mis 
olid siseveteks ka enne nende ümbritsemist sirgete lähtejoontega. Selle tule-
musel ei kohaldu Väinameres takistamatu läbisõidu õigus (ega üldjuhul ka nn 
Messina erand), kuigi see merekitsus ühendab kaht majandusvööndi osa. Eesti 
küll tunnustab siseriiklikus õiguses piiratud kujul rahumeelse läbisõidu õigust 
teatud tüüpi laevade suhtes Väinameres, kuid tal ei ole selleks mereõiguse 
konventsiooni artikli 35 punkti a kohaldumise tõttu kohustust. Eestil pole vaja 
täita mereõiguse konventsioonis sätestatud rannikuriigile seatud nõudeid rahu-
meelse läbisõidu õiguse tunnustamiseks Väinameres. 
Need järeldused on vastupidised seni rahvusvahelises erialakirjanduses esita-
tuga, mille kohaselt peaks Väinamerd kui sumbväina läbivatele laevadele kohal-
duma mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 45 lg 1 punkti b alusel mittepeatatava 
rahumeelse läbisõidu õigus. Sellised järeldused on ekslikud lisaks põhjusel, et 
mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punktis a sätestatud erandi mittekohal-
dumisel peaks välisriikide laevadel ja õhusõidukitel olema Väinameres prima 
facie takistamatu läbisõidu õigus Läti majandusvööndi tõttu Liivi lahes. Siiski 
näib neid seisukohti jagavat mh Ameerika Ühendriikide merevägi. Ligipääsuta 
Eesti arhiiviallikatele mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punktis a sätestatud 
erandi kohaldumise hindamiseks, on sellised järeldused Väinamere läbipääsu-
korra kohta jäänud pinnapealseteks. 
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Eelnevast tulenevalt koosneb Väinameri sellistest sisevetest, milles välis-
riikide laevadel ja õhusõidukitel ei ole võimalik takistamatu läbisõidu õigust 
(ega rahumeelse läbisõidu õigust) kasutada, kui vastupidist ei sätesta omal 
initsiatiivil Väinamere rannikuriik Eesti. Töös leiti, et 1938. a Põhjala neutrali-
teedireeglite tõttu on sellisteks Läänemere väinadeks, kus potentsiaalselt kohal-
dub mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punktis a sätestatud erand, ka Ahvena-
maa saarestiku arvukad väinad ja kitsas Kalmari väin Rootsi mandri ja Ölandi 
saare vahel. 
Kuna mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punktis a sätestatud erandi tõttu 
on väinale kohalduvale õiguslikule kategooriale oluline mõju väina rannikuriigi 
siseriiklikul õigusel, võivad samavõrra olulist mõju väina läbipääsukorrale 
omada välisriikide diplomaatilised protestid väina rannikuriigi siseriikliku 
õiguse asjassepuutuvate sätete vastu. Protesti esitanud riik võib säilitada oma 
laevadele ja õhusõidukitele selle läbipääsukorra, mis kohaldus väinale enne 
selle tunnistamist siseveteks. Ka Eesti erapooletuse korraldamise seaduses 
sätestatud sisevete õigusraamistiku (ka mõnede veeteede seaduse sätete) vastu 
esitasid Välisministeeriumile protestid Ühendkuningriik ja Saksamaa. Sarnaselt 
talitasid Ühendkuningriik ja Saksamaa kõigi teiste 1938. aastal neutraliteedi-
seaduse vastu võtnud Põhjala riikide suhtes. Protesti tõttu on neil õiguslik alus 
mitte tunnustada Väinamere suhtes mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punktis 
a sätestatud erandi kohaldumist. 
Eelnevast tulenevalt ei ole välistatud, et Ühendkunigriik ja Saksamaa ei pea 
ennast õiguslikult seotuks sellega, et Eesti on välistanud Väinameres takista-
matu läbisõidu korra ja mereõiguse konventsiooni tingimustele vastava rahu-
meelse läbisõidu korra. Selle eelduseks on, et nad jäävad kindlaks oma protes-
tidele 1938. a erapooletuse korraldamise seaduse nende sätete vastu, mis on 
õiguslikuks aluseks Eesti siseriiklikus õiguses kehtestatud Väinamere läbipääsu-
korrale. Üldisemaltki kinnitab see Euroopa Liidu ja Ameerika Ühendriikide 
protestide olulisust nende sirgete lähtejoonte suhtes, mille kehtestamisega 
kuulutasid Kanada ja Venemaa Föderatsioon Loodeväila ja Kirdeväila oma sise-
veteks ja mille suhtes võivad seetõttu need väina rannikuriigid oma huvides 
potentsiaalselt kohaldada mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punktis a sätes-
tatud erandit, kuigi need väinad ei pruugi tingimata selle tingimusi täita. 
Kui Ühendkuningriik ja Saksamaa kinnitavad oma protestide jätkuvat kehti-
vust, ei kohaldu nende laevadele ja õhusõidukitele Väinameres siiski mitte 
takistamatu läbisõidu õigus. Seda eeldusel, et Eesti tugineb sellisel juhul nn 
Messina klauslile. Nimelt kohaldub mereõiguse konventsiooni artiklite 38 lg 1 
ja 45 lg 1 punkti a järgi mittepeatatav rahumeelse läbisõidu õiguse kord sellis-
tele väinadele, millele ei kohaldu takistamatu läbisõidu õigus põhjusel, et väina 
moodustavad väinaga piirneva riigi saar ja selle riigi manner ning kui saarest 
mere pool on avamere või majandusvööndi läbisõidutee, mis navigatsiooni- ja 
hüdrograafiliste tingimuste poolest on sama sobiv. Väinameri täidab need 
tingimused nn Messina erandi kohaldumiseks. 
Väinamere läbipääsukord võib erineda ka Venemaa Föderatsiooni jaoks. 
Selle põhjuseks ei ole aga mitte diplomaatiline protest asjakohase siseriikliku 
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õigusakti või selle sätte vastu, vaid Eesti õigusliku järjepidevuse eitamine. Selle 
tulemusel võib Venemaa Föderatsiooni  laevadele kohalduda mittepeatatava 
rahumeelse läbisõidu õigus nn Messina klausli alusel sarnaselt potentsiaalselt 
Ühendkuningriigi ja Saksamaa laevadega. Nagu järgnevalt selgub, on õigusliku 
järjepidevuse põhimõte mõjutanud Eesti väinade läbipääsukorda ka muul moel. 
 
 
E. Merealade delimiteerimise ja õigusliku järjepidevuse  
mõju Eesti väinade õigusraamistikule 
Õigusliku järjepidevuse põhimõttel on olnud otsene mõju Eesti väinade õigus-
raamistikule. Nende omavahelist seotust näitab see, et kui Eesti oleks olnud 
sarnaselt Lätiga valmis loobuma õigusliku järjepidevuse põhimõtte rangest 
käsitlusest, oleks Liivi lahe väinade läbipääsukord tänasest väga erinev. Selle 
tulemusel Liivi lahele ajaloolise lahe kontseptsiooni kohaldumisel koosneksid 
Kura kurk, Väinameri ja kogu Liivi laht pikaaegsetest sisevetest mereõiguse 
konventsiooni artikli 35 punkti a tähenduses. 
Eestil ei oleks võimalik välistada ka Väinameres takistamatu läbisõidu 
õiguse kohaldumist ilma mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 35 punktis a sätes-
tatud erandi rakendamiseta. See erand kohaldub Väinamerele üksnes 1938. a 
Põhjala neutraliteedireeglite alusel koostoimes Eesti õigusliku järjepidevuse 
põhimõttega. Õigusliku järjepidevuse põhimõte on seega üheks Eesti väinade 
õigusraamistiku nurgakiviks. 
Eeltoodu viitab sellele, et Eesti peaks õigusliku järjepidevuse põhimõttest 
lähtuvalt ühtlasi tunnustama neid 1940. a eelseid lepinguid, mis ei ole üksnes 
tema kui lepingu osapoolest rannikuriigi huvides. Selline postulaat omaks 
Eestile praktilist tähendust ennekõike juhul, kui 1925. a Helsingi lepingud Eesti, 
Soome ja Nõukogude Liidu vahel vaba läbipääsu tagamisest Viru väinas oleksid 
jätkuvalt jõus. Nagu eelpool hinnatud, on need lepingud aga kehtetud hiljemalt 
alates Soome väljaastumisest 2010. aastal. 
Lisaks õiguslikule järjepidevusele võib ka merealade delimiteerimine omada 
mõju väinade läbipääsukorrale. Merealade delimiteerimisele kohalduva õiguse 
järgi võivad navigatsiooni-alased kaalutlused olla asjassepuutuvad territoriaal-
mere piiri määramisel. Väinade läbipääsukord on seotud otseselt navigatsioo-
niga, sest see määrab läbipääsuõigused väinades, nagu ka nendesse suunduvates 
merealades. Väinade läbipääsukord võib seega olla merepiiride delimiteerimisel 
eriliseks asjaoluks mereõiguse konventsiooni artikli 15 teise lause tähenduses. 
Väinade läbipääsukorra seosed merealade delimiteerimisega (ja vastupidi) või-
vad olla sama otsesed kui seosed merevööndite välimiste piiridega, väinade 
õigusraamistikku puutuvate lepingutega, õigusliku järjepidevuse põhimõttega ja 
sisevete-alaste siseriiklike õigusaktidega. 
Seda kinnitab asjaolu, et 1940. ja 1965. ning 1985. aastal Soome ning Nõu-
kogude Liidu vahel sõlmitud Soome lahe merealade piiritlemise lepingute alusel 
Venemaa Föderatsiooni kehtestatud majandusvööndi tõttu Goglandi saare 
vahetus läheduses on Viru väin majandusvööndi koridori kaotamisel väinaks, 
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mis ühendab kaht majandusvööndi osa. Mereala, kus Venemaa Föderatsiooni 
majandusvöönd paikneb, asub lähemal kui 12 meremiili lähtejoontest mõõde-
tuna. Seetõttu asuks asjassepuutuv mereala Venemaa Föderatsiooni majandus-
vööndi õiguslikuks aluseks olevate lepingute säteteta mitte majandusvööndis, 
vaid territoriaalmeres. Sellisel juhul kohalduks Viru väinale takistamatu läbi-
sõidu õigusliku raamistiku asemel majandusvööndi koridori kaotamisel mitte-
peatatava rahumeelse läbisõidu õigusraamistik – seda eeldusel, et Venemaa 
Föderatsioon ei tõmbaks sellisel juhul oma siseriiklikus õiguses ühepoolselt 
tagasi territoriaalmere välimist piiri asjassepuutuvas merealas. 
Merealade delimiteerimise ja väinade õigusraamistiku vastastikmõju ei 
pruugi siiski alati esineda, vaid sõltub ennekõike asjassepuutuva väina ja deli-
miteerimisele kuuluva mereala tunnustest, nagu ka merealade piiritlemise 
lepingu tingimustest. Seda kinnitab merealade delimiteerimine Eesti ja Läti ning 
Eesti ja Venemaa Föderatsiooni vahel. Kummalgi juhul ei saanud merealade 
delimiteerimine mõjutada läbipääsukorda asjassepuutuvas väinas. 
Enne Eesti ja Läti merealade delimiteerimist ei olnud Kura kurgu ja Väina-
mere läbipääsukord selge ega väljakujunenud. Selle põhjuseks ei olnud aga 
mitte merepiiri puudumine Liivi lahes, vaid rannikuriikide eriarvamused Liivi 
lahe tunnustamise asjus ajaloolise lahena. Vastupidiselt rahvusvahelises eriala-
kirjanduses seni leitule ei puuduta merepiir Liivi lahes vaid Eesti ja Läti territo-
riaalmerd. See on ühtlasi merepiiriks Läti majandusvööndile, mandrilavale ja 
võimalikule külgvööndile Liivi lahes. Sellest tulenevalt kohaldub Kura kurgule 
takistamatu läbisõidu kord. Merealade delimiteerimise käigus paistsid Eesti ja 
Läti üldiselt teadvustavat takistamatu läbisõidu korra kohaldumise mõju navi-
gatsioonile Liivi lahes. Samas näisid Eesti ja Läti eeldavat, et nad suutsid seda 
merealade delimiteerimisel vältida majandusvööndi olemasolu välistamise 
kaudu Liivi lahes. 
Kura kurgu õigusliku kategooria muutmiseks ja seeläbi takistamatu läbisõidu 
korra välistamiseks oleksid pidanud lahe rannikuriigid Eesti ja Läti ühiselt 
nõustuma Nõukogude Liidu pärandina ajaloolise lahe õigusraamistiku jätkuvas 
kohaldamises Liivi lahe suhtes. Läti nõudis, et Liivi laht tuleb tunnistada selli-
seks jagatud suveräänsusega merealaks mereõiguse konventsiooni ja Rahvus-
vahelise Kohtu 1992. a Fonseca lahe otsuse põhjal ning ka jõustas sellise korra 
oma siseriiklikus õiguses. Eesti vastustas seda ettepanekut peamiselt vastuolu 
tõttu õigusliku järjepidevuse põhimõttega. 
Majandusvööndi olemasolu Liivi lahes on ajaloolise lahe kontseptsiooni 
kohaldumise välistamise järel paratamatu. Seda kinnitavad ka Läti 2011. aastal 
Ühinenud Rahvaste Organisatsioonile esitatud õigusaktid ja kaardid majandus-
vööndi kohta Liivi lahe kaguosas. 
Lahe õigusliku korra määramine on eraldiseisev küsimus merealade delimi-
teerimisest. Kuna Liivi lahe tunnistamine ajalooliseks laheks ja eelpool hinna-
tud majandusvööndi koridori kehtestamine Kura kurgus ja Liivi lahes on ain-
sateks võimalusteks Kura kurgus ja Liivi lahes takistamatu läbisõidu õiguse 
välistamiseks ja need küsimused ei ole osa merealade delimiteerimisest, on 
selge, et Liivi lahe ja Kura kurgu merealade delimiteerimine ei omanud mõju 
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nende läbipääsukorrale. Samas on märkimisväärne, et merealade piiritlemise 
käigus andis Läti vaikiva tunnustuse Eesti sirgetele lähtejoontele Liivi lahes, 
nõustudes tõmbama keskjoone nende põhjal. 
Läti tunnustus omanuks Kura kurgu ja Liivi lahe läbipääsukorrale mõju, kui 
majandusvöönd Liivi lahes paikneks üksnes Eesti merealas. Läti kui väina teise 
rannikuriigi tunnustus Eesti sirgetele lähtejoontele merealade delimiteerimisel 
pakkus väina rannikuriikide ühetaolise praktika tõttu Eestile tugevama õigusliku 
aluse oma merealas majandusvööndi välistamiseks. Samas ei omanud potent-
siaalse Eesti majandusvööndi välistamine Liivi lahes ja sellega seoses Läti tun-
nustus asjassepuutuvatele sirgetele lähtejoontele mingit mõju Kura kurgu ja 
Liivi lahe läbipääsukorrale. Läti majandusvööndi tõttu Liivi lahe kaguosas 
kohaldub Kura kurgus ja Liivi lahes takistamatu läbisõidu õigus. Läti majan-
dusvööndi olemasolu Liivi lahes ei oleks saanud välistada merealade delimi-
teerimise kaudu. Merealade delimiteerimine Eesti ja Läti vahel näitab siiski, et 
see võinuks potentsiaalselt määrata Kura kurgu õigusliku kategooria juhul, kui 
Liivi lahe kaguosa geograafiline asetus oleks mõnevõrra teistsugune ja Läti 
majandusvöönd hõlmanuks selle tegelikust ulatusest üksnes väikest põhjapool-
set osa, mis külgneb Eesti territoriaalmere piiriga Liivi lahe idaosas. 
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ANNEX 1. MAPS 
Map 1. The EEZ Corridor in the Gulf of Finland 
 
Source: State Gazette of Estonia. Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the Republic of 
Estonia on the Boundaries of the Maritime Zones in the Gulf of Finland and the Northern Baltic 
Sea. Map added to the 1996 Maritime Boundary Treaty depicting the median line, the limit of the 
territorial sea and straight baselines of Estonia (south) and Finland (north) in the Gulf of Finland 
and in the Northern Baltic Sea. 
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Map 2. The High Seas Corridor in the Gulf of Finland  
under the 1925 and 1926 Agreements 
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Source: ERA.957.13.651, p. 4.  
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Map 3. The 3-Miles-Wide Territorial Sea of Estonia in 1923 
 
Source: ERA.T-6.3.1259, p. 1. 
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Map 4. The 12-Miles-Wide Maritime Zone of Estonia in 1923 
 
Source: ERA.T-6.3.1258, p. 1.  
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Map 5. The Maritime Boundary between Estonia and Latvia 
 
Source: State Gazette of Estonia. Agreement between the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of 
Latvia on the Maritime Delimitation in the Gulf of Riga, the Strait of Irbe and the Baltic Sea. 
Tallinn 12.07.1996, e.i.f. 10.10.1996. Accessible: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/aktilisa/0000/1308/ 
2873/13091545.gif# (01.10.2015). 
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Map 6. Latvia’s EEZ in the Gulf of Riga 
 
Source: Noteikumi par bāzes līniju punktu koordinātām. Ministru kabineta noteikumi Nr.779, 
17.08.2010. Accessible in Latvian: http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=215323 (01.10.2015). Also 
accessible: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/ 
lva_mzn84_2011.pdf (01.10.2015). 
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Map 7. The Russian Federation’s EEZ in the Gulf of Finland 
 
Source: Navionics Europe HD, Vers. 7.1.2, ‘Gogland’.  
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ANNEX 2. HISTORICAL TREATIES 
Treaty 1. The 1925 Helsinki Convention for the Suppression of 
the Contraband Traffic in Alcoholic Liquors and its Protocol 
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Source: Eesti lepingud wälisriikidega, vol. 5 (1925-1926). Tallinn: Tallinna Eesti Kirjastus-
Ühisus 1926, pp. 301–309.  
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Treaty 2. The 1925 Helsinki Agreement between  
Estonia, Finland and the Soviet Union 
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Source: Eesti lepingud wälisriikidega, vol. 5 (1925–1926). Tallinn: Tallinna Eesti Kirjastus-
Ühisus 1926, pp. 310–311.  
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Treaty 3. The 1926 Moscow Protocol 
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Source: Eesti lepingud wälisriikidega, vol. 6 (1926–1927). Tallinn: Riigi trükikoda 1927, pp. 48–
49. 
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